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Summary
With inequalities in earnings, employment and economic activity widespread throughout the 
UK, this thesis examines these inequalities and attempts to explain them. Data from the 
Living in Wales survey and the Annual Population Survey is used to examine the earnings 
response to unemployment in the UK, with particular attention paid to Wales and its position 
relative to other UK regions. Strong evidence of a wage curve is found, and this wage curve 
is tested over the earnings distribution and levels of centralization. The returns to degrees, 
masters and PhDs are investigated, with a focus on how returns vary over regions. Large 
differences are found using a national baseline, but these differences are greatly reduced 
when regional differences are controlled for. The use of quantile regression techniques 
suggests that the graduate premium varies little over the earnings distribution. The 
inequalities in earnings, employment and economic activity are broken down into a 
component of individual characteristics and a component of area effects. It is found that area 
effects play a small role, with inequalities driven by individual characteristics. These 
individual effects are also broken down, with occupation identified as the key driver of 
inequalities.
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Summary
With inequalities in earnings, employment and economic activity widespread 
throughout the UK, this thesis examines these inequalities and attempts to explain 
them. Data from the Living in Wales survey and the Annual Population Survey is 
used to examine the earnings response to unemployment in the UK, with particular 
attention paid to Wales and its position relative to other UK regions. Strong 
evidence of a wage curve is found, and this wage curve is tested over the earnings 
distribution and levels of centralization. The returns to degrees, masters and PhDs 
are investigated, with a focus on how returns vary over regions. Large differences 
are found using a national baseline, but these differences are greatly reduced when 
regional differences are controlled for. The use of quantile regression techniques 
suggests that the graduate premium varies little over the earnings distribution. The 
inequalities in earnings, employment and economic activity are broken down into a 
component of individual characteristics and a component of area effects. It is found 
that area effects play a small role, with inequalities driven by individual 
characteristics. These individual effects are also broken down, with occupation 
identified as the key driver of inequalities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
i
1.1 Introduction
Inequality in the UK is widespread, with recent evidence (Taylor, 2006, and Dickey, 
2007) suggesting that it continues to increase, with inequalities in earnings and 
employment leading to differences in quality of life. This thesis explores 
inequalities in earnings, employment and economic activity across the UK using data 
from the Annual Population Survey (APS) and the Living in Wales survey.1
Previous work (Blackaby and Manning, 1990, and Patacchini and Rice, 2005) has 
pointed to a North-South divide in earnings in the UK that has resulted in the 
Northern regions falling behind the Southern regions, although this may be more a 
difference between the London and South East region and the rest of the UK. In this 
thesis, attention is paid to Wales’ position in relation to other areas of the UK, with 
the most recent measures showing that earnings, employment rates and activity rates 
in Wales are below the UK average, with gross value added in Wales being just 74% 
of the UK figure2 This thesis examines the wage response to unemployment, 
economic inactivity and long term employment, the returns to qualifications and the 
causes of inequalities (in terms of area effects or individual effects), in an attempt to 
understand why these inequalities exist. I have set out a series of specific research 
questions which I endeavour to answer over the course of this thesis:
1. What is the earnings response to unemployment and how does this differ by 
region, worker groups and across the earnings distribution?
2. Does the use of different levels of unemployment rate aggregation, 
representing degree of bargaining centralization, affect the earnings response 
to unemployment?
3. Do claimants exert more downward pressure on earnings than those 
unemployed but not claiming unemployment benefits?
4. Do the economically inactive and the long-term unemployed place downward
1 The Living in Wales survey was used initially as the APS was unavailable at the start of this 
research.
2 Data from StatsWales.
2
pressure on earnings?
5. Is variation in earnings, employment and economic activity due more to 
places or the people living in them?
6. What is the largest cause of variation in earnings, employment and economic 
activity?
7. Does a graduate premium exist and how does it vary over gender, region, 
subject area, worker groups and the earnings distribution?
8. What are the returns to specific qualifications?
The methodology used in this thesis will allow me to provide answers to these 
questions over four empirical chapters and a concluding chapter. Much of the 
methodology uses an augmented Mincer (1974) human capital earnings function as a 
starting point. The basic form depicts earnings as a function of years of schooling 
and experience (although in this thesis the highest qualification held and age are 
preferred). This basic earnings function can then be manipulated to investigate 
inequalities via several methods in the upcoming chapters. These approaches tend to 
build on existing empirical studies, but apply the methodology in different contexts, 
taking the methodology further than has previously been seen (which is explained in 
greater detail in each individual chapter). To measure the wage response to 
unemployment, regional unemployment rates are added (in log form), with the 
coefficient on the unemployment rate term giving the unemployment elasticity of 
earnings (this methodology is used in chapters two and three). The effect of 
economic inactivity on earnings can also be explored in this way. Mincer’s 
specification uses years of schooling, which assumes that the returns to schooling are 
linear. In this thesis (chapter five), qualifications are used instead of years of 
schooling, which allows the relationship between earnings and schooling to be non­
linear. Using this methodology, the premium paid to qualifications (such as first 
degrees) can be quantified. By limiting the earnings function to either area effects 
(place) or individual characteristics (people), the variance in earnings can be 
decomposed into a component attributable to place and a component attributable to 
people (chapter four). The flexibility of Mincer’s human capital earnings function 
makes these methodologies possible. It should be noted that a possible consequence 
of estimating aggregated variables (such as the unemployment rate) upon micro units
(such as individual earnings) is that standard errors may be biased downwards 
resulting in statistical significance being awarded spuriously. This will occur if 
regression disturbances are correlated within groups (Moulton, 1986).
In chapter two, the earnings response to regional unemployment in Wales is 
analysed, using the Living in Wales survey. This work builds on the methodology 
devised by Blackaby and Manning (1987) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 
1994) that is known as the wage curve. The wage curve describes the negative 
relationship between unemployment and wages that means that a worker in a high 
unemployment area will earn a lower wage than an identical worker in a low 
unemployment area, all else held constant. Blanchflower and Oswald have stated 
that it is an empirical law of economics that a doubling of the regional 
unemployment rate shall cause wages to fall by 10%. Log unemployment rates are 
entered into the model at unitary authority level, producing unemployment 
elasticities for Wales that are similar to those suggested by Blanchflower and Oswald 
and those found in the wider literature. The claimant count rate is also used, 
producing larger elasticities, suggesting it is those who are unemployed and claiming 
unemployment benefits that place the greatest downward pressure on wages. The 
deprivation scores from the Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation 2005 are entered 
into the model to control for regional differences. The chapter ends with an 
investigation of the effects of long term unemployment and inactivity upon wages.
The wage curve specification is expanded in chapter three, taking advantage of the 
wide controls available in the APS and considering all of Great Britain. In addition, 
unemployment rates are entered at five levels of aggregation (NUTS 1, NUTS 2, 
NUTS 3, unitary authority and travel to work area). As a way of controlling for 
differences between regions, house price data is used, which is found to reduce 
observed unemployment elasticities substantially. Unemployment elasticities are 
calculated by region, industry, occupation and qualification level, demonstrating 
differences across groups in the wage response to unemployment. Wage flexibility 
is also examined across the earnings distribution.
4
Regional inequalities in earnings, employment and economic activity are considered 
in chapter four. Using a methodology based on Gibbons et al. (2010), the variance 
in earnings, employment and economic activity is decomposed into components that 
can be attributed to area effects (place) and individual characteristics (people), whilst 
also considering how these effects may be correlated. Labour market areas are 
created from existing travel to work areas and the effects of rural and urban area 
definitions are tested. Individual characteristics are found to drive regional 
inequalities and this effect is further decomposed into the separate components of 
individual characteristics.
In chapter five, the returns to qualifications are considered, focusing on the 
premiums paid to first degrees, masters degrees and PhDs. The previous literature 
has shown returns for women to exceed returns to men, prompting returns to be 
considered separately by gender in this chapter. Emphasis is placed on how the 
returns to qualifications differ over UK NUTS 1 regions, an area of research that has 
received little attention (O’Leary and Sloane, 2011, is one of few papers to examine 
this). The effects of subject area of degree and class of first degree on the 
qualifications premium are also considered, along with effects along the earnings 
distribution, via a quantile regression approach. A sub-regional analysis is included, 
examining how the graduate premium differs between Wales and the UK as a whole 
and the differences between smaller areas within Wales. Key findings from all four 
empirical chapters along with policy implications are drawn together in a sixth 
concluding chapter.
When carrying out empirical research there are certain processes, some of which are 
identified by Hamermesh (1999). As this thesis is far more empirical than 
theoretical, many of these processes have been used. When identifying work areas, I 
have looked for areas in which I believe I can make a contribution, to add value to 
the existing literature. This is something I have tried to do by taking the analysis to a 
deeper level, such as the use of five levels of unemployment rate aggregation in 
chapter three. After deciding on the area to focus on and deciding on the best 
methodological approach (through a review of the existing literature), I have then
had to decide on the best available data to use. Whilst I am fortunate that the APS is 
appropriate for the majority of my work, I had an issue as the APS was not available 
when I started work on chapter two. To solve this issue I used the Living in Wales 
survey and augmented this with data from the Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation 
2005. After selecting and obtaining the data, it is important to then check there are 
no mistakes in the data. To check for possible errors I have inspected the descriptive 
statistics of the variable I was interested in, paying close attention to the maximum 
and minimum values. Other decisions regarding the data and methodology included 
whether to split the sample, for example by gender, as the literature on the returns to 
qualifications and an inspection of the means suggests. Analysis of descriptive 
statistics may prompt other methodological ideas, such as the use of quantile 
regression techniques to measure differences in earnings response along the earnings 
distribution (as seen in chapters three and five). The correct set of explanatory 
variables must also be selected, so that as much variation as possible in the 
dependent variable can be controlled for, whilst avoiding the use of any variables 
that may cause an endogeneity problem.
When analysing results, Hamermesh refers to the “sniff test” which simply means 
that a researcher should question whether the results are reasonable and make 
economic sense. Where results may be unexpected I have gone back and checked 
the methodology and literature and have tried to find the reason for this result. This 
has proved possible in chapter three, where the ‘U’ shape in wage flexibility can be 
linked to a study by Groth and Johansen (2003), but more difficult in chapter two 
where the effects of economic inactivity on earnings is relatively unexplored. In 
terms of improving results by tinkering with the methodology, this should only be 
done as long as the benefits exceed the costs (such as the time taken). Due to the 
size of the data sets used and the focus on empirical results I have not presented 
many diagnostic statistics. Results should be included on the basis that they are 
economically important, not just statistically significant. Also, I only report the full 
set of results from a basic specification once in each of the empirical chapters, just 
focusing on the key variables in the majority of results tables. I have presented 
results in graphical form, where I believe this to be the most useful way of 
explaining results (for example, the quantile regressions in chapter three). When
drawing key findings together into conclusions I have tried to identify a series of 
policy implications that arise from these key results.
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Chapter 2
The Welsh Wage Curve and the Issue of Inactivity
8
2.1 Introduction
Since the early wage curve studies of Blackaby and Manning (1987) and 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), there has been a plethora of studies further 
examining the relationship between unemployment and wages, with research 
pointing to an unemployment elasticity around -.1. This chapter aims to estimate the 
wage curve for Wales, using data from the Living in Wales survey, and also to 
investigate the effect of changing the measure of labour market slackness used. 
Generally, in wage curve studies the unemployment rate is used, but in this chapter 
the claimant count rate is also used, at both unitary authority and postcode sector 
levels of disaggregation. These two rates both provide an indication of labour 
market slackness, but measure it in differing ways (which are discussed later on). It 
is believed that these measures will produce differing elasticities due to the 
differences between them. The wage curve is estimated for the whole of the UK 
(and its constituent countries and regions) in chapter three, with a focus on the use of 
differing aggregations of the unemployment rate.
Whilst investigating the relationship between unemployment/claimant count rates 
and earnings, I make use of the Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation (WIMD). The 
WIMD gives deprivation scores at Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) level 
across 7 categories. It is hoped that by entering these individual deprivation scores 
into my earnings function I will be able to control for differences between localities 
that are not usually controlled for in many wage curve studies. Use of the WIMD 
serves a dual purpose, as due to a lack of education data in the Living in Wales 
survey, the education domain can be used to control for differences in education (the 
Annual Population Survey, which is used in the remaining empirical chapters, does 
contain information on respondents’ education).
This chapter also attempts to address the issue of inactivity in Wales. Wales' poor 
economic performance in relation to the rest of the UK is partly driven by its high 
numbers of economically inactive. These high levels of inactivity may be a reaction 
to the large scale industrial restructuring that took place, particularly in the 1970s
9
and 1980s, which has left large numbers feeling distant to the labour market. 
Inactivity in Wales is above the UK average for both men and women, although it is 
falling for women. Inactivity serves as a cause of hidden unemployment, and I test if 
those who are inactive exert downward pressure on wages as the literature has shown 
the unemployed to do. To examine the problem of inactivity, inactivity rates are 
inserted into the earnings equation, along with separate rates representing those 
individuals who are inactive, but want to work, and those who are inactive and do 
not want to work. In addition, I also test the effect of the long term unemployed on 
wages. Both inactivity and long-term unemployment can be used to measure 
proximity to the labour market, and the effects on wages as people move further 
from the labour market.
In section two, an overview of the previous literature regarding the wage curve is 
provided. Section three is an explanation of the data and methodology used. Section 
four presents regression results and evaluates their meaning, with conclusions drawn 
in section five.
2.2 Literature Review
In presenting a review of the literature regarding the wage curve, it is useful to first 
examine the studies that led to the development of the wage curve methodology. 
After these early studies, the literature review focuses on studies that use UK and US 
data and then moves on to international studies.
The relationship between unemployment and wages has been investigated by 
economists since the early 1970s, with papers by Harris and Todaro (1970) and Hall 
(1970, 1972) leading the way. Harris and Todaro (1970) base their study on Africa 
and formulate a two sector model with migration between rural and urban areas. 
They find that rural workers earn a lower wage, but unemployment in these areas is 
low. Urban workers, on the other hand, earn higher wages, but have a greater chance 
of becoming unemployed. This supports the theory of compensating differentials,
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where to work in a high unemployment area (urban), workers must be compensated 
with high wages.
Hall (1970, 1972) bases his research on twelve US cities in 1966 and aims to 
investigate why there is high unemployment at full employment levels. He notes 
that this may be caused by differences in unemployment over cities, so that whilst 
the economy is at a point of full employment, some cities are not. Hall recognizes 
that high wage cities also have high unemployment, and that migration may not 
occur to smooth out unemployment rates as people are willing to risk unemployment 
for the chance of higher wages. Employers will be willing to operate in high wage 
cities because of the increased stability that unemployment causes in their workforce, 
as workers will not want to quit or change jobs due to the high levels of 
unemployment, reducing hiring and training costs for the employer.
Reza (1978) expands on Hall’s work, using 18 areas (12 of which are based on the 
cities used by Hall) between 1967 and 1974 to examine the link between 
unemployment and earnings. Findings again suggest the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and earnings to be positive, with larger and more robust 
estimates found using nominal earnings as opposed to real earnings. This study 
again supports the theory of compensating differentials.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1970 and 
1976, Adams (1985) tests the effects on log hourly wages of using unemployment 
rates measured at region and industry levels. Regional unemployment rates again 
display a positive coefficient, suggesting that high unemployment areas will also 
have high wages. However, industry unemployment rates have a negative effect on 
wages, suggesting that in industries with high unemployment, downward pressure is 
placed on wages.
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The methodology that would become known as the wage curve was first used by 
Blackaby and Manning (1987). Their innovation was the inclusion of the log of the 
regional unemployment rate and microeconomic data on earnings, which when used 
in an augmented Mincer earnings function gives the unemployment elasticity of 
earnings. Much of the previous literature regarding the role of unemployment in 
determining wages originated from the work of Phillips (1958) and the Phillips 
curve, which relied on the use of macroeconomic data and focused on the effects of 
the aggregate unemployment rate on the rate of change of wages. In their cross- 
section analysis, they use data from the General Household Survey from 1975, 
allowing them to control for schooling, work experience, marriage, industry of 
employment and the number of weeks worked in the previous year. The log of the 
unemployment rate is entered at region level. They find the sign on the log of 
unemployment to be negative, at -.16, which they interpret as the long run 
unemployment elasticity of earnings. This figure is above the suggested ‘averages’ 
that would emerge from Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) and Nijkampf and Poots 
(2005), but is well within the bounds of the literature. This negative relationship 
between regional unemployment and earnings does not fit with the theory of 
compensating differentials; however, as pointed out by Blackaby and Murphy 
(1991), it does provide support for the efficiency wage (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) 
and search models of wage determination.
The divide between the prosperous South and depressed North of Great Britain is 
investigated by Blackaby and Manning (1990), using the General Household 
Surveys of 1975 and 1982. They estimate an earnings function regressing individual 
annual earnings on a set of personal characteristics, industry, occupation, regional 
unemployment (in log form), regional long-term unemployment and regional cost of 
living differences. An unemployment elasticity of earnings of -.1289 is found in 
1975, rising to -.1859 in 1982. When including the proportion of unemployed who 
have been unemployed for 52 weeks or more, the coefficient is positive, whilst the 
overall unemployment term remains negative, supporting Layard and Nickell’s 
(1986) theory that the long-term unemployed do not exert downward pressure on 
wages. Decomposition analysis reveals that, for 1975 data, over 50% of the South
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East’s advantage is due to characteristics, although by 1982, characteristics are 
unable to explain as much of the regional difference in earnings.
The idea of the wage curve was further investigated by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1990, 1994). Blanchflower and Oswald set out to establish a law of economics 
concerning the negative effect of local unemployment upon the level of wages. 
Their 1990 study, which used 4 datasets from the UK and the US, found that there is 
a non-linear relationship between unemployment and the level of wages, resulting in 
a wage curve. The wage curve is negative at low levels of unemployment, reflecting 
the negative low level unemployment elasticity of wages, but will then flatten once 
unemployment has reached a certain level (found by Blanchflower and Oswald to be 
between 9 and 15 percent). This horizontal section is reached when the downward 
pressure of unemployment on wages has reached a maximum. At this point, shocks 
to the economy would have zero to slight effect on wages, but large effects on 
unemployment. They noted that the wage curve was found to reach a point where it 
would become positive, which was not predicted in their theoretical model. They 
dismiss this as unreliable, due to the small number of observations at such high 
unemployment rates. Blanchflower and Oswald test different methods of entering 
the unemployment rate into the model, such as the reciprocal, the square and the 
cube of the unemployment rate, but note that, partly due to its ease of computation 
and interpretation, the natural logarithm is their preferred specification. This has led 
to the natural logarithm becoming the preferred method of entering the 
unemployment rate across the wage curve literature, although some later studies, 
such as Johansen (1997), have experimented with alternative methodologies. 
Blanchflower and Oswald use area unemployment rates for 3 of their 4 datasets and 
use industry unemployment rates for the remaining dataset, but find the wage curves 
produced to be very similar. They also include long term unemployment in several 
specifications, but conclude that due to its weak performance, it has little effect on 
wage determination. This would imply that the long term and short term 
unemployed have similar effects on wages, an insight that contrasts with Layard and 
Nickel (1986) and would be challenged by later studies such as Blackaby, Bladen- 
Howell and Symons (1991) and Johansen (1997), who suggest the effect of the long­
term unemployed is smaller than the short-term employed. Blanchflower and
13
Oswald present three models to explain the relationship found between 
unemployment and the wage level: an implicit contracts model, an efficiency wage 
model and a bargaining model. Blanchflower and Oswald expanded their initial 
article to a near 400 page book and have revisited the wage curve in several further 
articles. They have set out an unemployment elasticity of -.1, as an empirical law of 
the magnitude of the unemployment elasticity of wages.
Blackaby and Murphy (1991) analyse regional wage differentials using data from the 
New Earnings Survey and the General Household Survey from 1982, with a sample 
size of 6,999 employees (working over 27 hours per week). Blackaby and Murphy 
identify large differences in earnings between different industries, highlighting the 
differences between each group of individual's human capital characteristics. 
However, after allowing for these characteristics, much variation in earnings within 
an industry by region still exists. Blackaby and Murphy theorize that (under the 
competitive theory model) these earnings inequalities may arise as a stage in the 
adjustment process to a long run wage equilibrium or as compensation for some non­
wage attributes. Exploring the latter, they introduce a series of environmental 
variables designed to reflect quality of life differences between regions, including a 
series of climate variables and variables representing atmospheric pollution, road 
congestion and recreational facility provision. This technique is in a similar vein to 
Roback (1982) and the later study of Srinivasan and Stewart (2004). However, in 
testing it was found that few of these variables were significant and they were 
therefore removed from further regressions. Population density was found to be a 
significant contributor with a positive coefficient. Blackaby and Murphy comment 
on the strong association between population density and variables representing 
regional social and environmental deprivations. They also test some firm based 
variables, looking at firm size, which is found to be insignificant and is therefore 
removed, and the proportion of employees paid under a payment by result scheme, 
which is found to be positive and significant. This result implies that employees' 
effort is increased and rewarded by an increase in wages, compared to those not 
remunerated by a payment by result scheme. Blackaby and Murphy identify cost of 
living differences (measured by regional price index) to be highly significant and 
close to unity. They find the regional unemployment rate to be significant,
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displaying an unemployment elasticity of approximately -.13, similar to the 
elasticities found by Blackaby and Manning (1987) and Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1990). Blackaby and Murphy state that this result provides support for the 
efficiency wage and search models of wage determination, assuming regional 
unemployment is a measure of excess demand across regions. As in similar studies, 
a long term unemployment variable becomes insignificant as further variables are 
added to the model. Initially, it was found that those individuals in long term 
unemployment caused a significant and positive effect on wages, with the total 
unemployment effect remaining negative, as above. They also find a positive and 
significant relationship between experience (represented as tenure in current job) and 
wages.
Blackaby, Bladen-Howell and Symons (1991) use a dataset of 25,653 male 
employees taken from the Family Expenditure Survey between 1980 and 1986 to 
investigate the role played by the unemployment rate in wage determination. They 
also consider the role of regional price variation in wage determination. As 
dependent variable they use real wage, defined as the log of normal hourly wage 
over the national retail price index. Unemployment is entered at regional level. 
Controlling for industry and occupation, the regional unemployment rate is found to 
be significant, with an unemployment elasticity of income of -.1659. Whilst this 
figure is greater than the unemployment elasticity set out by Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990), it is still comparable and is very close to the figure found by 
Blackaby and Manning (1987). Blackaby, Bladen-Howell and Symons replace the 
regional unemployment rate with regional prices, finding a coefficient of .72 which 
confirms the large role played by regional prices in wage determination.
Exploring the effect of duration of unemployment on wage determination, Blackaby, 
Bladen-Howell and Symons introduce a long term unemployment rate variable3 into 
the model, which is found to be positive and significant. This result is said to 
support Layard and Nickell's (1987) hypothesis that as unemployment duration
3 Where long term unemployment is classed as unemployment in excess of 52 weeks.
increases, the downward pressure on wages will subside, due to the chances of them 
finding a job getting progressively smaller, increasing the likelihood of them 
dropping out of the labour market altogether. Also, as regional cost of living is 
introduced into the model, the t statistics on the unemployment terms shrink, to the 
point that they are no longer statistically significant.
This work is furthered by Blackaby and Hunt (1992). Focusing on male employees 
from the 1982 General Household Survey, an augmented Mincer earnings function is 
set up with regional unemployment rates, regional unemployment duration rates and 
a regional cost of living index, whilst industry and occupation are controlled for.4 
Initially, Blackaby and Hunt present the results of specifications similar to previous 
studies, including Blanchflower and Oswald's wage curve. Their initial wage curve 
based specification produces results in line with Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), 
but by augmenting the wage curve, results differ from Blanchflower and Oswald 
(such as the inclusion of long term unemployment, which is positive and significant, 
and the long term unemployment rate squared, which is negative and significant). 
This leads Blackaby and Hunt to state that the long term unemployed do have a 
different effect on wages compared to the short term unemployed. The positive 
effect of the long-term unemployed on wages was also found in the previous studies 
of Blackaby and Murphy (1990) and Blackaby, Bladen-Howell and Symons (1991). 
Blackaby and Hunt go on to derive and test several further models. Blackaby and 
Hunt test whether the non-linear terms may be omitted, however, this specification is 
rejected by F-test. A specification is tested with all long term variables removed, the 
results of which allow Blackaby and Hunt to conclude that long term unemployment 
has no effect on wage determination and that the wage curve is a wage curve for 
short term unemployment and not total unemployment. Blackaby and Hunt are also 
able to put forth a theory as to why the wage curve becomes positive at high levels of 
unemployment: that it is an amalgamation of the wage equation and the migration 
equilibrium condition, which have opposite slopes.
4 Blackaby and Hunt have divided the data into 19 regions, based on CSO regions.
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Card (1995), has produced a review of the work of Blanchard and Oswald (1994). 
Card questions whether the wage curve is a completely new economic theory, 
comparing Blanchflower and Oswald's specifications and results to earlier studies 
(such as Bils 1985, Solon, Barsky & Parker 1994, Bartik 1991 and Blanchard & Katz 
1992), but does find the wage curve to produce new findings regarding the 
cyclicality of real wages. Card questions whether Blanchflower and Oswald’s use of 
annual earnings (particularly amongst their U.S. studies) has resulted in them 
discovering an “hours curve” as opposed to a wage curve. Blanchflower and Oswald 
claim wage curve elasticity to be the same for hourly, weekly and annual earnings, 
but Card is able to show this conclusion to be flawed. However, Black and FitzRoy 
(2000) later advocate the use of annual earnings in a wage curve setting, due to it 
encompassing overtime effects. Card finds differences in the elasticity across 
groups, with elasticity greater for men than for women, for those less educated, for 
those younger, for non-union members and for those in the private sector, 
conclusions which have been supported by numerous later wage curve studies.
Turunen (1998) presents his research on the wage curve disaggregated over time. He 
suggests that wage curves will vary over time and different labour market groups due 
to characteristic differences, differently influencing the effect of unemployment on 
wages. This variance is explained as being primarily due to differing responsiveness 
to local labour market conditions, with groups that are more highly vulnerable to 
outside labour market effects (such as the younger and less educated) having the 
largest unemployment elasticities. Turunen utilizes data taken from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth over the period 1979 to 1992,5 with 9,929 individuals 
included. Turunen estimates the wage curve via an augmented Mincer earnings 
function, with the log of real wages regressed on the log local unemployment rate 
along with controls for region, year and individual characteristics. Disaggregating 
by year, Turunen finds a wage curve for all years except 1980 (1979 with region 
controls omitted), with the unemployment elasticities growing larger and more
5 The NLSY is a longitudinal study of 14 to 22 year olds, interviewed in each subsequent year 
regarding their labour market experiences. It should be noted that there is oversampling of the 
economically disadvantaged, such as blacks, Hispanics and other ethnic minorities.
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significant as the period progresses. The explanation offered, drawing on 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995), is that the 1980s were characterised by relatively 
high, but declining unemployment rates, which would greatly affect young workers 
(who are generally found to be at a labour market disadvantage relative to other age 
groups), resulting in unemployment elasticity for the young rising throughout the 
1980s6
Turunen next calculates the wage curve after disaggregating by different worker 
characteristics using an individual fixed effects method suggested by Card (1995). It 
is found that the individual fixed effects controls or region controls are not required 
to observe a wage curve. Amongst his findings are that the earnings of men are 
more dependent on the local unemployment rate than women, particularly at higher 
unemployment rates. The greater the educational attainment, the less elastic an 
individual's wages will be to local unemployment rates, with the most educated 
experiencing an extremely shallow, almost flat, wage curve. Government workers 
experience very small unemployment elasticity, seemingly almost unaffected by 
local unemployment rates, perhaps due to centralised wage setting, as suggested by 
Katz and Kruegar (1991). Turunen's results pertaining to race suggest conflict with 
earlier studies. In contrast to Freeman (1990), Turunen finds that young black 
workers' wages are slightly less sensitive to local labour market conditions than 
young white workers. Hispanics are found to be greatly affected by local labour 
market conditions, with an unemployment elasticity of 17.2% (with no fixed effects). 
Also, in comparison to those living in rural areas, the wages of those living in urban 
areas are far more sensitive to the local unemployment rate. Disaggregating by 
occupation, Turunen finds the largest unemployment elasticities to belong to sales 
persons, craftsmen and labourers, whilst professionals and service workers appear to 
have the most labour market protection. Turunen cites Freeman and Katz's (1995) 
explanation that low skill occupations suffer greater unemployment than high skill 
occupations, which coupled with the high unemployment rates in 1980s USA, give 
the high unemployment elasticities experienced by these low skill occupation
6 Turunen notes that due to high year-to-year variance in unemployment elasticities, the results and 
corresponding explanation should be cautiously interpreted.
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groups. When disaggregating by industry, wage curves are found for all groups, 
except mining, which displays a positive and significant coefficient.7 Service 
industries are found to have large unemployment elasticities relative to traditional 
industries. Turunen suggests the reason for this may be that monitoring is easier in 
the traditional industries, therefore resulting in less need for incentive wages. 
Finally, Turunen calculates wage curves by region, finding most regions to have a 
wage curve, but significant variation in unemployment elasticities. Turunen 
concludes that by disaggregating by year, characteristics, industry, occupation and 
region, he has found many wage curves, and that the aggregate wage curve is made 
up of these disaggregated wage curves, accounting for the volatility in the aggregate 
wage curve.
Using county level data on full time male manual workers over the period 1979 to 
1995 from the New Earnings Survey, Black and FitzRoy (2000) evaluate the 
relationship between unemployment and earnings and examine the role played by 
hours worked. Black and FitzRoy claim that due to overtime being paid at a 
premium, average hourly earnings are insufficient for investigating the wage curve 
relationship. As overtime is utilized in response to demand shocks, it will vary over 
time, although there may be a cyclical effect, perhaps with overtime occurring more 
regularly during the Christmas period prompting them to suggest using total earnings 
in the wage curve relationship instead.8 They claim that the rapid response of total 
earnings through overtime hours suggests a wage curve, whilst the slower response 
of standard hourly earnings was more in line with a modified Phillips curve. Using 
Card and Hyslop's (1996) test of the wage curve based on the rate of change of 
wages, they find support for the wage curve from both average hourly earnings and 
total earnings. They initially find an unemployment elasticity of income of -.02, 
smaller than Blanchflower and Oswald's suggested figure of -.1. This would seem to 
be at odds with Nijkamp and Poofs (2005) analysis which suggested that
7 Perhaps this result may be the result of a small sample, only 593.
8 The Levin and Lin (1993) panel unit root test is used to test the suitability of total earnings and 
average hourly earnings.
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unemployment elasticity is greater when using annual earnings data compared to 
average hourly earnings (-.1365 to -.0628).
Black and FitzRoy regress the log of total hours on the log of unemployment and the 
change in the log of unemployment, with the results revealing that hours worked are 
affected by the change in unemployment, but not the level of unemployment, 
supporting Black and FitzRoy’s previously mentioned theory that overtime is a short 
run response to demand shocks. They also construct a panel estimation with two 
lags of total earnings and a differenced specification to investigate short run 
dynamics (with detrended total earnings and differenced total earnings as the 
dependant variable). They find that when lagged total earnings are tested there is 
great dependence on the change in unemployment. Concerning the differenced 
specification with total earnings, the level of unemployment is found to be 
insignificant (whilst the change in unemployment is highly significant), which is in 
line with Blanchflower and Oswald's theory about the Phillips curve's irrelevance. 
When replacing detrended total earnings with detrended average hourly wages, the 
effect of the change in unemployment is insignificant, resulting in a wage curve with 
long run unemployment elasticity of .07. With differenced average hourly earnings, 
level of unemployment reveals a strong negative coefficient, which is in support of 
the Phillips curve, in conflict to Blanchflower and Oswald's claims. Black and 
FitzRoy conclude by stating their results provide microeconomic support for the 
New Keynesian macroeconomics of sticky wages.
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) between 1991 and 1998 is used by 
Collier (2000) to estimate the UK wage curve. He uses the log of real hourly 
earnings and is able to control for a wide range of personal and job characteristics 
including gender, ethnicity, marital status, qualifications, children, age, health, recent 
labour market history, union membership, full time/part time status, promotion 
opportunities, management duties, supervisory tasks, industry, occupation, work 
travel time and region. From a semi-log function, Collier estimates a male 
unemployment elasticity of -.14. Switching to a log-log function, the unemployment 
elasticity drops to -.05, a result he notes to be surprising. The semi-log specification
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is Collier’s preferred specification, as it is less restrictive than the log-log 
specification. A J-test confirms the choice of a semi-log for Collier’s data. Results 
for women reveal there to be no significant wage curve for the female sample, a 
result previously found by Janssens and Konings (1998) and Pannenberg and 
Schwarze (1998). Collier adds regional fixed effects to his specification for men, 
finding the magnitude of the unemployment elasticity to be reduced. Collier also 
tests using monthly earnings instead of hourly earnings and finds very little 
difference in the elasticity of earnings.
Bell et al. (2002) use the New Earnings Survey (NES) covering the years 1976-1997 
to examine whether regional wages depend solely on regional unemployment or also 
on aggregate unemployment, and whether the wage equation is a relationship 
between unemployment and the wage level or wage changes, amongst other 
questions. Data is broken down to 10 regions across Britain. The dependent 
variable chosen is average hourly wage, specifically to avoid overtime effects due to 
their link with the business cycle. In the absence of information on qualifications or 
schooling, human capital is represented by four skill groups based on the occupation 
an individual is employed in. The Living in Wales survey also lacks qualification 
data, which prompts us to test Bell et al.'s method in this chapter. They find no 
evidence to suggest that regional wages are dependent on aggregate unemployment 
(although they are dependent on regional unemployment, thus maintaining the wage 
curve relationship) and also reject that the wage equation is a relationship between 
unemployment and wage changes (which, if true, would imply a Phillips curve, as 
opposed to a wage curve). Bell, et al. finds the short-run unemployment elasticity of 
wages to be -.034 and the long-run unemployment elasticity of wages to be -.13. 
They also find, by disaggregating by gender, that the wages of males are slightly 
more sensitive than the wages of women.
Johnes (2007) uses the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) between 1992 and 
2003 to test the relationship between regional unemployment and hourly wages. The 
use of a panel dataset allows for control of individual fixed effects, alongside gender, 
age, age squared, marital status, dependent children, health, union membership, and
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qualifications. An unemployment elasticity of -.048 is initially found. The addition 
of regional indicator variables reduces the coefficient to -.035, whilst the addition of 
controls for industry and occupation further reduce the elasticity to -.023. 
Interactions between years, gender, degree level qualifications and the 
unemployment rate reveal that the magnitude of the male wage premium fell to .097 
by 2003 (from .148 in 1992), whilst over the sample period the graduate premium 
declined from .308 to .260. The unemployment elasticity is unstable over 1992 to 
2003, peaking at -.074 in 1995 and falling to -.032 in 2003. Testing for endogeneity 
by instrumenting with the lag of unemployment increases the magnitude of the 
unemployment elasticity coefficient. The difference between using random effects 
and fixed effects is very small (-.032 to -.034).
Nijkamp and Poot (2005) present a meta analysis on 208 unemployment elasticities 
reported in 17 previous wage curve studies, with the aim of explaining why 
differences exist. Nijkamp and Poot estimate that, as of 2005, close to 1000 
estimates of the unemployment elasticity of wages exist. They report a minimum 
unemployment elasticity of wages of -1.43 and a maximum of .09 in their sample, 
with a mean of -.1184, close to Blanchflower and Oswald's figure of -.1. Nijkamp 
and Poot are able to answer Card's concern that the wage curve is partly affected by 
how working hours vary with business cycles, as the wage curve is more elastic in 
annual earnings equations compared to hourly earnings equations (-.1365 to -.0628). 
Nijkamp and Poot question whether wage curve estimates may be affected by 
publication bias and find there to be publication bias where too many equations with 
significant unemployment effects are reported. After controlling for this publication 
bias, they find their mean unemployment elasticity of wages falls to -.07.
There is also much international wage curve research conducted upon countries with 
economies of varying similarity to the UK. A selection of this international literature 
is examined in the remainder of this literature review.
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Long-term unemployment, convexity and kinks in the Norwegian wage curve are 
examined by Johansen (1997) via an error correction model. Testing for non- 
linearities in unemployment, Johansen enters the unemployment rate in several 
forms. The logarithm of unemployment gives an elasticity of -.07. Various other 
figures are obtained using the square, the cube and the reciprocal of unemployment, 
methods previously tested by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994). Using a 
piecewise regression model, a kink in the wage curve is found at an unemployment 
rate of 1.4%, with responsiveness differing above and below this point in the 
unemployment distribution. An elasticity of -.16 is found for unemployment rates 
greater than 1.4%, and -.035 for unemployment rates greater than 1.4%. Johansen 
suggests that the difference in these results may be caused by different wage 
formation mechanisms operating at low and high levels of unemployment. The 
effect of the long term unemployed is tested via the inclusion of unemployed who 
have been unemployed for 26 weeks of more. The coefficient on the proportion of 
long term unemployment is significant and positive, meaning that the long term 
unemployed place less downward pressure on wages than those who have been 
unemployed less than 26 weeks. They find no support for including the long term 
proportion of unemployed non-linearly.
Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998) calculate the wage curve of East Germany and 
question whether the unemployment rate is sufficient as a measure of labour market 
slack for countries with large scale labour market programs. Pannenberg and 
Schwarze's concern is whether countries operating an active labour market policy 
(ALMP9) will have accurate unemployment rates, as those participating in ALMP 
schemes would not be counted as unemployed. Using data from the German Socio 
Economic Panel (GSOEP) between 1992 and 1996 they remedy this problem by 
including in the standard augmented Mincer earnings function that forms the basis of 
most wage curve studies, the regional ratio of unemployed job searchers and 
participants in labour market training programs. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the average hourly wage, with standard control variables included. 
Although a wage curve is found with regional fixed effects (a relatively large
9 To include job creation schemes and training programs.
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unemployment elasticity of -.28), the addition of individual fixed effects strip away 
any evidence of an East German wage curve. Replacing unemployment rate with job 
searcher rate10, an inverse relationship is found between job searcher rate and 
average hourly wages of -.14. A Davidson/MacKinnon J-Test confirms that 
Pannenberg and Schwarze's extended wage curve is more suitable for East Germany 
than the standard Blanchflower and Oswald wage curve.
The German wage curve is again examined by Baltagi and Blien (1998) using the 
Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung (IAB) employment dataset between 
1981 and 1990, which includes 6590 workers and over 40,000 observations. They 
enter unemployment rates at a highly disaggregated level, using 142 labour market 
regions. The wage curve is estimated over subsamples such as age, gender and 
qualifications. Baltagi and Blien’s fixed effects results for qualifications corroborate 
those found by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) where less qualified workers have 
the greater negative unemployment elasticity. Young workers (below 30) are found 
to have a significant negative unemployment elasticity, whilst the coefficient on 
workers over the age of 30 is positive (.04). After controlling for gender, 
coefficients are significant.
Montuenga et al. (2003) estimate the wage curves of 5 EU countries: France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK between the years 1994 and 1996. Their aim is to 
challenge Blanchflower and Oswald's (1994) claim that regardless of the country or 
period analysed, the empirical law of an unemployment elasticity of -.1 will hold. 
Data on all countries is taken from the European Community Household Panel. As 
this dataset is homogeneous, with the same questions asked in all countries, cross 
country comparisons are possible. The logarithm of the average hourly wage is used 
as the dependent variable. Montuenga et al. find evidence supporting a wage curve 
in all 5 countries (although, in the case of the UK, the evidence is weak and sensitive 
to the testing method). In contrast to Blanchflower and Oswald. (.1994),
10 Job searcher rate is found as the ratio of unemployed and participants in labour market training 
programs to the total of unemployed, employed and trained.
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unemployment elasticity is found to vary across the 5 countries, with France being 
the most sensitive to unemployment and Portugal the least sensitive.
Wu (2004) attempts to establish a wage curve relationship for China. Due to the 
system for recording unemployment in China,11 the main source of unemployment 
is school leavers in cities. Wu states that over the preceding 20 year period, 
approximately 70% of the unemployed were aged 16 to 25. Since fewer youths are 
excluded from the unemployment rate than older individuals, Wu believes the youth 
unemployment rate to be a better source of data. Sabin (1999) previously attempted 
to find a wage curve for China using the provincial unemployment rate, however, the 
analysis failed to find a consistent inverse relationship between provincial wages and 
the provincial unemployment rate. For this reason, Wu concentrates on the 
provincial youth unemployment rate, finding an unemployment elasticity of -.22. 
This figure is relatively high compared to other wage curve studies, but may be 
explained by the fact it is limited to the youth unemployment rate, with previous 
studies (such as Card, 1995 and Baltagi et al., 2008) showing younger workers to be 
more sensitive to unemployment changes.
Berg and Conteras (2004) differentiate their contribution to the literature by studying 
two very different periods in Chile's history. Between 1957 and 1973, Chile was 
state-led and operated within a closed economy; however, due to a series of reforms 
in 1973 liberalizing trade and finance, increasing labour market flexibility and de- 
politicizing labour relations, the period 1974 to 1996 was characterised as private 
sector led, within an open economy. Berg and Conteras utilize data from the 
University of Chile's employment survey. They find an unemployment elasticity of 
.034 for the whole period and for the 1957-73 period. This positive result is in 
contrast to most wage curve studies, but may be caused by the labour market 
environment which existed in Chile during the state-led, closed economy period.
11 The only people classed as unemployed and part of the urban registered unemployment rate are 
those people registered as permanent residents in urban areas and involved in non-agricultural 
activities, thereby omitting the entire rural labour force. There are also other categories for the 
jobless, outside of unemployed, such as laid-off, which compounds the problem.
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After the 1973 reforms, unemployment elasticity was found to be -.078, which is in­
line with the expected wage curve elasticity of between -.07 and -.1. This means that 
only after trade and labour reforms did unemployment exert a downward pressure on 
the wage in Chile.
Berg and Conteras consider the problem outlined by Moulton (1986), whereby 
regressing a highly disaggregated variable (hourly wage) upon a more aggregated 
variable (unemployment) results in standard errors that are biased downwards. This 
causes t statistics to be biased upwards, overstating the significance of coefficients. 
To counter this problem, they employ a cell means regression. Variables are 
averaged according to economic sector and time, resulting in 256 cells, containing an 
average of 572 individuals. Regression is by generalised least squares. As expected, 
results are very similar to ordinary least squares (OLS) in magnitude, but t statistics 
are reduced, resulting in the coefficient on unemployment for the pre-reform period 
becoming insignificant. This supports the initial finding of a wage curve for Chile, 
occurring only after the 1973 reforms. Regarding disaggregation by worker groups: 
it is found that women have greater unemployment elasticity than men, a finding that 
is not shared with many other studies, but is explained in this case due to women 
being affected more than men by the 1973 reforms, as industries with heavy female 
employment, such as textiles, saw heavy losses in output and employment. As 
expected, unskilled workers were found to be more vulnerable to changes in 
unemployment than skilled workers. When split by private/public sector, both appear 
positive in the pre-reform period (although only private sector is significant), whilst 
both are negative after reform. In this post-reform period, the public sector is found 
to display the higher unemployment elasticity. However, this (unexpected) result 
may be due to Chile's classification of public sector including workfare recipients. 
Berg and Conteras are also interested in testing the theory that informal workers act 
as a buffer during recessions. To do this, they test self-employed workers, but their 
coefficient on unemployment is found to be insignificant, refuting the buffer theory.
Knight and Li (2006) concern themselves with the effect of unemployment duration 
on re-employment wages. To investigate this relationship, they use data taken from a
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2000 household study in urban China. China is unique in this period as 37 million 
workers were laid off between 1995 and 1999 due to restructuring of Chinese state 
enterprises. This paper holds relevance to the work carried out in this thesis as there 
is a focus on the factors that cause re-employment wages to fall relating to 
depreciation of human capital. Accordingly, Knight and Li hypothesize that longer 
spells of unemployment will lead to lower re-employment wages. Their study differs 
from wage curve based studies as they regress log earnings upon unemployment 
duration, not the unemployment rate (along with standard explanatory variables). 
They find unemployment duration to be exogenous (alleviating concerns that due to 
endogeneity, high reservation wages will result in individuals holding out for higher 
paying jobs, increasing unemployment duration) and not sensitive to selectivity. 
Knight and Li's results do support their hypothesis, confirming that as length of 
unemployment period increases, re-employment earnings decrease, however, their 
sample size of just over 300 workers is small in comparison to other studies.
Sans-de-Galdeano and Turunen (2006) add to the literature by estimating a wage 
curve for the Euro Area as a whole. The researchers identify the study's importance 
due to the introduction of the single monetary policy. Sans-de-Galdeano and 
Turunen make use of a longitudinal dataset, the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP), between 1994 and 2001. This longitudinal aspect allows control for 
composition biases, as workers can be followed over the sample period. 
Unemployment rates are taken from the REGIO database and are entered into the 
data at NUTS1 level. Sans-de-Galdeano and Turunen estimate a simple OLS model 
and a model with added individual fixed effects, both models producing similar 
results with the only major difference in the reported coefficients concerning 
education. The OLS model suggests that the wages of the less educated are more 
sensitive to the unemployment rate, whilst the individual fixed effects model 
suggests there is no difference in unemployment elasticity across different education 
groups. Both models produce results that imply that the wages of men and younger 
workers are more elastic within the Euro Area. Sans-de-Galdeano and Turunen 
hypothesize that the wages of public sector workers are primarily influenced by 
national labour market conditions. Results confirm this hypothesis, with results also 
showing that the regional unemployment rate affects private sector workers far more
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than public sector workers. Sans-de-Galdeano and Turunen also employ a quantile 
regression approach, finding that (using NUTS1 unemployment rate level), at lower 
levels of the wage distribution, elasticity is highest, decreasing at higher levels of the 
wage distribution.
Baltagi et al. (2008) examine the wage curve in Western Germany using a sample of 
974,179 over the time period 1980 to 2004. Baltagi et al. have disaggregated the 
data down to 326 regional labour markets. They report an unemployment elasticity 
of wages of -.016 in the short run and -.037 in the long-run. They compare these 
results to those of similar studies of the UK, noting that the elasticity is smaller in 
Germany, as a result of the system of wage setting, where unions negotiate at 
industry level. Baltagi et al. conclude that wages are more elastic for groups with 
weaker bargaining power, supporting this with elasticities concerning men versus 
women, younger versus older workers and natives versus foreigners, in line with 
results of previous studies. It is found that highly qualified workers have a slightly 
greater unemployment elasticity of wages than less qualified workers, but the 
elasticity estimate for the more highly educated is not significant. It should be noted 
that in most previous studies, such as Card (1995), those individuals less educated 
were found to have greater elasticity, with less protection in the labour market.
Confirmation of the Italian wage curve is sought by Devicienti et al. (2008). They 
note that previous research has indicated the Italian wage curve does not exist 
(Lucifora and Origo, 1999), blaming Italy’s restrictive wage bargaining system, 
which was replaced in 1993, with a bargaining system designed to improve 
responsiveness to local labour market conditions. Data comes from the Work 
Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), between 1985 and 1999. They test for the wage 
curve using unemployment disaggregated to 20 regions and also test for a structural 
break in 1993. Devicienti et al. find support for the wage curve after 1993, with the 
responsiveness of wage to unemployment increasing over time (-.027 in 1994-1996, 
and -.039 in 1997-1999). They calculate elasticity for both the total wage and for the 
top-up components of wage and find elasticity to be far higher (-.076) for the top-up 
component, which is more flexible than total wages (although top-ups account for
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only 22% of total wages, which they use to explain the relatively low elasticity for 
the total wage). They use a quantile regression approach to further investigate this 
finding, noting that elasticity increases along the wage distribution, which they 
attribute to the greater levels of top-up components and their flexibility at higher 
levels of the wage distribution.
Austria’s wage curve is considered by Falk and Leoni (2008), who use annual 
earnings from 2002 (the 2001 unemployment rate is used). They hypothesize that 
due to the high level of collective bargaining, the Austrian wage curve will be less 
elastic than that found in Anglo-Saxon countries. Noting that the responsiveness of 
wages to local unemployment will differ by gender, they carry out estimations 
separately for men and women. Unemployment rates are highly disaggregated (121 
districts) and the distance between districts is controlled for. As well as controlling 
for the distances between district capitals, the logarithm of population density is also 
entered into the earnings equation. From a spatial lag model, the unemployment 
elasticity of annual earnings is -.03. Using OLS, the elasticity falls to -.017, 
suggesting that results may be biased if spatial effects are ignored. Falk and Leoni 
also allow the effects of the unemployment rate to differ for the 25th percentile, 
median and 75th percentile via the use of a spline function. Results reveal a large 
elasticity for unemployment rates of 7.3% and above, but elasticity is close to zero at 
lower unemployment rates, (this figure is very large at -.182). Disaggregating by 
gender reveals an unemployment elasticity (above 7.3%) of -.169 for men and -.128 
for women. They recognize that their result of elasticity increasing with the 
unemployment rate contrasts with previous results (Buettner, 1999 and Longhi et al., 
2006), but note that comparisons are difficult due to differences in methodology, 
data, country and time period.
Shilov and Moller (2009) estimate the wage curve for Russia, with the aim of testing 
whether the wage curve operates in post-communist countries. They note that the 
first calculation of the wage curve in Russia was carried out by Blanchflower (2001), 
who found a relatively high unemployment elasticity of -.175, over the period 1995 
to 1997, using fourteen regions. Shilov and Moller expand their time period to 1995
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to 2005, increase the number of regions from 14 to 82 and use a panel dataset to 
reduce possible endogeneity. General least squares (GLS) estimations yield 
elasticities of -.101 and -.094, whilst general method of moments (GMM) 
estimations produce further elasticities close to the value of -.1, confirming that wage 
curve mechanisms operate in Russia, despite concerns regarding ongoing 
adjustments to the market economy and possible unreliable data collection.
2.3 Data and Methodology
The primary source of data for this chapter is the Living in Wales survey. The 
Living in Wales survey is a national omnibus survey designed to provide the Welsh 
Assembly Government with information about the Welsh population's views and 
opinions regarding key public services in Wales. It is commissioned by the Welsh 
Assembly Government and managed by the Local Government Data Unit. 
Fieldwork is carried out by Ipsos MORI and assisted by GfK NOP. The Living in 
Wales survey began in 2004, replacing die Welsh House Condition Survey (WHCS), 
which was discontinued in 1998. The survey consists of two separate surveys: a 
household survey that is conducted annually, providing information on households, 
their characteristics and the people living in them; and a property survey, providing 
information on the structure and condition of properties. The property survey was 
carried out in 2004 and 2008.
The household survey consists of an interview with the household reference person 
or their spouse/partner. The interview lasts approximately 50 minutes and contains 
around 200 questions, although not all questions are answered by all households. 
The interviews make use of Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) to 
improve efficiency.
The survey calls for at least 300 households to be successfully interviewed within 
each local authority each year, with at least 1,000 over 3 years. Each year a sample 
of approximately 12,000 addresses are chosen from across Wales via the Postal
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Address File.12 A stratified sample is preferred to a purely random sample, as this 
ensures that smaller local authority areas are adequately represented in the sample. It 
is checked that addresses from the previous surveys are not revisited in upcoming 
surveys. Interviews for the 2006 survey were conducted between March and 
October of that year. 7,443 households completed the questionnaire. This was then 
grossed to produce an estimate of 1,252,000 households and a population of 
2,987,600, implying that each household in the sample contains, on average, 2.39 
people.
It should be noted that the Living in Wales survey's focus on providing public 
opinions hampers it as an economic dataset, in some respects. Firstly, earnings data 
is banded. The measure of earnings used in this chapter is gross annual pay from the 
individual's main job. Gross pay is expressed across 53 bands, with irregular 
intervals, with the top brand representing gross pay above £200,000 per annum. 
This top band contains 0.4% of the sample. Due to the banded nature of the data, all 
descriptive statistics are calculated using band mid-points, unless otherwise stated. 
The banded data necessitates the use of an interval regression technique when 
estimating the earnings functions.
Secondly, due to the question and answer nature of the survey, any statements made 
regarding the accuracy of the earnings data must be made with caution. The 
individual is asked to state their gross pay, therefore there is the chance of an 
inaccurate response, perhaps due to error, or in an attempt to misrepresent their 
earnings, either higher or lower than the true amount. In comparison to datasets like 
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), where earnings data comes 
directly from employers' payroll records, the Living in Wales survey suffers in terms 
of accuracy.
12 Although not all will consent to be part of the survey.
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Thirdly, the standard form of the earnings function in wage curve studies uses the 
logarithm of average hourly earnings as the dependent variable. However, in the 
Living in Wales survey, data on hours is only asked of those individuals in part-time 
employment. Due to this limitation, calculating the average hourly wage is not 
possible. Instead, annual gross pay is used. This decision is supported by Black and 
FitzRoy (2000) who claim that due to overtime hours being paid at a premium in 
answer to demand shocks, the use of annual earnings may be more suitable for wage 
curve analysis than average hourly earnings. Black and FitzRoy use the Levin and 
Lin (1993) panel unit root test to compare the suitability of annual earnings against 
average hourly earnings, with the test supporting their hypothesis. Annual pay has 
also been used in other studies, such as Falk and Leoni (2008). Collier (2000) uses 
both hourly and monthly earnings in his study of the wage curve and finds there to 
be little difference in the elasticities these different measures produce.
In the years between 2004 and 2006, the Living in Wales survey does not contain 
any data pertaining to an individual's education or qualifications.13 As education is 
an integral part of most earnings functions, due to its key contribution to human 
capital, I have decided to use a proxy for education. The education domain of the 
Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation (WIMD) provides a measure of deprivation in 
education that can be entered into the model at postcode sector level. The WIMD 
and its contributing domains will be covered in greater detail later in this section.14
In addition to the education domain scores, occupation can be used to proxy for 
education and skills. This is done in two ways. Firstly, I follow the work of Bell et 
al. (2002), who create four skill levels from 2 digit SOC codes. Secondly, 1 digit 
standard occupational classification (SOC) dummies variables can be used, which 
control for the occupation the individual is employed in and their skills, as Bell et
13 Questions on education and qualifications are included for the first time in the 2008 survey.
14 It is fortunate that these issues are not encountered in the remaining empirical chapters, as the data 
source used in these chapters, the Annual Population Survey, contains earnings data that is unbanded 
and can be broken down into hourly rates. Information on education and qualifications is also 
available.
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al.'s method does, but allows for greater variation in occupation (and skill) levels. 
All three methods are tested in table 2.4 in the results section.
This allows us to take advantage of several different measures of labour market 
slackness. The ILO unemployment rate will be entered into the model at unitary 
authority level and the claimant count rate will be entered at unitary authority and 
postcode sector level. The ILO unemployment rate and the claimant count rate do 
not gage joblessness in the same way. Whilst the unemployment rate accounts for 
those persons without a job, but wanting to work, available to work and actively 
seeking jobs, the claimant count is only a record of persons claiming unemployment 
benefits. As not all unemployed persons choose to claim unemployment benefits (or 
may be ineligible) the resulting rates (calculated as a proportion of the working age 
population) are smaller. It has been noted15 that the difference in unemployment rate 
and claimant count rate grows when the employment level is high, as persons jobless 
but previously not seeking employment are enticed to begin searching, therefore 
becoming part of the unemployment rate. Table 2.1 gives the average 
unemployment rate and claimant count rate at unitary authority level over the years 
2004 to 2006 from the data used in this chapter.
Table 2.1
Unemployment Rate & Claimant Count Rate
Unemployment Rate Claimant Count Rate
2004 5.44% 3.35%
2005 6.09% 3.34%
2006 6.14% 3.54%
The use of these two measures will allow me to test whether those who are 
unemployed (but may not be claiming benefits) place as much downward pressure
15 Machin (2004).
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on wages as those who are claiming unemployment benefits. Additionally, claimant 
count rates are entered at postcode sector level (the lowest level the Living in Wales 
survey allows disaggregation to, of which there are 515 in Wales). As 
unemployment rates are not published at such a level of disaggregation, it is only 
possible to use the claimant count. These rates are constructed from the claimant 
count and the Office of National Statistics' (ONS) population estimates at lower 
layer super output area (LSOA). These figures are then converted, using population 
weights, to postcode sector level. The following chapter also tests the effects of 
using differing levels of aggregation, expanding this methodology to five levels.
In addition to the measures of total unemployment, the effect that long-term 
unemployment16 has upon the wage level and the wage curve relationship is tested. 
Unemployment produces downward pressure on local wages, but as an individual is 
unemployed for a great deal of time, their downward pressure they exert on wages 
will decrease. This may be due to their human capital attributes declining and their 
job search effort falling (perhaps due to the demoralising effect of repeated failures 
in finding a job), therefore decreasing the probability of them finding a job in the 
future and increasing the probability of them leaving the labour market and 
becoming economically inactive.
In Wales in the 21st century, perhaps the greater problem is not unemployment or 
long-term unemployment, but the high level of economic inactivity (although both 
unemployment and long-term unemployment may lead to inactivity). Wales' 
inactivity levels are greater than any other region in the UK, with the exception of 
Northern Ireland. Inactivity means that an individual of working age, is not in 
employment or is not classed as unemployed, effectively they are not part of the 
labour market. The high levels of inactivity may be one of the driving forces behind 
Wales' low employment and earnings figures. Inactivity may also be a source of 
hidden unemployment, distorting unemployment figures and diminishing their value 
to research and effective policy suggestions. Inactivity is a major problem in Wales
16 Classed as those individuals unemployed for 12 months or more.
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and inactivity rates will be inserted into the model, to better understand the effect on 
earnings.
Hypothesis tests have been carried out in this chapter (and throughout the thesis) as a 
way of determining the statistical significance of the results obtained. T-statistics are 
presented in all result tables along with the coefficient estimates as an indicator of 
statistical significance. Significance is defined at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
levels when the t-statistic exceeds the critical values of 2.576, 1.96 and 1.645. Other 
testing has been used during this work, such as the Hausman test for endogeneity, 
instrumenting with lags of the unemployment rate.
Specification
This sample has been restricted to working age males in full-time employment. The 
self-employed have been excluded due to concerns over the accuracy of reported 
earnings, a concern compounded by the method used to gather earnings data in the 
Living in Wales survey. These restrictions leave a sample of 8,486.
To examine the wage curve relationship in Wales, an augmented Mincer (1974) 
earnings function is used, specified as:
InEi = a + XlnUn + pXi + alNDi + aOCQ + aRURALr + aYEARt+ £iit (1)
Where E is the log of annual earnings, X is a vector of personal characteristics, IND 
is a vector of industry dummy variables, RURAL is a dummy variable to define 
rural/urban status and YEAR is a set of dummy variables indicating when the 
respondent was included in the sample, a is a constant and z is the error term. OCC 
is a set of occupation dummy variables (although the explanatory powers of a set of 
four skill levels based on Bell et al. (2002) is also be tested). U is the regional
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unemployment rate. This will be replaced by claimant count rate (at unitary 
authority and postcode sector levels) in later regressions.
When estimated, the coefficient on the unemployment term (A.) will give the 
unemployment elasticity of earnings. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) suggest that 
this should be -.1, following their declaration of the wage curve as an empirical law 
of economics, however, the previous review of the wage curve literature has 
suggested that this number may vary considerably, but it should be negative, as the 
wage curve details an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
level of earnings (a positive coefficient would support the theory of compensating 
differentials). Nijkamp and Poofs (2005) meta analysis calculates the mean 
unemployment elasticity (from 208 results) to be -.1184, but after correcting for 
publication bias, they claim that the actual wage curve 'average' should be 
approximately -.07.
Controls for industry are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2003. 
Occupation controls consist of a set of SOC dummies (the skill levels approach 
devised by Bell et al. (2002) is also tested). The rural dummy variable is classed as 
those areas listed as town and fringe, village and hamlet and isolated dwellings, as 
opposed to those in a predefined urban category (classed as greater than 10,000 
population)17. The year dummy variables consist of the year that the individual was 
interviewed in. No finer breakdown of time of interview is available. In trying to 
control for individual characteristics, age, age2 and ethnicity are included. 
Definitions of these variables are included in the appendix. In addition I utilize the 
domain scores of the WIMD (which are covered in detail later in this section). They 
are added into the model according to their level of weighting to the full WIMD. 
This gives specifications 2 to 6:
17 As defined by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
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InEi = a + XlnUrt + pXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + £m
(2)
InEi = a + XlnUrt + pXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + 
aHEALTHr+8irt (3)
InEi = a + XlnUrt + pXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + 
aHEALTHr + aACCESSr+ £iit (4)
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + 
aHEALTHr + aACCESSr + aHOUSINGr + 8irt (5)
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + 
aHEALTHr + aACCESSr + aHOUSINGr + aPHYSICALr + £lrt (6)
Specifications (2) to (6) include the domain scores of the WIMD, cumulatively, in 
order of their weighting to the overall WIMD. The order is education (EDUC), 
health (HEALTH), geographical access to services (ACCESS), housing (HOUSING) 
and physical environment (PHYSICAL). In specifications (7) to (11), the domain 
scores are included in the model separately:
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + £iit
(7)
37
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aHEALTHr +
Girt ( 8 )
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aACCESSr + 
Eirt (9)
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt+ aHOUSING r + 
Eirt (10)
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + aESTDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aPHYSICALr + 
Eirt (11)
To gauge the effect of labour market proximity on annual pay, long-term 
unemployment and inactivity are incorporated into the model. Following the 
methodology of Blackaby and Murphy (1991), the proportion of unemployed who 
have been unemployed for 52 weeks or more are inserted into the regression, along 
with the log unemployment rate. The proportion of long-term unemployed are 
entered linearly and in log form. The inclusion of long-term unemployed (LTU) in 
specifications is denoted with a single apostrophe and a double apostrophe indicates 
the inclusion of long-term unemployed, entered in log form, as shown below:
InEi = a + XlnUrt + pXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aLTUrt+ Eirt
O')
InEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + alnLTUrt + Eut
a ”)
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Where appropriate long-term claimants are used instead of the long-term 
unemployed. For inactivity, I enter the logarithm of the inactivity rate into the model 
(specification 12), both with and without log unemployment/claimant count rates. In 
addition, to test whether it is the inactive people who would like to work but are 
unable to or those who do not want to work who place the greatest downward 
pressure on wages, these rates are entered into the model in place of the full 
inactivity rate (separately in specifications 13 and 14 and together in specification 
15). The scores of all five WIMD domains are included in inactivity specifications.
InEi = a + 51nINACTrt + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + 
aHEALTHr + aACCESSr + aHOUSINGr + aPHYSICALr + 8* (12)
InEi = a + Sin WANT JOBrt + PXi + alND, + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + 
aEDUCr + aHEALTHr + aACCESSr + aHOUSINGr + aPHYSICALr+ £* (13)
InEi = a + SlnDONT WANT JOBrt + PXi + aENDi + aOCCi + aRURALr + aYEARt + 
aEDUCr + aHEALTHr + aACCESSr + aHOUSINGr + aPHYSICALr + 8* (14)
InEi = a + Sin WANT JOBrt + SlnDONTWANT JOBrt + PXi + alNDj + aOCCi + 
aRURALr + aYEARt + aEDUCr + aHEALTHr + aACCESSr + aHOUSINGr +
aPHYSICALr + 8^ (15)
Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation 2005
The Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation 2005 is a measure of deprivation across 
Wales at LSOA level. It was commissioned by the Welsh Assembly Government 
and was produced by the Assembly's Statistical Directorate and the Local 
Government Data Unit. It measures deprivation, classed as “problems caused by a
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general lack of resources and opportunities (not just money)”18, for seven separate 
domains. Each LSOA is ranked in terms of deprivation for each domain and 
assigned a deprivation score, 100 being the most deprived, 0 being the least 
deprived. Deprivation scores are assigned via an exponential transformation.19 Due 
to this method, only the most deprived 10% of LSOAs will have a score of 50 or 
over. Then the scores for each domain were combined to create the full WIMD, with 
the following weighting:
Income 25%
Employment 25%
Health 15%
Education, skills and training 15%
Geographical access to services 10%
Housing 5%
Physical Environment 5%
For the purposes of this chapter, however, the individual domain scores are used. 
The income and employment domains will not be used, due to their correlation with 
the earnings variable and existing measures of labour market slack. It is hoped that 
by including the WIMD domain scores as explanatory variables, it will be possible 
to control for a variety of regional differences. It is likely that the domains will be 
correlated with each other (and with the measures of labour market slackness), so 
whilst they may be picking up the effects of more than their specific domain, this can
18 WIMD 2005 Summary Report.
19 The exponential transformation used requires a LSOA's rank to be scaled between 0 and 1 (1/1896 
for the least deprived, 1 for the most deprived), giving R. This is then transformed via the formula:
-23 ’log {1 -R*[ 1 -exp(-100/23)]} 
to give each LSOA's deprivation score for each particular domain. More information on this method 
is available in the WIMD 2005 technical report, available from www.dataunitwales.gov.uk
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work in my favour as they may control for a wider range of regional differences, 
especially when all five domains are included.
The domain variables constructed are entered into the model according to their 
weighting in the overall Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation. The income and 
employment domains carry the most weight, but since I have decided to exclude 
these domains, I next come to the health and the education, skills and training 
domains, both of which hold a weighting of 15%. Due to the lack of information on 
education and qualifications in the Living in Wales survey, the education domain can 
be used as a proxy for respondent's education and qualifications (in conjunction with 
information on respondent's occupation). Therefore, the education domain will be 
the first entered, followed by the health domain. The remaining domains are entered 
in the following order: geographical access to services, housing and, finally, the 
physical environment. Domain scores are included together, in that order, to make 
up specifications (2) to (6), whilst they are entered into the model individually in 
specifications (7) to (11). Each LSOA's score was converted to postcode sector level 
via population weights before inclusion in the model (postcode sector is the smallest 
geography reachable using the Living in Wales survey).
Understanding the construction of each of the domains will aid in interpreting the 
effects of deprivation on wages and the wage response to unemployment. Here it is 
explained how each domain was constructed and which indicators of deprivation 
were used.
Education, Skills & Training Domain
The stated aim of the education domain is “to reflect the 'stock' and 'flow' or 
educational disadvantage within an area, by capturing low attainment among
s • 2 0children and young people and the lack of qualifications and skills in adults” . The
20 WIMD 2005 Technical Report
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following indicators were used to construct the education, skills and training domain 
(factor analysis was used to combine the indicators. Weights are included in 
parentheses):
• Key Stage 2, average point scores (0.11)
• Key Stage 3, average point scores (0.24)
• Key Stage 4, average point scores (0.25)
• Secondary school absence rates (0.08)
• Proportion of 16 to 18 year olds not entering further or higher education 
(0.15)
• Proportion of adults with low or no qualifications (0.31)
From this information, it is believed that the variable will capture and control for 
educational deprivation at a small area level (postcode sector level), which, along 
with the respondent’s occupational sector details, will provide an adequate proxy for 
respondent’s educational attainment.
Health Domain
The health deprivation domain includes the following indicators:
•  Limiting long-term illness (0.29)
•  Standardised all-cause death rate (0.55)
•  Standardised cancer incidence rate (0.20)
The health domain's high weighting to the overall Welsh Index of Multiple 
Deprivation reflects the belief that the aggregated health of a small area should have 
one of the larger effects on wages, out of the five domains used.
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Geographical Access to Services Domain
This domain will capture the effect of settlements which may be isolated from a 
range of services required for general daily activities. If the service is unreachable 
by either foot or public bus services, within the specified time, this indicates 
deprivation exists. The components of the geographical access to services domain 
are:
•  Food shop within 10 minutes (0.08)
•  GP surgery within 15 minutes (0.15)
•  Primary school within 15 minutes (0.24)
•  Post office within 15 minutes (0.24)
•  Public library within 15 minutes (0.07)
•  Leisure centre within 20 minutes (0.07)
•  NHS dentist within 20 minutes (0.12)
•  Secondary school within 30 minutes (0.12)
Housing Domain
The housing deprivation domain is constructed from just two indicators:
•  Lack of central heating
•  Overcrowding (excluding all student households)
Factor analysis is not used in the construction of this domain; each indicator is given 
equal weighting. There exist some concerns that the indicators used to construct the 
housing deprivation domain may not fully capture housing deprivation and its effect 
on local wages. The Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation 2005 technical report 
states that lack of central heating is used as a proxy measure for housing quality 
instead of a more direct measure, as it is available at LSOA level.
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Physical Environment Domain
The purpose of the physical environment domain is “to represent potential for
impacts on quality of life in terms of environmental factors that increase the potential
0 1for an area being viewed as a less pleasant or desirable place to live.” Due to the 
intended aim of the domain, the effects on earnings may be small, with low 
correlation. The physical environment domain consists of the following indicators:
•  Population averaged estimated air quality for each LSOA in relation to Air 
Quality Strategy objectives
•  Population averaged estimated emissions to air per LSOA
•  Proportion of residential population living within 1 kilometre from current 
and recent waste disposal sites (landfills and incinerators)
•  Proportion of residential population living within 1 kilometre from a 
significant industrial source.
•  Proportion of residential population living in an area with a significant risk of 
flooding.
Factor analysis is not used for creating this domain. Instead, three sub-domains are 
created (air pollution, proximity to regulated sites and flood risk) which have equal 
weighting in the physical environment domain.
Correlations between the measure of earnings and the individual domain scores of 
the WIMD (table 2.2) reveal that the largest correlation with annual pay comes from 
the education domain, as would be expected, with the health domain being the 
second most correlated domain. The correlation between the wage measure and the 
education and health domains is negative, reflecting that the domain scores measure 
deprivation and therefore high scores would be associated with lower wages. As 
suspected, the physical environment domain displays very little correlation with 
annual pay. The geographical access to services domain is positively correlated to
21 WIMD 2005 Technical Report
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Table 2.2
Correlations between Annual Pay and Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation
2005
Annual
Pay
Education Health Access Housing Physical
Annual Pay 1
Education -.1801 1
Health -.1439 .7260 1
Access .0908 -.4906 -.5240 1
Housing -.1057 .2422 .0805 -.0042 1
Physical -.0248 .2252 .1450 -.3296 .0279 1
Note: unemployment rate (U Rate) and claimant count rate (CC Rate) expressed at unitary
authority level.
Table 2.3
Correlations between ILO Unemployment Rate, Claimant Count Rate and 
Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation 2005
U Rate CC
Rate
Education Health Access Housing Physical
U Rate 1
CC Rate .7449 1
Education .3763 .4112 1
Health .5636 .5327 .7430 1
Access -.3296 -.3544 -.5074 -.5338 1
Housing -.1635 -.0636 .2410 .0744 -.0003 1
Physical .0712 .0562 .2452 .1655 -.3449 .0389 1
Note: unemployment rate (U Rate) and claimant count rate (CC Rate) expressed at unitary
authority level.
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annual pay. This may be due to carrying out this research using place of residence, 
as some of those who earn high wages, may commute into work from areas outside 
cities (which may then be classified as access deprived).
Table 2.3 shows that correlations between the unemployment rate and claimant count 
rates are largest for the health domain, followed by the education domain. Negative 
correlations are found between the measures of labour market slackness and the 
access and housing domains. In this case, positive correlations between deprivation 
and measures of labour market slack would be expected. The negative correlation 
with access may be explained by clusters of unemployment in towns and cities. The 
negative relationship between housing deprivation and the measures of labour 
market slack may suggest that a lack of heating and overcrowding may not 
accurately measure housing deprivation.
Summary Statistics
From the 8,486 individuals in the sample, the average of gross pay from main job is 
found to be £24,493 (calculated from mid-points). This is lower than data from 
ASHE for the same period would suggest, by around £1,500. There are several 
possible reasons for this disparity: the Living in Wales mean is calculated from 
banded figures, the samples between the Living in Wales Survey and ASHE differ, 
and the accuracy of earnings data in the Living in Wales Survey may be 
questionable, as respondents may downstate their earnings for a multitude of 
reasons. The average age of persons in the sample is 42. The descriptive statistics 
also show that 36% of the sample lives in rural areas. Full summary statistics are 
included in the appendix (table 2.A1).
From figure 2.1, the distribution of earnings across Wales can be seen to be focused 
on a level below the mean value of £24,508. It can be seen that the majority of 
individuals earn less than £50,000 per year, with under 5% earning above that figure,
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illustrated by the extended, flat right hand tail. For this reason, the distribution of 
earnings can be better seen if the focus is on the portion of the distribution up until 
the £50,000 level. By focusing on the distribution between zero and £50,000 (figure 
2 .2 ), it can be seen that the distribution of earnings focuses on the area around 
£15,000, which is below the mean value of £24,508. The average is obtained due to 
the shape of the distribution, which has a positive skew, with the mean larger than 
the median. Disaggregating by urban/rural divide does not show much difference in 
earnings distributions (figure 2.3). A greater proportion of individuals living in 
urban areas have earnings around the £15,000 level, which is lower than the mean, 
reflecting the slightly higher level of earnings in rural areas in the sample (£25,696 
to £23,841). Figure 2.4 demonstrates the advantage in earnings that those who have 
migrated to Wales have over those bom in Wales. Those bom in Wales have a 
higher proportion around the median of £15,000, with the earnings distribution of 
those bom outside of Wales rising above those bom in Wales after the mean of 
£24,508, indicating a higher proportion of non-Welsh individuals have above 
average earnings.
2.4 Results
The methods of controlling for education and skills discussed in the methodology are 
tested in table 2.4. Initial calculations of the unemployment elasticity of annual pay 
using no controls for education, find it to be equal to -.11958. This is close to the 
figure suggested by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990). The inclusion of four skill 
levels, as suggested by Bell et al. (2002) lowers the coefficient to -.09599. A notable 
change is the increase in the coefficient of determination (R2), which has risen from 
. 1157 to .2723 due to the inclusion of the skill level dummies. I next test including a 
set of dummies for the nine 1 digit SOC categories instead of the four skill levels. 
This lowers the coefficient and increases the R2, although there is little difference 
between methods. Whilst there is little difference, inclusion of SOC dummies 
explains marginally more of the variation than the skill levels, so a set of SOC 
dummies are included in the basic specification (1). The bottom section tests the 
inclusion of the education domain, without skill level or SOC dummies. The 
elasticity is halved from -.11958 to -.04718, but the R2 only increases slightly, from
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.1157 to .1349. Columns 2 and 3 of table 2.4 reveal that the elasticity calculated 
using the claimant count rate is greater (in absolute terms) than that found using the 
ILO unemployment rate, with the rates entered at unitary authority and postcode 
sector levels giving similar estimates. This initial result would suggest that those 
who claim unemployment benefits place the largest downward pressure on annual 
pay. Effects of adding skill level and SOC dummies are similar to those found using 
the unemployment rate. The coefficient of determination’s role in measuring the 
level of variation that can be explained by a model is a key part of chapter four, 
where it is used to determine whether places or the people who live in them explain 
the most variation in earnings, employment and economic activity.
Using a set of SOC dummies to control for education and skill differences, a full set 
of regression results from specification (1) are reported in table 2.5. The full set of 
results from specification (1) gives an unemployment elasticity of earnings of - 
.09161. This is significant at the 1% level. The expected signs are displayed on age 
and age2. No significant effect is found from the dummy variables for rural/urban 
status and ethnicity. Relative to the omitted category of utilities, finance is the only 
industry to have a positive coefficient. Most are negative, whilst three are 
insignificantly different from the baseline group. Administrative and secretarial 
occupations are omitted, with managerial, professional, and associate professional 
and technical occupations displaying positive coefficients. Skilled trades are 
insignificant, whilst the remaining occupations return negative coefficients. Year 
dummies rise in magnitude with time, suggesting earnings have risen over the 
sample period. From this point on, I will no longer report full results, only the 
coefficient on the logarithm of unemployment. Coefficients on the domain sores 
from the WIMD 2005 will also be reported.
Tables 2.6 to 2.11 give the results of regressions of the log of annual earnings upon 
log ILO unemployment rate, log claimant count rate at unitary authority level and 
log claimant count rate at postcode sector level. Domain scores from the Welsh 
Index of Multiple Deprivation 2005 are also entered into regressions (at postcode 
sector level) in order of their weighting to the overall deprivation index. Educational
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Table 2.4
Test of Education/Skills Proxies
Unemployment 
Rate (UA)
Claimant Count 
Rate (UA)
Claimant Count 
Rate (PCS)
No Controls
Elasticity -.11958*** -.16522*** -.16274***
t stat (7.92) (8.15) (14.71)
R2 .1157 .1163 .1313
Skill Levels
Elasticity -.09599**’ -.12653*** -.11331***
t stat (7.01) (6 .8 8 ) (11.18)
R2 .2723 .2723 .2791
SOC
Elasticity -.09161*** -.12391*** -.10851*’*
t stat (6.71) (6.76) (10.72)
R2 .2791 .2793 .2854
WIMD Education
Elasticity -.04718*** -.05929” * -.08409” *
t stat (2.98) (2.76) (5.62)
R2 .1349 .1348 .1373
Notes: results from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; significance 
is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; (UA) is unitary authority level; (PCS) is
postcode sector level; panel 1 has no controls for education/skills; panel 2 controls for education/skills 
via Bell et al.’s (2002) method of skill level dummies; panel 3 controls for education/skills via a set of 
occupation dummies; panel 4 controls for education/skills via domain scores from the WIMD 2005.
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Table 2.5
Full Results from Specification (1)
Coefficient t stat
Log U -.09161"' 6.71
Age .06154*’* 16.48
Age2 -.00066**’ 15.18
Rural -.0069 0.65
White .04211 1.09
Industiy
Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry -.3835*’* 4.80
Mining -.3681*** 6.74
Manufacturing -.14759**’ 3.85
Construction -.12828*** 3.22
Trade -.29609**’ 7.34
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants ..4 9 7 4 4 *** 9.37
Transport & Communications -.16914**’ 4.18
Finance .15038*’* 2.75
Real Estate -.02886 0.71
Public Administration -.02328 0.55
Education -.1008*’ 2 .2 0
Health -.16464**’ 3.83
Community -.26043 5.83
Private Households -.47294 1.48
Occupation
Managerial .40798*** 16.60
Professional .39128*** 14.72
Associate Professional & Technical .09475*** 3.78
Skilled Trade .02571 1.06
Personal Service -.29266**’ 7.85
Sales -.10573*** 3.23
Process, Plant & Machinery -.09819*** 4.02
Elementary -.26521*’’ 9.80
Year
2005 .03718*** 3.05
2006 .04126*** 3.35
Constant 8.3415*** 81.39
Notes: results from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; significance
is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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deprivation is entered first due to its implications for earnings, as a measure of 
human capital (or in this case, human capital deprivation).
Regarding table 2.6, the log unemployment rate is found to be highly significant in 
all specifications. Initially, an unemployment elasticity of -.09161 is found, which is 
very close to Blanchflower and Oswald's suggested value of -.1. This result would 
imply that a doubling of the unemployment rate would cause wages to fall by 9.16%. 
This is similar to the unemployment elasticity at unitary authority level found the 
chapter three using a different dataset (-.07903 for wales and -.12211 for the UK). It 
is possible that this figure of -.09161 could be overstated due to the use of annual 
pay instead of hourly earnings. Comparing the two methods, Nijkamp and Poot 
(2005) find that elasticities calculated using annual earnings are greater than hourly 
earnings (-.1365 to -.0628). When introducing measures of deprivation 
(specifications 2 to 6), the unemployment rate’s significant contribution to the 
determination of annual pay remains, but the magnitude of the unemployment 
elasticity falls to between -.04839 and -.07176. This fall in magnitude (along with 
lesser falls in significance, although never below the 1 % level) may be attributable to 
the amount of earnings determination that is dependent upon deprivation in each 
locality. When all domain scores are included cumulatively, only the education and 
housing domains are significant. Both are negative, as would be expected and are of 
comparable magnitude. In a surprising result, the unemployment elasticity increases 
in magnitude when housing deprivation is entered into the model, but this may be 
explained by my earlier concerns regarding whether the individual components of 
the housing domain (lack of central heating and overcrowding) truly control for 
regional housing differences (as house prices would). The use of mean house prices 
as a control for regional variation is explored in chapter 3. In table 2.7, each domain 
score is entered into the model individually (specifications 7 to 11). The largest 
coefficient on domain scores we find is for education, which is used to proxy for 
qualification differences, in the absence of individual information. The geographical 
access to services and physical environment domain scores remain insignificant,, 
suggesting they have little effect on wages. As seen in table 2.6, inclusion of the 
housing domain again causes the unemployment elasticity to increase (to -.10724).
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Table 2.6
Unemployment Rate Results (WIMD Entered Cumulatively)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Log U Rate -.09161**’ -.05492’*’ -.04839*” -.05009” * -.07176*” -.07151*”
(6.71) (3.82) (3.07) (3.17) (4.45) (4.44)
Education -.00307*” -.00274*” -.00285*” -.00191” * -.0 0 2 *”
(7.81) (5.39) (5.53) (3.57) (3.71)
Health -.00057 -.0007 -.00077 -.00071
(1 .0 2 ) (1.24) (1.37) (1.24)
Access -.00058 -.00053 -.00043
(1.28) (1.17) (0.94)
Housing -.00225*” -.00224*”
(6.39) (6.37)
Physical .00046
(1.34)
R2 .2791 .2846 .2847 .2848 .2882 .2884
Notes: results from specifications (l)-(6); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; U is unemployment.
54
Table 2.7
Unemployment Rate Results (WIMD Entered Separately)
1 7 8 9 10 11
Log U Rate -.09161’" -.05492’” -.04622’’’ -.08542’’’ -.10724’’’ -.09199’’’
(6.71) (3.82) (2.93) (6 .0 2 ) (7.83) (6.74)
Education -.00307’*’
(7.81)
Health -.00247’’*
(5.74)
Access .00068
(1.61)
Housing -.00286**’
(8.61)
Physical .00017
(0.51)
R2 .2791 .2846 .2823 .2798 .2857 .2795
Notes: results from specifications (1 ),(7)-(l 1); dependent variable is the log o f annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; U is unemployment.
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Table 2.8 presents the results obtained from using claimant count rate at unitary 
authority level. Specification (1) returns an elasticity of -.12391, slightly higher than 
the earlier unemployment elasticity of -.09161. This may suggest that whilst the 
unemployment rate consists of unemployed persons claiming unemployment 
benefits and those that do not claim unemployment related benefits, it is the people 
claiming unemployment related benefits that exert the greater downward pressure on 
wages. Claimant count elasticities are significant for all specifications, ranging from 
-.06034 to -.08076 with domain scores included. As before, the education domain 
displays the greatest (negative) coefficients and health is significant, but weakly 
significant results are found for health deprivation in two of the specifications.
Inclusion of domain scores separately (table 2.9, specifications 7 to 11) reveal a 
similar pattern to that found using unemployment, where education and health 
deprivation lower elasticity, the access and physical environment domains are fairly 
ineffective (and their domain score coefficients remain insignificant) and the 
inclusion of the health domain causes elasticity to increase slightly.
Table 2.10 presents the results of regressions using the log of claimant count rate at 
postcode sector level. Specification (1) gives an initial elasticity of -.10851, which is 
slightly higher than regressions using unemployment rate (-.09161), but lower than 
claimant count at unitary authority level (-.12391). This level of disaggregation is 
not tested in chapter three due to the lack of information for ILO unemployment 
(travel to work area is the most disaggregated level). However, chapter three shows 
unemployment elasticity falls as disaggregation is extended past unitary authority 
level. Claimant count rate at postcode sector level is highly significant in all 
specifications, ranging between -.06566 and -.08364 when deprivation is controlled 
for. The deprivation domain scores perform better when included with the claimant 
count rate at the same level, with all but the physical environment domain returning 
negative and significant coefficients. In addition, the housing domain controls for 
wage variation as hoped and causes the claimant count elasticity to fall when it is 
entered into the model. Inclusion of the deprivation scores individually (table 2.11) 
reveals that education does the best job of controlling for wage variation (as would
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Table 2.8
Claimant Count Rate Results at Unitaiy Authority Level (WIMD Entered
Cumulatively)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Log CC Rate -.12391*" -.07007*** -.06034*** -.06658*** -.08076*** -.0798” *
(6.76) (3.58) (2 .86 ) (3.10) (3.74) (3.70)
Education -.00305**’ -.00267*** -.00279**’ -.00191*** -.00199**’
(7.67) (5.25) (5.43) (3.57) (3.70)
Health -.00067 -.00081 -.0 0 1 0 2 * -.00096*
(1 .2 2 ) (1.45) (1.83) (1.71)
Access -.00072
(1.57)
-.00068
(1.49)
-.00059
(1.26)
Housing -.00206***
(5.95)
-.00206***
(5.93)
Physical .00043
(1.26)
R2 .2793 .2845 .2846 .2848 .2878 .2879
Notes: results from specifications (l)-(6); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings;
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; CC is claimant count.
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Table 2.9
Claimant Count Rate Results at Unitary Authority Level (WIMD Entered
Separately)
1 7 8 9 10 11
Log CC Rate -.12391*** -.07007*** ~ ***-.063 -.11644***
 ^ _ * «*** -.12948 -.12415***
(6.76) (3.58) (2.98) (5.93) (7.09) (6.78)
Education -.00305**’
(7.67)
Health -.00247***
(5.72)
Access .00046
(1.05)
Housing -.00261***
(7.91)
Physical .00017
(0.51)
R2 .2793 .2845 .2824 .2798 .2849 .2797
Notes: results from specifications (1 ),(7)-(l 1); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; CC is claimant count.
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Table 2.10
Claimant Count Rate Results at Postcode Sector Level (WIMD Entered
Cumulatively)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Log CC Rate
»»*00oI* -.07879*** -.0751**’ -.08364**’ -.066” * -.06566” *
(10.72) (5.78) (5.31) (5.74) (4.35) (4.33)
Education -.00163 -.00136** -.00141** -.00106* -.00116”
(3.25) (2.41) (2.49) (1 .86) (2 .0 1 )
Health -.00052 -.00074 -.0 0 1 1 1** -.00105*
(0.98) (1.38) (2.05) (1.92)
Access -.0 0 1 1 1*’ -.00091* -.00081*
(2.39) (1.94) (1.70)
Housing -.00148*** -.00148” *
(4.12) (4.11)
Physical .00045
(1.32)
R2 .2854 .2863 .2863 .2868 .2882 .2884
Notes: results from specifications (l)-(6); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings;
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; CC is claimant count.
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Table 2.11
Claimant Count Rate Results at Postcode Sector Level (WIMD Entered
Separately)
1 7 8 9 10 11
Log CC Rate -.10851*** -.07879*** -.09022*** -.1178*** -.09297*** -.10997***
(10.72) (5.78) (7.12) (10.31) (8 .6 6 ) (10.81)
Education -.00163
(3.25)
Health -.0 0 1 1 2 **
(2.40)
Access -.0008*
(1.75)
Housing -.0015***
(4.27)
Physical .00047
(1.41)
R2 .2854 .2863 .2859 .2857 .2870 .2856
Notes: results from specifications (1 ),(7)-(l 1); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; CC is claimant count.
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have been expected) and that access and physical environment are the least effective 
domains.
Long-Term Unemployment and Claimant Count
In tables 2.12 to 2.14,1 test whether the long-term unemployed place any downward 
pressure on wages. Layard and Nickell (1986) suggest that the long-term 
unemployed will not exert downward pressure on wages and this has been tested by 
Blackaby and Hunt (1992) and Johansen (1997). This may be due to de-moralisation 
and erosion of skills, amongst other factors. The proportion of unemployed who 
have been unemployed for 52 weeks or more are included. The aforementioned 
studies find a positive and significant effect on this variable, suggesting that the 
long-term unemployed do not exert downward pressure on wages. However, results 
from table 2 .1 2  show that the long-term unemployed do place downward pressure on 
wages, as the coefficient is negative and significant.22 This coefficient is negative 
and significant in all specifications when using the unemployment rate and the 
claimant count at postcode sector level. Only when using the claimant count at 
unitary authority level is the effect of the long-term unemployed found to be 
insignificant in two specifications (5 and 6), although it is significant and negative in 
the remaining four. These results are somewhat surprising given previous studies, 
and suggest that the long-term unemployed do place downward pressure on wages 
(from this dataset, at least). In an attempt to test if the long-term unemployment rate 
is picking up some effect other than long-term unemployment, I insert a full set of 
postcode sector dummy variables into the model. The results are given in table 2.15. 
The effect of including a full set of postcode sector dummies and picking up local 
variation is that the measures of long-term unemployment (and claimants) become 
insignificant. The top panel of table 2.15 presents results for unemployment, with 
both the unemployment rate and long-term unemployed having an insignificant 
effect on earnings. The effect of long-term claimants is also insignificant although 
the claimant count rate does have a significant, negative effect on earnings.
22 I also entered the proportion of unemployed who have been unemployed for one year or more in 
logarithm form. This makes no difference to the result
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Table 2.12
Unemployment Rate Results, with Long-Term Unemployment (WIMD Entered
Cumulatively)
1’ V 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’
Log U Rate -.09456’** -.05913*** -.05508” * -.05675*” -.07815**’ -.0778*”
(6.93) (4.10) (3.48) (3.57) (4.82) (4.80)
Long Term U -.24763**’ -.2069*** -.20311*** -.20284*” -.19876*** -.19395***
(4.47) (3.73) (3.64) (3.63) (3.57) (3.47)
Education -.00296 -.00273*** -.00283” * -.0019*** -.00197*”
(7.41) (5.37) (5.50) (3.56) (3.66)
Health -.00035 -.00048 -.00055 -.0005
(0.62) (0.84) (0.97) (0.89)
Access -.00057 -.00052 -.00045
(1.27) (1.16) (0.97)
Housing -.00223*” -.00223” *
(6.35) (6.34)
Physical .00036
(1.05)
R2 .2809 .2858 .2858 .2859 .2893 .2894
Notes: results from specifications ( l ’)-(6’); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; U is unemployment; LT is 
long-term.
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Table 2.13
Claimant Count Results at Unitaiy Authority Level, with Long-Term 
Claimants (WIMD Entered Cumulatively)
1’ V 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’
Log CC Rate -.09571*** -.03228 -.01472 -.0216 -.068** -.06991”
(4.29) (1.36) (0.57) (0.81) (2.42) (2.48)
Long Term CC -.26522** -.34026*** -.37411*** -.34953*’* -.09406 -.07335
(2 .2 1 ) (2.83) (3.07) (2.81) (0.71) (0.55)
Education -.00314*** -.00261*** -.00269*** -.00192*’* -.0 0 2 ***
(7.88) (5.13) (5.21) (3.59) (3.71)
Health -.00095* -.0 0 1 0 2 * -.00106* I o o «
(1.70) (1.81) (1.90) (1.77)
Access -.00045 -.00061 -.00054
(0.96) (1.30) (1.13)
Housing -.00197*** -.00198*"
(5.29) (5.33)
Physical .00041
(1.18)
R2 .2798 .2853 .2855 .2855 .2879 .2880
Notes: results from specifications ( l ’)-(6’); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; CC is claimant count; LT is 
long-term.
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Table 2.14
Claimant Count Results at Postcode Sector Level, with Long-Term Claimants
(WIMD Entered Cumulatively)
1’ V 3 ’ 4’ 5’ 6 ’
Log CC Rate -.08848*** -.04711*** -.04378** -.05396*** -.04111** -.04191”
(6 .8 6) (2.79) (2.54) (2.97) (2.23) (2.27)
Long Term CC -.18698** -.24267*** -.24144*** -.21305*** -.18534** -.17724”
(2.50) (3.19) (3.17) (2.74) (2.38) (2.26)
Education 4V «  4 ***-.00194 -.00169 -.00169*** -.00132*’ -.00139”
(3.81) (2.94) (2.93) (2.27) (2.37)
Health -.00049 -.00066 -.00103* -.00097*
(0.93) (1.23) (1.89) (1.79)
Access -.00085* -.00069 -.00061
(1.78) (1.44) (1.27)
Housing -.0014**’ -.0014**’
(3.89) (3.89)
Physical .00038
(1 .10)
R2 .2860 .2872 .2872 .2875 .2887 .2888
Notes: results from specifications (r )-(6 ’); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; CC is claimant count; LT is 
long-term.
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Inactivity
As mentioned in the previous section, Wales is blighted by very high inactivity rates 
(21.09% from the data used in this chapter). I have entered the log of inactivity rate 
in place of the unemployment rate in the earnings equation, the results of which are 
shown in table 2.16. An inactivity elasticity of -.25024 is initially found, which is 
far greater than the unemployment or claimant elasticities, suggesting that it is the 
economically inactive that place the greatest downward pressure upon earnings. 
This may also be a surprising result, as when distance from the labour market 
increases it may be expected that the downward pressure on wages will subside. 
When the unemployment rate and claimant count rates are included alongside 
inactivity, they are found to be insignificant, with inactivity appearing the dominant 
effect. In an effort to differentiate inactivity, I have constructed variables 
representing those that are inactive, but want to work (but are unable to at the present 
time) and those that are inactive and do not want to work. When entered separately 
(in log form), in the place of the total inactivity rate, both are significant, with a far 
greater elasticity for those that do not want to work (-.25053 to -.02815). This would 
imply that whilst inactivity has the greater effect on earnings, it is those people who 
are inactive and do not want to find employment that are driving this effect, which is 
surprising as these people would be expected to have the least proximity to the 
labour market. Inclusion of the unemployment rate and claimant count rate causes 
the effect of those who are inactive and want to work to become insignificant. This 
also occurs when both types of inactivity are entered together. These results suggest 
that the inactive, in particular those who do not want to work, place a large 
downward pressure on wages.
It is possible that the large negative inactivity elasticity is picking up some effect 
other than inactivity on earnings. To attempt to control for any possible regional 
effects being attributed to inactivity, a full set of dummy variables at postcode sector 
level are entered into specifications 12 to 15. Results are given in table 2.17. The 
large negative effect of the inactivity rate is replaced with a lowly significant 
positive effect. The result of large downward pressure on earnings from inactivity 
was unexpected; this result suggests it may have been due to the inactivity variable
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Table 2.15
Long-Term Unemployment/Claimant Count Results, with Postcode Sector
Dummy Variables
r 1 ”
Log Unemployment Rate (UA) -.00696 -.00537
(0.25) (0.19)
Long Term Unemployed (UA) -.11797 -.02578
(1.49) (1.47)
Log Claimant Count Rate (UA) -.13045* -.13196*
(1.71) (1.74)
Long Term Claimants (UA) -.46053 -.06774
(1.34) (1.40)
Log Claimant Count Rate (PCS) -.10045* -.12625**
(1.92) (2.24)
Long Term Claimants (PCS) -.09542 -.0105
(0.61) (1.25)
Notes: results from specifications (1’) and (1” ), with a full set of postcode sector dummies; 
dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) levels; (UA) is unitary authority level; (PCS) is postcode sector level.
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Table 2.16
Inactivity Rate Results
12 13 14 15
Inactivity -.25024***
(7.43)
Inactivity -  Want Job -.02815*
(1.85)
-.01851
(1.22)
Inactivity -  Don't Want Job -.25053***
(7.97)
-.24743***
(7.85)
Inactivity -.23545***
(6.00)
Inactivity -  Want Job .00964
(0.54)
-.00366
(0.20)
Inactivity -  Don't Want Job -.22929***
(6.91)
-.23003***
(6.89)
Unemployment Rate -.01377 -.07685 -.03372** -.03158
(0.73) (4.07) (1.99) (1.58)
Inactivity -.23482***
(6.57)
Inactivity -  Want Job -.01437
(0.91)
-.01181
(0.75)
Inactivity -  Don't Want Job _ _ _ * * ♦-.23625
(7.32)
-.2357***
(7.30)
Claimant Count Rate -.02944 -.07443*** -.043* -.03867*
(1.29) (3.33) (1.95) (1.69)
Notes: results from specifications (12)-(15); dependent variable is the log of annual earnings; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 2.17
Inactivity Rate Results, with Postcode Sector Dummy Variables
12 13 14 15
Inactivity .12038*
(1.74)
Inactivity -  Want Job -.01261
(0.57)
-.00081
(0.04)
Inactivity -  Don't Want Job .12771**
(2 .11)
.12714*’
(2.03)
Inactivity .12435*
(1.79)
Inactivity -  Want Job -.01056
(0.47)
.00147
(0.06)
Inactivity -  Don't Want Job .12678**
(2 .10)
.12778**
(2.04)
Unemployment Rate -.01951 -.01322 -.014 -.01433
(0.72) (0.48) (0.52) (0.52)
Inactivity .16813**
(2.34)
Inactivity -  Want Job -.00445
(0 .2 0 )
.01225
(0.52)
Inactivity -  Don't Want Job .14791*’
(2.42)
.15753”
(2.47)
Claimant Count Rate -.19822** -.14858** -.177** -.18636”
(2.57) (1.96) (2.35) (2.41)
Notes: results from specifications (12)-(15), with a fiill set of postcode sector dummies; dependent 
variable is the log of annual earnings; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels.
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picking up the effects of factors other than inactivity. The effect of those that want a 
job is always insignificant. When the unemployment rate is entered into the model 
(in panel 2) it is insignificant. The claimant count does come through as negative 
(and large) in the bottom panel of table 2.17. The positive effect of inactivity 
remains.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the existence of a wage curve for Wales, whilst also 
exploring the effects of using different measures of labour market slack and the 
effect that inactivity has upon earnings determination. It was found that the 
unemployment elasticity for Wales was -.09161, very close to the 'empirical law1 of - 
.1. When replacing unemployment rates with claimant count rates, the elasticity' 
figure was higher, suggesting that persons claiming unemployment related benefits 
put more downward pressure on wages than those people who are unemployed, yet 
do not claim unemployment related benefits. The Welsh Index of Multiple 
Deprivation is used to control for regional differences, but only the education, health 
and housing domains are able to control effectively for wage variation.23 The results 
presented in this chapter (and the following chapter) confirm that unemployment 
does have a negative impact upon earnings. Given the sharp rises in unemployment 
over the last few years this demonstrates the importance of schemes, such as Jobs 
Growth Wales, aimed at reducing unemployment.
Claimant count rates were also entered at a greater level of disaggregation, postcode 
sector level. The effect of this was to reduce the elasticity figure, although there is 
little difference in magnitude. The effect of using different levels of unemployment 
rate aggregation is explored in greater depth in chapter three. That a significant 
result is found when using such a disaggregated measure of labour market slack may 
suggest smaller local economies exhibiting their own wage curves, each contributing 
to the aggregate wage curve. An implication would be that policy makers should be
23 Although we do not use the income and employment domains.
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equally concerned with the economic gaps between regions in Wales as they are with 
closing the gaps between Wales and the rest of the UK. Efforts should also be 
directed at reducing economic inequality between regions within Wales.
Very high elasticities were found for the economically inactive. These illustrate the 
great problem that inactivity is, particularly in Wales, where inactivity is above the 
UK average. It was found that those people who were inactive and did not want to 
work placed the most downward pressure on wages. Long-term unemployment was 
also found to cause wages to fall, with long-term unemployment leading to increases 
in inactivity, as more people leave the labour market. The addition of a full set of 
postcode sector dummy variables removed the negative effects of inactivity and the 
long-term unemployed, suggesting that the negative effects may have been caused by 
some factor other than inactivity or long-term unemployment. The somewhat 
ambiguous fmdng with respect to the effects of economic inactivity may affect 
policy implications. If those who are economically inactive do indeed place 
significant downward pressure on earnings, this provides additional reasons to focus 
on schemes that reconnect disengaged individuals with the labour market. The 
causes of inactivity must also be addressed, in order to prevent further generations 
from inflating these already high inactivity figures, with particular attention paid to 
long term limiting illness, which has proven to be the largest cause of inactivity. 
This study represents an early attempt to quantify the effect of economic inactivity 
on earnings and this subject warrants further attention.
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Appendix 2.A
Earnings
Unemployment Rate
Claimant Count Rate
Inactivity Rate
Want Job
Don’t Want Job
Long Term Unemployed
Long Term Claimants
Age
Variable Definitions
Gross annual earnings of individual. Entered into 
model in log form
Proportion of economically active that are classed ILO 
unemployed. Entered into model in log form.
Proportion of economically active that are claiming 
unemployment benefits. Entered into model in log 
form.
Proportion of working age that are classed as 
economically inactive. Entered into model in log form.
Proportion of working age that are classed as 
economically inactive and want a job. Entered into 
model in log form.
Proportion of working age that are classed as 
economically inactive and don’t want a job. Entered 
into model in log form.
Proportion of unemployed that have been unemployed 
for 52 weeks or more
Proportion of claimants that have been claiming 
unemployment benefits for 52 weeks or more
Age of individual
Square of age of individual
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White
Rural
Industry
Occupation
Year
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if individual’s 
ethnicity white, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if rural, 0 if urban
Vector of dummy variables indicating industry sector. 
15 categories: agriculture, fishing and forestry; mining; 
manufacturing; utilities; construction; trade; 
distribution, hotels and restaurants; transport and 
communications; finance; real estate; public 
administration; education; health; community; and 
private households
Vector of dummy variables indicating occupation. 9 
categories: managers and senior officials; professional; 
associate professional and technical; administrative and 
secretarial; skilled trades; personal services; sales and 
customer service; process, plant and machinery; and 
elementary
Vector of year dummy variables
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Table 2.A1
Summary Statistics for Living in Wales Survey
Mean Standard Min Max
Gross Annual Pay 24493.44 18644.2 780 2 0 0 0 0 0
Age 42.29142 9.955784 18 64
Age2 1887.671 851.2383 324 4096
Rural 0.361174 0.480368 0 1
White 0.982818 0.129959 0 1
Industry
Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 0.004823 0.069284 0 1
Mining 0.015175 0.122255 0 1
Manufacturing 0.279849 0.448952 0 1
Utilities 0.017527 0.131233 0 1
Construction 0.113751 0.317528 0 1
Trade 0.096342 0.295077 0 1
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 0.017175 0.129929 0 1
Transport & Communications 0.099988 0.300002 0 1
Finance 0.014939 0.121318 0 1
Real Estate 0.097636 0.296839 0 1
Public Administration 0.085284 0.27932 0 1
Education 0.047171 0.212017 0 1
Health 0.068815 0.253155 0 1
Community 0.041289 0.19897 0 1
Private Households 0.000235 0.015338 0 1
Occupation
Managerial 0.154685 0.361625 0 1
Professional 0.118512 0.323232 0 1
Associate Pro. & Technical 0.128158 0.334285 0 1
Administration 0.058222 0.234177 0 1
Skilled Trade 0.176849 0.381563 0 1
Personal Service 0.028135 0.165368 0 1
Sales 0.039274 0.194258 0 1
Process, Plant & Machinery 0.204754 0.403545 0 1
Elementary 0.09141 0.288208 0 1
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Year
2004 0.325899 0.468736 0 1
2005 0.349795 0.476932 0 1
2006 0.324306 0.468142 0 1
WIMD
Education 20.96471 14.26016 0.35118 76.69798
Health 20.70004 14.10035 0.45159 92.89014
Geographical Access to Services 23.26203 16.28896 2.93041 87.50994
Housing 20.97148 15.11105 0.57062 85.91038
Physical Environment 21.52149 15.43896 0.22434 95.9614
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Chapter 3
The Wage Curve in Great Britain: Evidence across 
the Earnings Distribution
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3.1 Introduction
For the past two decades, the wage curve has been a highly active facet of economic 
research. The wage curve has been touted as an economic law that negatively links 
the regional unemployment rate with individual earnings. The basis behind the wage 
curve involves estimating an augmented Mincer (1974) earnings function, with the 
regional unemployment rate added as an explanatory variable. Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990, 1994) found that the resulting unemployment elasticity of earnings 
should be close to -.1, meaning that a doubling of die local unemployment rate will 
result in a drop in local wages of 10%. Whilst Blanchflower and Oswald have stated 
that an unemployment elasticity of earnings of -.1 constitutes an empirical law of 
economics, Nijkamp and Poot (2005) have found, through a meta-analysis covering 
over 200 estimates of unemployment elasticity, that the actual figure is -.07, 
attributing the difference in elasticities to publication bias. Despite the wage curve 
being closely associated with the works of Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994), 
the methodology can be seen in an earlier study by Blackaby and Manning (1987), 
where they find a coefficient of -.16 by regressing the log of unemployment upon the 
log of earnings.
Whilst the previous chapter estimated the wage curve for Wales between 2004 and 
2006, this chapter expands the analysis to estimate the wage curve for the UK 
between the years 2004 and 2007. To do so, I make use of the Annual Population 
Survey (APS), an extension of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is of particular 
interest as it provides a greater number of observations than the quarterly LFS, 
particularly in Wales and Scotland (through the Welsh Labour Force Survey and 
Scottish Labour Force Survey boosts). I hope to add to the existing literature by 
examining unemployment elasticity at the regional level as well as at the national 
level, allowing observation of how the earnings of regions differ in their response to 
the level of unemployment. Due to the sudden increases in unemployment that have 
occurred towards the end of the sample period and thereafter, a better understanding 
of unemployment responses will aid in planning for economic recovery, at the 
regional level.
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In addition, I plan to carry out this research using unemployment rates from five 
levels of aggregation: NUTS24 1, NUTS 2, NUTS 3, unitary authority (UA) and 
travel to work area (TTWA). This was touched on in the previous chapter using the 
claimant count at both unitary authority and LSOA level, although it is more fully 
explored here. The wage curve literature is concerned with the earnings response to 
local unemployment; however, unemployment measured at differing levels of 
aggregation will produce differing responses (Buttner and Fitzenberger, 1998). By 
utilizing unemployment rates from five levels of aggregation, I hope to observe the 
difference in the earnings response to unemployment when moving from a national 
to local level. These regressions will be carried out for the sample as a whole as well 
as splitting the sample according to factors such as age group, gender, occupation, 
industry, education and employment sector.
Finally, I utilize quantile regression techniques to examine unemployment elasticity 
across the wage distribution. This allows regression not just at the mean, but at 
regular intervals along the earnings distribution; more specifically in this analysis at 
each 10% along the earnings distribution (decile regression). Most wage curve 
studies focus only on wage flexibility at the mean, however, the wage response to 
unemployment will differ according to whether an individual has high or low 
earnings. These quantile regression techniques are combined with the 
unemployment rates from five different levels of aggregation in an attempt to explain 
wage flexibility across the wage distribution and at different levels of aggregation. 
Quantile regression techniques are also used in chapter five to examine how the 
returns to qualifications vary along the wage distribution.
In section two I present a review of the wage curve literature that concerns itself with 
quantile regression. Section three examines the data used from the APS, including 
analysis of earnings regionally and by factors relating to personal characteristics and 
employment. In section four I present results and analysis from regressions at the 
mean and quantile regressions, with conclusions drawn in section five.
24 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.
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3.2 Literature Review
As I have presented a full review of the wage curve literature in the previous chapter, 
here I just focus upon those studies that examine the unemployment elasticity of 
wages across the wage distribution. Buttner and Fitzenberger (1998) focus their 
study on how the wage response to unemployment varies across the wage 
distribution and over degrees of centralization. They set out a theoretical model that 
assumes workers are paid according to either a central wage agreement or local wage 
agreements. The wages paid under the central wage agreement do not react to 
local/regional unemployment, but to national unemployment, whilst local wages will 
react to local/regional unemployment. They set out that there is a tendency for lower 
paid workers to be paid according to central wage agreements (in Germany), 
meaning that the lower end of the wage distribution is more representative of 
centralized bargaining and that the local unemployment rate will have a smaller 
effect on wages than the national unemployment rate. Alternatively, at higher levels 
of the wage distribution, workers are more likely to be paid according to local 
agreements and therefore the local unemployment rate will have a greater effect on 
wages. To test their theoretical model, Buttner and Fitzenberger use IABS-REG data 
between 1976 and 1990, which breaks geographic location down into 259 districts. 
A cell mean regression technique is used. Three levels of unemployment rate are 
used: local, regional and national. Median regression reveals the effect of the local 
unemployment rate to be insignificant, but regional and national rates have a 
significant effect. The insignificance of the local unemployment rate holds across all 
quantiles, which prompts them to note that districts may be considered too small to 
be functional labour markets. Buttner and Fitzenberger’s theory is proven by their 
empirical evidence as wages are most sensitive to the national unemployment rate at 
the lower levels of the wage distribution and are more sensitive to regional 
unemployment at high levels of the wage distribution.
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Sanz-de-Galdeano and Turunen (2006) consider the unemployment elasticity of 
wages between 1994 and 2001 for the euro area.25 The European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) is used. Similar elasticities are found using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and individual fixed effects, -.135 and -.141. They also disaggregate 
their sample, finding that wages are more responsive for men (compared to women), 
younger workers, and private sector workers. Results by education levels are 
sensitive to the model used, but OLS results show the less educated to have the more 
flexible wages. Sans-de-Galdeano and Turunen’s quantile regression results show 
that it is the workers at the foot of the wage distribution that have the largest 
unemployment elasticity.
Devicienti et al. (2008) use the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) between 1985 
and 1999 to examine wage flexibility before and after the introduction of a new wage 
bargaining system, the Income Policy Agreement (IPA), in 1993. Unemployment 
rates are entered for 20 administrative regions. They find little support for the wage 
curve prior to 1993, but find that after the introduction of the IPA (which allowed 
wages to better respond to local labour market conditions), an elasticity of -.029 is 
found. They are able to isolate the top-up component of total wages, finding that it is 
far more responsive, with an elasticity of -.076. They examine how these effects 
may vary over the wage distribution. They find that both the total wage and its top- 
up component are significant from the median onwards. Wage flexibility is found to 
increase along the wage distribution, which Devicienti et al. state is due to top-up 
components making up more of total wage at high wage levels, therefore increasing 
the ability of wages to respond to local unemployment. This result is found using 
their ‘contract’ sample, which excludes some higher earners and fringe workers. 
Expanding their approach to the whole sample, high wage flexibility is found for 
both high and low earners (relative to those in the middle of the wage distribution). 
The high wage flexibility of low wage workers is attributed to the low levels of 
labour market protection they face.
25 Consisting of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Austria and Finland.
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Ammermuller et al. (2010) investigate wage elasticity in Italy and Germany, 
focusing their approach on differences in elasticity between groups and also 
including a quantile dimension. Data is available for Italy between 1991 and 2004, 
and 1996 and 2003 for Germany. Italy and Germany are selected due to being 
recognized by OECD for large and persistent regional disparities in their labour 
markets. The data used is the German Microcensus and the Bank of Italy’s Survey 
on Household Income and Wealth, with models estimated using hourly wages as the 
dependent variable. For Italy, weak evidence of the wage curve is only found for 
specifications that omit regional fixed effects. When disaggregating into worker 
sub-groups, the Italian data still fails to identify a wage curve relationship. Only 
those with a low level of education report a (weakly) significant relationship between 
unemployment and earnings, but even this relationship is positive. From their 
German sample, Ammermuller et al. again do not find evidence of the wage curve 
from their OLS specifications, but do find a weakly significant and negative 
relationship between unemployment and earnings of -.06 when utilizing an error 
correction model. After disaggregating by worker groups, the strongest wage curve 
evidence is found for females and the less educated. Also, East Germany is found to 
exhibit greater unemployment elasticity than West Germany. Ammermuller et al. 
carry out quantile regressions on both Italy and Germany. With Italian data, a 
significant and negative relationship between unemployment and earnings is only 
found, via an error correction model, at the median and sixth decile. At the bottom 
of the wage distribution, the first decile, the relationship is positive and significant. 
Italian OLS results (without regional fixed effects) suggest wage flexibility is 
greatest at lower wage levels. From their German error correction model, 
Amermuller et al. find a significant, negative relationship from the fourth decile and 
up, with the greater elasticity found at the higher end of the wage distribution. 
Results are similar for their OLS model with regional fixed effects. Without regional 
fixed effects, the unemployment rate is significant at all deciles, with the largest 
flexibility found for high wage workers.
Groth and Johansson (2004) do not consider the wage curve, but their study instead 
examines the link between the duration of wage contracts (and therefore wage 
flexibility) and the degree of wage bargaining centralization, which links to the use
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of several different levels of unemployment measures in this chapter. Groth and 
Johansson set up a model by which nominal contract length is determined by 
contract costs, which in turn are determined by the degree of centralization. They 
recognize that increases in centralization of wage bargaining may reduce contract 
costs by reducing the number of negotiations required across the economy, but may 
also increase contract costs as the costs of co-ordination rise with the degree of 
centralization. This co-ordination cost is labelled as the variable component of 
contract cost and is increasing and convex in centralization. The fixed component is 
‘a menu-cost for changing wages’ that is independent of the degree of centralization 
and represents die resources used in any wage negotiation. Groth and Johansson’s 
model predicts that, for a sufficiently large fixed component of contract cost, 
contract duration will be U-shaped in the degree of centralization. This is due to it 
being optimal to write lengthy contracts as co-ordination costs rise, an effect that 
dominates for high levels of centralization, but it may be optimal to write shorter 
contracts as centralization reduces the fixed contract cost per worker (an effect which 
dominates at low levels of centralization). Groth and Johansson test this theory 
using data from 16 OECD countries between 1975-1985 and 1986-1995. Data 
supports the notion of contract duration being U-shaped in the degree of 
centralization. They regress contract length upon the degree of central bank 
independence, variance of total factor productivity, and a set of dummy variables 
representing three levels of centralization. Coefficients on the dummy variables for 
low and high levels of centralization are greater than for intermediate levels of 
centralization. This result holds using both OLS and an ordered probit.
3.3 Data & Methodology
To carry out this research, the Annual Population Survey (APS) is used, between the 
years 2004 and 2007. The APS combines the quarterly Labour Force Survey with 
the local Labour Force Survey boosts (the English local Labour Force Survey 
[LLFS]; the Welsh Labour Force Survey [WLFS]; and the Scottish Labour Force 
Survey [SLFS]). Also included is the Annual Population Survey Boost Sample 
(APS[B]), although this boost is only available for 2004 and 2005. Unemployment 
rates are then linked to the data at NUTS1, NUTS2, NUTS3, unitary authority and
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travel to work area (TTWA) levels. Whilst in chapter 2 the effect of using different 
measures of labour market slack (ILO unemployment, claimant count, long term 
unemployment and economic inactivity) was the focus, with only a short time spent 
on differing level of aggregation, here the effects of using differing levels of 
aggregation is the focus. These varying levels of unemployment rates have been 
chosen to capture the effect of different sized labour markets and as a way of 
representing levels of wage bargaining centralization, whereby responses to highly 
aggregated unemployment rates would mainly encompass centralized bargaining and 
wage responses to disaggregated unemployment rates would represent decentralized 
bargaining, at a more local level. Unemployment rates between the extremes of the 
NUTS 1 and TTWA levels would represent intermediate level wage setting. Tables 
3.1 to 3.3 give the number of each labour market area included in the data, by year 
and by gender. Figures vary over the sample period due to classification changes 
and insufficient observations for calculation of unemployment rates. Whilst the 
number of NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and unitary authority regions remain constant over time 
(and sample restriction), there is a small variation in the number of regions at NUTS 
3 level and a larger variation at TTWA level. Due to the dwindling sample sizes 
used for calculating the unemployment rate, when using TTWA level, some 
unemployment rates are unavailable, so these TTWAs are dropped for the TTWA 
analysis (official unemployment rates are not available at TTWA level, necessitating 
calculating them from APS data). A list of these dropped TTWAs can be found in 
the appendix. This problem is worst in 2006 and 2007 when the APS(B) is not 
available. Due to the affected TTWAs having relatively small sample sizes and 
populations, the reduction in overall sample size is minimal compared to the more 
aggregated labour market analysis. This problem is slight for the NUTS 3 level.26
26 Unemployment rate for Orkney Islands (UKM45) are unavailable for males in 2007 and females 
for 2006, Shetland Islands (UKM46) are unavailable for females in 2004 and Eilean Siar (UKM44) is 
unavailable for females in 2005. There is also a small change in classification over the time period.
Table 3.1
Number of Labour Market Regions by Year (Full Sample)
2004 2005 2006 2007
NUTS 1 11 11 11 11
NUTS 2 36 36 36 36
NUTS 3 128 128 129 128
Unitary Authority 200 200 200 200
TTWA 292 288 283 275
Table 3.2
Number of Labour Market Regions by Year (Male)
2004 2005 2006 2007
NUTS 1 11 11 11 11
NUTS 2 36 36 36 36
NUTS 3 128 128 129 127
Unitary Authority 200 200 200 200
TTWA 283 275 267 261
Table 3.3
Number of Labour Market Regions by Year (Female)
2004 2005 2006 2007
NUTS 1 11 11 11 11
NUTS 2 36 36 36 36
NUTS 3 127 127 128 128
Unitary Authority 200 200 200 200
TTWA 275 274 249 253
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As with previous wage curve studies, an augmented Mincer (1974) earnings function 
is used:
lnEi = a + AJnUxt + pXi + alND* + aRURALr + alnPOPDENr + aYEARt + £ut (1)
Regression will be carried out using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods, with 
specification (1) given above. The unemployment elasticity of earnings is given by 
the coefficient on the log of unemployment rate (X). The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of hourly earnings (E). A vector of standard control variables (X) includes 
age and its square, job tenure, a dummy variable for marriage, a dummy for gender, 
a dummy to indicate the presence of an activity limiting health problem, a set of 
ethnicity dummy variables, a set of dummies controlling for firm size and a public 
sector dummy. Education is controlled for via a set of dummy variables, 
representing the highest qualification held by each individual (of which there are 
nine levels).27 A set of time dummies (YEAR) are also included. A set of dummies 
to control for industry sector (IND) have been included, with employment split into 
nine industry sectors (taken from the INDSECT variable). This was preferred to 
more commonly used divisions, such as SIC2003, as some of these groups (such as 
fishing) suffer from very small sample sizes, a is the constant and e is the error term.
Specification (1) includes a rural dummy variable, which is assigned at Unitary 
Authority - Local Authority District (UALAD) level. This is based on the URIND 
variable, taken from the APS, which is available at individual level between 2005 
and 2007. Due to the problem of having no data on the rural/urban split for 2004, a 
dummy variable is created at UALAD level, taking a value of 1 if 50% or more of 
the UALAD is classed as rural and a value of 0 if less than 50% of the UALAD is 
classed as rural (therefore the UALAD would be considered urban). This follows 
ONS' rural/urban definition, introduced in 2004, where settlements with populations
27 This represents an advantage over the dataset (the Living in Wales Survey) used in chapter two, 
which lacked qualifications data and required the use of a proxy.
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of over 10,000 are classed as urban and settlements with populations of under 10,000 
are classed as rural. Under this classification, there are three types of rural 
settlement: town and fringe, village or hamlet, and dispersed. Whilst I have 
controlled for rural/urban status, I also control more directly for population density 
by including the logarithm of population density at UALAD level (POPDEN), in 
specification (1). This will help control for agglomeration effects.
lnEi = a + AlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aRURALr + alnPOPDENr + aHOUSEPRICEr + 
a YE ARt + Cm (2)
In attempting to control for more regional variation in earnings, a variable based on 
house prices is included in specification (2). A measure of house prices is included, 
taken from data provided by HM Land Registry. The average house price in each 
UALAD is taken, then the deviations away from the national mean house price are 
entered into the regression. This methodology is suggested in Blackaby, Bladen- 
Howell and Symons (1991). This information is not available for Scotland; therefore 
Scotland is omitted from regressions that include house price data. Due to this 
factor, I run all regressions with and without the house price variable. This house 
price variable should be more effective in controlling for regional variation than the 
housing domain scores used in chapter two.
Another way of controlling for regional variation is to include a set of regional 
dummy variables, defined at NUTS 1 level. Both specifications (1) and (2) are 
augmented with this vector of regional dummies, giving specifications (3) and (4).
lnEi = a + AlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aRURALr+ alnPOPDENr+ aREGIONr +
a YE ARt + £iit (3)
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lnEi = a + XlnUrt + PXi + alNDi + aRURALr + alnPOPDENr+ aHOUSEPRICEr +
aREGIONr + a YEARt + 8^ (4)
The impetus to carry out this research using five different levels of unemployment 
rate was provided by Beuttner and Fitzenberger (1998). Beuttner and Fitzenberger 
theorize that wages in the lower portion of the wage distribution are primarily 
determined by central wage bargaining and therefore would be more sensitive to 
national unemployment. Conversely, wages in the higher portion of the wage 
distribution are determined by local wage formation and will be more responsive to 
disaggregated unemployment rates. Beuttner and Fitzenberger use quantile 
regression techniques to draw out these effects; I will do the same. By using 
unemployment rates with five different levels of aggregation, I would expect the 
NUTS 1 level unemployment rate to be one extreme, with high responsiveness at 
lower parts of the wage distribution and the TTWA level unemployment rate to be 
the opposing extreme, displaying high sensitivity in the upper parts of the wage 
distribution. The remaining three levels of unemployment rate (NUTS 2, NUTS 3 
and unitary authority) should provide a middle ground, with the greater sensitivity 
switching from the lower levels of the wage distribution to the upper levels of the 
wage distribution as the degree of disaggregation increases. The work of (froth and 
Johansson (2004) also influences this decision, as they determine that contract 
duration (and therefore wage flexibility) is U-shaped in centralization, a theory I 
hope to test using a wage curve framework.28
Regressions will be carried out for the sample as a whole and then split into separate 
male and female regressions. When running regressions on the sample as a whole, 
the unemployment rate used is the combined, non gender specific ILO 
unemployment rate. When restricting regressions to either male or female, gender 
specific ILO unemployment rates are used. All unemployment rates are entered 
yearly, at their respective levels of aggregation.
28 Both papers are covered in the literature review.
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In an effort to better understand the forces driving the elasticities obtained from the 
primary regressions, further regressions are carried out where the sample is split by 
industry sector, occupational category (SOC2000) and public/private sector 
employment status, qualifications, age group and year.
Before presenting regression results, I look at summary statistics of the variables 
used and also how earnings vary between areas, time and the group divisions 
mentioned previously. All of the following sample statistics are calculated using 
sampling weights and are restricted to full-time workers. Average hourly earnings 
are £11.70 for the full sample, £12.42 for males and £10.59 for females. By relaxing 
the full-time restriction, allowing the inclusion of part-time workers lowers the mean 
of hourly earnings, especially for females, who have the greater proportion of part- 
time workers. Whilst four years may be seen as a relatively short period, it can still 
be useful to look at how hourly earnings have changed over this time frame.
Table 3.4 gives hourly earnings, over time for the sample as a whole and 
disaggregated by gender. Also presented, is the percentage change in hourly 
earnings over the time frame of the sample (2004 to 2007). As expected, hourly 
earnings have risen over the sample period (by 10.84%), but by disaggregating the 
sample it is possible to see which section of the population are the main driving 
forces behind the earnings rise. Here I have disaggregated by gender, revealing an 
hourly earnings increase of 10.45% for males and 11.96% for females, supporting 
the notion that the earnings gap between males and females is closing, albeit at a 
slow rate. A similar type of analysis, foucusing on qualification levels, is carried out 
in chapter five.
Table 3.5 gives mean hourly earnings by NUTS 1 regions. The largest hourly 
earnings are found in London, followed by the South East and the East. This is seen 
for the sample as a whole and when disaggregated by gender. On the lower end of 
the earnings table, Wales and the North East have the lowest mean hourly earnings, 
followed by Yorkshire. When considering that the South West has the fourth highest
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Table 3.4
Mean Hourly Earnings by Year
Full Sample Male Female
2004-2007 11.70 12.42 10.59
2004 11.16 11.87 10.03
2005 11.52 12.22 10.47
2006 12.02 12.76 10.89
2007 12.37 13.11 11.23
% Change 10.84 10.45 11.96
Notes: % change is the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between 2004 and 2007.
Table 3.5
Mean Hourly Earnings by NUTS 1 Regions
2004-2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 % Change
Full Sample
East 12.55 11.83 12.42 12.74 13.18 11.41
East Midlands 10.85 10.12 10.72 11.17 11.20 10.67
London 14.55 14.26 14.12 14.73 15.33 7.50
North East 10.27 9.77 10.12 10.59 10.98 12.38
North West 10.75 10.26 10.48 11.11 11.38 10.92
Scotland 10.99 10.56 10.91 11.31 11.81 11.84
South East 13.07 12.34 12.77 13.34 13.80 11.83
South West 11.18 10.68 10.86 11.60 11.60 8.61
Wales 10.27 9.83 10.35 10.55 11.13 13.22
West Midlands 10.75 10.15 10.49 11.24 11.42 12.51
Yorkshire 10.40 9.99 10.33 10.66 10.94 9.51
Male
East 13.47 12.62 13.31 13.79 14.17 12.28
East Midlands 11.46 10.71 11.24 11.73 11.91 11.20
London 15.42 15.27 15.08 15.51 15.96 4.52
North East 10.83 10.31 10.69 11.13 11.58 12.32
North West 11.40 10.90 10.95 11.83 12.10 11.01
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Scotland 11.65 11.26 11.40 12.06 12.45 10.57
South East 14.19 13.38 13.90 14.45 15.07 12.63
South West 11.98 11.50 11.61 12.38 12.44 8.17
Wales 10.75 10.28 10.89 11.01 11.75 14.30
West Midlands 11.30 10.71 11.08 11.83 11.91 11.20
Yorkshire 10.96 10.58 10.93 11.21 11.42 7.94
Female
East 11.06 10.49 11.01 11.09 11.63 10.87
East Midlands 9.84 9.17 9.89 10.23 9.99 8.94
London 13.35 12.82 12.80 13.69 14.48 12.95
North East 9.39 8.90 9.26 9.77 10.00 12.36
North West 9.77 9.27 9.79 10.05 10.29 11.00
Scotland 10.02 9.52 10.21 10.22 10.86 14.08
South East 11.26 10.61 11.00 11.55 11.83 11.50
South West 9.85 9.29 9.64 10.34 10.21 9.90
Wales 9.51 9.12 9.49 9.85 10.23 12.17
West Midlands 9.85 9.21 9.54 10.27 10.67 15.85
Yorkshire 9.48 8.99 9.33 9.79 10.16 13.01
Notes: % change is the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between 2004 and 2007.
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average hourly earnings, it would seem to support the notion that the North-South 
divide is still a major issue for the economy of the United Kingdom. With regards to 
the narrowing of the North-South earnings gap, table 3.5 presents ambiguous 
evidence. Whilst London and the South West have relatively low rates of earnings 
growth (7.50% and 8.61%, respectively), the East and South East sport fairly high 
earnings growth (11.41% and 11.83%). The NUTS 1 regions that have experienced 
the highest earnings growth over the sample period are Wales (13.22%) and the West 
Midlands (12.51%). Some interesting differences can be seen between earnings 
growth rates of males and females at NUTS 1 level, particularly for London. When 
restricted to males, London has the lowest earnings growth (4.52%), but has the 
fourth highest earnings growth for females (12.95%), whilst still having the largest 
mean hourly earnings for both males and females.
Table 3.6 focuses on the North-South divide. Using the NUTS 1 regions to separate 
the United Kingdom, I have taken the South to consist of London, the East, the 
South East, and the South West, leaving the North to consist of Wales, Scotland, 
East and West Midlands, Yorkshire, the North East and the North West. As 
expected, the South has far higher mean hourly earnings (£13.13 to £10.63 for the 
sample as a whole, £14.05 to £11.21 for males and £11.72 to £9.73 for females). Of 
greater interest may be the change in hourly earnings over the sample period. Whilst 
both regions experience positive growth in earnings across the sample period, the 
North has experienced significantly larger growth of 11.17% compared to 7.80% for 
the South (similar figures are found for males and females separately; 10.55% to7.42 
% and 12.39% to 8.97%).
Continuing the focus on geographical differences in hourly earnings, table 3.7 
presents mean hourly earnings and the percentage change in earnings over the 
rural/urban split. It can be seen that those residing in urban areas enjoy a slight 
advantage in hourly earnings (£11.75 to £11.39), a gap which widens when 
examining workplace. As with the North-South earnings gap, the urban-rural 
earnings gap appears to be closing, as the hourly earnings of those living in rural
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Table 3.6
Mean Hourly Earnings by the North-South Divide
2004-2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 % Change
Full Sample
North
South
10.63
13.13
10.12
12.70
10.51
12.95
10.98
13.30
11.25
13.69
11.17
7.80
Male
North
South
11.21
14.05
10.71
13.61
11.04
13.89
11.58
14.22
11.84
14.62
10.55
7.42
Female
North
South
9.73
11.72
9.20
11.26
9.71
11.53
10.05
11.90
10.34
12.27
12.39
8.97
Notes: %  change is the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between 2004 and 2007.
Table 3.7
Mean Hourly Earnings by Rural/Urban Status
2004-2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 %  Change
Full Sample 
Rural 
Urban
11.39
11.75
10.67
11.21
11.21
11.56
11.62
12.09
12.12
12.41
13.59
10.70
Male
Rural
Urban
12.15
12.46
11.38
11.93
11.98
12.25
12.39
12.82
12.92
13.15
13.53
10.23
Female
Rural
Urban
10.14
10.65
9.48
10.09
9.94
10.53
10.37
10.97
10.79
11.30
13.82
11.99
Notes: % change is the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between 2004 and 2007.
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areas have increased by a greater percentage than those living in urban areas 
(13.59% to 10.70%).
Table 3.8 gives hourly earnings disaggregated by occupational category. As would 
be expected, the top earning occupational categories are professional occupations 
(£16.60) and managers and senior officials (£16.53), followed by associate 
professional and technical (£12.78). For men, managers and senior officials have the 
highest earnings, but for women those in professional occupations earn the most. In 
the previous case, a narrowing of the earnings gap between groups was observed, but 
here, results are slightly unclear. Whilst managers and senior officials have 
experienced relatively high earnings growth over the sample period, those in 
professional occupations have experienced the lowest earnings growth. The largest 
earnings growth over the sample period was enjoyed by process, plant and machine 
operatives (12.52%). This figure is being driven by a very large earnings growth for 
females employed as process, plant and machine operatives (14.17%).
Table 3.9 focuses on divisions by industry sector. The industries leading the hourly 
earnings rankings are banking, finance and insurance (£14.54) and energy and water 
(£13.89), a ranking which holds regardless of gender. Agriculture and fishing 
(£8.03) and distribution, hotels and restaurants (£8.78) are the industry sectors that 
suffer from the lowest hourly earnings. This result makes the figures for earnings 
growth over the sample period all the more interesting. The agriculture and fishing 
sector has experienced an hourly earnings growth of 29.94% between 2004 and 
2007, by far the largest growth experienced by any industrial sector. This figure 
remains fairly constant for both males and females. It is true that the agriculture and 
fishing sector suffers from under representation, making up just 0.74% of the 
sample. However, this does mean that the average earnings figures were calculated 
from over 1,300 individuals. Aside from agriculture and fishing, earnings growth 
appears quite uniform, with the second largest earnings growth in manufacturing 
(12.69%). Additionally, there seems to be quite a large difference in earnings 
growth rates between males and females in the banking, finance and insurance 
sector, with men receiving an hourly earnings growth of just 8.90%, the second
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Table 3.8
Mean Hourly Earnings by Occupation
2004- 2004 2005 2006 2007 %
Full Sample
Managers & Senior Officials 16.53 15.70 16.21 17.06 17.47 11.27
Professional Occupations 16.60 15.94 16.39 16.97 17.38 9.03
Associate Pro. & Technical 12.78 12.18 12.77 12.91 13.56 11.33
Administrative & Secretarial 9.09 8.67 8.98 9.39 9.62 10.96
Skilled Trades Occupations 9.26 8.86 9.26 9.41 9.76 10.16
Personal Service Occupations 7.18 6.80 7.20 7.40 7.52 10.59
Sales & Customer Service 7.21 6.90 7.07 7.41 7.59 10.00
Process, Plant & Machine 8.33 7.91 8.26 8.49 8.90 12.52
Elementary Occupations 6.90 6.61 6.82 7.07 7.23 9.38
Male
Managers & Senior Officials 17.63 16.78 17.27 18.25 18.62 10.97
Professional Occupations 17.36 16.64 17.07 17.80 18.25 9.68
Associate Pro. & Technical 13.62 12.98 13.57 13.81 14.47 11.48
Administrative & Secretarial 9.87 9.52 9.65 10.27 10.22 7.35
Skilled Trades Occupations 9.40 9.00 9.40 9.54 9.91 10.11
Personal Service Occupations 7.99 7.68 7.94 8.12 8.38 9.11
Sales & Customer Service 7.80 7.46 7.58 8.02 8.23 10.32
Process, Plant & Machine 8.55 8.15 8.46 8.69 9.14 12.15
Elementary Occupations 7.20 6.88 7.16 7.37 7.54 9.59
Female
Managers & Senior Officials 14.29 13.43 14.12 14.71 15.23 13.40
Professional Occupations 15.46 14.88 15.35 15.76 16.11 8.27
Associate Pro. & Technical 11.73 11.15 11.79 11.81 12.46 11.75
Administrative & Secretarial 8.79 8.34 8.73 9.03 9.38 12.47
Skilled Trades Occupations 6.90 6.61 6.85 7.12 7.23 9.38
Personal Service Occupations 6.95 6.53 6.97 7.20 7.28 11.49
Sales & Customer Service 6.76 6.50 6.69 6.94 7.07 8.77
Process, Plant & Machine 6.71 6.28 6.75 6.98 7.17 14.17
Elementary Occupations 6.02 5.73 5.89 6.21 6.31 10.12
Notes: % change is the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between 2004 and 2007.
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Table 3.9
Mean Hourly Earnings by Industry
2004- 2004 2005 2006 2007 %
Full Sample
Agriculture & Fishing 8.03 6.98 7.31 8.46 9.07 29.94
Energy & Water 13.89 13.33 13.58 13.95 14.84 11.33
Manufacturing 11.42 10.80 11.19 11.89 12.17 12.69
Construction 11.20 10.67 10.91 11.62 11.77 10.31
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. 8.78 8.41 8.70 8.98 9.20 9.39
Transport & Communication 10.93 10.37 10.91 11.24 11.59 11.76
Banking, Finance & Insurance 14.54 13.87 14.20 14.88 15.47 11.54
Public Administration 12.19 11.68 12.04 12.53 12.77 9.33
Other Services 10.28 9.75 10.07 10.68 10.86 11.38
Male
Agriculture & Fishing 7.96 6.95 7.59 8.27 8.98 29.21
Energy & Water 14.45 13.82 13.93 14.68 15.49 12.08
Manufacturing 11.79 11.19 11.61 12.19 12.54 12.06
Construction 11.30 10.79 11.02 11.70 11.85 9.82
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. 9.44 9.04 9.37 9.67 9.88 9.29
Transport & Communication 11.12 10.54 11.05 11.45 11.81 12.05
Banking, Finance & Insurance 16.22 15.62 15.85 16.59 17.01 8.90
Public Administration 13.72 13.19 13.46 14.21 14.30 8.42
Other Services 11.17 10.63 10.73 11.34 12.14 14.21
Female
Agriculture & Fishing 8.28 7.08 6.24 9.19 9.39 32.63
Energy & Water 11.60 11.06 12.06 10.99 12.45 12.57
Manufacturing 10.13 9.39 9.70 10.83 10.93 16.40
Construction 10.31 9.61 9.93 10.91 11.03 14.78
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. 7.73 7.39 7.68 7.91 8.11 9.74
Transport & Communication 10.26 9.69 10.41 10.53 10.79 11.35
Banking, Finance & Insurance 12.07 11.34 11.83 12.30 13.15 15.96
Public Administration 11.22 10.68 11.14 11.50 11.83 10.77
Other Services 9.05 8.53 9.14 9.75 9.13 7.03
Notes: % change is the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between 2004 and 2007.
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lowest earnings growth for men, but women have seen a large growth in earnings of 
15.96%, although the banking, finance and insurance sector has been had the largest 
earnings in all years for both men and women.
Finally, table 3.10 disaggregates between public and private sector employment. 
Those employed in the public sector enjoy an earnings advantage over those in 
private sector employment (£12.59 to £11.37). This earnings advantage remains for 
both males and females. With regards to hourly earnings growth over the sample 
period, those in the private sector have experienced slightly higher earnings growth 
(11.07% to 10.76%). The gap in earnings growth is larger for women (12.78% to 
11.74%) than for men (10.70% to 10.18%).
Table 3.10
M ean Hourly Earnings by Em ploym ent Sector
2004-2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 % Change
Full Sample
Private 11.37 10.84 11.17 11.66 12.04 11.07
Public 12.59 11.99 12.44 13.00 13.28 10.76
Male
Private 12.13 11.59 11.93 12.43 12.83 10.70
Public 13.56 12.97 13.28 14.04 14.29 10.18
Female
Private 9.85 9.31 9.67 10.12 10.50 12.78
Public 11.79 11.16 11.74 12.15 12.47 11.74
Notes: %  change is the percentage change in mean hourly earnings between 2004 and 2007.
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3.4 Results
In this section, I present, analyse and discuss results obtained from regressions of log 
hourly pay upon local unemployment. As noted in the methodology section, each 
specification is repeated, once with the house price variable included, and once with 
it omitted. Those regressions containing the house price variable have omitted the 
Scottish section of the sample, as house price data was not available for Scotland. 
Before focusing on the effects on unemployment on earnings, I present a full set of 
results from specifications (1) and (2).
Full results of specifications (1) and (2) reveal that the unemployment elasticity of 
earnings is initially -.04122, but falls to insignificance once the house price variable 
is added (for unemployment rate at NUTS 1 level). This is due to the inclusion of 
house prices ‘mopping up’ much of the regional variation that may have been 
attributed to the unemployment rate. The unemployment elasticity will be focused 
on throughout the results section; for now I will comment on the wider results. The 
population density variable is positive, suggesting that earnings increase with 
agglomeration. The coefficient on the rural dummy is also positive in specification 
(1), but this becomes negative after the introduction of the house price variable. 
Returns are positive to men, size of employer, public sector employment and 
intermediate/higher qualifications. Negative returns are found for marriage (a result 
found by Johnes, 2007, in his study of the wage curve). Relative to the omitted 
group of banking, finance and insurance, returns are negative for other industry 
sectors. I will now turn my attention to the unemployment elasticity of earnings.
Region
Table 3.12 presents unemployment elasticities for the sample as a whole (not 
disaggregated by gender) and for regions from specification (1). The regions in rows
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Table 3.11
Full Regression Results for Specifications (1) and (2)
Specification (1) Specification (2)
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
Log Unemployment Rate
. .....  ^ '■ ' 1 1 W W W  ' '
-.04122 7.44 -.00293 0.50
Log Population Density .02225*” 22.97 .00706*” 6.10
House Price - - .24818"* 87.65
Rural .02217*** 5.95 -.03743” ’ 8.95
Male .13496 61.71 .13442*" 57.84
Age .06792’** 112.39 .06803’** 105.44
Age2 -.00078 105.18 -.00078*** 99.38
Public .01529’*’ 4.39 .02318 6.16
Job Tenure .00971*** 74.58 .0098 70.10
Health Limit -.08997*” 25.92 -.08467*** 22.86
Married -.08059*” 35.14 -.08334*** 34.20
Plant Size
25 to 49 .06752” * 20.66 .07093*” 20.24
50 to 499 .10277” * 40.51 .10594**’ 39.14
500 and over .17741” * 57.90 .18085"’ 55.55
Ethnicity
White .04446 4.09 .09546*** 8.76
Mixed .06764*” 3.93 .08204” * 4.73
Asian -.02318* 1.90 .0068 0.56
Black -.01922 1.43 -.01516 1.13
Chinese -.01326 0.61 .00221 0.10
Industry
Agriculture & Fishing -.39126*** 33.10 -.37481 28.35
Energy & Water -.0532*" 6.52 -.06737” * 7.11
Manufacturing -.19785*** 56.36 -.16973*" 45.66
Construction -.11467” ’ 24.50 -.08718*** 17.28
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. -.28792 78.16 ^ * * *-.26909 69.14
Transport & Comms. -.20151*** 45.79 -.1872**’ 40.40
Public Administration -.18712*” 46.47 -.17187*** 39.87
Other Services -.26914 49.46 -.26099"’ 45.04
Qualifications
PhD .58273*”  . . 58.57 . .54446’” . 51.70
Masters .55552” * 93.07 .50776*** 79.98
PGCE .51379” ’ 62.66 .48588**’ 56.35
First Degree .44013*** 110.91 .40792*" 95.97
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Higher Education .25294*” 60.17
_ _ _ _ _ *** .25805 56.14
A Level .09847*” 27.50 .10549"* 27.33
GCSE .00078 0.21 .00894** 2.28
Other -.06055*” 14.46 -.06107*” 13.81
Year
2005 .04316 15.77 .03804 13.00
2006 .07901*** 28.11 .07292*** 24.08
2007 .10343 37.24 .09378” * 31.29
Constant .37721*** 14.79 32052*** 11.48
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
regions.
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Table 3.12
Wage Flexibility by Region (House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample -.04122*** -.06915*** -.11031*** -.12211*** -.04275
(7.44) (16.40) (30.82) (38.41) (13.60)
East - .29592*** -.12867*** -.12867’** .0921***
- (4.93) (6.65) (6.65) (7.64)
East Midlands - -.12965*** -.10556*** -.09424**’ -.04109
- (3.53) (7.45) (6.61) (2.95)
London - .10947*** -.07041*** -.09747*** .0739
- (3.05) (3.20) (7.23) (1.56)
North East - -.00488 -.00002 -.0357” -.00816
- (0.06) (0.00) (2.43) (0.49)
North West - -.05332*** -.07556 -.10611*** .0175
- (3.22) (4.16) (9.67) (1.29)
Scotland - -.04464*** -.04581*** -.09135” * -.04052” *
- (3.00) (4.72) (10.55) (4.70)
South East - -.18642*** 4 *^**-.13235 -.15071*** -.00764
- (5.97) (9.84) (12.94) (0.66)
South West - -.20379*** -.10865*** -.07789**’ -.03279*’*
- (7.29) (6.97) (5.99) (3.23)
Wales - -.27559*** -.05712***
_____ *** 
-.07903 -.03373
- (9.11) (4.35) (7.44) (3.45)
West Midlands - .08611*** .00192 -.004 .04225***
- (5.82) (0.13) (0.29) (3.96)
Yorkshire - -.02928* -.06732 -.05721*** -.0377
- (1.75) (4.27) (4.02) (3.09)
London & SE .23551*** .18792*** .03316*** -.04935*** .1046***
(20.78) (18.34) (3.45) (6.06) (10.76)
Rest England * ~ — * * *  -.18527 -.09409*** -.10598*** -.09983*’’ -.02284***
(22.54) (16.53) (21.17) (22.25) (5.60)
Rest UK -.19506*** -.11186*** -.10354*** -.10633*** -.03933***
(26.39) (23.42) (26.79) (30.51) (11.95)
North -.07952*** -.05405*** -.06978*** -.08461*** -.02765***
(5.75) (9.15) (15.20) (20.97) (6.93)
South .29489*** .22218*** .06138*** .00019 .11019***
. (33.81) . . (28.59) . . (8.85) . . (0.03)- - - (19.-30) -
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of hourly
earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by region
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two to twelve are NUTS 1 regions and the remainder are NUTS 1 regions aggregated 
into larger areas of interest.29 The house price variable is omitted. Focusing on the 
top row, all unemployment elasticities are negative and significant for the different 
levels of unemployment rate aggregation used. However, the magnitude of the 
elasticity varies wildly. At the NUTS 1 level of aggregation, unemployment 
elasticity is -.04122, but this rises as disaggregation increases, reaching -.12211 at 
unitary authority level, before falling back to -.04275 at TTWA level. These figures 
are comparable to elasticities obtained by previous studies of the UK wage curve, 
and fit reasonably well with Blanchflower and Oswald's suggested elasticity of -.1 
and Nijkamp and Poofs publication bias adjusted elasticity of -.07.
This result of wage flexibility being U shaped in the level of centralization has been 
previously identified by Groth and Johansson (2004), although using differing 
methodology. Groth and Johansson’s model links wage flexibility and wage 
bargaining centralization together via contract duration. They find, as here, that 
wages are more flexible under intermediate centralization systems than for 
centralized or decentralized systems, as contracts are shorter. Groth and Johansson 
split contracting costs into a fixed menu cost and a variable co-ordination cost, 
finding that, as co-ordination costs are convex in the degree of centralization, a 
sufficiently large fixed cost causes the U shaped wage flexibility they encounter. 
This fits with the results of table 3.12, as wage flexibility at intermediate levels of 
centralization (especially NUTS 3 and UA levels) exceed those at the extremes of 
NUTS 1 and TTWA.
Whilst I am unaware of other studies that examine the unemployment elasticity of 
earnings using several levels of unemployment rate, Baltagi et al. (2008) enter the 
German unemployment rate at a highly disaggregated level (326 areas). They report
29 London and SE is restricted to London and South East England; Rest of England is made up of 
East England, East Midlands, North East, North West, South West, West Midlands and Yorkshire; 
Rest of UK is the same as Rest of England, but additionally including Wales and Scotland; South of 
the UK consists of London, the East, South East and South West; North of the UK includes East 
Midlands, North East, North West, Scotland, Wales, West Midlands and Yorkshire.
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a short-run elasticity of -.016 and a long-run elasticity of -.037, which are small in 
comparison to the majority of elasticities reported in the literature.
Rows two to twelve present the unemployment elasticities found when restricting the 
sample to individual NUTS 1 regions. There are no elasticities reported for the 
NUTS 1 level unemployment rate, as there would be little variation in the 
unemployment rate within each of the NUTS 1 regions. When restricted to singular 
NUTS 1 regions, the reported unemployment elasticities show large variation. 
Considering the NUTS 2 level of aggregation first, significant and negative 
elasticities are found for seven of the eleven NUTS 1 regions, the largest for Wales, 
the South East and the South West. Only the North East exhibits an insignificant 
unemployment elasticity. The remaining three regions (the East, London and West 
Midlands) display significant and positive elasticities. These positive elasticities and 
the extremely large magnitude of some of the negative elasticities may be due to the 
low number of NUTS 2 regions found within each of the NUTS 1 regions distorting 
results. There are 36 NUTS 2 regions that are split between eleven NUTS 1 regions. 
The distribution of these regions is shown below:
Table 3.13
Number of NUTS 2 Regions in each NUTS 1 Region
NUTS 1 Region Number of NUTS 2 Regions
East 3
East Midlands 3
London 2
North East 2
North West 5
Scotland 4
South East 4
South West 4
Wales 2
West Midlands 3
Yorkshire 4
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Table 3.13 confirms the concern that there is insufficient variation causing some of 
the more suspect results encountered in table 3.12. Indeed, the North East which 
returned insignificant results contains only 2 NUTS 2 regions. Of the NUTS 1 
regions that produced positive elasticities, London also has just two NUTS 2 regions, 
whilst the East of England and the West Midlands consist of three NUTS 2 regions 
each. Wales proves to be an anomaly, as it returns a significant and negative 
coefficient (-.27559), but is also made up of only 2 NUTS 2 regions. However, the 
size of this coefficient seems infeasible. Due to these concerns, results from 
regressions with minimal variation in the unemployment rate should be interpreted 
with care.
Examining column 3 of table 3.12, unemployment elasticities at NUTS 3 level, nine 
of the eleven NUTS 1 regions report significant and negative elasticities. The 
remaining two regions (the North East and West Midlands) do not exhibit a 
significant result. By increasing the level of disaggregation in the unemployment 
rate, the previous problems of positive or unfeasibly large negative elasticities has 
been eliminated. The areas reporting the largest elasticities are the South East and 
the East (-.13235 and -.12867).
Column 4 increases the level of disaggregation of the unemployment rate further, to 
unitary authority level. Now, ten of the eleven NUTS 1 regions exhibit significant 
negative unemployment elasticity, with only the West Midlands failing to display a 
significant elasticity. In terms of magnitude, the South East and the East are once 
again the largest (-.15071 and -.12867).30 At this level of disaggregation, Wales has 
an unemployment elasticity of -.07903, which is close to the elasticity of -.09161 
obtained in the previous chapter using a different dataset and a different set of 
controls.
30 Elasticities for the East are the same for NUTS 3 and unitary authority level, as geographies are the 
same, just with a split in Bedfordshire.
Finally, results from the highest level of disaggregation, TTWA level, are shown in 
the final column of table 3.12. When running regressions for the sample as a whole, 
the magnitude of the elasticity falls to less than half its previous value, at -.04275. 
The results for individual NUTS 1 regions at this level of disaggregation are less 
uniform than at the previous two unemployment rates. At TTWA unemployment 
rate level, only five of the eleven NUTS 1 regions display negative and significant 
unemployment elasticity. As the magnitude of the elasticity for the sample as a 
whole has fallen, so has the magnitude of the individual regional elasticities. Of the 
remaining six NUTS 1 regions, two have significant and positive elasticities (East of 
England and West Midlands, both of which had positive elasticities at NUTS 2 
level), whilst four (London, North East, North West and South East) fail to display a 
significant coefficient.
The final five rows of table 3.12 give unemployment elasticities for areas of interest 
aggregated from the NUTS 1 regions. London and the South East of England report 
a positive elasticity for all unemployment rates up to and including NUTS 3 level 
and at TTWA level, with a negative elasticity at unitary authority level. A similar 
pattern is found for the South of the UK, with positive elasticities at all levels of 
aggregation except for unitary authority (which is insignificant). It is possible that 
these results are distorted by a London effect (which is controlled for by the use of 
regional/London dummy variables in Table 3.14).
The remaining three areas of interest (the rest of England, rest of the UK and North 
of the UK) display significant negative unemployment elasticities at all 
unemployment rate levels. The previously discussed problems at NUTS 1 level are 
present, with very large negative elasticities reported, particularly for the rest of 
England and the rest of the UK. At levels of disaggregation higher than NUTS 1 
level, the reported elasticities are similar to those found for the sample as a whole. 
The removal of the London (and South East) areas suggests that distortion from 
London is not the cause of the fall in elasticity at TTWA level.
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Table 3.14 reports unemployment elasticities for the sample as a whole and for the 
five areas of interest detailed above, with dummy variables for NUTS 1 regions 
inserted. Due to the insertion of these dummy variables, elasticities at NUTS 1 level 
must be interpreted with caution, due to most of the variation in unemployment rate 
being controlled for via the regional dummies. Most results are insignificant, except 
for the South of the UK and London and the South East, which report large, positive 
elasticities. Results at NUTS 2 level and above are of greater interest. As seen in 
the previous section, there appear to be two sets of behaviour: one belonging to the 
Southern areas (the South of the UK and London and the South East) and another to 
the more Northern areas (the North of the UK, the rest of England and the rest of the 
UK). The Northern areas tend to behave in much the same way as the sample as a 
whole. In comparison to the previous set of results (without regional dummies), as 
expected, the coefficients have decreased in magnitude, due to the additional 
controls. For the sample as a whole, elasticity increases in magnitude, until reaching 
-.08318 at unitary authority level and then falling to insignificance at TTWA level.31 
Similar results are found for the Northern areas, although the rest of England posts a 
positive coefficient at TTWA level. The South of the UK and London and the South 
East both show significant and negative unemployment elasticities (between -.08612 
and -.09926) at NUTS 3 and unitary authority level, whilst London and the South 
East fails to reach significance at TTWA level. This supports my earlier concern 
that a London effect was dominating and distorting results in these restricted 
regressions (which has now been controlled for).
Table 3.15 introduces the house price variable with specification (2). It is hoped that 
the house price variable will control for a wide variety of regional differences in non­
price amenities (Roback, 1982, and Blackaby and Murphy, 1990), along with 
earnings differences between areas. The methodology is based on that found in 
Blackaby, Bladen-Howell and Symons (1991), where the average house price in 
each unitary authority is calculated, then the deviations away from the national 
average house price is entered into the model at unitary authority level......................
31 Dummy variables at unitary authority level were also tested, but caused all unemployment 
elasticities to become statistically insignificant.
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Table 3.14
Wage Flexibility by Aggregated Regions (NUTS 1 Dummies Included, House
Price Variable Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample .00536 -.02499***
^  „  *♦* 
-.06817 -.08318*** -.00558
(0.27) (4.34) (16.21) (23.24) (1.59)
London & SE .21364*** .05424*** -.08612***
. .  ..*** 
-.0943 .00445
(3.32) (3.16) (7.81) (11.32) (0.39)
Rest England -.03586 -.01983*** -.0752 -.07634*** .00799*
(0.81) (2.73) (12.94) (15.15) (1.77)
Rest UK -.02961 -.04067*** -.06712 -.080603*** -.00725**
(1.42) (6.72) (14.85) (20.44) (2.00)
North -.02869 -.03334*** -.05608***
.  _  .  . *** 
-.0764 -.01621***
(1.34) (5.27) (11.40) (17.87) (3.91)
South .15976*** .00833 -.09926*** -.09559*** .01835***
(3.22) (0.60) (12.23) (14.66) (2.84)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (3); dependent variable is the log of  
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
regions.
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Table 3.15
Wage Flexibility by Region (House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample -.00293 -.01771*** -.02509*** -.0311*** .00674*
(0.50) (3.85) (6.05) (8.37) (1.94)
East - .10049* -.0267 -.0267 .02938"
- (1.68) (1.35) (1.35) (2.38)
East Midlands - -.03187 -.04729*** -.04666*** -.00378
- (0.84) (3.00) (3.08) (0.26)
London - .06539* .01653 -.03241** .15737
- (1.82) (0.71) (2.13) (3.29)
North East - -.19926** .00612 -.02052 .01179
- (2.36) (0.34) (1.37) (0.70)
North West - -.01967 -.00677 -.03964*** .01927
- (1.18) (0.36) (3.23) (1-43)
Scotland - - - - -
South East _ -.01167 -.03398** -.04706*” -.00674
- (0.37) (2.44) (3.78) (0.59)
South West - -.17413*** -.08476**’ -.05893*** -.02174**
- (6.07) (5.03) (4-31) (2.11)
Wales - -.09826** -.00994 -.03673*** -.01171
- (2.24) (0.71) (3.10) (1.17)
West Midlands - -.00554 -.01586 -.012 .00004
- (0.35) (1.06) (0.87) (0.00)
Yorkshire - .08195*** -.00732 -.00943 .00523
- (3.64) (0.37) (0.56) (0.37)
London & SE .14755*** .08479*** .02499*** -.01642** .06929***
(12.52) (7.72) (2.63) (2.02) (7.15)
Rest England -.00223 .01241** -.00813 -.01474*** .02292’**
(0.23) (1.99) (1.45) (2.94) (5.49)
Rest UK -.0073 .00473 -.01388*** -.02122***
_ „ __*** 
.01535
(0.78) (0.78) (2.73) (4.67) (4.03)
North
_ ,  ^  _ *** 
-.06374 .00042 -.02828**’
. . _ _ ,*** 
-.03596 .00061
(3.85) (0.06) (4.80) (6.93) (0.13)
South .17305 .09933*** .04273 .01591*** .07151***
(18.38) (11.71) (6.24) (2.64) (12.52)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (2); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
regions.
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The effect of including house prices as an explanatory variable is greatly decreased 
levels of elasticity. Mean house prices are able to explain such a large proportion of 
the variation in earnings between areas, that a large decrease in the magnitude of the 
unemployment elasticities was not unexpected. However, even with such large 
decreases in the magnitude of the unemployment elasticity, the previous finding of 
wage flexibility peaking over moderate levels of disaggregation (and therefore 
centralization) still holds. This method appears to better control for regional 
differences than the housing domain of the WIMD that was used in chapter two. 
Looking at the sample as a whole, an insignificant result is found at the NUTS 1 
level and a small positive elasticity is found for the TTWA level. At moderate levels 
of centralization, unemployment elasticity is found to be between -.01771 and - 
.0311. Due to the decreases in the magnitude of the elasticities, results for individual 
NUTS 1 regions would be considered somewhat erratic.32 As previously mentioned, 
results at NUTS 2 level are affected by the low variation in unemployment rates 
when constrained to individual NUTS 1 regions. Due to the inclusion of the house 
price variable controlling for much of the regional variation, results at NUTS 3 level 
are not as strong as in the house price free specification. Only results for three 
NUTS 1 regions are significant and display the expected negative coefficient (East 
Midlands, South East and South West). The remainder fail to display significant 
results. Results are somewhat improved when increasing the level of disaggregation 
to unitary authority level, with six of the ten NUTS 1 regions experiencing 
significant negative unemployment elasticity. Due to the effect of adding a house 
price variable greatly diminishing the magnitude of the unemployment elasticity 
coefficients, the results at TTWA level (which are increasing in wage rigidity, as set 
out previously) don't offer much in the way of compelling evidence in support of the 
wage curve. As can be seen in the case of the sample as a whole, at TTWA level, 
results are insignificant or positive. This finding is repeated for NUTS 1 regions, 
with only three posting significant results; one negative (the South West) and two 
positive (London and the East). This result may seem somewhat disappointing, but 
knowing that wages become more rigid at high levels of decentralization and that the 
addition of a variable representing house prices will control for a large portion, of the 
variation between regions, the largely insignificant result is not Mi oily surprising.
32 Due to house price data being unavailable for Scotland, there are no results for Scotland.
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Focusing on the lower portions of table 3.15, results for the South of the UK and 
London and the South East are similar to those presented in table 3.14, only with the 
magnitude greatly decreased due to the presence of the house price variable. Results 
for the remaining three areas of interest are also similar to those in table 3.15, but the 
addition of the house price variable has caused several of the coefficients to become 
either positive or insignificant.
There is not an appreciable improvement in the full sample results when adding 
regional dummies to the specification (table 3.16). For the sample as a whole, 
elasticities at NUTS 2, NUTS 3 and unitary authority levels remain significant and 
negative, but the coefficient on NUTS 1 unemployment has become positive. 
Results for the rest of England and the rest of the UK again remain largely the same, 
with a small increase in magnitude. Results for the North of the UK appear to have 
deteriorated (in respect to the expected wage curve result). Without controlling for 
house price variation, negative elasticities were found at NUTS 1, NUTS 3 and 
unitary authority levels of disaggregation.33 However, after inserting regional 
dummies into the specification, significant negative elasticities are found only at 
NUTS 3 and unitary authority level (positive elasticities are found at NUTS 2 and 
TTWA level). Conversely, results for the South of the UK and London and the 
South East have benefited by the inclusion of regional dummy variables. Without 
regional dummies, elasticities were found to be primarily positive, which would be 
unexpected according to previous wage curve literature (instead supporting the 
theory of compensating differentials). With regional dummies, at the three 
intermediate levels of centralization, the South of the UK and London and the South 
East exhibit the expected negative unemployment elasticities. That die South of the 
UK and London and the South East only display the expected negative sign on the 
unemployment coefficient when regional dummies are included may mean that the 
NUTS 1 dummies are controlling for a London based effect, distorting results due to 
the'difference's between the regional economy of the capital and the regional
33 Although due to the low level of variation when the sample is geographically restricted, results at 
NUTS 1 level of disaggregation may be considered unreliable.
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Table 3.16
Wage Flexibility by Aggregated Regions (NUTS 1 Dummies Included, House
Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample .12564*** -.01264** -.03345*** -.0416*** .01072***
(4.12) (1.96) (6.92) (10.13) (2.76)
London & SE .26638 -.04442** -.04562*** -.04981*** .01532
(4.17) (2.54) (4.12) (5.86) (1.37)
Rest England -.06161 .00987 -.02578 -.02959 .01406***
(1.41) (1.35) (4.28) (5.61) (3.13)
Rest UK -.02227 .0078 -.02175*** -.02913*** .01103***
(0.55) (1.11) (3.95) (6.09) (2.70)
North -.00541 .02113*** -.01261** -.0251*** .01053**
(0.13) (2.78) (2.01) (4.63) (2.14)
South .21551*** -.06604*** -.05526*** -.05192*** .01837***
(4.38) (4.72) (6.74) (7.80) (2.87)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (4); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
regions.
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economies of the surrounding areas. After controlling for regional differences via 
the NUTS 1 dummies, significant negative elasticities are displayed.
To better understand the results examined thus far, the sample can be split by gender. 
The results for males are presented in table 3.17. The house price variable is not 
included. When the sample is restricted to males, results are very similar to the 
results obtained for the sample as a whole, albeit with increased magnitude. Without 
the house price variable, elasticities between the NUTS 1 and unitary authority level 
of disaggregation are between -.11877 and -.12877, reducing to -.06031 at TTWA 
level. A difference to the sample as a whole is that elasticity at NUTS 1 level is 
greater, which reduces support for Groth and Johansson’s (2004) model that suggests 
wage flexibility will be U-shaped in centralization. Elasticities of NUTS 1 regions 
and areas of interest are again very similar to results for the sample as a whole, with 
small variations in the magnitude of the elasticities.
The addition of the house price variable reduces the magnitude of the elasticities, as 
seen in previous regressions, but again, results are similar to those seen for the 
sample as a whole (table 3.18). These findings are confirmed when adding NUTS 1 
region dummies to the specification (results for specifications 3 and 4 available in 
appendix). Results, when limited to females, appear weaker than those obtained for 
the sample as a whole and for men only. The findings are given in tables 3.19 and 
3.20 .
Only at NUTS 3 and unitary authority level do females exhibit significant and 
negative unemployment elasticity (at -.03459 and -.05029). Several previous studies 
have failed to find a significant wage curve for females (Pannenberg and Schwarze, 
1998, and Collier, 2000). These smaller coefficients would suggest that the wages of 
females are less responsive to the local unemployment rate than the wages of males. 
A large, positive elasticity is found for women at NUTS 1 level (with a smaller 
positive elasticity at NUTS 2 level). When combined with the large negative 
elasticity found for men at this level, a small, negative elasticity for the sample as a
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Table 3.17
Wage Flexibility by Region (Males Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample -.12877*** 1 H—t
 
00
* * *
-.12527**’ -.12608*** -.06031***
(19.10) (23.39) (29.89) (35.01) (16.79)
East - -.07539 -.16291*** -.16204*’* .037”
- (1-14) (6.74) (6.74) (2.46)
East Midlands - -.04713 -.10004*** -.07406*** -.0337”
- (L15) (5.62) (4.53) (2.14)
London - .13538” -.08665*’* -.08826*** .10815*
- (2.56) (3.21) (6.23) (1.75)
North East - -.21998 .03945* -.00304 .04829”
- (1.22) (1.83) (0.17) (2.40)
North West -
_ _ _ _ -  * * *  
-.05352 -.05773*** -.07228*” .01126
- (2.61) (2.69) (5.50) (0.78)
Scotland - -.06899*** -.02661** -.06605*** -.02224”
- (3.74) (2.25) (7.27) (2.28)
South East - -.28068*** -.10513*** -.13982**’ -.00596
- (6.90) (6.44) (10.25) (0.43)
South West - -.17922*** -.09436**’ -.0838**’ -.0353***
- (5.75) (6.16) (5.95) (3.41)
Wales - -.32131 -.06616*** . _ . _ . * * *  -.08954 -.03184***
- (8.78) (4.16) (7.24) (2.77)
West Midlands - .11072*** .016 .00036 .04513***
- (5.96) (0.89) (0.02) (3.38)
Yorkshire - -.00677 -.04846** -.0345** -.01949
- (0.36) (2.37) (1.97) (1.40)
London & SE .20428*** .14877*** -.00128 -.07446*** .06734***
(13.28) (10.60) (0.10) (7.94) (5.50)
Rest England -.18892**’ -.09741*’* -.10099*** -.09114*** -.03199**’
(19.54) (14.42) (17.41) (17.49) (6.92)
Rest UK -.19807*** -.11972 -.09935*** -.09708*** -.04363***
(23.06) (21.21) (22.07) (24.47) (11.69)
North -.07875*** -.05734***
_ _ _ . ^ * * *  
-.05941 -.06998*** -.02143***
(4.86) (8.14) (10.86) (15.25) (4.70)
South .26494*** .17085 .01267 ~  - *** -.04331 .06384***
(21.50) (16.00) (1.49) (6.04) (9.40)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1}; dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
regions; restricted to men.
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Table 3.18
Wage Flexibility by Region (Males Only, House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample -.0396*** -.04005*** -.04119*** -.04519*** -.01011**
(5.40) (7.03) (8.31) (10.45) (2.51)
East - -.07929 -.04274* -.04377* -.02529*
- (1.22) (1.70) (1.75) (1.65)
East Midlands - .00879 -.05657*** -.03425** -.0156
- (0.21) (3.03) (2.00) (0.99)
London - .0793 -.01567 -.04505*” .1849
- (1.50) (0.56) (2.96) (2.98)
North East - -.39217** .04515** .00741 .05995***
- (2.14) (2.10) (0.42) (2.96)
North West - -.03001 -.00456 -.02505* .01096
- (1.46) (0.21) (1.79) (0.76)
Scotland - - - - -
South East _ -.08028* -.03824** -.07071*** -.01569
- (1.92) (2.30) (4.99) (1.16)
South West - -.15138*** -.07246*** . . . . .«* -.06403 -.02636”
- (4.78) (4.45) (4.30) (2.52)
Wales - -.15859*** -.01726
_ . _ A ,*** 
-.04926 -.00848
- (2.91) (1.02) (3.59) (0.72)
West Midlands - .01157 -.02336 -.02504 -.00744
- (0.57) (1.30) (1.52) (0.54)
Yorkshire - .06047** -.01262 -.00891 .00108
- (2.55) (0.54) (0.47) (0.07)
London & SE .11526*** .04719*** -.00618 -.0465*** .04006***
(7.22) (3.18) (0-51) (4.96) (3.29)
Rest England -.01805 .00413 -.01469** -.01708’** .00738
(1.58) (0.55) (2.27) (2.96) (1.56)
Rest UK -.01905* -.0057 -.02082***
_  ^ . _*** 
-.02545 .00223
(1.72) (0.79) (3.53) (4.88) (0.51)
North -.03208* .00294
_ _ ,  ^4 *** 
-.02464 -.03042*** -.0001
(1.68) (0.35) (3.54) (5.12) (0.02)
South .12974*** .04559*** .00445 -.02165 .03305***
(9.81) (3.99) (0.53) (3.05) (4.88)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (2); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
regions; restricted to men.
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Table 3.19
Wage Flexibility by Region (Females Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample .11314*** .02867*** -.03459*** -.05029*** .00481
(13.36) (4.57) (6.80) (11.35) (1.12)
East - .5785*** -.04105* -04105* .10006***
- (7.70) (1.76) (1.76) (6.07)
East Midlands - -.15151*** -.07024*** -.06713*** -.01797
- (2.86) (3.88) (3.53) (1.08)
London - .07644 -.03548 -.03786** .06178
- (1.63) (L19) (2.31) (0.92)
North East - .08717 -.01619 -.03111* -.03188
- (L18) (0.60) (1.65) (1.51)
North West - -.03093 -.03959* -.07133 .00099
- (1.33) (1.73) (5.47) (0.07)
Scotland - -.00481 -.04792*** -.07823 -.04657**’
- (0.24) (3.77) (6.23) (3.98)
South East - -.03328 -.11487*** -.11244*** -.00925
- (0.91) (6.72) (7.29) (0.67)
South West - -.08944** -.03527 -.02135 -.00713
- (2.27) (1.41) (1.25) (0.51)
Wales - -.17287*** -.0186 -.02369 -.03304**
- (3.20) (1.04) (L63) (2.43)
West Midlands - .01355 -.00829 -.00942 .02742*
- (0.64) (0.42) (0.52) (1.66)
Yorkshire - -.08057*** -.04869*** -.04165** -.04665***
- (3.43) (2.78) (2.57) (3.27)
London & SE .26121*** .20573*** .05472*** -.00249 .09479***
(16.14) (14.85) (4.48) (0.24) (8.07)
Rest England -.13769 -.05814**’ -.05552 -.05246*’* -.00085
(10.17) (6.77) (7.95) (8.85) (0.16)
Rest UK -.14175*** -.06684*** -.0606*** -.06108*** -.0173***
(11.50) (9.17) (10.96) (12.59) (3.83)
North -.03742* -.03986***
- „*** 
-.0495 -.05622*** -.02624***
(1.79) (4.60) (7.90) (10.30) (4.96)
South .29673*** .23898*** .09386*** .04228*** .10774***
. (25.40) . - (23.55) ■ - (10.46) (5.46) (14.77)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of hourly
earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by regions; restricted to 
women.
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whole is found, prompting the U-shape in the full sample unemployment elasticity. 
Groth and Johansson do not disaggregate by gender in their study, but my research 
points to the U-shape in wage flexibility being influenced by the gender 
composition. Making comparisons between genders at a regional level, it can be 
seen that there are large differences in unemployment elasticity between males and 
females. Several instances where unemployment elasticity is larger for women at 
NUTS 3 and unitary authority levels occur, for Scotland (at NUTS 3 and UA level), 
the South East (at NUTS 3 level) and Yorkshire (at NUTS 3 and UA levels), 
although these differences are small and statistically insignificant.34
When the house price variable is added to the specification, for males and the sample 
as a whole, large decreases in the magnitude of the unemployment elasticities are 
exhibited. When restricted to just females, this effect is far more prominent, 
primarily due to the already smaller unemployment elasticities (table 3.20). When 
looking at the UK as a whole, unemployment elasticity for females is significant 
(except at unitary authority level), however, it is positive.
When restricting the female sample to individual NUTS 1 regions, the majority do 
not display significant elasticities. Only three regions exhibit the expected negative 
elasticity: the South West and West Midlands (at NUTS 2 level) and Wales (at 
TTWA level). The addition of regional dummy variables to the female specification 
improves results slightly, with significant negative results found at NUTS 3 and 
unitary authority levels before the inclusion of the house price variable, and at 
unitary authority level thereafter (table 3.A6). When house prices are included, the 
magnitude of the unemployment elasticity is very small, at -.0168.
34 Due to concerns regarding the validity of results at the NUTS 2 level of disaggregation when 
restricting the sample to individual regions, we have not discussed any differences appearing at this 
level.
Table 3.20
Wage Flexibility by Region (Females Only, House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample .05755*** .02335*** .01059* .00168 .02013***
(6.53) (3.49) (1.89) (0.35) (4.40)
East - .3268*** -.00269 -.00269 .05573***
- (4.16) (0.12) (0.12) (3.32)
East Midlands - -.04758 -.01673 -.02572 .01964
- (0.85) (0.80) (1.26) (1.11)
London - .04884 .03373 -.002 .13132*
- (1.04) (1.06) (0.12) (1.94)
North East - -.03594 -.01495 -.01895 -.01529
- (0.43) (0.56) (0.99) (0.71)
North West - .00338 -.00127 -.02064 -.00431
- (0.14) (0.06) (1.45) (0.32)
Scotland - - - - -
South East _ .07908** -.02061 -.00926 .00555
- (2.16) (1.16) (0.56) (0.41)
South West - -.06883* -.0176 -.01437 -.00251
- (L70) (0.67) (0.83) (0.18)
Wales - .03914 .00707 -.00039 -.02329*
- (0.52) (0.38) (0.03) (1.70)
West Midlands - -.04631** .00203 .00199 -.0034
- (2.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.20)
Yorkshire - .01821 .01677 .01491 -.00423
- (0.60) (0.79) (0.78) (0.26)
London & SE .18348*** .12101*** .04628*** .01356 .06925***
(10.93) (8.17) (3.83) (1.33) (5.93)
Rest England .02941** .02453*** .01171 .00265 .02274***
(1.96) (2.70) (1.58) (0.42) (4.18)
Rest UK .01959 .02143** .00767 .00017 .0154***
(1.34) (2.43) (1.13) (0.03) (3.06)
North -.05853** -.00761 -.014* -.01676** -.00808
(2.36) (0.74) (1.81) (2.56) (1.33)
South .19987*** .14661*** .07041*** .041*** .07802***
. (15.87.) . . (13.23) . - - (7.92) - - (5.38) (10.71)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (2); dependent variable is the log of hourly
earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by regions; restricted to 
women.
115
Rural/Urban Status
I have established that, using the APS between 2004 and 2007, the wages of men 
appear more responsive to changes in local unemployment. This result is in line 
with previous results in the literature (Card, 1995, Bell et al., 2002, and Sanz-de- 
Galdeano and Turunen, 2006). However, these elasticities may vary due to other 
factors relating to personal characteristics or the worker's occupation. To further 
examine wage flexibility, I have disaggregated by factors relating to the individual's 
employment characteristics and have then calculated unemployment elasticities. 
Firstly, I disaggregate geographically by the rural/urban split.35 Table 3.21 gives the 
resulting elasticities.
Regarding the sample as a whole, elasticities at all levels of the unemployment rate 
are negative and significant, but higher wage flexibility is found for rural areas at 
greater levels of centralization (NUTS 1 and NUTS 2), whilst at more decentralized 
levels (NUTS 3, unitary authority and TTWA) people living in urban areas are more 
sensitive to the local unemployment rate. It is possible that the size of the NUTS 1 
and NUTS 2 elasticities for rural areas are biased, as some NUTS 1 areas are 
predominantly urban, reducing the variation for the rural sample at these levels of 
aggregation. The result of urban elasticities being greater than rural elasticities has 
previously been found by Turunen (1998). By splitting the sample by gender, an 
interesting result is uncovered: for men, results are similar to the main sample and 
living in an urban area results in larger elasticities than living in a rural area (except 
for at NUTS 2 level), but the opposite is true for women: those living in rural areas 
are more open to earnings change due to local unemployment rates than those in 
urban areas. In fact, women experience significant and positive elasticities in urban 
areas at the NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and TTWA levels. This may explain the large rural 
advantage at NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 levels for the sample as a whole.
35 Details of the rural/urban split variable are given in the methodology and data section.
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Table 3.21
Wage Flexibility by Rural/Urban Status (House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample
Rural  ^ *^** -.12656 -.1328 -.09641*** » H-*
 
00
* « *
-.03134*”
(6.82) (11.70) (10.18) (11.38) (5.17)
Urban -.02774*** -.05752*** -.11187*** -.12223*** -.04782***
(4.66) (12.60) (28.85) (36.29) (13.02)
Male
Rural -.11474*** -.1435*** -.09115*** -.11401” * -.03033*”
(5.32) (10.32) (7.97) (10.16) (4.27)
Urban -.12672*** -.11224*** -.12915*** -.126” * -.07052***
(17.34) (20.42) (28.49) (32.96) (16.93)
Female
Rural -.08034*” -.06396*’* -.04855*” -.0523 ~  ~ *** -.03837
(2.63) (4.15) (3.98) (3.97) (4.31)
Urban .13316***
_ . _*** 
.04635 -.03188*” -.0504 .01722*”
(14.83) (6.74) (5.69) (10.68) (3.53)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
rural/urban status.
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The addition of the house price variable (table 3.22) seems to affect elasticities for 
women more than for men. For men, greater (negative) wage flexibility is found in 
urban areas at all levels of unemployment rate disaggregation, except for unitary 
authority. For women, the effect of the house price variable has been to turn 
negative elasticities for rural areas either positive or insignificant. This large change 
in female results has an effect on the sample as a whole. The only significant result 
at NUTS 1 level is for rural areas and is positive, whilst no significant results are 
found at TTWA level for the sample as a whole. The greater negative elasticity at 
unitary authority level is found for rural areas (-.03768), whilst at NUTS 2 and 
NUTS 3 levels, the only significant elasticities are found for urban areas (both are 
negative).
Industry
Previous research has found the unemployment elasticity of earnings to vary by 
industry sector, with Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) finding construction, 
manufacturing, and banking, finance and insurance to have the greatest wage 
flexibility. Table 3.23 gives unemployment elasticities by industry sector with the 
house price variable omitted. It reveals several industries that have large wage 
flexibility, regardless of the level of unemployment rate disaggregation, primarily: 
manufacturing, energy and water, transport and communications, and distribution, 
hotels and restaurants. Construction, finance, and public administration, education 
and health also display a consistently significant and negative elasticity, albeit at a 
lower magnitude. Turunen (1998) reports large elasticities for construction and 
transport and communications The elasticity in the finance sector is sensitive to the 
level of unemployment rate used, suggesting that wages in this sector respond more 
to local unemployment (NUTS 3 and unitary authority). Only the earnings of those 
employed in agriculture and fishing appear to be insensitive to the unemployment 
rate. Table 3.24 adds the house price variable to the previous specification.
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Table 3.22
Wage Flexibility by Rural/Urban Status (House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample
Rural .06605*** -.00107 -.02224 -.03768*** .00683
(2.79) (0.06) (1.49) (2.71) (0.91)
Urban -.00048 -.01566*** -.02286*“ -.02801*** .00642
(0.08) (3.23) (5.25) (7.23) (1.63)
Male
Rural .07457*** -.02073 -.03105* -.04873 -.00576
(2.66) (1.02) (1.81) (3.18) (0.66)
Urban -.04034*** -.03773*** -.03877*** -.04199*** -.01136*
(5.20) (6.26) (7.43) (9.27) (2.49)
Female
Rural .07918** .04549* .01012 .00192 -.01237
(2.15) (1.77) (0.57) (0.11) (1.14)
Urban .06148*** .02394*** .01134* .00251 .0279
(6.63) (3.37) (1.90) (0.50) (5.48)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (2); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
rural/urban status.
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Table 3.23
Wage Flexibility by Industry Sector (House Price Excluded)
NUTS I NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Agriculture & Fishing .00695 -.03584 -.00028 -.00587 .01592
(0.11) (0.76) (0.01) (0.15) (0.63)
Energy & Water -.094** -.13906*** -.09597*** -.09505*** -.03942*
(2.08) (4.35) (3.68) (4.06) (1.70)
Manufacturing -.15291*** -.12716*** -.14234*** -.14829*** -.06727***
(11.41) (13.20) (18.09) (20.96) (9.71)
Construction -.08397*** -.09779*** -.07745*** -.09251*** -.0368***
(3.86) (5.97) (5.80) (7.63) (3.16)
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. -.09861*** -.10368*** -.1275*** -.14101*** -.0629***
(6.79) (9.36) (13.46) (16.71) (7.74)
Transport & Communications -.13238*** -.13354*** -.14863*** -.14948*** -.07649***
(6.93) (9.03) (11.78) (13.34) (6.69)
Finance -.01035 -.05064*** -.16057*** - *** -.1727 -.04212***
(0.69) (4.22) (15.05) (18.79) (4.39)
Public Admin, Educ. & Health .0299*** -.01693** -.05483*** -.06669*** -.01692***
(3.30) (2.47) (9.45) (12.92) (3.32)
Other Services .04458* -.01607 -.09166**’ -.10194’** -.04492’**
(1.64) (0.76) (5.00) (6.29) (2.81)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
industry sector.
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Table 3.24
Wage Flexibility by Industry Sector (House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Agriculture & Fishing -.01939 -.01867 .03844 .00222 .03317
(0.25) (0.31) (0.73) (0.05) (1.11)
Energy & Water -.02663 -.05493 -.00861 -.00705 .01037
(0.55) (1.45) (0.26) (0.24) (0.39)
Manufacturing -.0308** -.02528** -.03456*** -.0414*** .00102
(2.18) (2.41) (3.80) (5.03) (0.13)
Construction .00273 -.01059 .00487 .00208 .01062
(0.11) (0.56) (0.30) (0.14) (0.79)
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. -.04092*** -.03785*** -.03496*** -.04951*** -.00686
(2.65) (3.11) (3.16) (5.01) (0.76)
Transport & Communications -.08079*** -.06174*** -.05441*** -.05304*** -.01887
(4.06) (3.89) (3.79) (4.15) (1.51)
Finance -.02044 -.04103*** -.05301*** -.05081*** .0086
(1.30) (3.20) (4.49) (4.88) (0.84)
Public Admin, Educ. & Health .05632*** .0201*** .00423 -.00319 .01819***
(5.84) (2.64) (0.62) (0.52) (3.17)
Other Services .03221 -.01957 -.0317 -.02425 -.02027
(1.09) (0.84) (1.49) (1.28) (1.13)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (2); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
industry sector.
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The addition of the house price variable has much the same effect as seen previously, 
reducing the magnitude and significance of the coefficients, due to the large amount 
of regional variation it is able to control for. Whilst energy and water and 
construction may have sported elasticities large in magnitude, their t-statistics were 
small relative to other industries, and the additional control exerted by the house 
price variable has caused the elasticities of these industries to become insignificant. 
The industries displaying the largest (negative) elasticities are manufacturing, 
distribution, hotels and restaurants, transport and communications and finance. Due 
to the house price variable exerting a fairly uniform effect, reducing magnitude and 
significance, tables of further specifications that include the house price variable will 
no longer be reported.
Table 3.25 gives elasticities by industry sector when the sample is restricted to just 
men. Whilst I have generally found the elasticities of males only to be highly similar 
to those for the sample as a whole, but at a larger magnitude, it is interesting to note 
that elasticities in several industries have fallen when restricting the sample to males. 
This is most notable for the energy and water industry (at NUTS 3 and UA level), 
and transport and communications (also at NUTS 3 and UA level) where earnings 
for men are less responsive to regional unemployment than for the sample as a 
whole. This would suggest that males in these industries are better protected from 
changes in the regional labour market than their female counterparts.
Comparison with table 3.26 (elasticities by industry sector restricted to females) 
reveals the energy and water industry to be an isolated case, as unemployment 
elasticities are found to be greater for women than for men, meaning that women in 
the energy and water industry have far less labour market protection than men. 
Further examination reveals no further industries (at any level of unemployment rate 
disaggregation) where female elasticity exceeds male elasticity. For females, the 
manufacturing and transport and communication industries post high levels of 
elasticity (at NUTS 3 and UA level), peaking at -.10525 for manufacturing and - 
.1202 for transport and communications. Elasticities in the remaining industries are 
of small magnitude in comparison to male elasticities, with a greater number of
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Table 3.25
Wage Flexibility by Industry Sector (Males Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Agriculture & Fishing .00748 -.04304 .00732 .0006 .04129
(0.12) (0.91) (0.18) (0.02) (1.57)
Energy & Water -.08176* -.14208*** -.07673*** -.07419*** -.04561**
(1.83) (4.36) (2.95) (3.36) (2.05)
Manufacturing -.17852*** -.1394*** -.12886*** -.1289 -.06883***
(13.04) (14.17) (16.38) (18.75) (10.33)
Construction -.12885*** -.11668*** -.0889*** -.0956*** -.04388***
(6.24) (7.58) (7.21) (8.83) (4.12)
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. -.16365*** -.13653*** -.13464 -.13615 -.07001***
(9.28) (10.25) (12.17) (14.23) (7.37)
Transport & Communications -.20279*** -.15881*** -.13083*** -.12308*** -.07793***
(10.24) (10.56) (10.40) (11.29) (7.00)
Finance -.13309 -.12879*** -.19101*** -.17966*** -.08213***
(6.81) (8.36) (14.45) (16.45) (7.05)
Public Admin, Educ. & Health -.03571*** -.05487*** -.077*** -.08102*** -.03296***
(2.60) (5.30) (9.00) (11.07) (4.53)
Other Services -.0632* -.08511**’ -.12924*** -.12696*** -.06972***
(1.83) (3.19) (5.73) (6.80) (3.76)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
industry sector; restricted to men.
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Table 3.26
Wage Flexibility by Industry Sector (Females Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Agriculture & Fishing -.12335 .0604 -.03823 .0237 .05642
(0.78) (0.57) (0.42) (0.29) (0.86)
Energy & Water -.11258 -.11618 -.09502* -.09978** -.07438
(1.00) (1.60) (1.65) (1.96) (1.41)
Manufacturing -.01939 -.03149 -.09357 -.10525*** -.01183
(0.67) (1.54) (5.91) (7.50) (0.88)
Construction .01331 -.01979 -.02288 .00738 -.01784
(0.19) (0.37) (0.55) (0.21) (0.50)
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. .02577 -.01086 -.04664*** -.06197*** -.00865
(1.15) (0.66) (3.54) (5.39) (0.81)
Transport & Communications .05795 -.03461
. ___**# 
-.1202 -.11516*** -.04306*
(1.40) (1.08) (4.69) (5.22) (1.92)
Finance .1809*** .08308*** -.02583* -.05751*** .04387***
(8.71) (5.07) (1.89) (4.94) (3.74)
Public Admin, Educ. & Health .12488*** .03525*** -.00931 -.02494*** .00676
(10.74) (4.17) (1.36) (4.18) (1.18)
Other Services .15772*** .05107* -.0202 -.02469 -.00277
(4.03) (1.73) (0.81) (1.12) (0.13)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
industry sector; restricted to women.
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insignificant coefficients. Focusing again on the figures for males, wage flexibility 
in the finance industry is far larger for men than women (and for the sample as a 
whole). The same is true, to a lesser extent, for the distribution, hotels and 
restaurants industry, particularly at high levels of centralization.
Occupation
Switching the focus from industry sector to occupational category, table 3.27 gives 
unemployment elasticities for the sample, disaggregated by occupation. The work of 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) has also examined wage flexibility over 
occupation, finding that wages are less responsive for those in high skilled 
occupations. From table 3.27, results appear strong, with all but professional 
occupations and associate professional and technical occupations returning a 
significant negative elasticity at four or more levels of unemployment rate 
disaggregation. Those in professional occupations only experience negative 
unemployment elasticities at the NUTS 3 and unitary authority levels of 
disaggregation (in fact, elasticities are positive at the NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 levels), 
whilst those in associate professional and technical occupations achieve negative and 
significant elasticities at NUTS 3, UA and TTWA levels, although these are amongst 
the smallest elasticities. All other occupation groups experience far more flexible 
earnings, in particular managers and senior officials. This difference is interesting 
when considering that these two occupational groups have the highest mean 
earnings, suggesting that the level of mean earnings in an individual's occupational 
group offers no indication of the level of insulation that earnings may have from 
regional unemployment. The result of large wage flexibility for managers and senior 
officials is surprising as it may have been expected that the wages of those with 
lower skill levels would be more vulnerable to the unemployment rate, with Turunen 
(1998) finding the largest wage flexibility for sales persons, craftsmen and labourers. 
Wage flexibility across occupations is fairly uniform, but those in administrative and 
secretarial occupations seem to have fairly high levels of wage flexibility.
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Table 3.27
Wage Flexibility by Occupation (House Price Excluded)
NTJTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Managers & Senior Officials -.03213*’ -.06041*** -.09989**’ -.11491*** -.0216’’*
(2.37) (5.70) (10.82) (14.25) (2.74)
Professional Occupations .08106*” .03416*** -.01515* -.03236 .00969
(6.42) (3.49) (1.79) (4.30) (1.29)
Associate Pro. & Technical .04221*** -.00396 -.06217*** -.06754*** -.01301*
(3.61) (0.44) (7.96) (9.78) (1.89)
Administrative & Secretarial .0069 -.04796*** -.09378*** -.09831*** -.02241***
(0.59) (5.30) (12.20) (14.60) (3.25)
Skilled Trades Occupations -.06842*** -.06096*** -.06307*** -.07047*** -.03671***
(4.47) (5.43) (6.91) (8.49) (4.66)
Personal Service Occupations -.01785 -.04305*** -.05735” * -.05417*** -.03386***
(0.97) (3.15) (4.96) (5.28) (3.36)
Sales & Customer Service -.07476*** -.05688*** -.07077*** -.07178*** -.05316***
(3.75) (3.79) (5.57) (6.35) (4.67)
Process, Plant & Machine -.04519*** -.0603*** -.06642*** -.06756*** -.03399***
(2.95) (5.59) (7.57) (8.45) (4.47)
Elementary Occupations -.05393*** -.05744*** -.07587*** -.07076*** -.03801***
(3.80) (5.47) (8.64) (8.84) (4.89)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
occupation.
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Table 3.28 gives the corresponding values from regressions restricted to males. 
Results for men appear very strong, with all but professional occupations and 
personal service occupations returning a full set of significant negative elasticities 
(professional occupations has insignificant unemployment elasticity at NUTS 1 level 
and there is no significant effect of unemployment on wages at NUTS 2 level for 
those in personal service occupations). Occupations with the greatest wage 
flexibility appear to be administrative and secretarial staff, managers and senior 
officials, and sales and customer service workers. The remaining occupational 
groups display relatively uniform unemployment elasticities, suggesting that (aside 
from the aforementioned high elasticity occupations) the choice of industry sector 
affects an individual's wage flexibility greater than the occupational group they 
belong to.
Results for females (table 3.29) appear weaker than those for males, with around half 
of the coefficients statistically insignificant. Again, professional occupations give an 
interesting result, with significant positive elasticities at four levels of unemployment 
rate disaggregation. Positive elasticities are also found at differing unemployment 
rates for several other occupational groups. For females, process, plant and machine 
operatives experience the most consistent, negative unemployment elasticities, with 
those in administrative and secretarial occupations, personal service occupations and 
elementary occupations also displaying significant negative elasticities at several 
levels of disaggregation, although, in comparison to men, the magnitude of 
elasticities for women are far smaller. These results suggest that wage flexibility for 
women is far more dependent on occupational group than for men.
Employment Sector
The final disaggregation relating to an individual's employment is whether their job 
is part of the public or private sector. Table 3.30 presents unemployment elasticities 
for the sample as a whole and the corresponding figures when the sample is 
restricted to only males or females.
127
Table 3.28
Wage Flexibility by Occupation (Males Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Managers & Senior Officials -.10134*** -.10134*** -.1125*** -.11412*** -.04164’**
(6.48) (8.39) (11.01) (13.22) (4.82)
Professional Occupations -.0121 -.02938** -.05524*** -.05764*** -.0162*
(0.78) (2.43) (5.46) (6.72) (1.86)
Associate Pro. & Technical -.04782*** -.05864*** -.08361*** -.08191*** -.04057***
(3.13) (5.00) (8.55) (9.89) (4.84)
Administrative & Secretarial -.07671*** -.11281*** -.11955*** -.12291*** -.054***
(3.33) (6.45) (8.28) (9.90) (4.17)
Skilled Trades Occupations -.09149*** -.07439*** -.0641*** -.06703*** -.03644
(6.42) (7.10) (7.69) (9.11) (5.16)
Personal Service Occupations -.06429* -.04151 -.08054*** -.08042*** -.05587***
(1.87) (1.62) (3.69) (4.44) (3.06)
Sales & Customer Service -.16383*** -.10761*** -.10272*** -.0858*** -.08393*’*
(5.46) (4.74) (5.42) (5.31) (5.01)
Process, Plant & Machine -.06764*** -.06653*** -.06382*** -.05968*** -.03633***
(4.56) (6.31) (7.53) (7.94) (5.10)
Elementary Occupations -.08483*** -.07309*** -.07767*** -.06615 -.03802
(5.54) (6.47) (8.34) (8.15) (4.77)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
occupation; restricted to men.
128
Table 3.29
Wage Flexibility by Occupation (Females Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Managers & Senior Officials .12123*** .03952** -.01519 -.04315*** .0216*
(5.40) (2.31) (1.07) (3.54) (1.84)
Professional Occupations
***0000 .0991*** .03573*** .00817 .03483***
(9.68) (7.00) (3.06) (0.79) (3.47)
Associate Pro. & Technical .16948*** .07534*** -.0047 -.01634* .01622*
(10.37) (6.10) (0.46) (1.84) (1.88)
Administrative & Secretarial *  ^  ,  *** .13374 .03961*** -.0251*** -.03785*** .01849***
(9.96) (3.89) (3.10) (5.41) (2.65)
Skilled Trades Occupations -.00357 .02265 -.02252 -.01752 -.01104
(0.06) (0.57) (0.72) (0.64) (0.45)
Personal Service Occupations .04705** -.01243 -.03542*** -.02772** -.01955*
(2.14) (0.79) (2.84) (2.53) (1.92)
Sales & Customer Service .0197 .00114 -.01979 -.02255* .00121
(0.77) (0.06) (1.36) (1.78) (0.10)
Process, Plant & Machine -.03692 -.04965* -.03947* -.04593** -.05004***
(0.88) (1.82) (1.93) (2.54) (2.97)
Elementary Occupations .00498 -.02163 -.05126*** -.04035*** -.02134*
(0.19) (1.15) (3.52) (3.03) (1.72)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
occupation; restricted to women.
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Table 3.30
Wage Flexibility by Employment Sector (House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample
Public Sector .02279" -.01881*** -.05446*** -.07139*** -.02062***
(2.46) (2.70) (9.25) (13.63) (3.97)
Private Sector -.06863*" -.09036*** -.13246*** -.14155*** -.05278***
(10.18) (17.54) (30.22) (36.37) (13.74)
Male
Public Sector -.05294*** -.06388*** -.07162*** -.08588*** -.03897***
(4.07) (6.55) (8.94) (12.49) (5.68)
Private Sector -.14928*** -.13391*** -.13867*** -.13571*** -.06624***
(19.26) (22.90) (28.71) (32.67) (15.99)
Female
Public Sector .124*** .03816*’* -.00762 -.02446**’ .00348
(10.01) (4.25) (1.05) (3.87) (0.57)
Private Sector .10143*** .02296*** -.05033**’ -.06525*** .00549
(9.03) (2.72) (7.34) (10.95) (0.96)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
employment sector.
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As can be seen from table 3.30, regardless of the level of unemployment rate 
disaggregation, the earnings of those in private sector employment are far more 
sensitive to the regional unemployment rate than those in public sector employment. 
This result has previously been obtained by Card (1995) and Sanz-de-Galdeano 
(2006). As an aside, the U-shape in wage flexibility observed over the spectrum of 
centralization can be identified clearly in both the public and private sectors. 
Turning to the gender specific results, those for men would be considered strongest, 
as had been expected, displaying elasticities of a larger magnitude than those of the 
sample as a whole; whilst results for women are found to be highly sensitive to the 
level of unemployment rate disaggregation. For women in both the public and 
private sectors, significant and positive elasticities are found at both NUTS 1 and 
NUTS 2 levels. The only significant negative elasticities for the private sector are 
found at the NUTS 3 and unitary authority levels of disaggregation, whilst a 
significant negative result is only found at unitary authority level for the public 
sector. The remaining results fail to attain the 10% level of significance. The small 
magnitude of the elasticities found in the public sector (particularly for females) 
results in several additional positive elasticities when house prices are controlled for, 
which is most apparent for females, with all public sector elasticities turning 
positive, except unitary authority, which is insignificant.
Qualifications
I have examined unemployment elasticities disaggregated by factors relating to an 
individual's employment, but to better understand wage flexibility it is also possible 
to disaggregate the sample by factors relating to personal characteristics. Table 3.31 
disaggregates the sample by the highest level of qualifications an individual 
possesses, whilst tables 3.32 and 3.33 give the corresponding unemployment 
elasticities when the sample is restricted to just males or females. Eight levels of 
qualification are used, ranging from no qualifications held up to doctorate.
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Table 3.31
Wage Flexibility by Qualifications (House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
PhD -.00198 -.01412 -.03033 -.04107 .05906’
(0.04) (0.36) (0.89) (1.35) (1.90)
Masters .15487*** .06898*** -.01382 -.04444** .02037
(5.64) (3.19) (0.70) (2.56) (1.12)
PGCE .17708*** .10657*** .05234** .0388**
_ _ _ _ _  _*** 
.07087
(5.14) (4.12) (2.38) (1.97) (3.67)
First Degree .07476*** .02068* -.05995*** ,08147*** ,01005
(5.38) (1.91) (6.25) (9.71) (1.18)
Higher Education -.11609*** -.11921*** -.12084*** ,12751*** -.06866***
(7.17) (9.90) (12.30) (14.69) (8.08)
A Level -.09527*** -.10361*** 1 H-i 3^ O 00
* # *
,12643*** -.05481***
(8.70) (12.52) (17.16) (20.68) (9.20)
GCSE -.12622*** -.13065*** -.13727***
***0000r -.0534***
(10.83) (14.76) (18.51) (21.12) (8.39)
None -.0542*** -.07019*** -.09785*’* ,10896*** -.0425***
(3.02) (5.49) (9.23) (11.49) (4.44)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
highest qualification held.
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Table 3.32
Wage Flexibility by Qualifications (Males Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
PhD -.01846 -.04168 -.03928 -.06735** .01481
(0.32) (0.93) (1.03) (2.05) (0.44)
Masters .08835** .01314 -.05099** -.06749*** -.02436
(2.57) (0.49) (2.14) (3.48) (1.16)
PGCE .13052** .07195* .05091* .03388 .06622**
(2.52) (1.86) (1.65) (1.27) (2.56)
First Degree -.0378** -.06353*** -.09462*** -.10344*** -.04521***
(2.09) (4.59) (7.97) (10.44) (4.43)
Higher Education -.21852*** -.1689*** -.12592*** -.12748*** -.08054***
(10.48) (11.10) (10.20) (12.10) (7.65)
A Level -.16057*** ,13571*** ,12095*** ,1186*** -.05972***
(13.25) (14.96) (16.53) (18.70) (9.59)
GCSE -.20121*** ,1655*** ,15024*** -.14052*** -.06876***
(13.19) (14.35) (15.86) (17.08) (8.61)
None -.10446*** -.09686*** ,11116*** ,10735*** -.05418***
(4.95) (6.45) (9.10) (10.15) (5.09)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
highest qualification held; restricted to men.
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Table 3.33
Wage Flexibility by Qualifications (Females Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
PhD .0648 .04778 .00094 .03631 .09423**
(0.77) (0.77) (0 .02) (0.76) (2 .10)
Masters .23311*** .12332*** .04316 -.00163 .05898**
(5.69) (3.99) (1.60) (0.07) (2.55)
PGrCE .17035*** .09835*** .01263 .01807 .01235
(3.80) (2.99) (0.47) (0.77) (0.55)
First Degree .2197*** .12169*** .01375 -.00964 .04497***
(11.18) (8.14) (1.08) (0.87) (4.12)
Higher Education .04785** -.02289 -.06353*** -.07079*** -.02667**
(2.07) (1.40) (4.93) (6.27) (2.44)
A Level .06268*** -.01006 -.05948*** -.07276*** -.01901**
(3.25) (0.71) (5.36) (7.45) (2.05)
GCSE .04554*** -.0189 -.03856*** -.04739*** .0049
(2.77) (1.57) (4.07) (5.84) (0.63)
None .03511 -.01469 -.02148 -.03689*** .00703
(1.24) (0.74) (1.41) (2.72) (0.53)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
highest qualification held; restricted to women.
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As seen in previous sets of results, elasticities vary by unemployment rate 
disaggregation, however, the elasticity of those whose highest qualification is at 
GCSE level appears to remain high throughout (with the usual decline at TTWA 
level). The wages of those educated to below degree level appear far more 
responsive to unemployment than those educated to degree level and above. This 
result is in line with previous wage curve research (such as Turunen, 1998) which 
has found that the wages of the less educated are more sensitive to local labour 
market conditions. This effect appears even clearer when the sample is restricted to 
men. With women, no education level at first degree level or higher displays a 
negative unemployment elasticity. These results seem to confirm that the wages of 
those with lower skill levels are more sensitive to unemployment, after the 
occupation results clouded the issue. An interesting result can be seen from all three 
tables, where the wages of those with no qualifications are actually less responsive to 
unemployment than those educated to GCSE level (and are similar to A level). 
Using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey between 1985 and 1989, 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) find an insignificant effect of unemployment on 
the wages of those with the lowest levels of schooling, despite rising to -.0873 for 
intermediate levels. From my results, degrees seem to act as a divider in the 
magnitude of wage flexibility, perhaps due to signalling.
Age Group
Elasticities from regressions disaggregated by age are presented in tables 3.34 
through 3.36. Age has been split into four divisions. Previous studies (such as 
Turunen [1998]) have tended to show that younger workers have greater wage 
flexibility than older workers. My results differ from this result, as those between 
the ages of 35 and 49 experience the greater wage flexibility, across all 
unemployment rate levels. Ranking of the remaining age groups in terms of 
elasticity is inconsistent across degrees of centralization, but it would appear that 
those over 50 up to retirement age have the least flexible wages. The elasticity of 
individuals in the age divisions 16 to 24 and 25 to 34 varies according to the level of 
unemployment rate disaggregation, but generally forms a middle ground between 
those in the 35 to 49 and 50 to retirement age categories. Whilst my results do not
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Table 3.34
Wage Flexibility by Age (House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
16-24 -.05028*** -.06515*** -.08592*** -.09069*** -.04549***
(3.36) (5.78) (9.04) (10.71) (5.35)
25-34 .00677 -.027*** -.10934*** -.11398*** -.0357***
(0.64) (3.34) (15.60) (18.24) (5.64)
35-49 -.06257*** -.09251*** -.12369*** -.13643*** -.04804***
(6.94) (13.53) (21.41) (26.69) (9.56)
50 - retirement -.04776*** -.06844*** -.08653*** -.10993*** -.02929***
(3.84) (7.72) (11.66) (16.62) (4.59)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
age group.
Table 3.35
Wage Flexibility by Age (Males Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
16-24 -.10263 -.09556**’ -.09637’” -.09747*** -.04985” *
(5.30) (6.63) (8.13) (9.61) (4.89)
25-34 -.07931*** -.0762*** -.11844 -.11498*** -.05629***
(6.07) (7.69) (14.28) (16.07) (7.71)
35-49 -.16372*** -.15291*** -.14646*** -.14334*** -.07003***
(15.18) (18.87) (2 1 .86) (24.96) (12.34)
50 - retirement -.11068*** -.10158*** -.09803*** -.11289*** -.04075***
(7.92) (9.63) (11.42) (15.26) (5.58)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by
age group; restricted to men.
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Table 3.36
Wage Flexibility by Age (Females Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
16-24 .04552** -.00308 -.03592*** -.03983’** -.00864
(2.14) (0 .20) (2.87) (3.64) (0.81)
25-34 .13677*** .06492*** -.03242*** -.04376*** .0199**
(8.71) (5.46) (3.27) (5.06) (2.34)
35-49 .11983*** .02474** -.03486*** -.05619 .00339
(8.52) (2.39) (4.18) (7.80) (0.49)
50 - retirement .09091*** .00886 -.02632** ^  . _ _  . *** -.04574 .00453
(5.04) (0.67) (2.52) (4.96) (0.52)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (1); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
age group; restricted to women.
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suggest that younger workers have the most sensitive wages, as the previous 
literature would suggest, there is little difference between the age groups.
Results for males are very similar, although a slight pattern emerges when examining 
elasticities for the younger age groups: at lower levels of centralization, the elasticity 
of those in the 16 to 24 age category exceeds those of the 25 to 34 age category, 
whilst the opposite is true for areas of NUTS 3 or greater decentralization. Turning 
to the results for females, there are many significant positive and insignificant 
results, as would be expected; however, all of the significant negative elasticities are 
found at NUTS 3 and unitary authority levels of disaggregation. Of these, 
elasticities are highest for younger workers, at NUTS 3 level, but results are similar 
to results for the sample as a whole at unitary authority level, with those aged 35 to 
49 displaying the greatest wage flexibility. Results are highly dependent on 
unemployment rate aggregation, as those aged 16 to 24 have the most flexible wages 
at NUTS 3 level, and the least flexible wages at unitary authority level (although all 
elasticities are similar).
Quantile Regression Results
This section focuses on the results obtained through quantile regression techniques 
(specifically a decile regression). The reason for extending the methodology to 
include a series of quantile regressions is to observe how wage flexibility varies over 
the wage distribution. The previous set of results dealt only with wages at the mean; 
by extending the methodology to points across the entire wage distribution, it is 
possible to gain a greater understanding of wage responses to unemployment (similar 
reasons are behind examining the graduate premium across the earnings distribution 
in chapter five). As mentioned in the methodology section, I do not expect these 
results to be uniform across the spectrum of centralization of wage bargaining (as 
represented by the five levels of unemployment rate aggregation regressions are run 
at). As in the previous section, results will be presented excluding the house price 
variable and including the house price variable (necessitating the exclusion of all 
Scottish observations). Table 3.37 presents quantile regression results for the sample
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as a whole, with the house price variable excluded, across the five levels of 
unemployment rate aggregation.
At NUTS 1 level, the highest level of unemployment rate aggregation, representing 
the most centralized level of wage bargaining, wage flexibility is found to be greatest 
at the lower end of the wage distribution, gradually decreasing along the wage 
distribution. This result seems to conform with Buettner and Fitzenberger's (1998) 
proposition that, as the nationally set contract wage is dominant to the local wage 
regime in the lower portions of the wage distribution, using the national 
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable results in the greater wage flexibility 
(in absolute terms) being observed in the lower tail of the wage distribution. 
Buettner and Fitzenberger's theory would mean that as the unemployment rate 
becomes more disaggregated, it is more likely to affect those who engage in wage 
bargaining at the local level, which will result in the greater effects of the 
unemployment rate upon wages being seen in the upper section of the wage 
distribution. From the second row of table 3.37 it can be seen that this effect is 
starting to become apparent at NUTS 2 level, as whilst those at the lower end of the 
wage distribution still display the greater wage flexibility, the effect is far less 
pronounced. Coefficients at all deciles are greater than those found at NUTS 1 level, 
as would be expected given the U-shaped wage flexibility found using regressions at 
the mean in the previous section (and can also be seen in the first column of table 
3.37). By moving to the NUTS 3 level of unemployment rate aggregation, the effect 
is amplified, as wage flexibility now rises along the wage distribution, peaking in the 
upper tail. This effect is even more noticeable at unitary authority level. The switch 
in wage flexibility from the lower end of the wage distribution to the upper end of 
the wage distribution can be clearly seen in figure 3.1, where unemployment 
elasticity has been plotted along the wage distribution for all five levels of 
unemployment rate aggregation.
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Table 3.37
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
0.1 -.06672*** -.07708*** -.10171*** -.10536*** -.04666***
(8.59) (12.87) (19.53) (21.64) (9.52)
0.2 -.0657*** -.07666*** -.10346*** -.10816*** -.05111***
(11.14) (16.63) (25.68) (30.82) (13.93)
0.3 -.05376*** -.07195*** -.10468*** -.11018*** -.04466***
(9.23) (15.68) (29.23) (33.50) (12.52)
0.4 -.0514*** -.07408*** -.10632*** -.11201*** -.0446***
(9.19) (15.37) (26.98) (31.86) (14.17)
0.5 -.04965*** -.06938*** -.10627*** -.11432*** -.04152***
(8.37) (14.33) (28.23) (32.99) (12.68)
0.6 -.04339*** -.06897*** -.10641**’ -.11669*** -.03948***
(7.02) (14.15) (26.23) (32.76) (11.54)
0.7 -.04218*** -.07075*** -.11428*** -.12204*** -.04216
(5.80) (13.71) (26.03) (31.91) (10.63)
0.8 -.03986*** -.07374*** -.11736*** -.12779*** -.04169***
(4.89) (12.04) (25.11) (28.84) (8.87)
0.9 -.03073*** -.06661**’ -.11634’** -.13374 -.03996***
(2.78) (8.65) (16.69) (22.99) (6.80)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported quantile regression of specification (1); dependent
variable is the log of hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column 
headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels; deciles shown in first column.
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Figure 3.1
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (House Price Excluded)
Quantiles
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The slope of each unemployment rate level shows at which tail of the wage 
distribution the greater wage flexibility is found: a negatively sloped line results in 
greater elasticity for the upper portion of the wage distribution, whilst a positively 
sloped trend line means that wage flexibility is greater at lower levels of the wage 
distribution. The difference between NUTS 1 and NUTS2, and NUTS 3 and UA can 
clearly be seen in figure 3.1. Interestingly, at TTWA level, wage flexibility is close 
to uniform across the wage distribution (with just a small decrease across the wage 
distribution). Buettner and Fitzenberger find that their most disaggregated level of 
unemployment rate returns insignificant results at both the mean and all quantiles 
(Buettner and Fitzenberger test at the 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 quantiles). Their 
German data consists of 259 districts at the local unemployment rate level, whilst at 
TTWA level I have between 292 and 241 regions.36 Whilst the TTWA 
unemployment rate does not return insignificant results, falling coefficients are 
encountered at both the mean and each decile. The fall in wage flexibility at the 
mean is predicted by Groth and Johansson's (2004) model. Whilst Buettner and
36 Buettner and Fitzenberger (1998) contend that districts of this size are too small to be considered 
functional regional labour markets.
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Fitzenberger do not consider wage flexibility over the wage distribution at highly 
disaggregated levels (due to their insignificant district result), Groth and Johansson's 
model linking the level of centralization in wage bargaining to wage flexibility may 
offer some insight into the result obtained.
According to Groth and Johansson, at the extremes of centralized and decentralized 
bargaining, longer contracts are more likely to be observed than at intermediate 
levels of centralization (resulting in lowered wage flexibility at each end of the 
centralization spectrum and the U shaped wage flexibility found from regressions 
dealing with the mean). To extend Groth and Johansson's model to a quantile 
regression setting and to account for the elasticities found across the wage 
distribution, at the more centralized and decentralized levels of wage bargaining it 
would require that at low wages, short contracts are more prevalent than long 
contracts and that at high wage levels, longer contracts are more likely to be 
observed than short contracts. Conversely, for intermediate levels of wage setting 
(and the corresponding aggregation level of unemployment rate) it would be 
expected that long contracts would be more likely to be observed over short 
contracts at lower levels of the wage distribution and at higher levels of the wage 
distribution short contracts would be more likely to be observed opposed to long 
contracts. This theory requires additional exploration, but adequate information is 
not available in the APS.
The inclusion of the house price variable has much the same effect as it had upon 
previous mean regressions (the results of which can be seen in the first column of 
table 3.38). Once again, significance is greatly affected, with only around half of the 
coefficients remaining significant. The results are plotted in figure 3.2.
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Table 3.38
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
0.1 -.01849** -.02779*** -.03778’** -.0443*** -.00503
(2 .10) (3.83) (6.08) (7.95) (0.92)
0.2 -.00819 -.02415*** -.03345*** -.03882*** -.00483
(1.24) (4.68) (7.12) (8.91) (1.20)
0.3 -.00095 ,015*** -.02815*** -.03287*** -.0006
(0.15) (2.97) (5.97) (7.98) (0.16)
0.4 .00196 -.0127** -.02783*** -.03089*** .00235
(0.30) (2.45) (5.80) (7.60) (0.61)
0.5 .00863 -.00558 -.02108*** -.02547*** .00936**
(1.38) (1.09) (4.49) (5.90) (2.43)
0.6 .00635 -.0045 -.01747*** -.01964*** .01282***
(0.96) (0.87) (4.04) (4.88) (3.15)
0.7 .01187* .0015 -.01293*** ,01431*** .01478***
(1.76) (0.28) (2.70) (3.37) (3.72)
0.8 .01362* .00599 ,00551 ,00818 .0215***
(1.68) (0.99) (1.01) (1.63) (4.58)
0.9 .003 -.00049 .00564 -.00354 .02132**’
(0.29) (0.06) (0.79) (0.56) (3.54)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported quantile regression of specification (2); dependent 
variable is the log of hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column 
headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels; deciles shown in first column.
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Figure 3.2
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (House Price Included)
Quantiles
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The pattern of the largest wage flexibility being found at the lower portion of the 
wage distribution is continued along all levels of unemployment rate aggregation, 
with the magnitude of wage flexibility following the same pattern as the mean (with 
unemployment elasticity positive at NUTS 1 and TTWA levels). This may imply 
that the effects seen previously, in table 3.37, may have been caused by some factor 
that has now been controlled for by the house price variable and Buttner and 
Fitzenberger’s results are being caused by some factor that is now controlled for. 
After controlling for regional differences in house prices, I am left with results that 
support the notion that wages are more flexible for those with low earnings, as 
opposed to those with high earnings, regardless of the level of centralization. This 
result has previously been found by Sanz-de-Galdeano and Turunen (2006) and 
Ammermuller et al. (2010, for Italy only).
Table 3.39 presents unemployment elasticities obtained via quantile regressions 
when the sample is restricted to males (house price variable omitted), whilst figure 
3.3 is the corresponding graphical representation.
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Table 3.39
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Males Only, House Price
Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
0.1 -.14261*** -.11634*** -.11724*** -.10938*** -.06251***
(15.76) (15.06) (20.61) (2 1 .10) (10.97)
0.2 -.14222 -.11587*** -.11474*** -.11535*** -.06546***
(18.74) (21.34) (24.72) (30.38) (14.94)
0.3 -.13032*** -.11405*** i  -a , * * *  -.11626 -.11467*** -.06138***
(18.59) (19.91) (25.91) (28.84) (14.92)
0.4 -.12612*** -.11528*** -.11779*** -.11682*** .  _  _  „ „ * * *  -.05811
(18.28) (21.30) (27.78) (31.89) (14.64)
0.5 -.13039*** -.11442*** -.11786*** -.11896*** ~  - _ * * *  -.05847
(18.50) (21.94) (26.79) (29.62) (14.91)
0.6 -.13456*** -.11814*** -.12447*** -.12277*** -.05822***
(17.12) (19.88) (25.46) (30.37) (13.43)
0.7 -.13379*** -.12123 -.12534*** -.12418 -.06009***
(16.06) (18.56) (25.26) (29.29) (14.27)
0.8 -.13441*** -.12635*** -.13181*** -.128*** -.05627***
(13.30) (17.14) (23.93) (23.78) (11.56)
0.9 -.13046 -.12715 -.13023*’* -.13198*** -.05862*”
(9.49) (12.95) (18.10) (20.59) (9.84)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported quantile regression of specification (1); dependent 
variable is the log of hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column 
headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels; deciles shown in first column; restricted to men.
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Figure 3.3
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Males Only, House Price
Excluded)
Quantiles
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When the sample is restricted to males, the effects seen for the sample as a whole are 
still apparent with low earners at high levels of centralization experiencing greater 
unemployment elasticity than high earners, with the opposite being found when 
looking at lower levels of centralization. The differences over the wage distribution 
are greatly reduced, however, and the differences between coefficients are not 
statistically significant along the earnings distribution. As quantile results tend to 
center around the result obtained from a regression at the mean, the wage elasticity at 
TTWA level is smaller than at all other unemployment rates. Figure 3.3 makes it 
apparent that there is little difference in the results found at the NUTS 2, NUTS 3 
and unitary authority levels, although the difference in wage flexibility at both ends 
of the wage distribution is increasing slightly as the unemployment rate used 
becomes more disaggregated, as seen in the results for the sample as a whole.
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Table 3.40
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Males Only, House Price
Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
0.1 -.05919*** -.05067*** -.05476*** -.05399*** -.01474**
(5.78) (6 .01) (7.86) (8 .11) (2.40)
0.2
_ . _  .  _  *** -.04202 -.03675 -.04478*** -.04818*** -.0175***
(4.54) (5.06) (7.89) (9.02) (3.53)
0.3 -.03395 -.03452*** -.04147*** -.04361*** -.01698
(4.36) (5.75) (6.85) (9.43) (4.04)
0.4 -.02769*** -.03035*** -.03916*** -.0445*** -.01191***
(3.33) (4.77) (6.83) (9.31) (2.64)
0.5 -.02988*** -.02814*** -.0369*** -.04029*** -.00718
(3.58) (4.57) (6.38) (8 .22) (1.62)
0.6 -.02986*** -.0279*** -.03577*** -.0371*** -.00324
(3.66) (4.15) (6 .02) (7.22) (0.69)
0.7 -.02898*** -.02471*** -.03289*** -.0353*** -.00494
(3.15) (3.49) (5.65) (7.15) (1.04)
0.8 -.0191* -.01909** -.02435*** -.02742*** .00222
(1.83) (2.38) (3.57) (4.55) (0.38)
0.9 -.02443* -.01766* -.01197 -.01927** -.00198
(1.88) (1.85) (1.42) (2.50) (0.27)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported quantile regression of specification (2); dependent 
variable is the log of hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column 
headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels; deciles shown in first column; restricted to men.
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Figure 3.4
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Males Only, House Price
Included)
Quantiles
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The addition of the house price variable (seen in table 3.40 and figure 3.4) shrinks 
the magnitude of the coefficients, as would be expected, but significance is 
maintained by most coefficients. Controlling for regional differences in house prices 
results in the largest wage flexibility being found for low wage workers, regardless 
of the level of unemployment rate used, as found for the sample as a whole, again 
echoing the results found by Sanz-de-Galdeano and Turunen (2006) and 
Ammermuller et al. (2010). The result is logical, as the wages of the less educated 
are most sensitive to the unemployment rate and they would likely be grouped in the 
lower end of the wage distribution. As the mean regressions revealed, for males, the 
lowest wage flexibility is found at TTWA level, followed by NUTS 1 level 
(although, all unemployment aggregations other than TTWA level produce results of 
similar magnitude). Table 3.41 and figure 3.5 present quantile regression results for 
females, with the house price variable omitted.
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Table 3.41
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Females Only, House Price
Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
0.1 .0763*** -.0013 -.03405*** -.04364*** -.01361**
(6.31) (0.15) (4.68) (6.77) (2.29)
0.2 .07649*** .00115 -.0359*** -.04367*** -.00758
(9.16) (0.16) (5.46) (7.88) (1.58)
0.3 .08115*** .01197 -.03804 ~  M***-.04754 -.00654
(9.47) (1.79) (7.11) (9.77) (1.48)
0.4 .08277*** .00982 -.03662*** -.04787*** -.00318
(9.36) (1.47) (6.71) (10.62) (0.72)
0.5 .0942*** ~  — ***.01823 -.0369*** -.04848*** .00073
(10.76) (2.74) (6 .66) (10.07) (0.16)
0.6 .10172*** .02278*** -.03959*** -.04953*** .00141
(10.30) (3.25) (7.29) (10.61) (0.30)
0.7 .11721*** .03206*** _ * * *-.03713 -.05373*** .00477
(10.74) (3.85) (5.96) (9.70) (0 .86)
0.8 .12648*** .04007*** -.03134*** -.05193*** .01128*
(10.20) (4.71) (4.52) (8.56) (1.81)
0.9 .13179 .04772*** -.02042** -.0446’** .02429” *
(8.49) (4.25) (2.27) (5.53) (3.25)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported quantile regression of specification (1); dependent 
variable is the log of hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column 
headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels; deciles shown in first column; restricted to women.
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Figure 3.5
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Females Only, House Price
Excluded)
Quantiles
0.15
0.1
0.05>■
4 -1U
LU
-0.05
- 0.1
—  NUTS1 
 NUTS 2
— — NUTS 3 
 UA
—  • TTWA
Again, results center around the mean estimates, with the largest variation found at 
the NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 levels of aggregation. There appears to be less variation at 
other levels of unemployment rate aggregation. It can be seen that elasticities are 
positive at all deciles for NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 levels and negative at more 
disaggregated levels (except at TTWA level, for those with the highest earnings). 
Regarding the pattern in wage flexibility over the wage distribution that has been 
found for the sample as a whole and the male restriction, the presence of positive 
elasticities from the female sub-sample cannot be ignored. At the NUTS 1 level of 
unemployment rate aggregation, the trend line is still upward sloping over the wage 
distribution. However, due to the positive elasticities, the largest effect on wages 
due to the local unemployment rate is found for those earning the most, whereas the 
regression results for males (and the sample as a whole) revealed that the largest 
absolute wage flexibility was found in the lower portions of the wage distribution.
At the NUTS 2 level of aggregation, coefficients are also positive (but are only 
significant at the fifth decile and above). Whilst the unemployment elasticity is now
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positive, the largest wage flexibility is still found for higher earners (as seen for 
males and the sample as a whole). Both NUTS 3 and unitary authority level results 
are negative and there is very little difference between low and high earners. 
Unemployment elasticity at TTWA level transitions from negative to positive as 
wages increase, although results are only significant at the first, eighth and ninth 
deciles. The effect of augmenting the specification by adding the house price 
variable (and therefore excluding all Scottish observations) can be seen in table 3.42 
and figure 3.6.
Looking at the NUTS 1 level of aggregation first, controlling for regional differences 
through the house price variable greatly reduces the disparity in wage flexibility 
between high and low earners. Elasticity remains positive, and is still greatest for 
high earners, but the difference has fallen significantly. Results are found to be of a 
smaller magnitude for the NUTS 2, unitary authority and TTWA levels of 
aggregation, but the slopes of their trend lines appear identical to the trend line 
produced for the NUTS 1 unemployment rate, therefore wage flexibility increases 
with earnings (coefficients at NUTS 2 and TTWA levels are significant from the 
third and second deciles onwards, although elasticities are positive). Results at the 
NUTS 3 and unitary authority levels of aggregation were negative when house prices 
were excluded, but the inclusion of house prices has turned them positive. They are 
significant from the fifth and seventh deciles and follow the same pattern as the other 
unemployment rates, with high earners having the largest (positive) unemployment 
elasticity.
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Table 3.42
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Females Only, House Price
Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
0.1 .05069*** .00941 -.00103 -.00817 .00669
(4.14) (0.96) (0 .12) (1.18) (1.02)
0.2 .05107 .01089 -.00274 -.00764 .00973*
(4.96) (1.34) (0.42) (1.34) (1.92)
0.3 _ _  ^ _  _*** .05185 .02163 .00258 -.00201 .01156**
(5.86) (3.21) (0.42) (0.40) (2.30)
0.4 .05011*** .02174*** .00451 -.00159 .01662***
(5.26) (2.97) (0.76) (0.33) (3.61)
0.5 .05421*** .0288*** .01238** .0034 .01511***
(6 .01) (4.14) (2 .12) (0.71) (3.12)
0.6 .06046*** .03171*** .01288** .00634 .02055***
(6.27) (4.64) (2 .21) (1.26) (4.50)
0.7 .06991*** .03762*** .01735*** .01102* .02193***
(6.78) (4.57) (2.73) (1.95) (4.17)
0.8 .07693*** .04869*** .02714*** .01315** .02851***
(5.74) (5.48) (3.50) (1.98) (4.56)
0.9 .0547” * .04166’*’ .03886*’* .02719*** .03753**’
(3.42) (3.63) (4.05) (3.32) (4.84)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported quantile regression of specification (2); dependent 
variable is the log of hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column 
headings; t-statistics in parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels; deciles shown in first column; restricted to women.
152
Figure 3.6
Wage Flexibility from Quantile Regressions (Females Only, House Price
Included)
Quantiles
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined wage flexibility over the entire wage distribution, 
using five different levels of the unemployment rate. By utilizing unemployment 
rates at five different levels of aggregation, I have observed that the wage response 
to unemployment varies according to the level that unemployment is measured at, 
from national to local (which serves as a link to the level of wage bargaining 
centralization, with the NUTS 1 level representing highly centralized bargaining 
systems and the TTWA level representing decentralized bargaining). Wage 
flexibility is found to peak over intermediate levels of unemployment rate 
aggregation (particularly at the NUTS 3 and unitary authority levels). This result, of 
U shaped wage flexibility, is in line with results obtained by Groth and Johansson 
(2004), although their result is obtained using unrelated methodology. It appears 
that this U-shape in wage flexibility is a result of the composition of male and female 
effects. Apart from the specific results concerning wage flexibility that arise from 
using multiple unemployment rate levels, it appears that utilizing several levels of 
unemployment rate aggregation can provide a greater understanding of wage 
flexibility than using just one unemployment rate.
I disaggregate by sub-samples and find several results that concur with previous 
results in the literature, such as the wages of men, private sectors workers and the 
less educated are more sensitive to the unemployment rate. These results, alongside 
my results by NUTS 1 regions suggest that the aggregated wage curve consists of 
many individual wage curves for sub-groups that vary greatly (Turunen, 1998).
The use of differing aggregations of the unemployment rate, whilst illuminating the 
notion that the use of just one level may be insufficient, do make drawing out policy 
implications more difficult. Different approaches may be required as we move 
through the process of economic recovery, depending on the level of wage flexibility 
in the region or for the worker group. Those with a high level of wage flexibility are 
likely to have been affected worse by the economic downturn and the sharp rise in 
unemployment. Therefore it is imperative to ensure that these regions and worker
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groups are targeted by initiatives to get people back into employment during the 
period of economic recovery. Policy is more likely to succeed in raising wages 
through lowering unemployment in these areas as their wages are more likely to 
respond to any changes in unemployment levels. Regions that show highly elastic 
wage responses to unemployment include the South East and South West of 
England, whilst the male, private sector and less educated worker groups also appear 
to have highly flexible wages.
Turning to the quantile regression results, I found that at highly aggregated levels of 
the unemployment rate, the greatest flexibility was found in the lower tail of the 
wage distribution. As the level of unemployment rate becomes more disaggregated, 
a change in wage flexibility is observed, as wages are found to be more flexible for 
higher earners. Further increases in disaggregation to TTWA level resulted in a near 
uniform elasticity across the wage distribution. These effects seemed to dissipate 
when adding controls for regional house price differences, as wage flexibility was 
observed to be largest for those at the lower end of the wage distribution (for males 
and the full sample). Regardless, the differences in wage flexibility over the wage 
distribution would suggest that regressions at the mean are insufficient to fully 
capture wage flexibility; points all along the wage distribution should be considered. 
Those wages of those at the lower tail of the wage distribution are likely to respond 
most to increases in employment, so the employment prospects of this group should 
be a priority for policy makers.
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Appendix 3.A
Earnings
Unemployment Rate
Population Density 
House Price
Rural
Male
Age
Age2
Public
Job Tenure
Variable Definitions
Gross hourly earnings of individual. Entered into 
model in log form
Proportion of economically active that are classed ILO 
unemployed. Entered into model in log form, at NUTS 
1, NUTS 2, NUTS 3, unitary authority and TTWA 
level
Population per km2, entered into model in log form, at 
unitary authority level
Average house price in each unitary authority divided 
by national mean house price. Entered into model at 
unitary authority level
Dummy variable taking a value of 1, if 50% or more of 
unitary authority is classified as rural. A value of 1 
denotes an urban unitary authority. Based on URIND 
variable
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
male, 0 if female
Age of individual
Square of age of individual
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
employed in the public sector, o if private sector
Job tenure of individual
156
Health Limit
Married
Plant Size
Ethnicity
Industry
Occupation
Qualifications
Year
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if  an individual 
has an activity limiting health problem
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
married, 0  otherwise
Vector of dummy variables indicating size of 
employer. 4 categories: under 25 employees, 25 to 49 
employees, 50 to 499 employees, and 500 and over 
employees
Vector of dummy variables indicating ethnicity of 
individual. 6  categories: white, mixed, black, Asian, 
Chinese, and other.
Vector of dummy variables indicating industry sector. 
9 categories: agriculture and fishing; energy and water; 
manufacturing; construction; distribution, hotels and 
restaurants; transport and communications; banking, 
finance and insurance; public administration, health 
and education; and other services
Vector of dummy variables indicating occupation. 9 
categories: managers and senior officials; professional; 
associate professional and technical; administrative and 
secretarial; skilled trades; personal services; sales and 
customer service; process, plant and machinery; and 
elementary
Vector of dummy variables indicating highest 
qualification attained. 9 categories: PhD, masters,
PGCE, first degree, higher education, A level, GCSE, 
other, and none
Vector of year dummy variables
157
Table 3.A1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Personal Characteristics
Hourly Earnings 11.35277 6.651062 1.2 53.13
Male 0.593032 0.49127 0 1
Female 0.406968 0.49127 0 1
Age 39.96636 11.60878 16 64
Age2 1732.073 937.6447 256 4096
Activity Limiting Health Problem 0.090034 0.286231 0 1
Married 0.305567 0.460649 0 1
Ethnicity
White 0.940778 0.236041 0 1
Mixed 0.005242 0.072214 0 1
Asian 0.028429 0.166196 0 1
Black 0.01448 0.119458 0 1
Chinese 0.002697 0.051866 0 1
Other 0.008374 0.091126 0 1
Qualifications
PhD 0 .0 1 1 1 1 1 0.104822 0 1
Masters 0.037487 0.189953 0 1
PGCE 0.017662 0.131718 0 1
First Degree 0.153552 0.36052 0 1
Higher Education 0.116825 0.321212 0 1
A Level 0.251311 0.433768 0 1
GCSE 0.215234 0.410986 0 1
Other 0.112462 0.315935 0 1
None 0.087229 0.28217 0 1
Employment
Job Tenure 8.402216 8.787324 0 49
Public Sector 0.290208 0.45386 0 1
Private Sector 0.709792 0.45386 0 1
Plant Size under 25 0.291032 0.45424 0 1
Plant Size 25 to 49 0.135808 0.342586 0 1
Plant Size 50 to 499 0.372382 0.483441 0 1
Plant Size over 500 0.200778 0.400583. 0 1
Industry Sector
Agriculture & Fishing 0.007424 0.085841 0 1
Energy & Water 0.016253 0.126448 0 1
Manufacturing
Construction
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants
Transport & Communications
Banking, Finance & Insurance
Public Admin. Educ. & Health
Other Services
Occupation
Managerial
Professional
Associate Pro. & Technical
Administration
Skilled Trade
Personal Service
Sales
Process, Plant & Machinery
Elementary
Year
2004
2005
2006 
2007
Geography
Population Density 
Rural Dummy
0.182308 0.3861 0
0.06761 0.251076 0
0.142813 0.349883 0
0.078472 0.268913 0
0.152969 0.359959 0
0.308416 0.461841 0
0.043577 0.204153 0
0.17393 0.37905 0
0.145871 0.352978 0
0.157587 0.364354 0
0.122509 0.327873 0
0.104479 0.305881 0
0.064282 0.245255 0
0.047206 0.212079 0
0.095376 0.293734 0
0.088762 0.284401 0
0.450631 0.497558 0
0.183198 0.38683 0
0.183424 0.387015 0
0.182747 0.38646 0
1544.689 1926.875 8
0.152307 0.359319 0
13609
1
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Table 3.A2
Travel to Work Area Exclusions
This table lists the TTWAs that have been excluded from the analysis, due to 
insufficient observations required to calculate unemployment rates.
Travel To Work Area Code Full Sample Male Female
Ashford 029 2004
Thetford 041 2006, 2007
Mildenhall 043 2007
Diss 044 2006 2007
Fakenham 045 2004, 2006
Cromer 048 2006
Bury St Edmunds 051 2007
Woodbridge 052 2007
St Austell 058 2006
Newquay 061 2007 2007 2006, 2007
Penwith and Isles of Scilly 063 2006
Wadebridge and Bodmin 064 2006
Launceston 065 2005, 2007 2005, 2007 2005, 2006, 2007
Bude 066 2006 2004, 2005, 2007
Camelford 067 2005, 2006, 2007 2005, 2006, 2007 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007
Axminster 072 2006 2005, 2006, 2007 2006
Barnstaple 074 2006 2006 2006
Tiverton 075 2006 2007
Chard 076 2004 2006, 2007
South Molton 079 2004 2004 2004, 2005, 2007
Ilfracombe 080 2006, 2007 2006, 2007 2006, 2007
Kingsbridge 082 2006, 2007
Dartmouth 083 2005, 2007 2005, 2006, 2007 2005, 2007
Newton Abbot 084 2006
Bideford 086 2007
Holsworthy 087 2006, 2007 2005, 2006, 2007 2004, 2006, 2007
Shaftesbury 090 2007 2007 2007
Bridport 091 2006 2007
Cirencester 094 2006
Evesham 095 -2006,. 2007 - - 2004
Bridgwater 100 2004
Minehead 101 2007 2007 2007
Devizes 102 2007
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Trowbridge and Warminster 104 2006
Leominster 108 2004 2007
Leek 119 2006, 2007
Rugby 122 2004
Boston 133 2006
Skegness and Mablethorpe 134 2007
Louth 135 2006
Horncastle 136 2005, 2006, 2007 2004
Sleaford 139 2007
Gainsborough 142 2007 2007 2007
Retford 146 2006, 2007
Settle 151 2005 2005, 2007 2005, 2006
Hawes and Leyburn 156 2005, 2007 2005, 2007 2005, 2006, 2007
Richmond 158 2006 2006 2006
Malton 159 2006
Pickering 160 2004, 2006, 2007
Whitby 161 2006
Lancaster and Morecambe 176 2007
Keswick 179 2004, 2006, 2007 2004, 2006, 2007 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007
Haltwhistle 183 2004, 2005, 2006
Appleby 184 2005, 2007 2004, 2005, 2007 2005, 2006, 2007
Penrith 185 2007 2007 2006, 2007
Kendal 186 2005
Windermere 187 2007 2007 2005, 2007
Barnard Castle 192 2006, 2007 2006, 2007 2006, 2007
Berwick-upon-Tweed 195 2006, 2007
Betws-y-Coed 200 2004, 2005 2006
Ruthin and Bala 201 2005 2005 2005
Welshpool 202 2004, 2006
Llandeilo 209 2005 2004, 2005 2005, 2006, 2007
Fishguard and St David's 211 2006
Portmadoc and Ffestiniog 219 2004, 2006
Machynlleth 220 2006
Dolgellau and Barmouth 221 2006
Brecon 226 2006 2005, 2006 2006
Llandrindod Wells 227 2005, 2006
Knighton and Radnor 229 2007 2004, 2006, 2007 2007
Kelso and Jedburgh 233 2007
Kirkcudbright 240 2005, 2007
Newton Stewart 241 2005
Stranraer 242 2005
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Banff 249 2007 2007 2005, 2007
Huntly 252 2004 2004, 2007 2004
Dufftown 255 2007 2004
Badenoch 256 2007 2005, 2006
Thurso 257 2007 2007 2006, 2007
Wick 258 2004, 2005, 2006, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007
Inverness 259 2007
Lochaber 260 2007 2005, 2007 2004, 2006, 2007
Skye and Ullapool 261 2004, 2006, 2007 2004, 2006, 2007 2004, 2006, 2007
Sutherland 263 2005
Campbeltown 264 2004
Lochgilphead 265 2005 2004
Oban 266 2006 2006 2006, 2007
Girvan 273 2005
Pitlochry 275 2006, 2007 2005, 2006, 2007 2006, 2007
Crieff 276 2004, 2005
Orkney Islands 277 2007 2006
Shetland Isles 281 2004
Lewis and Harris 282 2005
Uists and Barra 283 2005, 2006, 2007
Argyll Islands 284 2004, 2005, 2006
Harwich 286 2006 2005
Redruth and Camborne 287 2007
Melton Mowbray and Oakham 290 2006 2006 2006
Matlock 295 2006
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Table 3. A3
Wage Flexibility by Aggregated Regions (NUTS 1 Dummies Included, Males
Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample -.01911 -.04406*** -.06286*** -.07487*** -.0094**
(0.82) (6 .22) (12.49) (18.39) (2.33)
London & SE .1132** .00349 _ _  „ *** -.08091 -.09201*** .00272
(1.99) (0.15) (6 .01) (9.78) (0 .20)
Rest England -.02382 -.024*** -.06853 -.06531*** -.00126
(0.51) (2.75) (10.03) (11.09) (0.25)
Rest UK -.04254* -.0522*** -.06095*** -.07003*** -.01047**
(1.68) (7.10) (11.33) (15.58) (2.52)
North -.04952* -.03846*** -.0446*** -.06115*** -.00922*
(1.84) (4.96) (7.44) (12.51) (1.92)
South .08849* -.05829*** ^  _  _  _ _*** -.09855 -.09767*** -.00497
(1.84) (3.30) (10.57) (13.30) (0 .68)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (3); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
region; restricted to men.
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Table 3.A4
Wage Flexibility by Aggregated Regions (NUTS 1 Dummies Included, Males
Only, House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample .08024** ,***-.0226 -.03652*** -.04403*** .0006
(2.47) (2.87) (6.36) (9.34) (0.14)
London & SE .15682*** -.07245*** -.04968*** -.06021 .00902
(2.78) (3.12) (3.69) (6.32) (0 .68)
Rest England -.06102 .0043 -.02836*** -.02756*** .00061
(1.31) (0.49) (4.05) (4.54) (0 .12)
Rest UK -.01154 -.00021 -.02496*** -.02925*** .00008
(0.28) (0.03) (3.88) (5.31) (0 .02)
North .0001 .0213** -.00948 -.02018*** .00951*
(0 .00) (2.32) (1.25) (3.23) (1.67)
South .13414*** -.10519*** -.06292*** -.06329*** -.00549
(2.81) (5.97) (6.70) (8.48) (0.76)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (4); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
region; restricted to men.
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Table 3.A5
Wage Flexibility by Aggregated Regions (NUTS 1 Dummies Included, Females
Only, House Price Excluded)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample .0574** .00399 -.04085*** -.04649*** -.00432
(2.38) (0.50) (7.39) (9.98) (0.95)
London & SE .1694* .08351*** -.06461 -.05128 .00051
(1.94) (3.80) (4.55) (4.84) (0.04)
Rest England .03708 -.01083 -.03852 ***-.04175 .00771
(0 .88) (1.05) (5.11) (6 .66) (1.35)
Rest UK .02502 -.01521* -.03843*** -.04615*** -.0059
(0.92) (1.77) (6.44) (8.95) (1.24)
North .02123 _ _ _ _ _*** -.02386 -.04118*** _ _  „  _ _ *** -.05103 -.02175***
(0.69) (2.64) (6.39) (9.11) (4.05)
South .11385** .08058*** -.05067*** -.04336*** .02671***
(2.15) (4.56) (4.72) (5.20) (3.22)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (3); dependent variable is the log of 
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
region; restricted to women.
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Table 3.A6
Wage Flexibility by Aggregated Regions (NUTS 1 Dummies Included, Females
Only, House Price Included)
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 UA TTWA
Full Sample .09094*** .00555 -.01216* -.0168*** .00844*
(3.06) (0.62) (1.94) (3.27) (1.71)
London & SE .18942** .00493 -.03215** -.0228** .00992
(2.19) (0 .22) (2.25) (2.13) (0.74)
Rest England .04735 .01278 -.00378 -.01036 .01283**
(1.12) (1.23) (0.49) (1.60) (2.25)
Rest UK .03433 .01498 -.00223 -.00923 .00809
(0.87) (1.49) (0.31) (1.55) (1.54)
North .02542 .00785 -.00598 -.01209* -.00341
(0.56) (0.72) (0.75) (1.80) (0.55)
South .13571*** .02001 -.02003* -.01806** .02765***
(2.58) (1.12) (1.86) (2.15) (3.36)
Notes: unemployment elasticities reported from specification (4); dependent variable is the log of
hourly earnings; unemployment rate aggregation level indicated in column headings; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; disaggregated by 
region; restricted to women.
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Chapter 4
Inequalities in Earnings, Employment and 
Economic Activity: People or Place?
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4.1 Introduction
Inequality is widespread across the UK. It can be seen on a large scale, such as the 
North-South divide, but is also present within much smaller areas. In this chapter I 
intend to examine the determinants of inequality in terms of earnings, employment 
and economic activity, focusing on the role of ‘people versus place’. Much work has 
been done in this area regarding earnings inequalities (for example Taylor et al., 
2006 and Gibbons et al, 2010), but less attention has been paid to employment and 
activity inequalities. The value to policymakers of such a study is the determination 
of whether resources should be directed at areas themselves or the individuals 
working within them (this could be used in conjunction with the results of earlier 
chapters which determine to what extent the earnings of places and groups of people 
will respond to reductions in unemployment). Previous studies, such as Gibbons et 
al. (2 0 1 0 ), suggest that individual characteristics account for most of the earnings 
inequality in the UK and that area effects explain little of the inequality. Results for 
earnings are tested using a different dataset and expand the methodology to take 
employment and economic activity into account.
In this chapter, the variance in earnings, employment and activity is decomposed into 
components that can be explained by area effects and individual characteristics, 
paying attention to how these effects may be correlated. Using the Annual 
Population Survey (APS) between 2004 and 2007, the UK is split into 124 labour 
market areas constructed from existing standalone travel to work areas (TTWAs) and 
combined TTWAs. I examine the differences in relative importance that area effects 
and individual characteristics have in explaining earnings, employment and 
economic activity variation for a number of sub groups and consider how these 
effects may differ across urban and rural regions. Individual characteristics tend to 
explain the greatest amount of variation, but I test which components of individual 
characteristics are of most importance.
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In section two a selection of the relevant literature in this field is examined. Section 
three consists of an investigation of the data and an explanation of the methodology. 
In section four findings are presented, and in section five conclusions are drawn.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section I will summarize a selection of the relevant literature. Many earlier 
studies of inequalities were based less on spatial inequalities and more on the 
inequalities between workers in different industries, amongst other sub groups 
(Gibbons and Katz, 1992 and Kruegar and Summers, 1988). This literature review is 
focused on the studies that investigate inequalities over space.
Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) investigate differences in similar workers’ wages 
across UK regions and the evolution of these differences over the period 1982 to 
1997. Their primary data source is the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). Firstly, 
they use a Mincer earnings function with controls for gender, education, experience 
and experience squared to obtain coefficients for each year and region (twelve NUTS 
1 regions, including Northern Ireland). They then divide their analysis of these 
coefficients across four strategies: examining the range of the coefficients between 
1982 and 1997; calculating the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean) for each variable and examining its evolution; calculating a 
time series trend for each variable using OLS and checking the correlation between 
intercepts and trends; and decomposing the changes across regions (London 
compared with the rest of the UK except the South East and Northern Ireland) 
between the start and end of the sample period.
Duranton and Monastiriotis note that the mean coefficient of determination (the 
percentage of variance that can be accounted for from the model) across all regions 
is 38.6%, with extremes in the East Midlands in 1987 (53.9%) and London in 1996 
(20.4%). The coefficient of determination is found to decline over the sample 
period, suggesting less of the inequality is explained. Examining coefficients
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between the beginning and end of the period suggests that the coefficients on 
characteristics converge across regions. They estimate that it would take 22 years 
for full convergence in real regional fixed effects to take place. Switching to 
nominal regional fixed effects extends the convergence period to 44 years. 
Regarding the gender wage gap, they find evidence of convergence over the sample 
period (with the range between regions falling from 19% to 14%) and estimate the 
full convergence period at 26 years. Experience and experience squared show strong 
convergence over 1982 to 1997, and full convergence is calculated at twelve and 
nine years, whilst education convergence is found to be occurring at a slower rate 
than the other measures, taking 35 years. They pinpoint the low returns to education 
in London as the cause for this. The inclusion of a set of dummy variables 
controlling for occupation has its greatest effect in London, causing a jump in the 
coefficient of determination. Decomposition analysis reveals that the main 
determinant of the increase in inequalities is the convergence in the returns to 
education and experience.
Rice and Venables (2003) investigate regional disparities across Great Britain at the 
NUTS 3 administrative area level of disaggregation between 1996 and 1998. To do 
this they use a three step approach. Firstly, they create a model of regional 
inequalities linking exogenous differences between regions to the equilibrium values 
of endogenous variables. Secondly, they compare observed outcomes with outcomes 
from their model. Thirdly, they use the model to identify the sources of regional 
disparities. Rice and Venables point out that the spatial disparities observed in the 
UK are greater than those in the EU and the US and that spatial differences in output 
per worker and differences in regional unemployment rates may be driving this large 
level of spatial disparity. Differing skill compositions are identified as generating 
these spatial differences in output per worker, with a positive correlation between 
skill composition indicators and gross domestic product (GDP) per employee. After 
controlling for skill composition factors, Rice and Venables state that the spatial 
differences in skill composition cannot fully explain the degree of spatial disparity in 
GDP per employee. Rice and Venables consider the role of agglomeration effects on 
spatial disparity, finding population density to be positively correlated with earnings, 
house prices, GDP per employee and skill composition (as seen in Ciccone and Hall,
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1996, and Ciccone, 2002). Regarding house prices, Rice and Venables find the 
house price index to show greater spatial disparity than earnings indices and a 
positive correlation with the earnings indices and GDP per employee. Rice and 
Venables observe that spatial disparities in household utility may not be correlated 
with earnings or GDP per employee, possibly explaining the UK's low levels of 
labour mobility, which they conclude to mean that spatial disparities in earnings and 
GDP per employee do not necessarily mean there is no disequilibrium in the labour 
market. Therefore, observed regional disparities may be a part of this equilibrium 
and must be caused by some underlying regional differences. Rice and Venables' 
theoretical model shows how small exogenous differences (i.e. geographical 
advantage/disadvantage) between cities and regions cause the large spatial disparities 
that can be observed in the UK today and also how, if the exogenous difference has 
different effects on different industrial sectors, there will be further spatial variation 
in terms of industrial structure, in turn creating greater spatial variation in skill 
composition, which will magnify the observed spatial disparity.
Patacchini and Rice (2005) aim to provide a description of the spatial structure of 
economic performance for Great Britain via exploratory spatial data analysis. To do 
this they analyse the spatial structure of the productivity component and the 
occupational component decomposed from regional income per employee (at the 
NUTS 3 level) over the period 1998 to 2001. As a measure of income they use both 
gross value added (GVA) per hour worked and average hourly earnings. From their 
descriptive statistics they find that it is metropolitan areas that have a high ratio of 
average hourly earnings to GVA per hour worked, with a low ratio in rural areas 
(including South West Wales). Regarding the North-South divide in Great Britain, 
this theory is supported by GVA per hour worked data, however, when considering 
average hourly earnings there is less support, with earnings more dispersed. 
Patacchini and Rice construct a productivity index and an occupational composition 
index. The two indices are found to be positively correlated meaning that regions 
that boast high levels of productivity also have a good occupational composition. 
Through decomposition methods it is found that 60% of the variance in average 
hourly earnings is due to variance in the productivity index, whilst the remaining 
40% is due to variance in the occupational composition index and the covariance
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term. Patacchini and Rice’s results support positive spatial autocorrelation in 
income, meaning areas of high income are located in close proximity to other areas 
of high income. Similarly, areas of low income are found to be in close proximity to 
other areas of low income.37 Two specific regimes are identified -  a low income 
regime in the North West and North East regions of the UK and a high income 
regime of clustering in the South and the East of the UK, supporting the North-South 
divide theory. In both regimes, atypical areas are identified (by Moran's I statistic, a 
measure of spatial autocorrelation), but the clustering of similar areas cannot be 
ignored.38 Patacchini and Rice suggest that rather than a North-South divide, the 
results suggest a 'winner’s circle' based in the South East of England with earnings 
high relative to the rest of the UK. The 'winner's circle' is found to have both higher 
than average productivity and a better than average occupational composition. It is 
also noted that the low income regime in the North East and North West of Great 
Britain is driven by poor occupational composition.
Taylor (2006) focuses on regional and industry wage inequalities between UK bom 
men in full time employment over the years 1981 to 1995 (split into three periods: 
1981-85, 1986-90 and 1991-95) using the General Household Survey (GHS). He 
examines and tests several possible explanations for within group wage inequality. 
Taylor uses a two step approach, firstly splitting inequality into its within group and 
between group components, using a standard wage equation. The residual from this 
wage equation is taken as the within group wage inequality after controlling for 
personal characteristics, occupation, time and region and industry effects. Secondly, 
aggregate data for ten UK regions and six industries is used to evaluate possible 
within group wage inequality determinants.
Taylor finds that within group wage inequality has increased in each of the periods 
under consideration. The services sector tends to have comparatively large levels of
37 The measures of spatial autocorrelation are the Moran's I statistic and Geary’s C statistic. Results 
hold regardless of the measure of income (average hourly earnings or GVA per hour worked).
38 When focusing only on average hourly earnings, the evidence for low income clustering in the 
North East and North West is reduced.
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within group wage inequality in all periods and manufacturing has relatively low 
levels of wage inequality. Regarding the determinants of industry level within group 
wage inequality, Taylor finds that the effect of technological change is insignificant 
and explains less than 2% of wage inequality. Trade intensity (to proxy 
globalisation) also explains 2% of variation, with de-unionisation explaining 5% of 
the inequality. Increasing female participation in the labour market is found to 
account for 12% of variation, whilst immigration accounts for 8%. Taylor finds the 
largest determinant of within group wage inequality across industries to be changing 
inter cohort skills, which explains 36% of wage inequalities. When including all six 
possible determinants at once, 47% of the wage variation is explained. Splitting the 
industries into manufacturing and non-manufacturing, more of the variation is 
explained for manufacturing industries (6 6% to 45%). For manufacturing industries, 
unionisation is the largest determinant, followed by cohort effects, whilst cohort 
effects explain the most variation in non-manufacturing industries.
Regarding regional wage inequalities, almost all regions experience an increase in 
within group wage inequality over the sample period. Wage inequality remains large 
in the South East at all times. The Midlands regions have the lowest within group 
wage inequality in 1981, but experience very large increases in wage inequalities 
over the next half decade. A greater level of the within group wage inequality is 
explained at a regional level (6 8 %). The largest single determinant of wage 
inequality is found to be female participation (57%), followed by unionisation 
(52%), trade intensity (50%), technological change (34%) and cohort effects (28%). 
The effects of immigration are insignificant in explaining regional within group 
wage inequalities. Taylor splits regions into North and South, finding that 
technological change is the major determinant of wage inequalities in the North, 
whilst in the South female participation explains the largest portion of variation 
(61%). Taylor also finds this to be a determinant of wage inequality in the North.
Rice et al. (2006) examine the causes of spatial inequality in income and 
productivity. Income data is in the form of gross value added (GVA) from The 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) and hourly earnings from the New Earnings
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Survey (NES). Sub-regional data is entered at NUTS 3 level, although some areas 
are combined, reducing the number of NUTS 3 areas from 126 to 119. They are able 
to decompose earnings into a productivity effect and a composition effect, finding 
that the productivity effect is larger, accounting for around two-thirds of the spatial 
inequality in earnings. They then use proximity to economic mass to explain the 
spatial variation. Economic mass is proxied using the population of working age in 
an area. Proximity is measured in bands based on driving time around each sub- 
region, with the working age population measured within each proximity band. For 
both measures of income (GVA and earnings), a significant and positive effect of 
proximity to economic mass is found, with this effect shrinking with distance, 
becoming insignificant beyond 80 minutes driving time. This effect is determined to 
be due to the productivity component, whilst no significant effect is found for the 
occupational composition component. Rice et al. find that doubling the economic 
mass of an area should increase its productivity by 3.5%.
Combes et al. (2007) explain spatial wage disparities in France using a panel dataset 
between 1976 and 1998. They determine whether these disparities are due to spatial 
differences in worker skills, non-human endowments or local interactions. Using a 
two stage approach, they first estimate a wage equation using controls for time 
varying worker characteristics, worker fixed effects, area fixed effects, industry fixed 
effects, and the local characteristics of the industry of employment (local 
interactions). The first stage wage regression reveals that 70% of the variation in 
individual wages is explained by worker fixed effects, far more than is explained by 
any other factors. Regarding spatial wage disparities, between 40% and 50% can be 
explained by differences in skill composition. The second stage of their method 
involves taking the area fixed effects found during the first stage and regressing them 
on controls for time, local interactions and local endowments. Interactions are found 
to play a larger role than endowments, with urbanisation economies (captured by 
employment density) driving this result. There is support for sorting of worker 
characteristics, as results suggest that individuals with good unobserved skills sort 
themselves into labour markets that are large, dense and boast high skill levels. 
Combes et al. conclude that the main determinant of high local wages is this sorting 
of high skilled workers.
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Dickey (2007) examines the increase in earnings inequality in Great Britain between 
1976 and 1995 using a quantile regression technique, looking at the differences in 
earnings at different quantiles. Data comes from the New Earnings Survey (NES). 
She hypothesises that the increased inequality in earnings is not due to increased 
inequality between regions, but increased inequality within regions. The inequality 
between regions may have decreased over this period due to recession narrowing the 
North-South divide. Dickey states that over the period 1976 to 1995, earnings 
inequality (measured by 90th - 10th percentile difference) in Great Britain has 
increased by 25%, with this effect greater for males than females (35.7% to 20.7%). 
Over this period, the greatest rise in earnings inequality occurred in Wales, where 
earnings inequality increased by 35.5% (46.9% for males, 32.5% for females). 
Through the use of kernel density graphs, it is shown that the regional earnings 
distributions have widened, indicating a substantial rise in inequality at the lower 
half of the earnings distribution. Dickey reports that earnings inequality between the 
low skilled and high skilled has grown over the period. As the education level rises, 
so does earnings inequality, meaning that in regions with progressively increasing 
education levels, inequality will be greater. Dickey examines the effect age has on 
earnings inequality. She finds an earnings advantage for workers aged between 36 
and 50 years, with workers aged between 16 and 20 years earning the least. The 
earnings of the 16 to 20 age group, relative to the 36 to 50 year group have diverged 
for low paid workers, but converged for highly paid workers. Relative to the 36 to 
50 year age group, the 21 to 30 year group suffers larger inequality between highly 
paid workers. Compared to the 36 to 50 year age group, the 61 to 65 year age 
group's earnings have diverged for lower paid workers, but drawn closer for high 
paid workers. The gap in wages between males and females increases as earnings 
increase, with men earning more than women. However, the gender pay gap has 
decreased over the period. Dickey also reports a North-South divide in gender 
earnings inequality, as inequality is greater in the North compared to the South. 
Regarding migration, it is found that (excluding Greater London) high paid workers 
will benefit more from migration, possibly due to increased mobility and higher skill 
levels. Dickey concludes by stressing that policy should be targeted toward 
inequalities within regions, not inequalities between regions, by focusing on 
investment in education and training.
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Data from the New Earnings Survey (NES), the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is used by Bell et al (2007) to investigate 
the public-private sector wage differential in the UK across geographical areas and 
over time. Three time periods (1975-1979, 1985-1989 and 1993-2001) are chosen as 
they represent upward stages of the business cycle. They use two approaches to 
carry out this task. Firstly, they calculate standardized spatial wage differentials 
(SSWDs) at local authority district level from a Mincer earnings function for the 
public sector and the private sector. Secondly, they use quantile regression 
techniques to calculate the public sector premium along the wage distribution (at the 
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles). This is carried out at country level due to sample size 
restrictions.
Bell et al find that private sector inequality between the SSWDs has increased along 
the three time periods. Whilst the dispersion has increased, the ranking of SSWDs is 
found to be stable over time and also between genders. Switching to the public 
sector, they find differences in the pattern of SSWDs compared to the private sector. 
Bell et a l find that private sector SSWDs are more responsive to spatial differences 
than in the public sector. Regarding the public sector premium, it is found to be 
greater for women, to have risen over the 1990s after reaching low levels in the 
1980s, and to be greater in Wales than Scotland or England. All three datasets are 
used when obtaining quantile regression results and there are differences between 
these sets of results. They note that drawing conclusions from these results would be 
‘based on judgement and an interpretation of the economic findings’, however, 
results seem to suggest that the public sector premium at the 25th and 75th percentiles 
in Wales and Scotland exceeds that of England. Results from the LFS show a public
iL
sector disadvantage at the 75 percentile for England.
Mion and Naticchioni (2008) investigate the spatial distribution of wages in Italy 
using a matched employer-employee panel (from the Italian Social Security Institute) 
between 1991 and 1998. A two stage approach is used. First, an augmented Mincer 
earnings function that includes characteristics including employment density and 
market potential (the potential demand for goods and services produced in a
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location) is implemented. They find, initially, that doubling density increases wages 
by 2.21% and doubling market potential increases wages by 10.88%. Adding 
individual fixed effects sees the effect of doubling density fall to 0.74% and the 
market potential coefficient halve to 5%. The inclusion of firm heterogeneity (in the 
form of firm size) further decreases coefficients to 0.56% and 4.56%. Variance 
decomposition reveals that the largest determinant of wage inequality is worker 
skills, followed by time, age and firm size. Employment density and market 
potential explain little wage variation.
Mion and Naticchioni split the 95 Italian provinces into low density and high density 
provinces. They find that high density provinces feature far higher skill levels, and 
that sorting of worker skills accounts for close to 75% of wage inequality between 
high and low density provinces. Taking advantage of the panel element of the data, 
they are able to examine the migration of individuals from high density to low 
density provinces and find that skills migrate towards high density provinces. When 
splitting provinces by market potential instead of employment density, results are 
very similar.
A recent study of wage disparities has been carried out by Gibbons et al. (2010), 
where they determine whether wage inequalities are driven by area effects or 
personal characteristics. Their study uses data from the New Earnings Survey (NES) 
and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) between 1998 and 2008. 
They assign individuals to travel to work areas (TTWAs) according to where they 
work. TTWAs with less than 200 average annual observations are combined with 
other nearby TTWAs with less than 200 average annual observations. Combined 
TTWAs are classed as rural, whilst stand alone TTWAs are considered urban. 
Gibbons et al. first examine the difference in area average wages when moving 
between different points on the distribution. When controlling only for the year of 
observation, the difference between the best and worst area is 61.6%, This falls to 
29.4% when a number of controls for personal characteristics are included. The 
dataset used allows panel analysis, which Gibbons et al. make use of by including
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individual fixed effects. This causes the difference between the best and worst area 
to fall to 17.4%.
Regression including only TTWA dummies and controls for time explains just less 
than 6 % of wage variance. When individual fixed effects are controlled for, area 
effects are found to control for less than 1% of total wage variation. Regarding area 
disparities, area effects account for more of the variance, nearly half with only basic 
individual characteristic controls included. This falls to 10% for the share of area 
disparities correlated with personal characteristics and 1% for the uncorrelated share. 
They find the amount of wage variation explained by personal characteristics to be 
far higher. Basic controls account for 55-58% of wage variation, whilst this rises to 
85-88% when individual fixed effects are included. These effects are found to be 
relatively stable over the time period. Making use of the panel element of the 
NES/ASHE dataset, they also look at area effects for movers only. Initially, area 
effects are found to account for 4% of wage variance, as opposed to 6 % for the full 
sample, but after personal characteristics are controlled for results become very 
similar.
The differences between urban and rural areas are also considered. Urban areas are 
confirmed to have higher average wages, with less variation in rural areas. This 
increased variation is reflected in greater changes between 1998 and 2008 than urban 
areas in terms of ranking. Over the sample period, the advantage of urban areas has 
fallen, as the urban premium has dropped from 7.4% to 6.5%. Variance 
decomposition reveals that area effects explain far more of the wage variation in 
urban areas (5.71%) than rural areas (2.39%). The larger effect for urban areas 
remains until individual fixed effects are accounted for; thereafter less than 1% of 
total variation is explained in both urban and rural areas. This suggests that sorting 
is greater in urban areas and that sorting on unobservable skills (controlled for by 
individual fixed effects) is more important for urban areas. Gibbons et al. conclude 
that, relative to individual characteristics, area effects are ‘not very important’ in 
explaining wage disparities, and that policies should target individuals not areas.
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4.3 Methodology and Data
As the focus of this chapter is upon the variation explained by people and place, I 
will follow and build upon the methodology used in Gibbons et al. (2010), which 
decomposes earnings variance into portions that can be attributed to individual 
characteristics (people) and area effects (place). I extend their approach by taking 
advantage of the wealth of controls available in the APS and by repeating the 
exercise for employment and economic activity as well as earnings.
If earnings (or employment/activity) inequality can be explained by individual 
characteristics, it means that the individuals living in an area of high earnings 
possess characteristics that are lacking in an area of low earnings and that these 
characteristics are the reason why some areas are prosperous whilst other areas are 
not. Alternatively, if area effects explain the earnings disparities, it is not the people 
living in the area, but the area itself that drives prosperity through factors such as 
local endowments and economic policy. In practice, these two possible causes of 
inequalities are likely to be correlated (for example, an individual living in a high 
skilled area may experience productivity gains), an issue explored later in this 
section.
Data is taken from the Annual Population Survey (APS) between the years 2004 and 
2007. The APS is a large scale dataset that combines the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey with Local Labour Force Surveys for England, Wales and Scotland, and the 
Annual Population Survey Boost (although this was discontinued after 2005). The 
size of the dataset allows me to go down to small levels of disaggregation, which in 
this chapter allows estimation at the travel to work area (TTWA) level of 
disaggregation. Following Gibbons et al. (2010), the restriction that TTWAs must 
have a minimum of 200 annual observations to be used is imposed. Of the 232 
TTWAs available in the data, 92 of these have 200 or more annual observations and 
can be included as standalone TTWAs. TTWAs that fall beneath the 200 annual 
observations threshold are joined with other underrepresented neighbouring TTWAs 
to form larger areas that are able to pass the 200 annual observations restriction. In
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some cases it is necessary to join a TTWA with less than 200 annual observations 
with one that has more than 2 0 0  annual observations, due to it being geographically 
isolated from other TTWAs with under 200 annual observations (for example, 
Holyhead is joined to Bangor, Caernarfon and Llangefni). Once the process of 
ensuring all TTWAs have 200 or more annual observations is completed, there are 
124 areas left.
Whilst Gibbons et al. (2010) define their TTWAs according to place of work, 
definitions in this chapter are based on place of residence. This is necessitated by 
carrying out this research for employment and activity as well as earnings. It is 
unlikely that results will be effected much, due to the way in which TTWAs are 
constructed, as at least 75% of people who live in that TTWA will also work in that 
TTWA. Gibbons et al. test their results for both TTWA of workplace and TTWA of 
residence and find there to be little difference, with workplace based area disparities 
found to be marginally larger.
The remainder of the discussion of methodology and data is split between earnings, 
employment and activity. An in-depth examination of the data and how earnings 
vary across sub groups is available in chapter five.
Earnings
Initially, an earnings function with controls for area of residence and time only is 
estimated. This takes the form:
lnEi = a+ L \R E A r +aYEARt+£irt (1)
Specification (1) includes controls for the TTWA the individual resides in (AREA) 
and the year of the observation only (YEAR). No controls for personal
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characteristics are included, a denotes a constant and 8 is the error term. The 
controls for area of residence are then replaced with controls for personal 
characteristics only. This gives specification (2):
InEi = a + pXi + alNDi + aOCCj + aYEARt + (2)
In specification (2) I am able to take advantage of the APS’ wide range of personal 
information and control for an individual’s age, gender, marriage status, health, 
ethnicity, qualifications, job tenure, employer size, employment sector and full 
time/part time status through a vector of personal characteristics (X). Dummy 
variables for industry (IND), occupational group of employment (OCC) and the year 
the observation is taken from (YEAR) are also included. These variables should 
allow control of most of the observable differences in characteristics between 
individuals. Specifications (1) and (2) are then combined in specification (3):
lnEj = a + AAREAr + pXi + aINDi+ aOCCi + aYEARt+ em (3)
Specification (3) includes controls for both the area in which an individual lives and 
personal characteristics. Whilst spatial disparities on earnings will depend on both 
the area an individual is employed in and their individual characteristics 
(specification [3]), each are estimated separately (specifications [1] and [2]) to 
determine the relative importance of ‘people’ or ‘place’ in driving spatial earnings 
disparities.
From these three specifications I record the coefficient of determination (R2). The 
coefficient of determination gives the percentage of variation in earnings explained 
by the model. Therefore, the percentage of earnings variation explained by the area 
in which the individual is employed will be the resulting R2 from specification (1) 
and die percentage of earnings inequality explained by individual characteristics will
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be the R2 recorded from specification (2). Whilst it is important to determine the 
relative importance of ‘people’ versus ‘place’, it is important to make the distinction 
between correlated and uncorrelated variance. The resulting R2 from specification 
(1) will likely pick up area effects that are correlated with individual characteristic 
effects. If positive sorting is taking place, high skilled workers will locate in high 
earnings areas, and area effects may be boosted by sorting effects. To find the 
uncorrelated area variance share I take the difference between the R2 from 
specification (3) and the R2 from specification (2). This will give the earnings 
variation that is explained by the area effects that are uncorrelated with individual 
characteristics. The uncorrelated variance share will be lower than the correlated 
variance share. The uncorrelated individual variance share is obtained by similar 
methods, taking the difference between R2 (3) -  R2 (1). This gives the amount of 
earnings disparity explained by individual characteristics that are uncorrelated with 
area effects. This methodology for differentiating between correlated and 
uncorrelated variance shares is taken from Gibbons et al. (2010).
When examining sub groups (for example male and female) I will use an additional 
measure, the people-place ratio (PPR). This is simply the contribution of individual 
characteristics (people) in explaining earnings variation divided by the contribution 
of area effects (place). This ratio will tells how the variance share of individual 
characteristics changes relative to the variance share of area effects when switching 
between different sub groups, regardless of differences in the total variance.
Table 4.1
Summary Statistics for Earnings by Year
Year Obs. Mean SD Min Max CV
2004 124 9.6087 1.0641 8.0436 13.2328 .1107
2005 124 9.9805 1.1807 8.0453 13.3262 .1183
2006 124 10.4493 1.2183 8.4114 14.1631 .1166
2007 124 10.8188 1.2748 8.5104 14.7748 .1178
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Table 4.1 presents earnings summary statistics for the 124 TTWAs in the sample.39 
As expected, the mean level of earnings across the TTWAs has increased year on 
year, along with the standard deviation, minimum and maximum values. The 
coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) has remained relatively 
stable over the sample period, which shows that wage disparities between TTWAs 
have also remained relatively stable over the sample period. The results of the 
previous chapter, which identified areas of high wage flexibility, may suggest that 
some areas will have been affected to a greater degree by the rises in unemployment 
resulting from the economic downturn, which could see an increase in earnings 
inequality. Table 4.A1 in the appendix ranks TTWAs according to mean hourly 
earnings (aggregated over 2004 to 2007). Hourly earnings are found to vary from 
£8.40 (Merthyr Tydfil & Aberdare) to £13.64 (Guildford & London), illustrating the 
size of the earnings gap.
Employment
The analysis is split by the disparities in earnings, employment and economic 
activity, all of which need to be tackled if the inequality seen across the UK is to be 
reduced. For employment I use similar methodology to the work on hourly earnings, 
but replace the log of hourly earnings with an employment dummy. The EMP 
dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the individual is classified ILO employed and 0 
if they are ILO unemployed. The same methodology is used as for earnings 
equations, but many controls that are available in the earnings equations are not 
available for employment regressions. Specification (1) remains the same, just with 
the measure of employment replacing log hourly earnings, giving specification (4).
EMPi = a + AAREAr + aYEARt + (4)
39 General summary statistics are included in the appendix (table 4. A4)
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Specifications (2) and (3) are altered, due the changes in the controls available. 
Specification (2) becomes specification (5):
EMPi = a + pXi + aNS-SECi + aYEARt + £irt (5)
By switching the focus from earnings to employment, the controls for job tenure, 
employment sector, part time/full time status, industry and size of employer are no 
longer available. It is still possible to control for occupation using the National 
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC), which classifies the whole adult 
population. As with the previous measure of occupation, this consists of a series of 
dummy variables. Controls for housing type and dependents are added. 
Accordingly, specification (3) becomes specification (6 ):
EMPi = a + XAREAr + |3Xi + aNS-SECi + aYEARt + e^ (6 )
Specification (6) is as specification (5), but with a vector of dummy variables to 
indicate the TTWA of residence. Summary statistics for employment between 2004 
and 2007 are presented in table 4.2.
Table 4.2
Summary Statistics for Employment by Year
Year Obs. Mean SD Min Max CV
2004 124 .956 .0138 .9064 .9785 .0144
2005 124 .954 .0156 .9117 .9907 .0164
2006 124 .9487 .0191 .8831 .99 .0201
2007 124 .9508 .0167 .9022 .9875 .0174
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The mean of employment varies little over the sample period (between .956 and 
.949). Due to this stability at the mean, the minimum and maximum are also stable, 
although the minimum value drops slightly in 2006, which is reflected in slight 
increases in the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation. The rank of 
mean employment over TTWAs is given in the appendix in table 4.A2. Dorset is 
found to have the highest mean employment level (.974), whilst Hartlepool sits at the 
bottom of the table (.912). The large unemployment rate and high mean hourly 
earnings in London can be demonstrated by comparison of tables 4.A1 and 4.A2, as 
London ranks 2nd in terms of mean earnings, but is forced down to 117th in table 
4.A2 due to its high unemployment rate.
Economic Activity
Finally, I consider economic activity. To do this I replace the employment indicator 
with an indicator of economic activity (ACT), which takes a value of 1 if an 
individual is economically active and a value of 0 is an individual is classified 
economically inactive. This change gives specifications 7 to 9.
ACTi = a + XAREAr + aYEARt+ e^ (7)
ACTi = a + pXi + aNS-SECi + aYEARt+ Eut (8)
ACTi = a + AAREAr + pXi + aNS-SECi + aYEARt+ Eiit (9)
Apart from the change in the dependant variable from EMP to ACT, the 
methodology for economic activity is the same as for employment. Table 4.3 gives 
summary statistics for the 124 TTWAs regarding economic activity. These figures 
illustrate the importance of economic activity, as close to 24% of the sample would 
be classified as economically inactive. As with the mean employment rate, the mean
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activity rate is stable across the four years of the sample, along with the other 
associated measures. Table 4.A3 in the appendix ranks TTWAs in order of 
economic activity rate. There are similarities between the rank of TTWAs in terms 
of activity and the other measures, as Hartlepool is again at the bottom of the 
ranking, whilst Wiltshire has the highest activity rate.
Table 4.3
Summary Statistics for Economic Activity by Year
Year Obs. Mean SD Min Max CV
2004 124 .7659 .0344 .6682 .8388 .045
2005 124 .7648 .0347 .6863 .8388 .0453
2006 124 .7628 .0395 .6613 .8567 .0518
2007 124 .7628 .0381 .6474 .8375 .0499
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4.4 Results
In this section the findings of the variance decomposition are presented. As with the 
data and methodology section, this section is separated into earnings, employment 
and economic activity. First, full results from an earnings specification (2) are 
presented in table 4.4, with results appearing as expected. There is an advantage to 
men, those who work in the public sector and those who work full time. Returns 
increase as employer size increases. Ethnicity appears to have little effect on 
earnings compared to other variables. Qualification returns are strong, with positive 
returns for all qualifications except GCSE and ‘other’ (relative to no qualifications). 
Only the energy and water sector has positive returns relative to the omitted industry 
of banking, finance and insurance. For occupation, managers and senior officials, 
professional occupations and associate professional and technical have positive 
returns relative to administrative and secretarial occupations.
Differences can be seen in the results from employment and activity regressions 
(table 4.5). Whilst age has a positive effect on economic activity, a negative effect is 
found for employment. This may reflect the large unemployment rates for younger 
age groups. The same is true for the coefficients on the male and marriage dummy 
variables. Positive returns are found for those with a mortgage and those that own 
their home (for employment) relative to the omitted group of ‘other rented’. 
Qualifications appear as a good determinant of employment and activity. Relative to 
the omitted group of no qualifications, positive returns are found for all 
qualifications (except PGCE in the employment regression). Results for ethnicity 
are stronger than found for the earnings regression. All NS-SEC dummy variables 
have a large and positive effect compared to the omitted group of never worked, as 
would be expected.
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Table 4.4
Full Results from Earnings Regression
Coeff. t stat
Age .0427"” 97.24
Age2 -.00048*** 90.02
Male .11467*** 61.47
Part Time -.04593*** 22.57
Public .01876*** 7.18
Job Tenure .00729*** 69.86
Health Limit ~  ^  ^  ~*** -.05639 21.80
Married -.04289*’* 23.73
Plant Size
25 to 49 .06652 27.18
50 to 499 .1024**’ 52.93
500 and over .16722*” 69.75
Qualifications
PhD ^  ~.30249 35.42
Masters .30064” * 59.92
PGCE .21895*** 32.33
First Degree ~  ^  -  *** .22034 67.44
Higher Education .11691*” 35.52
A Level .05791*’* 20.90
GCSE -.00114 0.42
Other -.01956*” 6.22
Ethnicity
White .01357 1.62
Mixed .03676*** 2.77
Asian -.01251 1.32
Black .02661” 2.54
Chinese -.0245 1.50
Industry
Agriculture & Fishing -.22895*** 24.07
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Energy & Water .0275*”  3.92
Manufacturing -.09307*’* 30.63
Construction -.02861**’ 7.05
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. -.21436*** 73.13
Transport & Comms. -.05539*”  14.95
Public Administration -.1342*”  41.96
Other Services -.18607 45.26
Occupation
Managerial .39456*** 127.56
Professional .40302**’ 120.02
Associate Pro. & Technical .22037*** 73.59
Skilled Trade -.02824*** 7.56
Personal Service -.12642*”  36.40
Sales -.10945*”  29.74
Process, Plant & Machinery -.12891*** 33.74
Elementary -.21184*** 66.47
Year
2005 .04263*”  20.27
2006 .07323” * 34.82
2007 .10529*”  49.9
Constant 1.31283*”  102.00
Notes: Regression results from specification (2); significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) 
and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 4.5
Full Results from Employment and Economic Activity Regressions
Employment Economic Activity
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
Age -.00303’” 18.38 .01692 76.33
Age2 .3**’ 19.18 -.00026*** 95.00
Male -.01706*** 28.57 ~  ~  ~  ~  ,  *** .08094 92.17
Dependents Under 19 .00346**’ 11.14 -.03185"* 71.98
Health Limit -.02653*’* 25.22 -.21401” * 168.33
Married -.01176*** 16.54 .01537*’* 14.81
Housing Type
Mortgage .02811 28.27 .07893"* 54.10
Owns Home .01858*** 15.93 -.00163 0.97
Council Home -.06742” * 52.76 -.0454"* 26.07
Qualifications
PhD
*oo
1.66 .07348” * 13.99
Masters .00506*” 2.75 .06971*” 23.87
PGCE .00164 0.63 .07428*** 17.87
First Degree .0031*” 2.97 .0568*” 35.16
Higher Education .00728 6.28 .07699**’ 43.18
A Level .01649*” 19.21 .05914*” 46.93
GCSE .00109 1.24 .0538*** 42.48
Other ~  ~  ~ ,*** -.00486 4.54 .05568 35.93
Ethnicity
White .02448*” 8.35 .04126 10.47
Mixed .01085” 2.25 .03859*” 5.77
Asian -.00204 0.62 -.00055 0.12
Black .00888” 2.38 .05683*" 11.10
Chinese .02237*” 3.95
^  A ***-.02573 3.38
NS-SEC
Higher Managerial .3321*” 208.47 .53524**’ 281.28
Lower Managerial .32828*” 228.74 .53963*” 351.29
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Intermediate .31975*** 210.84 .53672*” 308.75
Small Employers .33645**’ 208.69 .56798*” 294.96
Lower Supervisory .33064’” 212.48 .526” * 289.75
Semi-routine .31416” * 216.41 .51469*” 330.67
Routine .31085*** 203.58 .5057"* 295.47
Year
2005 -.00443*” 5.81 -.01377 12.29
2006 -.00952*** 11.58 -.01029*” 8.56
2007 -.00615*” 7.33 -.01189*** 9.70
Constant .64259’” 148.21 .17954*” 30.55
Notes: Regression results from specifications (5) and (8); significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Earnings
As I presented summary statistics by year of observation, I will also carry out the 
variance decomposition of earnings by year as well. The results are shown in table 
4.6. Columns 1 and 2, which give the amount of earnings variation explained by the 
component of area effects which is correlated with individual characteristics (column 
1) and uncorrelated with individual characteristics (column 2), reveal that very little 
of the variation in earnings can be explained by the area a person resides in. When 
allowing area effects to be correlated with individual characteristics it is possible to 
explain around 4.5% of earnings variation. Partialling out individual characteristics 
sees the amount of explained variation halved to less than 2%. The coefficient of 
variation in table 4.1, suggested that earnings variation had varied very little over the 
period 2004 to 2007. The explanatory power of area effects is similarly stable, 
varying extremely little over the sample period. Columns 3 and 4 give the correlated 
and uncorrelated individual characteristics variance share. The amount of earnings 
variation explained by individual characteristics dwarfs that of area effects, with the 
uncorrelated individual characteristics variance share being over 25 times the size of 
the corresponding area effects share. Indeed, individual characteristics are able to 
explain over half of the variation in earnings (50-54%). As expected, the 
uncorrelated individual characteristics variance share is smaller than the correlated 
variance share by around 2-3 percentage points. As results do not seem to vary over 
time, remaining results are aggregated to include all years. The results of Gibbons et 
al. (2010) support the notion that effects vary little over time (1998 to 2008).
Whilst I have found evidence confirming that individual characteristics are far more 
useful than area effects in explaining earnings variation, table 4.7 explores which 
components of individual characteristics account for the most earnings variation, 
reporting the coefficient of determination for a regression of hourly earnings upon 
differing sets of characteristics. In the first column I include each set of controls in 
separate earnings equations (along with year dummies) and report the resultant R2. 
This gives the amount of earnings variation that is explained by each specific group 
of controls. In the second column I start by regressing hourly earnings on just year 
dummies and then add in each set of controls until all possible controls are included
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Table 4.6
Earnings Variance Decomposition by Year
Area Effects Individual Characteristics
Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated
2004 .0449 .0185 .5436 .5172
2005 .0455 .0180 .5446 .5171
2006 .0443 .0185 .5386 .5128
2007 .0448 .0185 .5285 .5022
calculated as R2 of specification (3) -  R2 of specification (2); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (2); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (3) - R 2 of specification (1); disaggregated by year.
Table 4.7
Earnings Variance Decomposition by Components of Individual Characteristics
R2 Cumulative R2
Year .0077 .0077
+ Personal Characteristics .1751 .1751
+ Qualifications .1985 .3399
+ Employment .1967 .4029
+ Industry .1206 .4283
+ Occupation .4096 .5431
+ Area Effects
A r . j .  . ________  ,  ________I - . 2  f ___________
.0502 .5605
Notes: column 1 reports R from specification (3) when altering groups of controls individually
(along with year dummies); column 2 reports R2 from specification (3) when groups of controls are 
entered cumulatively.
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together in the final row. The R2 from each regression is reported, allowing 
correlation between individual characteristics and area effects. The previous table 
showed that earnings variation differs little over 2004 to 2007. Accordingly, the set 
of year dummies controls for less than 1% of earnings variation. Non-employment 
personal characteristics (including age and its square, gender, ethnicity, health and 
marital status) are found to explain 18% of earnings variation. Very similar figures 
are found for qualifications and for employment (full time/part time status, job 
tenure, employment sector and size of employer). Industry of employment is found 
to account for less of the earnings variation (12%), which is the least of the 
individual characteristics groups tested here. Of far more importance to earnings 
variation is the occupational group a worker belongs to. This is found to explain 
41% of the variation in earnings, the majority of explainable variation. This supports 
the use of occupation as a proxy for skills (such as we have used in chapter two), as 
it is found to explain more than twice as much earnings variation as highest 
qualification level. At this point the cumulative R2 is .5431, which is the most 
variation that individual characteristics alone will explain. In comparison, area 
effects (when correlated with individual characteristics) can explain just 5% of 
earnings variation, bringing the total that individual characteristics along with area 
effects can account for to 56.05%.
It is likely that the amount of earnings variation that area effects and individual 
characteristics can explain will vary according to sub-samples. In other chapters, I 
have shown that unemployment elasticities and the returns to education differ by 
gender. Table 4.8 splits the sample into male and female and examines the 
explanatory power of area effects and individual characteristics. Whilst I have 
previously shown unemployment elasticites to differ by gender, table 4.8 suggests 
that the determinants of earnings disparities vary little over gender. I have 
introduced a further measure in the final two columns, the people -  place ratio 
(PPR). This is simply the ratio of the individual characteristics variance share to the 
area effects variance share, calculated separately depending on whether area effects 
and individual characteristics are allowed to be correlated or not. A motive for 
introducing this measure at this point is that different sub groups may have different 
amounts of earnings variation, but this measure will show how the explanatory
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power of individual characteristics changes relative to area effects. For men and 
women none of the measures differ much, the (slightly) larger decline for women 
than men when switching from correlated to uncorrelated measures suggests that 
there is greater correlation amongst individual characteristics and area effects for 
women, although the change is small. The PPR confirms the earlier observation, 
that the uncorrelated individual characteristics variance share is around 25 times the 
size of the uncorrelated area effects variance share. The correlated PPR is far 
smaller at around 10, due to the relatively large reduction in area effects when I 
ensure it is not correlated with individual characteristics.
Table 4.9 presents results of an earnings variance decomposition by employment 
sector. Large differences can be seen in columns 1 and 2, where both correlated and 
uncorrelated area effects in the private sector are double that in the public sector 
(.0695 to .0302 and .0226 to .0095). That area effects explain a lot more of the 
earnings variation in the private sector is not surprising due to public sector wage 
setting being more centralised. More of the earnings variation is explained by 
individual characteristics in the public sector than the private sector, although both 
are high (55% in the public sector and 53% in the private sector when individual 
characteristics are correlated with area effects). Due to the low explanatory power of 
area effects in the public sector, the PPR for the public sector is more than double 
that found in the private sector.
It is possible to split the sample by urban/rural status, which will allow the 
identification of differences in the importance of area effects and individual 
characteristics for explaining earnings disparities between urban and rural areas. The 
urban/rural split is defined using three methods. Firstly (method A), I use the 
URIND variable that is available in the APS to identify TTWAs where more than 
50% of the population reports that they live in a rural area. The URIND variable 
splits areas into four classes: those that have a population of over 10,000  (urban), 
town and fringe, village, and hamlet. I classify all areas other than urban as rural
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Table 4.8
Earnings Variance Decomposition by Gender
Area Effects Individual Char. People - Place Ratio
Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr.
Male .0524 .0195 .5295 .4966 10.11 25.47
Female .0556 .0179 .5332 .4955 9.59 27.68
calculated as R2 of specification (3) -  R2 of specification (2); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (2); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (3) -  R2 of specification (1); people-place ratio is the ration of individual 
characteristic effects to area effects; disaggregated by gender.
Table 4.9
Earnings Variance Decomposition by Employment Sector
Area Effects Individual Char. People - Place Ratio
Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr.
Public .0302 .0095 .5485 .5278 18.16 55.56
Private .0695 .0226 .533 .4861 7.67 21.51
calculated as R2 of specification (3) -  R2 of specification (2); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (2); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (3) -  R2 of specification (1); people-place ratio is the ration of individual
characteristic effects to area effects; disaggregated by employment sector.
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(town and fringe, village, and hamlet). If the 50% threshold is met or exceeded, the 
TTWA is classified as rural.40 Method B again makes use of the URIND variable, 
but recognizes that TTWAs are not going to be entirely urban or entirely rural, but 
almost all will be a mixture of urban and rural. Here I allow urban/rural status to be 
defined at postcode level for individuals. As the URIND variable is not available in 
2004, this variance decomposition will be restricted to the years 2005-2007 41 The 
third method (method C) follows Gibbons et al. (2010), where they define 
standalone TTWAs as urban and combined TTWAs as rural. In some cases it is 
necessary to join a TTWA with an annual average number of observations under 200 
to a TTWA with more than 200 observations. In this case I define the combined 
TTWA as urban.
Table 4.10 presents the earnings variance decomposition split by rural and urban 
status. Examining the contribution of area effects in explaining earnings variance 
first, across all three methods area effects are able to explain more of the variation in 
urban areas than rural areas. This result is in line with that found by Gibbons et al. 
(2010). There appears to be relatively little difference between rural and urban areas 
regarding the individual characteristics variance share, which remains between 50 
and 55% depending on the rural/urban definition used and whether individual 
characteristics are allowed to be correlated with area effects. Due to area effects 
being small for rural areas, the PPR is far greater in rural areas.
It is apparent that individual characteristics are the driving force behind earnings 
inequalities in the UK and that these are relatively stable over rural and urban areas. 
However, by carrying out the variance decomposition analysis separately for rural 
and urban areas, I allow the effects of individual characteristics on log hourly 
earnings to be different across rural and urban areas, which means that the
40 Population weights are used, although this makes very little difference and I end up with the same 
number of rural TTWAs (17) without using population weights.
411 do not image that this should effect method A, as rural status is unlikely to change between 2004 
and the rest of the sample period.
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Table 4.10
Earnings Variance Decomposition by Rural/Urban Status
Area Effects Individual Char. People - Place Ratio
Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr.
Method A
Rural .0366 .0078 .5316 .5028 14.52 64.46
Urban .0505 .0177 .544 .5112 10.77 28.88
Method B
Rural .0459 .0119 .5455 .5115 11.88 42.98
Urban .0537 .0206 .5364 .5033 9.99 24.43
Method C
Rural .0401 .0092 .5327 .5018 13.28 54.54
Urban .0509 .018 .5443 .5114 10.69 28.41
calculated as R2 of specification (3) -  R2 of specification (2); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (2); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (3) -  R2 of specification (1); people-place ratio is the ration of individual 
characteristic effects to area effects; disaggregated by rural/urban status.
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Table 4.11
Earnings Variance Decomposition by Components of Individual Characteristics
by Rural/Urban Status
Rural Urban
R2 Cum. R2 R2 Cum. R2
Method A
Year .0127 .0127 .0072 .0072
+ Personal Characteristics .1869 .1869 .1748 .1748
+ Qualifications .1952 .3394 .1989 .3406
+ Employment .2166 .4070 .1953 .4029
+ Industry .1325 .4305 .1198 .4283
+ Occupation .4018 .5316 .4103 .5440
+ Area Effects .0366 .5394 .0505 .5617
Method B
Year .0035 .0035 .0028 .0028
+ Personal Characteristics .1908 .1908 .1576 .1576
+ Qualifications .1933 .3412 .1909 .3272
+ Employment .2013 .4061 .1877 .3915
+ Industry .1227 .4327 .1136 .4178
+ Occupation .4153 .5455 .4028 .5364
+ Area Effects .0459 .5574 .0537 .5570
Method C
Year .0107 .0107 .0073 .0073
+ Personal Characteristics .1912 .1912 .1741 .1741
+ Qualifications .1873 .3330 .1996 .3409
+ Employment .2154 .4040 .1953 .4031
+ Industry .1306 .4305 .1199 .4285
+ Occupation .4011 .5327 .4105 .5443
+ Area Effects .0401
<v
.5419 .0509 .5623
Notes: columns 1 and 3 report R from specification (3) when entering groups of controls 
individually (along with year dummies); columns 2 and 4 report R2 from specification (3) when 
groups of controls are entered cumulatively; disaggregated by urban/rural status.
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explanatory power of the components of individual characteristics may differ as 
well. This is explored in table 4.11. Splitting the sample by rural and urban status 
reveals very little difference between the explanatory powers of the components of 
individual characteristics. Rural/urban discrepancies are small, but I find that the 
controls for personal characteristics, employment and industry explain more of the 
variance for rural areas, whilst the variance share of qualifications and occupation 
changes as rural/urban definition is changed. Urban TTWAs are able to explain 
more of their earnings variation than rural TTWAs through area effects.
Employment
Inequalities across the UK in terms of earnings are widespread, but disparities in 
employment are equally important. I have replaced die log of hourly earnings with 
an indicator variable for employment status and have amended individual 
characteristics controls, as some are no longer available (as explained in the 
methodology section). I first look at the explanatory power of area effects and 
individual characteristics across the years 2004-2007 in table 4.12. It is clear from 
die contents of diis table that, as found for hourly earnings, the share of variance 
explained by area effects or individual characteristics varies very little over the 
sample period. However, the size of the employment variance explained by the 
variables in the model is far below the amount of earnings variance that can be 
explained. When allowing area effects to be correlated with individual 
characteristics it is possible to explain around 0.5% of employment variation, around 
one tenth of the earnings variation that area effects can explain. Whilst my results 
and the results of previous studies (Gibbons et al., 2010) show that area effects 
explain little earnings variation, these results show that area effects are of even less 
use in explaining employment variation and that almost all of the inequality in 
employment is due to within TTWA effects rather than between TTWA effects. For 
employment, individual characteristics explain around a third of the variation they 
were able to explain in earnings, although some decline would be expected as there 
are now less controls for individual characteristics (as most employment related 
controls are not available for the unemployed part of the sample). Little difference is 
seen between correlated and uncorrelated individual characteristics, suggesting that
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Table 4.12
Employment Variance Decomposition by Year
Area Effects Individual Characteristics
Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated
2004 .005 .0024 .1735 .1709
2005 .0043 .0024 .1707 .1688
2006 .0055 .0029 .1982 .1956
2007 .0044 .0027 .1797 .178
—   —— ■ "■ -   " ■ '■■■ ■ — ' ‘ 1 ' 11 » ■■■-            ■ ' ■ ' »' - .■ I .1-  .■■■     ■< -  -  —  ■ ■ ■
Notes: correlated area effect is calculated as R of specification (4); uncorrelated area effect is
calculated as R2 of specification (6) -  R2 of specification (5); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (5); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (6) -  R2 of specification (4); disaggregated by year.
Table 4.13
Employment Variance Decomposition by Components of Individual
Characteristics
R2 Cumulative R2
Year .0005 .0005
+ Personal Characteristics .0661 .0661
+ Qualifications .0048 .0673
+ Occupation .1516 .1775
+ Area Effects .0041 .1791
Notes: column 1 reports R from specification (6) when entering groups of controls individually
(along with year dummies); column 2 reports R2 from specification (6) when groups of controls are 
entered cumulatively.
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only a small amount of the individual characteristics that explain employment 
disparities are correlated with area effects.
Table 4.13 explores the components of individual characteristics, as I try to 
determine the reason for this large fall in explanatory power. I split individual 
effects into three groups (non-employment personal characteristics, qualifications 
and occupation). The personal characteristics component (age and its square, 
gender, ethnicity, health, marital status, number of dependent children and housing 
type) has been expanded from the earnings equation, yet it now only explains around 
6 .6 % of the variation in employment compared to 21.3% of earnings variation. 
Occupation again explains the largest proportion of variation (15.2%), and although 
this is far less than occupation explains in earnings variation (40.96%), this is the 
most important determinant of variation, providing a good proxy of the skills of 
individuals that maybe aren’t controlled for just by qualifications. Qualifications 
perform extremely poorly in explaining the variation in employment, accounting for 
just 0.5%. This poor result in comparison to occupation is disappointing, suggesting 
that qualifications alone explain very little of the inequality in employment rates.42 It 
is possible that qualifications do little to explain the probability of being employed as 
opposed to be unemployed, but may be a better measure of whether individuals are 
active or inactive in the labour market (which is examined in the next sub-section). 
When all individual characteristic controls and area effects are included in the model 
it is possible to explain 17.91% of employment variation, around one third of the 
amount of the variation in hourly earnings that can be explained (56.43%). This 
would suggest that employment disparities depend far more on unobservable 
characteristics than earnings disparities.
Splitting the sample by gender reveals that, through the controls available, it is 
possible to explain more of the variation in employment for men than women (table 
4.14). Area effects remain low for both males and females, although they are larger
42 All qualification dummies, except for GCSE, are significant relative to the omitted group (no 
qualifications)
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for men. There is a large difference between the amount of employment variation 
explained by individual characteristics for men and women, with the male figure 
around eight percentage points larger. This would suggest that whilst targeting 
employment disparities is more difficult than earnings disparities, this is even harder 
for women. There is very little difference between the correlated individual 
characteristics variance share and the uncorrelated individual characteristics variance 
share, but the variance share of area effects halves when the restriction that area 
effects cannot be correlated with individual effects is imposed. This means that 
more than half of the area effects that are able to explain employment disparities are 
correlated with individual effects. The uncorrelated PPR exceeds the correlated 
PPR, as found for earnings, but the magnitude has increased greatly, with 
uncorrelated individual characteristics able to explain over a hundred times more of 
the employment variation than uncorrelated area effects for men. This is due to the 
tiny uncorrelated area effects.
The first noticeable result of the employment variance decomposition by rural/urban 
status (table 4.15) is that whilst area effects explain more of the employment 
variance in urban areas (as found for earnings) when imposing the restriction that 
TTWAs are either rural or urban, this result is reversed when rural/urban status is 
based on individual responses and allows each TTWA to be a mix of urban and rural. 
This result holds whether area effects are allowed to be correlated or uncorrelated 
with individual effects (although the magnitude is far smaller for uncorrelated 
variance share, as would be expected). Gibbons et al (2010) find the explanatory 
power of area effects to be greater in urban areas, which I confirm when using their 
method (method C) and method A (which like method C, imposes the restriction that 
TTWAs are either rural or urban). Whilst the gap is smallest between rural and 
urban using method B for earnings, area effects still explained more of urban 
variance. Due to the poor explanatory performance of area effects, the PPR is 
relatively large, except for rural areas using method B (where area effects explain 
more in rural TTWAs than urban TTWAs). Regarding individual characteristics, the 
choice of rural/urban definition method has very little effect, with a greater 
proportion of the employment variance in urban TTWAs being explained by 
individual characteristics. This result differs from the result found for hourly
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Table 4.14
Employment Variance Decomposition by Gender
Area Effects Individual Char. People - Place Ratio
Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr.
Male .0052 .0021 .2199 .2168 42.29 103.24
Female .0037 .0015 .1385 .1363 37.43 90.87
calculated as R2 of specification (6) -  R2 of specification (5); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (5); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (6) -  R2 of specification (4); people-place ratio is the ration of individual 
characteristic effects to area effects; disaggregated by gender.
Table 4.15
Employment Variance Decomposition by Rural/Urban Status
Area Effects Individual Char. People - Place Ratio
Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr.
Method A
Rural .0024 .0011 .1216 .1203 50.67 109.36
Urban .0038 .0015 .1812 .1789 47.68 119.27
Method B
Rural .0052 .0035 .1231 .1214 23.67 34.69
Urban .0033 .0016 .1951 .1934 59.12 120.88
Method C
Rural .003 .0013 .1219 .1202 40.63 92.46
Urban .0038 .0016 .1832
l"'.
.181 48.21 113.13
calculated as R2 of specification (6) -  R2 of specification (5); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (5); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
cs R2 of specification (6) -  R2 of specification (4); people-place ratio is the ration of individual 
characteristic effects to area effects; disaggregated by rural/urban status.
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earnings, where there was no difference across rural and urban areas, suggesting that, 
in terms of observable skills that determine employability (if not earnings) sorting is 
occurring from rural areas to urban areas.
Results from table 4.15 confirm that the ability of area effects to explain employment 
variation is minute and that this holds across both rural and urban areas. In table 
4.16 I turn my attention to how the components of individual characteristics can 
account for employment disparities over rural and urban areas. As I regress 
employment probability on individual characteristics (and area effects) separately for 
rural and urban TTWAs, I allow the effects of individual characteristics on 
employment to differ over rural and urban areas, which would allow the explanatory 
power of the individual characteristic components to differ as well. Table 4.16 
reveals that, regardless of rural/urban definition, all components of individual 
characteristics are able to account for more employment variation in urban areas. 
The largest difference is in occupation, which is 5 to 6 percentage points higher in 
urban areas. Qualifications continue to explain less than 1% of employment 
variation, regardless of rural/urban status.
Economic Activity
Both area effects and individual characteristics have proven to be poor predictors of 
employment probability. It may be possible that whilst little of the variation in 
employment can be explained, it may be possible to explain more of the variation in 
economic activity. As with earnings and employment, I first test if the determinants 
cf economic activity have changed over the sample period. Results show that the 
controls for area effects, whilst explaining less than 1% of the variation in activity, 
are slightly more effective than they were in explaining employment disparities 
(table 4.17). Compared to employment, a far larger proportion of the area effects 
tiat explain activity are correlated with individual characteristics, as when switching 
to the uncorrelated area effect, it drops to less than a quarter of the correlated area 
effect, and less than the employment area effects variance share. Individual 
characteristics on the other hand are far more effective at explaining the variation in
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Table 4.16
Employment Variance Decomposition by Components of Individual 
Characteristics by Rural/Urban Status
Rural Urban
R2 Cum. R2 R2 Cum. R2
Method A
Year .0008 .0008 .0005 .0005
+ Personal Characteristics .0412 .0412 .0677 .0677
+ Qualifications .0032 .042 .005 .0689
+ Occupation .1049 .1216 .1548 .1812
+ Area Effects .0024 .1227 .0038 .1827
Method 6
Year .0000 .0000 .0002 .0002
+ Personal Characteristics .0467 .0467 .0756 .0756
+ Qualifications .0031 .0478 .0079 .0785
+ Occupation .1018 .1231 .1665 .1951
+ Area Effects .0052 .1266 .0033 .1967
Method C
Year .0012 .0012 .0004 .0004
+ Personal Characteristics .0424 .0424 .0684 .0684
+ Qualifications .0029 .043 .0052 .0698
+ Occupation .1034 .1219 .1566 .1832
+ Area Effects .003
-wi-y "
.1232 .0038 .1848
■ . i- .  -  ■ -  — -  -  . . . I .  .....................................
Notes: columns 1 and 3 report R from specification (6) when entering groups of controls 
individually (along with year dummies); columns 2 and 4 report R2 from specification (6) when 
groups of controls are entered cumulatively; disaggregated by urban/rural status.
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Table 4.17
Economic Activity Variance Decomposition by Year
Area Effects Individual Characteristics
Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated
2004 .0087 .0016 .4423 .4352
2005 .0063 .0014 .4354 .4305
2006 .0081 .0018 .4535 .4472
2007 .007 .0012 .4524 .4466
Notes: correlated area effect is calculated as R of specification (7); uncorrelated area effect is
calculated as R2 of specification (9) -  R2 of specification (8); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (8); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (9) -  R2 of specification (7); disaggregated by year.
Table 4.18
Economic Activity Variance Decomposition by Components of Individual
Characteristics
R2 Cumulative R2
Year .0005 .0005
+ Personal Characteristics .2566 .2566
+ Qualifications .0535 .2711
+ Occupation .3455 .4435
+ Area Effects .0073 .4446
' ' . I I 1 ■ — 2  M ■ '■ .1 . . . .  . .................... ■ . . .  —,
Notes: column 1 reports R from specification (9) when entering groups of controls individually 
(along with year dummies); column 2 reports R2 from specification (9) when groups of controls are 
entered cumulatively.
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economic activity than employment, explaining around 43-45% of inequality, more 
than double the amount explained for employment. There is little change in the 
explanatory powers of area effects or individual characteristics over the sample 
period.
Whilst I have determined that individual effects are better at explaining economic 
activity than employment, table 4.18 investigates which components of individual 
characteristics are driving this result. Once again, occupation is the most effective 
determinant, explaining 35% of economic activity variance, more than twice that of 
employment. Personal characteristics explain four times as much activity variance 
as they did employment variance. Non-employment personal characteristics prove 
to be a very good determinant of activity, explaining even more than they did for 
earnings (26% to 21%). Qualifications, which explained only 0.5% of employment 
activity, are able to explain 5% of economic activity inequalities. Whilst this is an 
improvement on their explanatory power regarding employment, for activity 
qualifications still explain only a quarter of the variance they were able to explain for 
earnings. Driven by the high explanatory power of non-employment personal 
characteristics and occupation, individual characteristics are able to explain 44% of 
economic activity disparities.
Whilst I found a large difference in the explanatory power of individual 
characteristics for employment between men and women, there is little difference for 
economic activity (table 4.19). Slightly more of the male variation is explained, 
although the difference is only approximately 2 percentage points. The poor 
explanatory power of area effects holds for both men and women. Regarding the 
relative sizes of area effects and individual characteristics, due to the extremely 
small uncorrelated area effects, the PPR is huge at 316 for men and 283 for women. 
As I found a difference in employment variation between rural and urban areas, the 
difference for economic activity is also tested.
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Table 4.19
Economic Activity Variance Decomposition by Gender
Area Effects Individual Char. People - Place Ratio
Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr.
Male .01 .0014 .4518 .4432 45.18 316.57
Female .0065 .0015 .4291
1 .
.4241 66 .0 2 282.73
calculated as R2 of specification (9) -  R2 of specification (8); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (8); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (9) -  R2 of specification (7); people-place ratio is the ration of individual 
characteristic effects to area effects; disaggregated by gender.
Table 4.20
Economic Activity Variance Decomposition by Rural/Urban Status
Area Effects Individual Char. People - Place Ratio
Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr. Corr. Uncorr.
Method A
Rural .0048 .0012 .408 .4044 85 337
Urban .0072 .0011 .446 .4399 61.94 399.91
Method B
Rural .0072 .0021 .4175 .4124 57.99 196.38
Urban .0066 .001 .4541 .4485 68.80 448.5
Method C
Rural .0048 .0007 .3958 .3917 82.46 559.57
Urban .007 .001 .4483
' ' r>
.4423 64.04 442.3
calculated as R2 of specification (9) -  R2 of specification (8); correlated individual characteristic 
effect is calculated as R2 of specification (8); uncorrelated individual characteristic effect is calculated 
as R2 of specification (9) -  R2 of specification (7); people-place ratio is the ration of individual 
characteristic effects to area effects; disaggregated by rural/urban status.
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Table 4.21
Economic Activity Variance Decomposition by Components of Individual 
Characteristics by Rural/Urban Status
Rural Urban
R2 Cum. R2 R2 Cum. R2
Method A
Year .0007 .0007 .0004 .0004
+ Personal Characteristics .2196 .2196 .2592 .2592
+ Qualifications .0338 .2308 .0558 .2742
+ Occupation .3111 .408 .3479 .446
+ Area Effects .0048 .4092 .0072 .4471
Method B
Year .0000 .0000 .0000 .0 0 0 0
+ Personal Characteristics .2357 .2357 .2741 .2741
+ Qualifications .0621 .2550 .0788 .2936
+ Occupation .3152 .4175 .3523 .4541
+ Area Effects .0072 .4196 .0066 .4551
Method C
Year .0008 .0008 .0004 .0004
+ Personal Characteristics .2061 .2061 .2616 .2616
+ Qualifications .0268 .2151 .0585 .2772
+ Occupation .3043 .3958 .3494 .4483
+ Area Effects .0048
—
.3965 .007 .4493
Notes: columns 1 and 3 report R from specification (9) when entering groups of controls 
individually (along with year dummies); columns 2 and 4 report R2 from specification (9) when 
groups of controls are entered cumulatively; disaggregated by urban/rural status.
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Individual characteristics are found to be better at explaining economic activity 
inequalities for urban areas, which follows the results found by Gibbons et al. (2010) 
for earnings, although the individual characteristics variance share is large for both 
rural and urban areas (table 4.20). Results confirm that, regardless of rural/urban 
status or the method of defining rural/urban status, area effects are relatively 
ineffective in explaining economic activity disparities.
Table 4.21 examines the contribution of the components of individual characteristics 
to explaining economic activity inequalities between rural and urban areas. All three 
of the individual characteristics components explain more urban activity inequality 
than rural activity inequality. Figures are comparable across all three rural/urban 
definition methods, except for qualifications, which seem to explain more of the 
activity variance for method B (with the difference being larger for rural areas).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have decomposed the variance in earnings, employment and 
economic activity into shares attributable to individual characteristics (people) and 
area effects (place) using the APS between 2004 and 2007. Results indicate that 
inequalities are driven by individual characteristics as opposed to area effects, a 
result in line with previous studies such as Gibbons et al. (2010). Results imply that 
only 5% of earnings variance is between area inequality and that within area 
inequality accounts for 95% of the total disparities. Switching from earnings to 
employment and economic activity, the amount of between region inequalities fall to 
less than 1%, meaning that almost all of the employment and activity variation is due 
to within area inequalities. The policy implication of these results is that, in order to 
reduce inequality across the UK, policies cannot target areas themselves, but must 
target the people living in those areas. This is even more important when dealing 
with employment and activity inequalities, as results suggest that policies aimed at 
areas themselves would be ineffective. Dickey (2007) states that policy should be 
directed toward inequalities within regions as opposed to inequalities between 
regions. It is possible that areas do account for more of the variation in earnings than
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the model is capturing. For example, place may play a part in the occupational 
structure, the area which explains the most spatial variation. Therefore, further work 
in this area will be required. Future work could also examine agglomeration effects, 
perhaps using a measure of population density.
As area effects are able to explain little of the inequalities in earnings, employment 
or activity, policies should be aimed at people themselves. I find that individual 
characteristics are able to account for around 55% of the variation in earnings, 44% 
of the variation in activity, but only 18% of the variation in employment. This 
suggests that employment disparities depend more on unobservable characteristics 
t lian earnings or activity disparities, and may therefore prove more difficult to target 
via policy directives.
Earnings, employment and activity variation have been decomposed by the 
components of individual characteristics, split into non-employment personal 
characteristics, qualifications, employment, industry and occupation (although the 
employment and industry components are dropped in the employment and activity 
analysis). I find that occupation explains the largest amount of variation (41% of 
earnings inequality, 15% of employment inequality and 35% of activity inequality). 
Whilst qualifications are able to explain 20% of earnings inequality, around the same 
amount as non-employment personal characteristics and employment characteristics, 
qualifications are only able to explain 5% of economic activity inequality and 0.5% 
of employment inequality. This result is disappointing, as results suggest that 
policies aimed at raising skills through academic qualifications may do little to 
ieduce employment disparities and to a lesser extent activity disparities (although 
his should reduce earnings disparities). The occupation controls may be picking up 
skills and abilities that are not picked up through academic qualifications and better 
determine earnings and the probability of employment or economic activity. Policy 
should be directed at developing the skills that can close these gaps.
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The variance shares of individual characteristics and area effects according to 
rural/urban status are also examined. I find that area effects are able to account for 
more variation in urban areas (except for when allowing rural/urban status to vary by 
postcode for employment and activity inequality). For earnings, rural/urban status 
has relatively little effect on the explanatory power of individual effects. For 
employment, there is a difference in individual characteristics, as individual 
characteristics can account for around 8 percentage points more of employment 
variation in urban areas than rural areas, whilst for activity, this difference is around 
4 percentage points. This suggests that directing policies to closing employment and 
activity gaps in rural areas may prove more difficult than in urban areas.
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Appendix 4.A
Earnings
Employed
Activity
Age
Age2
Part Time
Public
Job Tenure 
Health Limit
Married
Plant Size
Variable Definitions
Gross hourly earnings of individual. Entered into 
model in log form
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if individual is 
employed, 0  if unemployed
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if individual is 
economically active, 0 if economically inactive
Age of individual
Square of age of individual
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
employed part time, 0 if full time
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
employed in the public sector, o if private sector
Job tenure of individual
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual 
has an activity limiting health problem
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
married, 0  otherwise
Vector of dummy variables indicating size of 
employer. 4 categories: under 25 employees, 25 to 49 
employees, 50 to 499 employees, and 500 and over 
employees
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Ethnicity Vector of dummy variables indicating ethnicity of 
individual. 6 categories: white, mixed, black, Asian, 
Chinese, and other.
Industry
Occupation
NS-SEC
Qualifications
Housing Type
Dependents
fear
Vector of dummy variables indicating industry sector. 
9 categories: agriculture and fishing; energy and water; 
manufacturing; construction; distribution, hotels and 
restaurants; transport and communications; banking, 
finance and insurance; public administration, health 
and education; and other services
Vector of dummy variables indicating occupation. 9 
categories: managers and senior officials; professional; 
associate professional and technical; administrative and 
secretarial; skilled trades; personal services; sales and 
customer service; process, plant and machinery; and 
elementary
Vector of dummy variables indication socio-economic 
group. 8 categories: higher managerial and
professional; lower managerial and professional; 
intermediate occupations; small employers and own 
account workers; lower supervisory and technical; 
semi-routine occupations; routine occupations; and 
never worked and unemployed
Vector of dummy variables indicating highest 
qualification attained. 9 categories: PhD, masters,
PGCE, first degree, higher education, A level, GCSE, 
other, and none
A vector of dummy variables indicating housing type. 
4 categories: has mortgage, owns home, council home, 
other rented
Number of dependent children under the age of 19
Vector of year dummy variables
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Table 4.A1
Ranking of TTWAs by Mean Hourly Earnings
TTWA
Guildford & Aldershot 
London
Wycombe & Slough 
Reading & Bracknell 
Newbury 
Luton & Watford 
Crawley
Tunbridge Wells & Ashford
Stevenage
Oxford
Cambridge
Southend & Brentwood
Rugby, Warwick & Stratford upon
Essex
Brighton
Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 
Wiltshire
Banbury, Cheltenham & Evesham
Swindon
Edinburgh
Cambridgeshire
Aberdeenshire
Southampton
Bath
Maidstone & North Kent 
Bristol
Kidderminister, Worcester & Malvern 
South West Sussex 
Gloucester, Monmouth & Cinderford 
York
Mean Earnings Relative to
(£) National Mean
13.642 1.344
13.636 1.343
13.467 1.327
13.352 1.315
13.004 1.281
12.940 1.275
12.657 1.247
12.174 1.199
12.143 1.196
12.129 1.195
12.087 1.191
11.971 1.179
11.960 1.178
11.844 1.167
11.574 1.140
11.572 1.140
11.476 1.131
11.472 1.130
11.321 1.115
11.248 1.108
11.208 1.104
11.159 1.099
11.135 1.097
11.051 1.089
10.853 1.069
10.818 1.066
10.714 1.055
10.638 1.048
10.633 1.048
10.574 1.042
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31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
Chestershire 10.550 1.039
Huddersfield 10.550 1.039
Derby & Burton upon Trent 10.548 1.039
Wirral & Ellesmere Port 10.521 1.037
Portsmouth 10.471 1.032
Peterborough 10.461 1.031
Glasgow 10.428 1.027
Falkirk 10.425 1.027
Stirling & Alloa 10.380 1.023
Perth & Blairgowrie 10.362 1.021
Northampton & Wellingborough 10.346 1.019
Ipswich 10.303 1.015
North East Yorkshire 10.276 1.012
Manchester 10.271 1.012
Birmingham 10.259 1.011
Nottingham 10 .220 1.007
Bournemouth 10.216 1.006
Leicester 10.200 1.005
Calderdale 10.145 0.999
South Kent 10.125 0.997
East Kent 10.119 0.997
Coventry 10.118 0.997
Dorset 10.113 0.996
Cardiff 10.104 0.995
Preston 10.094 0.994
Poole 10.023 0.987
Leeds 9.955 0.981
Exeter & Newton Abbot 9.948 0.980
Cumbria 9.932 0.979
Lanarkshire 9.884 0.974
Dumbarton 9.882 0.974
Warrington & Wigan 9.880 0.973
Walsall & Cannock 9.858 0.971
Berwick, Galashiels & Peebles 9.835 0.969
Mid Wales Border 9.812 0.967
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66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
East Norfolk 9.778 0.963
Newcastle & Durham 9.741 0.960
Derbyshire 9.733 0.959
North Scotland 9.712 0.957
Darlington 9.707 0.956
Greenock 9.702 0.956
Morpeth, Ashington & Alnwick 9.689 0.954
Sheffield & Rotherham 9.669 0.953
Bolton 9.647 0.950
Angus 9.633 0.949
Fife 9.626 0.948
Bridgend 9.603 0.946
West Norfolk 9.600 0.946
Dudley & Sandwell 9.573 0.943
Scottish Border 9.568 0.943
Liverpool 9.559 0.942
Newport & Cwmbran 9.518 0.938
Moray 9.517 0.938
Rochdale & Oldham 9.464 0.932
Livingston & Bathgate 9.457 0.932
Rhyl & Denbigh 9.442 0.930
Irvine & Annan 9.421 0.928
North Lancashire 9.419 0.928
Blackburn 9.415 0.928
Staffordshire 9.403 0.926
Blackpool 9.388 0.925
Ayr & Kilmarnock 9.384 0.925
Somerset & East Devon 9.373 0.923
Anglesey & Bangor 9.360 0.922
Telford & Bridgnorth 9.360 0.922
Plymouth 9.351 0.921
Hull 9.347 0.921
Wakefield & Castleford 9.346 0.921
Middlesborough & Stockton 9.292 0.915
Gwynedd & Conwy 9.224 0.909
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101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
Wrexham & Whitchurch 
Swansea Bay 
Bradford
Hereford & Leominster 
Lincolnshire
Carmarthenshire & Brecon
Wolverhampton
Cornwall
North Devon
Doncaster
Hartlepool
West Mid Wales
Sunderland
South Devon
Isle of Wight
Barnsley
Ebbw Vale & Abergavenny
South West Scotland
Grimsby
Scunthorpe
Argyll & Perthshire
Pembrokeshire
Mansfield
Merthyr Tydfil & Aberdare
9.219 0.908
9.211 0.907
9.195 0.906
9.173 0.904
9.140 0.900
9.121 0.899
9.120 0.898
9.113 0.898
9.102 0.897
9.066 0.893
9.031 0.890
9.028 0.889
8.992 0 .8 8 6
8.990 0 .8 8 6
8.971 0.884
8.958 0.882
8.873 0.874
8.765 0.864
8.701 0.857
8.641 0.851
8.632 0.850
8.628 0.850
8.524 0.840
8.396 0.827
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Table 4.A2
Ranking of TTWAs by Mean Employment
Rank TTWA Mean Relative to
Employment National Mean
1 Dorset 0.973935 1.021816
2 Chestershire 0.973174 1.021018
3 Wiltshire 0.973019 1.020855
4 Poole 0.972189 1.019984
5 Scottish Border 0.971981 1.019766
6 Banbury, Cheltenham & Evesham 0.97197 1.019755
7 Rugby, Warwick & Stratford upon 0.971676 1.019446
8 Hereford & Leominster 0.971653 1.019422
9 North East Yorkshire 0.970306 1.018009
10 Bath 0.970192 1.017889
11 Perth & Blairgowrie 0.969551 1.017217
12 Newbury 0.96867 1.016293
13 Rhyl & Denbigh 0.967769 1.015347
14 Wrexham & Whitchurch 0.967628 1.0152
15 Moray 0.967615 1.015186
16 Oxford 0.967312 1.014868
17 Gloucester, Monmouth & Cinderford 0.967079 1.014623
18 South Devon 0.966697 1.014222
19 Bournemouth 0.96667 1.014194
20 Ipswich 0.966075 1.01357
21 Exeter & Newton Abbot 0.965997 1.013488
22 North Scotland 0.965663 1.013138
23 Cambridge 0.965354 1.012813
24 Darlington 0.965127 1.012575
25 Guildford & Aldershot 0.964896 1.012332
26 Northampton & Wellingborough 0.96479 1 .012222
27 Bristol 0.964574 1.011995
28 Carmarthenshire & Brecon 0.964131 1.011531
29 Reading & Bracknell 0.964075 1.011471
30 Tunbridge Wells & Ashford 0.963898 1.011286
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31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
Argyll & Perthshire 0.963654 1.011029
Swindon 0.963521 1.010891
Southampton 0.963203 1.010556
Peterborough 0.963139 1.010489
Mid Wales Border 0.963102 1.01045
Somerset & East Devon 0.962898 1.010237
York 0.962106 1.009405
Kidderminister, Worcester & Malvern 0.961826 1.009112
South West Sussex 0.961357 1.00862
Portsmouth 0.961141 1.008393
Berwick, Galashiels & Peebles 0.9611 1.00835
Isle of Wight 0.961015 1.008261
Crawley 0.96052 1.007742
South West Scotland 0.960412 1.007629
Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 0.959951 1.007145
West Norfolk 0.959725 1.006907
Southend & Brentwood 0.959653 1.006832
Staffordshire 0.959026 1.006174
Scunthorpe 0.958964 1.006109
Cambridgeshire 0.958697 1.005829
Wycombe & Slough 0.958612 1.00574
Calderdale 0.957857 1.004948
North Devon 0.957593 1.004671
Essex 0.957588 1.004666
West Mid Wales 0.957533 1.004608
Wakefield & Castleford 0.957326 1.00439
Luton & Watford 0.956595 1.003624
Preston 0.95636 1.003377
Cumbria 0.956336 1.003352
Anglesey & Bangor 0.956115 1.00312
Aberdeenshire 0.955585 1.002564
Blackpool 0.955382 1.002351
Plymouth 0.955253 1.002216
East Norfolk 0.955181 1.00214
Livingston & Bathgate 0.95461 1.001541
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66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Gwynedd & Conwy 0.954288 1.001203
Derby & Burton upon Trent 0.954024 1.000927
Blackburn 0.953604 1.000486
Warrington & Wigan 0.953153 1.000013
Falkirk 0.952966 0.999816
Derbyshire 0.952476 0.999302
Telford & Bridgnorth 0.951105 0.997864
Leicester 0.950441 0.997167
Wirral & Ellesmere Port 0.95012 0.996831
Hull 0.949874 0.996573
Cornwall 0.949844 0.99654
Huddersfield 0.949287 0.995956
Edinburgh 0.94893 0.995582
Lincolnshire 0.948923 0.995574
Leeds 0.947833 0.994431
South Kent 0.947605 0.994192
Coventry 0.946883 0.993434
Rochdale & Oldham 0.946811 0.993358
Barnsley 0.946803 0.993351
East Kent 0.946502 0.993034
Maidstone & North Kent 0.945954 0.99246
North Lancashire 0.945611 0.9921
Manchester 0.945367 0.991844
Stevenage 0.945026 0.991486
Newport & Cwmbran 0.944574 0.991012
Cardiff 0.944491 0.990925
Brighton 0.944374 0.990801
Bolton 0.944168 0.990585
Pembrokeshire 0.943877 0.99028
Nottingham 0.943802 0.990202
Lanarkshire 0.94374 0.990137
Walsall & Cannock 0.943547 0.989935
Doncaster 0.941772 0.988072
Mansfield 0.941389 0.98767
Dumbarton 0.941283 0.987559
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101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
Swansea Bay 
Grimsby 
Bridgend 
Sunderland
Sheffield & Rotherham
Wolverhampton
Morpeth, Ashington & Alnwick
Glasgow
Stirling & Alloa
Dudley & Sandwell
Fife
Middlesborough & Stockton
Angus
Bradford
Newcastle & Durham 
Ebbw Vale & Abergavenny 
London
Ayr & Kilmarnock 
Liverpool
Merthyr Tydfil & Aberdare
Birmingham
Irvine & Annan
Greenock
Hartlepool
0.94128 0.987555
0.941208 0.98748
0.940928 0.987187
0.940465 0.986701
0.940047 0.986262
0.939689 0.985887
0.938802 0.984956
0.938242 0.984369
0.93793 0.984042
0.937437 0.983524
0.937289 0.983368
0.936805 0.98286
0.936509 0.982551
0.936245 0.982273
0.935278 0.981259
0.933896 0.979808
0.932213 0.978043
0.931456 0.977249
0.928992 0.974664
0.927936 0.973556
0.927037 0.972613
0.923057 0.968437
0.917958 0.963087
0.911707 0.956529
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Table 4. A3
Ranking of TTWAs by Mean Activity
TTWA
Wiltshire
North Scotland
Guildford & Aldershot
Banbury, Cheltenham & Evesham
Swindon
Aberdeenshire
Cambridgeshire
Newbury
Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 
Northampton & Wellingborough 
Reading & Bracknell 
Crawley
Wycombe & Slough 
Oxford
Argyll & Perthshire 
Stevenage
Hereford & Leominster
Cambridge
Southampton
Tunbridge Wells & Ashford
Luton & Watford
South West Sussex
York
Essex
Livingston & Bathgate
Falkirk
Ipswich
Berwick, Galashiels & Peebles 
Portsmouth
Gloucester, Monmouth & Cinderford
Mean Activity Relative to
National Mean
0.831923 1.08831
0.83131 1.087509
0.828832 1.084267
0.819934 1.072626
0.817831 1.069875
0.81707 1.06888
0.81615 1.067677
0.815359 1.066641
0.815101 1.066304
0.812277 1.06261
0.808952 1.05826
0.808487 1.057652
0.80625 1.054725
0.805512 1.05376
0.805503 1.053748
0.805017 1.053112
0.803471 1.05109
0.801852 1.048972
0.799801 1.046288
0.797408 1.043158
0.796837 1.042412
0.794487 1.039337
0.793626 1.038211
0.792906 1.037268
0.792642 1.036923
0.791833 1.035865
0.791575 1.035527
0.7902 1.033729
0.790182 1.033705
0.79011 1.033612
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31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
Maidstone & North Kent 0.788514 1.031523
Bristol 0.788143 1.031038
Poole 0.788091 1.03097
Mid Wales Border 0.788018 1.030874
Moray 0.785062 1.027007
North Devon 0.78494 1.026847
Edinburgh 0.78403 1.025657
Scottish Border 0.78319 1.024558
Rugby, Warwick & Stratford upon 0.782917 1.024201
Somerset & East Devon 0.782697 1.023913
South Kent 0.78218 1.023237
Fife 0.782109 1.023144
Brighton 0.781373 1.022181
West Norfolk 0.780539 1.02109
Dorset 0.78026 1.020725
Southend & Brentwood 0.778759 1.018762
Huddersfield 0.778385 1.018273
Peterborough 0.777024 1.016492
Perth & Blairgowrie 0.776936 1.016377
South West Scotland 0.775955 1.015093
Chester shire 0.775498 1.014496
Leicester 0.774432 1.013101
Bath 0.77282 1.010992
Kidderminister, Worcester & Malvern 0.772037 1.009969
Scunthorpe 0.7711 1.008743
Exeter & Newton Abbot 0.770374 1.007793
Stirling & Alloa 0.769389 1.006504
Preston 0.769309 1.006399
Derby & Burton upon Trent 0.768986 1.005977
Lincolnshire 0.767357 1.003846
Wakefield & Castleford 0.766768 1.003076
Leeds 0.764488 1.000093
North East Yorkshire 0.763824 0.999225
Bournemouth 0.763588 0.998915
Telford & Bridgnorth 0.762652 0.99769
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66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Grimsby 
Darlington 
Angus 
South Devon 
Plymouth
Wrexham & Whitchurch
Lanarkshire
East Kent
Nottingham
East Norfolk
Ayr & Kilmarnock
Staffordshire
Dumbarton
Calderdale
Coventry
Isle of Wight
Derbyshire
Walsall & Cannock
Cornwall
Blackpool
Hull
Morpeth, Ashington & Alnwick
Dudley & Sandwell
Cumbria
Manchester
Warrington & Wigan
North Lancashire
Bolton
London
Gwynedd & Conwy
Newcastle & Durham
Pembrokeshire
Doncaster
Irvine & Annan
Mansfield
0.762631 0.997664
0.762419 0.997386
0.761999 0.996837
0.761634 0.996359
0.76157 0.996276
0.761515 0.996203
0.760361 0.994694
0.758884 0.992761
0.758533 0.992302
0.758021 0.991632
0.756161 0.9892
0.755965 0.988943
0.754371 0.986858
0.754026 0.986407
0.753359 0.985534
0.753109 0.985208
0.7516 0.983233
0.750482 0.981771
0.749738 0.980797
0.748446 0.979107
0.745942 0.975831
0.742397 0.971194
0.741412 0.969905
0.741218 0.969651
0.740357 0.968525
0.739656 0.967608
0.739504 0.967409
0.738715 0.966377
0.737609 0.96493
0.737609 0.964929
0.737002 0.964136
0.733515 0.959575
0.733431 0.959464
0.732733 0.958551
0.732598 0.958375
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101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
Wirral & Ellesmere Port 
Bridgend
Carmarthenshire & Brecon 
Rochdale & Oldham 
Sheffield & Rotherham 
Newport & Cwmbran 
Greenock
Middlesborough & Stockton
Anglesey & Bangor
Bradford
Barnsley
Wolverhampton
Rhyl & Denbigh
Cardiff
Birmingham
Glasgow
Blackburn
West Mid Wales
Sunderland
Swansea Bay
Liverpool
Ebbw Vale & Abergavenny 
Merthyr Tydfil & Aberdare 
Hartlepool
0.732312 0.958
0.731837 0.957379
0.731225 0.956578
0.73088 0.956127
0.73083 0.956062
0.729987 0.954959
0.72865 0.95321
0.723506 0.946481
0.72242 0.94506
0.721905 0.944387
0.721858 0.944325
0.721827 0.944284
0.721548 0.94392
0.721218 0.943488
0.720636 0.942727
0.719096 0.940711
0.718559 0.940009
0.710443 0.929392
0.707607 0.925682
0.703942 0.920887
0.697202 0.912071
0.696209 0.910772
0.692081 0.905371
0.689287 0.901716
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Table 4.A4
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hourly Earnings 10.46033 6.478015 1.2 53.13
Employed 0.953279 0.211041 0 1
Activity 0.75411 0.430614 0 1
Personal Characteristics
Male 0.478179 0.499524 0 1
Female 0.521821 0.499524 0 1
Age 40.72369 13.64538 16 64
Age2 1844.615 1106.463 256 4096
Activity Limiting Health Problem 0.136999 0.343846 0 1
Married 0.352249 0.477671 0 1
Dependent Children under 19 0.760977 1.054175 0 11
Housing Type
Mortgage 0.535711 0.498724 0 1
Owns Home 0.214783 0.410672 0 1
Council Home 0.148294 0.355392 0 1
Other Rented 0 .1 0 1 2 1 2 0.301609 0 1
Ethnicity
White 0.925294 0.262917 0 1
Mixed 0.00573 0.075479 0 1
Asian 0.038473 0.192335 0 1
Black 0.015309 0.122777 0 1
Chinese 0.003954 0.062756 0 1
Other 0.011241 0.105427 0 1
Qualifications
PhD 0.008316 0.090813 0 1
Masters 0.028802 0.167249 0 1
PGCE 0.013257 0.114371 0 1
First Degree 0.127983 0.334071 0 1
Higher Education 0.088001 0.283296 0 1
A Level 0.224888 0.417509 0 1
GCSE 0.224355 0.417157 0 1
Other 0.118759 0.323505 0 1
None 0.167297 0.373242 0 1
Employment
Job Tenure 7.773167 8.471827 0 49
Part Time 0.253184 0.434836 0 1
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Full Time 
Public Sector 
Private Sector 
Plant Size under 25 
Plant Size 25 to 49 
Plant Size 50 to 499 
Plant Size over 500 
Industry Sector 
Agriculture & Fishing 
Energy & Water 
Manufacturing 
Construction
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants
Transport & Communications
Banking, Finance & Insurance
Public Admin. Educ. & Health
Other Services
Occupation
Managerial
Professional
Associate Pro. & Technical
Administration
Skilled Trade
Personal Service
Sales
Process, Plant & Machinery
Elementary
Year
2004
2005
2006 
2007 
Rural 
Method A 
Method B 
Method C
0.746816 0.434836 0
0.248494 0.43214 0
0.751507 0.43214 0
0.36123 0.480358 0
0.134295 0.340969 0
0.335805 0.472272 0
0.168671 0.374462 0
0.01396 0.117325 0
0.011208 0.105271 0
0.14078 0.347795 0
0.079072 0.269851 0
0.193735 0.395224 0
0.067937 0.251638 0
0.145217 0.35232 0
0.289861 0.453698 0
0.058075 0.233885 0
0.146357 0.353464 0
0.120646 0.325716 0
0.137355 0.344222 0
0.12453 0.330186 0
0.115026 0.319054 0
0.082643 0.275342 0
0.076964 0.266535 0
0.07938 0.270331 0
0.117098 0.321538 0
0.502246 0.499995 0
0.199456 0.399591 0
0.152757 0.359753 0
0.145542 0.352646 0
0.072349 0.259065 0
0.231311 0.421671 0
0.101011 0.301344 0
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Chapter 5
The Graduate Premium: Differences by Region
and Subject Area
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5.1 Introduction
Amidst news of higher education funding cuts, escalating tuition fees and a labour 
market flooded with graduates, this chapter aims to analyse the financial benefits that 
come from possession of a degree. Whilst the numbers of students attending 
universities has risen dramatically over the previous four decades, recent studies 
show that the graduate premium, which is the additional income that a university 
graduate can expect to earn over an individual who chose not to attend university, 
has persisted over this period (Walker and Zhu, 2010). This means that along with 
the shift in supply of graduates to the labour market, there has been au equal shift in 
the demand for graduates, driven by the United Kingdom’s shift to a knowledge 
based economy, requiring a more highly skilled workforce.
Due to the recent increases in tuition fees, it is more important than ever that a 
potential student is aware of the rewards to obtaining a university level education. 
This chapter examines where graduate premiums are available and in which subjects, 
industries and employment sectors the greatest graduate premiums are found. This 
will reveal the routes of possible graduate migration and allow more informed 
decisions to be made, both on the part of the (potential) student and policy makers, 
when setting future tuition fee levels.
In this chapter I assess the graduate premium using the Annual Population Survey 
(APS) between 2004 and 2007. I place particular focus on how the graduate 
premium varies across NUTS 1 regions in the UK, an important area of research, yet 
one that has received little attention. This information can be used along with the 
results on regional wage flexibility obtained in chapter 3 to aid in planning for 
economic recovery. The graduate premium measures how much possession of a first 
degree is rewarded and the regional results can be interpreted as providing a measure 
of regional demand for high level skills. The regional analysis is taken one step 
further by including a sub-regional analysis, looking at how the graduate premium 
changes between smaller areas within Wales and gauging how Wales fares in 
comparison to the UK. I also examine the premium paid to postgraduate
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qualifications, individual subject areas, industries and employment sectors, and 
assess the effects of degree classification on the returns to first and higher degrees.
In the following section I present a summary of the literature in this area, in section 
three the data used is examined and the methodology is explained, in section four 
results are presented and conclusions are drawn in section five.
5.2 Literature Review
The literature on educational returns tends to focus on either returns to years of 
education or the returns to qualifications. One major departure between these two 
methods is that whilst studies that estimate returns to years of education make the 
assumption that returns are linear and do not differ over years, those that estimate 
returns to qualifications allow returns to vary over years. This means that years in 
which qualifications are attained can have greater returns than years in which no 
qualifications are attained. Whilst this chapter focuses on the premium paid to 
qualifications, this literature review will also consider the returns to years of 
schooling. Studies may also calculate the private rate of return, which considers the 
costs to the individual of educational attainment, and the social rate of return, which 
accounts for costs incurred by the state.
Early examples of the literature on returns to education built on the human capital 
theory work by Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964), where educational investment 
was treated similarly to other types of capital investments (Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos, 2011). Much of the returns to education literature has used an 
augmented Mincer (1974) earnings function, as is used here. Whilst I generally 
focus on more recent contributions to the returns to education literature, 
Psacharopoulos (1981) presents a comparison of the returns to education over 44 
countries between 1957 and 1978, which summarises the results of many early 
studies. Both private and social returns are considered, at primary, secondary and 
higher education levels. Several patterns in the results of these studies are noted: the
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returns to primary education exceed the returns to secondary and higher education in 
terms of both private and social returns; private returns to education exceed social 
returns, with the largest discrepancy at higher education level; returns to education 
exceed the opportunity cost of capital (which Psacharopoulos places at a yardstick 
value of 10%); and the rate of return is greatest in developing countries. From these 
patterns in the results, Psacharopoulos identifies four policy implications: that 
returns suggest that the greatest focus should be placed upon primary level 
education; that returns to both secondary and higher education provide a large 
enough social benefit that they should be pursued with primary education in a 
‘programme of balanced human resource development5; students could contribute 
financially towards a university level education, due to the large private returns; and 
that although developing countries have greater rates of return to education, the 
difference is relatively small.
Belman and Heywood (1991) examine sheepskin effects for women and minority 
men using data from the May 1987 Current Population Survey (CPS), hypothesising 
that signalling effects of holding a higher qualification are greater for women and 
minority men than white males. A spline function is estimated, with years of 
education split at 8 and 12 years. Dummy variables are also included for years of 
schooling greater than 8 , greater than 12 , greater than 16, equal to 17, and equal to 
18. Results for black males are compared to white males, with the graduate premium 
for black males more than twice that of white males. Black males also receive a 
higher degree premium, where white males do not. These effects support their 
hypothesis of black males benefiting more from signals of higher productivity. 
Additionally, no high school premium is found for black males, but one is found for 
white males, which fits their signalling hypothesis. Results for black women fit the 
signalling hypothesis well, with large returns to first degrees and higher degrees, and 
insignificant returns to lower qualifications. Belman and Heywood find that white 
women are a middle ground between white men and racial minorities, as their results 
fit the signalling hypothesis, but not as well as black men and women. White 
women receive large returns to higher degrees, but also to high school.
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Blundell et al (1997, 2000) use data from the British National Child Development 
Study (NCDS) to estimate the effects of degree possession in the medium to long 
term. A cohort bom between the 3rd and 9th of March 1958 was selected and was 
surveyed several times, the most recent being in 1991, when respondents would have 
been 33 years old. This dataset contains the results of maths and reading tests 
undertaken at seven years old, which are used to control for ability. Relative to A 
level holders, Blundell et a l report returns for men (women) of 15% (26%) for non­
degree higher education qualifications, 21% (39%) for first degrees and 15% (43%) 
for higher degrees, although the magnitudes of these premiums decrease as more 
controls are added to the specification. The large discrepancy between the graduate 
premiums of men and women again supports the notion that women benefit more 
from holding degree level qualifications. Blundell et al find that as qualification 
levels increase, the gender pay gap narrows. Splitting the sample by subject, they 
find the greatest returns, for both men and women, to be found in economics, 
accountancy and law, whilst the lowest returns are found for those whose degrees are 
in the areas of chemistry and biology. Blundell et al theorize that the premiums 
associated with particular subjects are due to either subjects attracting different 
qualities of students (through their level of entry requirements) or that students are 
motivated by studying a subject with a high level of estimated returns, which 
increases their productivity. Blundell et al are able to test the effect on earnings of 
non-completion of a higher education course. They find that men who began, but 
failed to complete a higher education course suffered a 9% penalty relative to those 
who had never attempted a higher education course. They theorize that this effect 
may be due to time taken out of the labour market (resulting in lower labour market 
experience) or a negative signalling effect. There is no penalty to non-completion 
for women. They also test the effect of starting a higher education course aged 21 or 
older. Men are found to pay a penalty of between 7% and 8% relative to those who 
started their higher education course before the age of 21. Again, there is no penalty 
found for women. Blundell et al also examine the effect that higher education has 
on employment. They find that whilst there is no observable effect of higher 
education on the employment prospects of men, women with a higher education 
qualification are 8% more likely to be employed than those with just A levels.
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Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary (1999) use the Labour Force Survey between 1993 
and 1995 to explore the differences in the premium paid to different subjects, 
amongst other issues. They calculate the rate of return to a first degree, relative to an 
individual with no qualifications, to be 88.9% for men and 112.5% for women. 
Returns for women are also significantly higher than men for higher degrees, other 
degree level qualifications and diplomas in higher education, again confirming that 
women benefit more from higher education. To look at the differences between 
subjects, Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary first create twelve broad subject groups. 
Comparing these groups to persons educated up to A level, they find that all subject 
areas offer significant positive returns. For both men and women, medical subjects 
carry the greatest rewards. Outside of medical subjects, the largest rate of return for 
men (women) is found in the subject area of economics, accountancy, law and 
management (architecture and building), whilst the smallest is found for arts (other 
social sciences). For all subjects, female returns exceed those for men. There also 
appears to be less variation in the graduate premium across subjects for women. 
This effect remains Mien the broad subject groups are split into over one hundred 
more detailed subjects. For men, the broad subject group of economics, 
accountancy, law and management provided the greatest rate of return (apart from 
medical studies). By splitting the subjects into finer areas, they find that 
accountancy is the main driving force behind that result. Blackaby, Murphy and 
O’Leary conclude that choice of subject is far more important for men than it is for 
women, with the large variation in the graduate premium over subject areas holding 
over both broad and finer subject classifications.
The National Child Development Study (NCDS) is used by Dear den (1999) to 
estimate the returns to years of education for 33 year old men in 1991. The NCDS 
dataset contains information on family background and ability (tested at age 7), 
which is not available in the majority of datasets. This information causes Dearden 
to explore the determinants of years of education. Regarding ability, high ability 
men are found to stay in education longer than low ability men, with the effects for 
reading ability slightly higher than mathematics ability (0.97 years to 0.65 years). 
School type also has an effect on years in education, with those who attended 
grammar or private schools staying in education for 1.03 and 1.39 years more than
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men who attended a comprehensive school. Regarding family background, time 
spent in education increases for men with more educated parents, fathers who work 
in highly skilled jobs (mothers occupation has no significant effect on years of 
education), and parents who have shown an interest in their child’s education. 
Financial difficulties in the family are shown to have a negative effect on years of 
education. When estimating the effect of years of schooling on earnings, a return of 
4.8% is found. Dearden notes that controls for family background and ability are 
very important, and that OLS returns are significantly higher without them. 
Evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to education is found, showing that those 
with less taste for education have higher returns to an additional year of education, 
with returns decreasing by 0.55 percentage points for each additional year of father’s 
schooling.
A meta-analysis by Ashenfelter et al. (1999) reviews estimates for returns to 
schooling, paying particular attention to the effects of publication bias. A dataset of 
96 estimates of the return to schooling, from 27 studies, covering 9 countries is used, 
with the sample being divided into OLS, IV and twin studies. They find that 
estimation methods differ in the returns to education produced, with IV and twin 
studies producing estimates 3 and 1.6% greater than OLS. Testing for publication 
bias suggests that IV studies do suffer from publication bias. Correcting for this bias 
lowers the return to education for IV studies (.086 to .081), but this still exceeds 
OLS estimates (0.64). Ashenfelter et al. conclude that after controlling for the 
likelihood of reporting a result, differences between estimation methods are 
relatively small.
Harmon and Walker (2000) explore the effects of quality and quantity on the returns 
to education. They hypothesise that high returns to schooling may be due to the 
correlation between quantity and quality of education. A high quality of education 
may result in individuals undertaking less education, as they are able to reach a high 
level of productivity quickly, whilst the high quality of education may convince 
individuals to undertake more education, because it is of a very high quality. Data 
for their study is taken from the National Child Development Study (NCDC),
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focusing on men aged 33 in 1991. This dataset allows them to control for ability 
differences, by using the results of ability tests in mathematics and English at age 7. 
Their basic specification reveals returns to schooling to be around 5% and that 
mathematics and English ability have the same effect on earnings. Harmon and 
Walker estimate the returns to education by school types, using comprehensive 
schools as a baseline. Years of schooling at secondary modem, grammar or private 
schools are found to have no significant effect over comprehensive school. 
Regarding ability, they find results that do not concur with the theory that selective 
schooling levels allow children to achieve the most that their ability level will allow. 
High ability children who fail to gain entry to a grammar school and who attend a 
secondary modem school do better than others in secondary modem schools and low 
ability children that do gain entry to grammar school do better than those of high 
ability. IV regression causes the returns to years of schooling to double relative to 
OLS, from 5% to 10%.
The suitability of the schooling coefficient in the Mincer earnings function to 
approximate the marginal internal rate of return to education is assessed by 
Bjorklund and Kjellstrom (2002). Data for men from 1968, 1981 and 1991 is used, 
taken from the Swedish Level of Living Survey. The Mincer earnings function is 
extended, firstly using a Box-Cox transformation, and secondly, by applying the 
Box-Cox transformation and including dummy variables for years of education and 
interactions between education and experience. Results suggest that Bjorklund and 
Kjellstrom’s extended models are more appropriate to use than the standard Mincer 
earnings equation. The return to schooling in Sweden is found to have fallen 
between 1968 and 1981, which Bjorlund and Kjellstrom attribute to a fall in the 
graduate premium, as the returns to high school have remained stable.
McIntosh (2002) uses the Labour Force Survey (LFS) between 1993 and 2001 to 
calculate the earnings premium. His methodology differs from most other studies in 
that he uses all qualifications held by an individual, rather than just their highest 
qualification. This allows the rates of return to specific degrees to be added together 
to calculate the return to specific combinations of qualifications. McIntosh identifies
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a potential problem: respondents in the LFS are only asked for their highest three 
qualifications prior to 1996. This causes the returns to high level qualifications to be 
biased upward prior to 1996. This is seen in the results, as the rate of return to a 
higher degree falls by 15 percentage points between 1995 and 1996, due to the 
inclusion of all qualifications. McIntosh finds that, for men, possession of a first 
degree increases earnings by between 24% and 28%, relative to an individual who 
does not have a first degree, all other qualifications held constant. Other higher 
education qualifications and higher education diplomas have rates of return of 
between 5% and 10% and between 2% and 8%, far below that of degrees. 
Interestingly, McIntosh finds no evidence that women benefit more than men from 
obtaining a degree. Their rate of return is between 25% and 27%, which is very 
similar to men. It is found that women benefit more than men from teaching and 
nursing qualifications, with the returns to these qualifications increasing with age. 
Comparing the graduate premium over the sample years, it is found to vary very 
little, showing just slight growth. By splitting the sample by sector, McIntosh finds 
the return to a degree to be far greater in the private sector compared to the public 
sector, for men (29% to 17%). Whilst the difference between these returns is 
significant, the difference between returns to a degree for women in the public and 
private sectors is statistically insignificant (25% to 30%). McIntosh also analyses 
the graduate premium using pseudo cohorts, based on age. He finds that the rate of 
return to holding a degree rises whilst the individual is in their twenties, before 
stabilizing in their early thirties and remaining relatively stable throughout the rest of 
their working lives.
Estimates of the returns to schooling in 28 countries are calculated by Trostel et al. 
(2002). To make estimates comparable over such a large number of countries, data 
from the International Social Survey Programme between 1985 and 1995 is used. 
By pooling the sample, a worldwide estimate of the returns to education of 4.8% for 
men and 5.7% for women is found. Disaggregation by country produces a wide 
variety of estimates, peaking at 19.2% for women in the Philippines, and falling to 
1.9% for females in the Netherlands. Trostel et al. note that there are no obvious 
explanations for the wide variety of results. Examination of the data reveals there to 
be little correlation between the returns to education and per capita income, average
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educational attainment or the percentage of gross national product spent on 
education. They do note that the high estimates for Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland may be biased upwards due to schooling being truncated between 10 and 14 
years in the data for these countries. The use of IV estimation methods produces 
returns to education that exceed OLS returns by around 20%. Trostel et al. include a 
trend interacted with schooling to examine how the returns to education have 
changed over time. Results vary greatly by country, but worldwide pooled results 
suggest that returns to schooling are declining slightly, with the larger effect found 
for women.
Bonjour et al. (2002) focus their returns to schooling research on UK twins, using 
the results of a questionnaire they administered to twins on the St. Thomas’ UK 
Adult Twin Registry. Their sample consists of 428 individuals (214 pairs), all of 
whom are women. Years of education are assigned to different qualifications. 
Using OLS methods, Bonjour et al. find a return to schooling of 7.7%. To control 
for the problem of measurement error on schooling, they instrument using the 
education level of the other twin, increasing the return to schooling from 7.7% to 
8.5%. Bonjour et al. also find that omitted ability causes results to be biased 
downward and that measurement error biases education returns upward.
Sloane et al. (2003) calculate the returns to qualifications for Wales and for Great 
Britain as a whole, using the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Net and gross earnings are 
used as dependent variable, measured both hourly and weekly. Male returns are 
found to be highest using gross hourly earnings, whilst women find their greatest 
returns for gross weekly earnings. Returns using net earnings are estimated to be 
significantly lower than gross returns, which Sloane et al. note to be consistent with 
progressive taxation. They find that over the sample period, the returns to 
qualifications have fallen, which is more apparent for women than men. Returns 
vary greatly according to subject area of degree, with the largest returns by far found 
for medicine (although the duration of medicine degrees would account for much of 
the difference). Outside of medicine, the largest returns for men result from degrees 
in mathematical sciences and computing and law, whilst women find their greatest
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returns in the subject areas of architecture, law, education and mathematics and 
computer science. Over time, the variation in returns by subject of degree has fallen. 
From their Welsh sample, Sloane et al. calculate that male Welsh returns to first and 
higher degrees are lower than for Great Britain as a whole, but for women they are 
slightly higher. Calculating the graduate premium over unitary authorities, the 
largest return for men is found in Flintshire, and in Carmarthenshire for women.
Austria has seen a large expansion in higher education over the past 3 decades, with 
a sharp rise in the supply of graduates. Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) use the 
Austrian Mikrozensus between 1981 and 1997 to examine how the returns to 
education have responded. Initially, years of schooling are used, but they also use 
qualification dummies to allow for non-linear returns to education. At the start of 
the sample period, returns to schooling for women are around 2 percentage points 
higher than for men, but returns are found to have equalised by 1997. Returns for 
both men and women are found to have fallen over the sample period, consistent 
with the large rise in graduates. A Heckman correction for sample selection is used, 
but male results are found to be the same with and without sample selection, and 
returns for women are only 0.4 percentage points lower after correcting for sample 
selection. Using qualification dummies, the largest decrease over the sample period 
is in the graduate premium, with the fall in female returns greater than the fall in 
male returns. A quantile regression is also used, finding that returns to education are 
greater at the higher end of the earnings distribution, larger differences between the 
10th and 90th percentiles are found for men than women, and that the decreases in the 
returns to education are similar across the earnings distribution.
Bratti and Mancini (2003) look at the graduate premium of male UK graduates 
between 1980 and 1993. They utilize three models: a ‘proxying and matching’ 
method (ordinary least squares), a propensity score matching method, and a 
simultaneous equations model of earnings determination and subject choice 
(maximum likelihood). Data is from the Universities’ Statistical Record (USR) on 
students who graduated from university between 1980 and 1993. The USR data 
does not contain earnings information. Instead, earnings are matched in from the
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New Earnings Survey (NES) according to three digit SOC codes, by year. They 
group subjects into five broad groups: science, hi-tech, economics and business, 
humanities and other social sciences, and a group of the remaining subjects 
(economics and business is used as the reference group). Bratti and Mancini’s OLS 
results show that economics and business graduates have a greater rate of return than 
the other subject groups. These results also reveal that the graduate premiums of 
these subject groups are fairly close for the 1980 cohort, but variation increases 
through time. The ranking of subject groups following economics and business is: 
hi-tech, science, and humanities and other social sciences. In the propensity score 
matching model, economics and business again display the greatest graduate 
premium. Compared to OLS, the gap between economics and business, and science 
and hi-tech is wider, but the gap with humanities and other social sciences is 
reduced, to the point that the rate of return to humanities and other social sciences 
exceed that of science and hi-tech for some of the years considered. The results of 
the maximum likelihood model differ from those found by the OLS and propensity 
score matching models. They find strong evidence that (in most years) hi-tech 
results suffer from positive selection bias, so OLS and propensity score matching 
premia are biased upwards. In the maximum likelihood model, the earnings 
premium of science graduates exceeds that of economics and business graduates for 
some years. The volatility of these results cause the rankings found in the previous 
models to disappear here.
Chevalier (2003) examines variation in the graduate premium due to the prestige of 
the university attended. He splits universities up into three categories: Russell group 
universities, old universities (pre 1992) and new universities, which display 
statistically different A level intake scores, staff-student ratios, research assessment 
scores and destinations of graduates. Quality is highest in Russell group universities 
and lowest in new universities. Data from the Graduate Cohort Studies of 1985, 
1990 and 1995 is used. Chevalier first estimates the effect of university quality 
using a linear specification. Relative to modem universities, the premium for 
Russell group universities is between 9% and 12%, whilst the premium for old 
universities is between 3% and 8%. The quality premium is found to increase with 
the more recent cohorts. Chevalier expands this initial specification by using a
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propensity score matching model. Analysis of the propensity scores over time 
reveals that average ability in both Russell group universities and modem 
universities has fallen, as Russell group universities have recruited the best students 
from modem universities and modem universities have attracted lower ability 
students during the higher education expansion. Chevalier finds that the quality 
premium increases over cohorts. Testing whether the quality premium is correlated 
with ability or family background, Chevalier focuses on two Russell group 
universities and finds that the quality premium is not correlated with family 
background or ability, suggesting that the quality premium is due to improved 
teaching. Examining wage growth across cohorts, Chevalier determines that the 
university attended has no effect on wage growth, but that the human capital 
acquired at university results in a constant positive earnings effect.
Using the Labour Force Surveys of the UK and Germany, Machin and Puhani (2003) 
explore the effects on the gender wage gap of controlling for subject of degree. 
Grouping subjects into broad categories, they find that men are more likely to study 
engineering, technology and physical/mathematical sciences, which tend to be well 
paid, whilst women are more likely to enrol in subject areas with lower returns, such 
as languages, humanities, creative arts and education. The gender wage difference 
for graduates is larger in Germany than the UK (.280 to .208), which Machin and 
Puhani attribute to women being more advanced on the wage hierarchy in the UK 
than Germany. In their preferred specification, broad subject areas account for a 2% 
male wage premium, which increases to 4% (for the UK) when a more detailed 
breakdown of subject is used. This represents between 8 and 20% of the overall 
gender wage gap, confirming the importance of degree type.
Black et al. (2003) place their focus on the premium paid to obtaining a degree in 
economics. Using the 1993 National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG), they 
construct 85 subject majors and use economics as the excluded group, so the returns 
to all other majors will be measured relative to economics. Focusing initially on 
those who just have an undergraduate degree, the importance of separating 
economics from other social sciences is clear in their results, as those who major in
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economics are found to earn 13% more than those whose undergraduate degree is in 
other social sciences. They find that the only major that displays a substantial 
earnings advantage over economics is engineering. By splitting their sample into 
three age cohorts (25-34, 35-44 and 45-55), they find that the gap in earnings for 
elementary education, history, English and foreign languages compared to 
economics has increased for the youngest cohort. Comparing economics to five 
groups of majors using quantile regression techniques, Black et al find that the 
earnings gap between economics and business administration, political science, and 
history is fairly stable across quantiles, remaining between 10% and 20%. However, 
at lower levels of the earnings distribution, those with first degrees in accounting 
and, especially, electrical engineering display a significant earnings advantage over 
economics. The earnings advantage of electrical engineering remains until the 80th 
percentile. At the 90th percentile, both accounting and electrical engineering display 
an 11% earnings disadvantage relative to economics. Black et al also examine the 
role of economics as a precursor to postgraduate study. Undergraduate subject 
choice is found to be extremely important to the choice of whether to continue into 
postgraduate education. They find that around 45% of economics graduates will 
pursue a postgraduate degree, which Black et a l consider to be ‘middle of the pack’. 
This figure is exceeded by subjects such as biology, chemistry, maths, physics, 
history and English. Looking at the earnings of those with an MBA, Black et al find 
that economics graduates enjoy an earnings advantage over all other undergraduates, 
except for those who studied chemical engineering. They suggest that the high 
earnings of engineering students are due to the highly valued skills they acquire as 
part of their degree course.
Heckman et a l (2003, 2008) use a nonparametric approach to estimate the marginal 
internal rate of return to education for men using the US decennial Census and the 
Current Population Survey between 1940 and 2000. They believe that the Mincer 
(1974) earnings function is unsuitable for estimating the marginal rate of return, as it 
ignores several factors, such as income taxes and time out of the labour market. 
Testing this theory, they find that results obtained using a Mincer earnings equation 
are biased downwards, with a large difference in the returns to high school 
completion. Returns to high school completion rose sharply between 1970 and
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1990, whilst there were rises in the graduate premium between 1980 and 2000. Bias 
is found to be less when estimating the graduate premium using a Mincer earnings 
function, than when estimating the returns to high school completion. Comparing 
Mincer and nonparametric methods, estimates tend to be within five percentage 
points of each other. Heckman et al. note that the Mincer model is supported by data 
between 1940 and 1950, but by the 1980s data seems to reject the Mincer 
specification. In addition, Heckman et al. provide support for taking a cohort based 
approach opposed to a cross sectional approach, as they believe that cross section 
data will produce biased estimates in times of economic transition, if individuals 
cannot foresee differences in the price of skills.
Leslie (2003) focuses on the quality of students. Leslie theorizes that the most 
talented students self-select into the more difficult subjects, which have higher entry 
requirements and offer greater returns. Leslie uses data from the Universities 
College Admissions Service (UCAS) to create a measure of student quality across 21 
broad subject areas and 170 specific subject groups. Measures of quality for subjects 
are expressed between zero and one, where a score of one suggests that all persons 
accepted onto the course possess top ranked qualifications and a score of zero means 
all students that enrol on the course have the lowest ranked qualifications. Using the 
UCAS data, Leslie finds a correlation between the quality of applicants to a subject 
and the quality of acceptances to the subject of 0.93, which confirms the theory that 
the most talented students self-select into more difficult subjects. As expected, the 
quality of acceptances exceeds those of applicants. The UCAS data contains 
information on both HND as well as degree courses, with Leslie finding that (in 
terms of acceptances) the highest ranked HND group is below the lowest ranked 
degree group. Among Leslie’s finding are that those who study education as an 
undergraduate degree possess a low quality score, those who do not specify a 
preferred subject are ranked last, there is very little difference in quality between 
those that enrol on single subject and combined subject degrees, specific subjects 
tend to consist of students of greater ability than broad subject areas (for example, 
chemical engineering compared to general engineering), and pure subjects display a 
greater quality score than applied subjects (for example, physics compared to 
environmental sciences). The importance of separating economics from other social
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sciences is again observed, as economics ranks 20th, whilst sociology ranks 115th. 
Economics is found to attract more capable students than law and business.
O’Leary and Sloane (2005) calculate the premium paid to first degrees, masters 
degrees and PhDs using the Labour Force Survey (LFS), over the period 1994 to 
2002. This study breaks from the conventional approach of using a dummy variable 
indicating highest qualification within a single equation by utilising a multi equation 
approach. This methodology builds on Blinder and Oaxaca’s (1973) decomposition 
framework, which allows the difference in mean hourly earnings between two 
subjects to be split into components due to characteristic and ability differences, and 
due to the way the labour market rewards these factors. O’Leary and Sloane’s 
results confirm that, compared to a baseline of no qualifications, possession of a 
degree will benefit women far more than men, a result they use to explain the greater 
numbers of women enrolling in higher education. Whilst returns at degree level 
(including degree equivalents and higher degrees) favour women, returns at GCSE 
and A level are greater for men than for women. Estimating the earnings premium 
relative to persons who could have gone to university (those who have two or more 
A levels), returns for women exceed those for men at all degree levels 
(undergraduate, masters and PhD), and by a large margin. Comparing the mark-up 
of broad subject areas at first degree level relative to a first degree in arts, the largest 
returns are found in the subject areas of maths and computing, medicine and related, 
and engineering for men, and medicine and related, maths and computing, and 
education for women. Splitting broad subject areas into smaller groupings, they find 
accountancy to offer the greatest premium relative to arts for both men and women. 
O’Leary and Sloane also calculate the expected increase in lifetime earnings of 
degree holders compared to those with two or more A levels, finding a lifetime 
earnings advantage of £141,539 for men and £157,982 for women. There is 
considerable variation available amongst subjects, ranging (for men) from £22,458 
for arts degree holders to £222,419 for those with a degree in maths and computing. 
Finally, O’Leary and Sloane estimate the returns to higher degrees (masters and 
PhDs) by broad subject groups relative to an undergraduate degree in the same 
subject area. At masters level, the greatest returns are found for business and 
financial studies for both men and women (14.34% for men and 19.52% for women).
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At PhD level, men find their greatest returns for business and financial studies, 
whilst women find their largest premiums in the combined group, followed by 
medicine and related studies. Whilst all returns for women are positive relative to 
the A level group, for men, negative returns are found for maths and computing, and 
languages at masters level, and architecture and related, and education at PhD level, 
although none of these results are significant at the 10% level. Also, for several 
subjects, the returns at doctoral level are lower than those at masters level.
Whilst there has been relatively little evidence on differences in the graduate 
premium over regions, the issue has been explored by O’Leary and Sloane (2008). 
Using the Labour Force Survey between 2000 and 2004, university graduates are 
compared to holders of two or more A levels, over Government Office Regions 
(equivalent to NUTS 1 areas, as used in this study). Firstly, they look at the share of 
graduate employment to total employment, by region, finding a large clustering of 
graduate employment in London and the South East, whilst the North East has the 
lowest ratio of graduate employment, followed by the East Midlands. Estimating the 
graduate premium relative to A level holders in the West Midlands, the largest 
premium is found in London, followed by the South East and the East of England. 
Both nominal and real earnings are used, which alters the size of the regional 
graduate premiums and changes the rankings of regions (although London remains at 
the top of the rankings). For example, Wales offered the lowest graduate premium to 
men Mien using nominal earnings, but a higher cost of living forces the South West 
to the bottom of the rankings when using real earnings. Comparing the results for 
men and women, there is little similarity outside of the South Eastern regions, 
although female premiums generally exceed male premiums, supporting the notion 
that women benefit more from obtaining a degree than men. O’Leary and Sloane 
also estimate regional graduate premiums relative to A level holders within the same 
region. This causes the London premium to shrink so much that the graduate 
premium in London is smaller than in any other region and premiums across the 
generally high earnings South Eastern regions also decrease dramatically. Relative 
to A level holders within the same region, the largest graduate premium for men is 
found in the East Midlands and in Scotland for women. O’Leary and Sloane look at 
the determinants of regional graduate performance, focusing on differences in
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occupational and industrial structure. London is found to have the largest percentage 
of managers and senior officials; however, they do not believe that occupational 
structure is the main determinant, due to high earnings in some regions with poor 
occupational structures. Examination of industrial structure reveals a large 
percentage of persons employed in the banking, finance and insurance sector in 
London, three times larger than in Wales. In Wales, the public administration, 
education and health sector dominates, although O’Leary and Sloane do not believe 
that more similar industrial structures would remove the regional differences in the 
graduate premium. Decomposition analysis reveals that, for both men and women, 
the coefficient effect is greater than the composition effect, suggesting that the cause 
of regional disparities in the graduate premium is the regional differences in how 
personal characteristics are rewarded.
Walker and Zhu (2008) use the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) over the 
period 1994 to 2006 to calculate the graduate premium in the UK. Their main focus 
is on the change in the graduate premium over this time period and over birth 
cohorts. Walker and Zhu address the issue that the expansion of the UK higher 
education system may have resulted in high ability non-graduates becoming low 
ability graduates, resulting in the lowering of mean ability across both groups. To 
counter this problem, they use quantile regression techniques, so that the graduate 
premium is estimated at different points along the wage distribution. In the top 
quartile, they find a fall in the graduate premium for both men and women between 
the pre and post expansion cohorts (the pre expansion cohort consists of those who 
were aged 19 up to 1987 and the post expansion cohort consists of those up to 19 in 
1993). At the median, there is an increase for men and a fall for women (although 
these changes are statistically insignificant). A large change is found for men in the 
lower quartile, as the graduate premium fell by 15%. Women see a small rise in the 
botom quartile (although these differences are again insignificant). Walker and 
Zhu’s findings suggest that those at the top of the earnings distribution (who would 
have the highest unobserved skills), have seen their premium increase, but they 
would have attended university anyway. It is those at the lower end of the 
distribution who have benefitted from the expansion of higher education, resulting in
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a fall in average ability for this group and a corresponding fall in the graduate 
premium for men).
The effects of university quality on the graduate premium are explored by Hussain et 
al (2009). For earnings data, they use the Graduate Cohort Study (for 1985, 1990, 
1995 and 1999), with wages recorded 3 to 6 years after graduation (depending on 
cohort). Data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency is used to construct five 
measures of institutional quality: research assessment exercise (RAE) score; faculty- 
student ratio; retention rate; total tariff score; and mean faculty salary and 
expenditure per pupil. Hussein et al. point out how most prior studies use a single 
measure of university quality, which is insufficient, as institutional quality is multi­
dimensional, so multiple measures are more appropriate. All of the above measures, 
except for mean faculty salary, are found to have a positive and significant effect on 
earnings (when included separately). Factor analysis and IV methods are used when 
including multiple quality measures. They find that using just one quality measure 
results in downward bias in earnings regressions, with the coefficient on university 
quality varying between 2.99 and 4.68 when a single measure is used, compared to 
4.19 to 9.91 when multiple quality measures are included together. Examining the 
effects of institutional quality across the cohorts, Hussain et al find that the returns 
to university quality have increased over time, which they suggest is due to the 
expansion of higher education. A quartile regression approach suggests that 
institutional quality has a non-linear effect on earnings, with the greatest effects 
found for those in the highest quartile.
Walker and Zhu (2010) examine the graduate premium in the UK, looking at the 
effects of subject choice, classification of first degree and postgraduate 
qualifications. Data used is from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) between 1994 and 
2009. They group subject areas into four broad categories: STEM (science, 
technology, engineering and medicine), LEM (law, economics and management), 
OSSAH (other social sciences, arts and humanities) and combined degrees. Male 
returns are found to be largest for LEM graduates, far above STEM returns. There is 
much variation across subject groups in the returns for men, far more so than for
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women. The largest returns for women are also found in LEM. Degree 
classification is found to have a large effect, particularly for LEM graduates, 
however, the difference between a first class degree and an upper second class 
degree tend to be insignificant. The greater effect is for an upper second class degree 
relative to a lower second class degree. Postgraduate degrees are also found to have 
a significant effect on earnings (above that of holding an undergraduate degree). The 
effect is found to be between 5% and 10% for men (highest for LEM and combined 
subjects) and is larger for women at around 15%. Walker and Zhu are surprised to 
find that the graduate premium does not vary by region.
O’Leary and Sloane (2011) revisit the graduate premium, focusing on the supply and 
demand of graduates, using data from the LFS between 1997 and 2006. Estimates of 
the graduate premium are calculated across the wage distribution. The mark-up to a 
degree appears greater in the lower tail of the wage distribution, although the 
difference between the lower and upper quartiles is insignificant. The difference in 
the graduate premium between genders is also clear, as women have greater returns 
than men across the wage distribution. Dividing graduates by subject area of degree 
confirms that the difference between the lower and upper quartiles is statistically 
insignificant. O’Leary and Sloane also calculate the graduate premium according 
birth cohort. Relative to the pre 1950 birth cohort, there are positive returns for male 
birth cohorts between 1950 and 1979 at the median and upper quartile. Differences 
are noted for the male post 1979 birth cohort. At the upper quartile, there is still 
evidence of increasing returns, however, in the lower quartile, returns decline 
relative to earlier birth cohorts (estimates at the median are statistically 
insignificant). Significantly lower returns are found for women at the median and 
lower quartile. A smaller decline in returns is also found for women in the 1970-79 
birth cohort. Examining returns over birth cohorts disaggregated by subject area 
reveals increases for men in medicine and related subjects, and education, but falls in 
sciences and business and finance. They note that the popularity of business and 
finance subjects may have led to demand falling behind supply. Many subject areas 
for women show declining returns, particularly in social sciences, and business and 
finance.
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5.3 Data & Methodology
To examine regional differences in the graduate premium the Annual Population 
Survey (APS) is used. The APS combines the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(QLFS), Local Area Labour Force Survey (LALFS) and the Annual Population 
Survey Boost (APS(B) ) 43 This increased sample size makes examination of smaller 
sub samples possible, a feature that this chapter takes advantage of, disaggregating 
by region, subject area, qualification level and degree class amongst other sub 
samples.
The sample is restricted to those aged between 25 and 64. By the age of 25, most 
will have completed their first degree and should have been able to find a job with a 
salary that will reflect their human capital investment. The sample is split between 
males and females in an attempt to understand how the private returns to a university 
level education vary by gender. Previous studies tend to show that females benefit 
more from attaining a degree than males, an understanding I hope to add to by 
making use of the strengths of the APS. When looking at earnings, hourly figures 
are used. The dataset covers the period 2004 to 2007, although some regressions 
have to exclude early periods of data due to missing values, particularly with class of 
first degree44 (sample sizes are included in results tables).
I will now examine mean hourly earnings for males and females across relevant sub 
samples. A table of general summary statistics is included in the appendix (table 
5A.1). All summary statistics are produced using population weights. Mean hourly 
earnings for men are £13.43 and £10.50 for women. The sample includes both full 
and part time workers. As women account for a greater proportion of part time 
wcrkers than men (41.35% of female workers are part time compared to just 5.15% 
of males), this causes the earnings gap between men and women to appear 
exaggerated. Looking at just full time earnings, this gap closes slightly with male 
full time earnings averaging £13.63 compared to £11.55 for females. Table 5A.3 in
43 The APS(B) was only carried out in 2004 and 2005.
44 This is unavailable in 2004 and only partially available in 2005.
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the appendix shows that the proportions of persons working in full time occupations 
remains relatively stable over educational attainment levels, with those with no 
qualifications displaying the greatest proportion of part time workers. Full time 
proportions for men show little variation over UK regions (see table 5A.4). There is 
more variation across regions for females, with London possessing the greatest 
proportion of full time female workers (72.87%). The inclusion of part time workers 
is controlled for in regressions through the use of a part time employment indicator 
variable.
Table 5.1 shows mean earnings for males and females according to the highest 
qualification they possess.45 The numbers of males and females with each 
qualification level is included. As expected, those possessing a higher level of 
qualification earn the most and men earn more than women at all qualification levels. 
Men and women with a first degree earn more than double per hour what those with 
no qualifications earn, and those who possess a PhD earn around twice as much as 
those educated to GCSE level. The earnings jump from first degree to masters is 
larger for women than men (£2.22 per hour to £1.79), but men still earn almost £3 
per hour more than women at masters and PhD level. Figures suggest that women 
benefit from the possession of a PGCE qualification relative to their first degree, but 
male PGCE holders earn less than those whose highest qualification is a first degree. 
Despite this, male PGCE holders still earn more per hour than female PGCE holders 
(£16.73 to £15.01).
Table 5.2 shows highest qualification by gender. Regarding the highest attainment 
levels of males and females, at first degree level the proportions for both men and 
women are fairly similar. However, 33.25% of men possess A Levels compared to 
just 18.47% of women. This is reversed at GCSE level as 19.40% of males are 
educated up to GCSE level compared to 30.75% of women. Given the higher
45 In addition to the qualifications presented above, respondents can also state that they hold ‘other’ 
qualifications or they don’t know which qualifications they possess. Respondents in these categories 
are excluded from this sample.
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Table 5.1
Mean Hourly Earnings by Highest Qualification
Male
Hourly N.
Female
Hourly N.
PhD 20.70 1,388 17.98 733
Masters 19.39 4,007 16.61 3,187
PGCE 16.73 1,214 15.01 2,481
First Degree 17.60 13,905 14.49 14,497
Higher Educ. 14.13 10,419 11.46 14,649
A-Level 11.81 28,272 9.29 17,435
GCSE 10.94 16,502 8.28 29,021
None 8.27 9,613 6.47 12,673
Notes: mean hourly earnings are expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals with each level of 
highest qualification.
Table 5.2
Proportion of Highest Qualification by Gender
Male (%) Female (%)
PhD 1.55 0.72
Masters 4.52 3.23
PGCE 1.37 2.52
First Degree 16.35 15.36
Higher Education 12.25 15.52
A Level 33.25 18.47
GCSE 19.40 30.75
None 11.30 13.43
Notes: proportion of each gender according to highest qualification, expressed as percentage
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earnings enjoyed by those educated to A Level, this may contribute to the higher 
earnings of men relative to women. Women also have a slightly higher percentage 
of persons with no qualifications (13.43% to 11.30%). Regarding higher 
qualifications, a larger percentage of men are found to hold PhD and masters level 
qualifications (1.55% to 0.72% and 4.52% to 3.23%), but more women possess 
PGCEs (women benefit more than men from possession of a PGCE relative to a first 
degree).
Much of the focus of this chapter concerns the private returns attributable to the 
possession of a first degree. One recent addition to the APS is the inclusion of a 
question regarding the degree class attained for a first degree.46 Table 5.3 presents 
mean earnings by first degree classification. As with table 5.1, mean hourly earnings 
are as expected, with earnings decreasing with degree class and men earning more 
per hour than women at all degree classes. Mean earnings peak at £19.60 per hour 
for men who attained a first class degree. Table 5A.3 in the appendix shows that the 
proportion of workers in full time occupations varies very little over qualification 
levels, so this is unlikely to exert much influence on mean earnings.
Subject area of degree is split into twenty distinct subject areas.47 This allows the 
identification of which subject areas drive the graduate earnings premium. Table 5.4 
gives mean hourly earnings for men and women with a first degree by subject area. 
For ease of analysis the rank of subject areas by hourly earnings has been included. 
For both men and women, hourly earnings are highest for those who studied 
medicine and dentistry (£22.83 for men, £19.76 for women). Whilst this result is not 
surprising, it may be somewhat misleading. Whilst those who studied medicine and 
dentistry may earn more per hour than those who studied other subjects, this may be 
reflecting that many degrees in medicine and dentistry require a greater time 
commitment than the three years required by the majority of first degrees. For men,
46 The majority of data on degree class comes from the 2006 and 2007 surveys, with limited data 
available from 2005.
47 Due to a change in subject classifications between 2004 and 2005, we only use subject area data 
between 2005 and 2007.
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Table 5.3
Mean Hourly Earnings by Degree Class
Male
Hourly N.
Female
Hourly N.
First 19.60 703 16.08 683
Upper Second 18.72 2,083 15.54 2,589
Lower Second 17.51 1,569 14.45 1,679
Third 16.71 304 13.62 159
Notes: mean hourly earnings are expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals within each class 
of first degree
Table 5.4
Mean Hourly Earnings by First Degree Subject Area
Hourly
Male
R. N. Hourly
Female
R. N.
Medicine & Dentistry 22.83 1 141 19.76 1 203
Medicine Related 16.00 14 306 14.47 12 1,444
Biological Sciences 15.44 17 630 13.79 15 931
Veterinary & Agricultural 15.69 15 141 12.89 17 133
Physical Sciences 17.90 9 1,064 14.95 8 437
Maths & Computing Science 18.74 5 1,212 16.14 5 430
Engineering 18.91 4 2,059 16.50 4 143
Technologies 16.56 11 150 12.75 18 72
Architecture 18.03 8 487 15.23 7 138
Economics 20.94 2 373 16.59 3 167
Politics 18.23 7 161 14.38 13 119
Social Studies 16.44 12 496 13.70 16 1,010
Law 20.25 3 416 17.31 2 500
Business Administration 18.28 6 1,354 14.64 9 1,326
Mass Communications 13.85 19 150 12.72 19 239
Linguistics & Classics 15.56 16 246 14.52 11 597
Language & Literature 16.27 13 165 14.55 10 351
History & Philosophy 15.03 18 560 13.92 14 549
Arts 13.81 20 579 12.15 20 775
Education 16.92 10 376 15.31 6 1,335
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first 
degree level in each subject area; R. is the rank of subject areas in order of mean hourly earnings.
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the hourly earnings from an economics degree follow medicine and dentistry at 
£20.94. Law also offers high earnings (£20.25). For women, the highest hourly 
earnings (after medicine and dentistry) also come from first degrees in the subjects 
of law (£17.31) and economics (£16.59). For both men and women, the lowest mean 
hourly earnings are attributable to those with an arts degree (£13.81 for men, £12.15 
for women), followed by mass communications.
Whilst the focus of most papers considering the returns to a degree focus on first 
degrees, I also examine the returns to higher degrees, focusing on masters and PhDs. 
Table 5.5 presents mean hourly earnings by twenty subject areas for those with 
masters degrees. As with first degrees, those whose masters degree is in the subject 
area of medicine and dentistry earn the most (£25.45 for men and £23.87 for 
women). This is followed by business administration, for men (£22.29) and law for 
women (£21.43). Economics follows for men (£21.70), but I find that female 
masters degree earnings in economics are low in comparison (£15.87).
Table 5.6 presents the difference between first degree and masters degree earnings. 
Subject areas have been ranked (R) according to the percentage difference between 
first degree and masters degree earnings. From table 5.6, negative returns for 
obtaining a masters degree in comparison to a first degree are found in several 
subjects. It is worth noting that no controls are included at this point. Negative 
returns for obtaining a masters degree are found for men in the politics subject area, 
physical sciences and language and literature, whilst a fall in earnings at masters 
level is also found for women who studied physical sciences, economics, politics and 
language and literature. The largest percentage gain for obtaining a masters degree 
relative to a first degree is found in business administration (21.94% for men and 
26.09% for women). When focusing on first degrees, arts offers the lowest average 
hourly earnings for both men and women, and earnings at masters degree level for 
arts still rank lowly (20th for men and 16th for women). However, due to the low 
earnings at first degree level, the percentage increase at masters degree level is large, 
especially for women (21.15%, which is the fourth largest percentage gain for 
women).
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Table 5.5
Mean Hourly Earnings by Masters Subject Area
Hourly
Male
R. N. Hourly
Female
R. N.
Medicine & Dentistry 25.45 1 36 23.87 1 31
Medicine Related 18.32 10 103 17.54 6 247
Biological Sciences 16.84 15 130 16.34 7 219
Veterinary & Agricultural 18.70 8 49 15.27 12 37
Physical Sciences 17.30 13 240 14.80 15 123
Maths & Computing Science 19.39 7 406 16.25 8 141
Engineering 19.99 5 451 17.69 5 63
Technologies 19.84 6 36 13.50 20 20
Architecture 18.34 9 124 15.65 11 51
Economics 21.70 3 95 15.87 9 43
Politics 15.44 18 55 14.07 19 47
Social Studies 17.90 12 151 15.78 10 311
Law 20.78 4 127 21.43 2 78
Business Administration 22.29 2 779 18.46 3 406
Mass Communications 15.44 18 80 14.99 14 106
Linguistics & Classics 16.90 14 61 15.27 12 131
Language & Literature 16.17 17 37 14.43 17 64
History & Philosophy 16.31 16 164 14.43 17 144
Arts 15.43 20 116 14.72 16 109
Education 18.04 11 151 17.80 4 245
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to masters 
degree level in each subject area; R  is the rank of subject areas in order of mean hourly earnings.
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At PhD level (table 5.7), some subject areas suffer from very small sample sizes, so 
any figures may be affected by this. Medicine and dentistry again dominates the 
male rankings (with earnings exceeding £27 per hour). For women, the hourly 
earnings of PhD holders in mass communications and education exceed those in 
medicine and dentistry by £0.86 and £0.52 per hour. Men in economics perform 
very strong at PhD level, earning £24.18 per hour.
A decrease of £1.12 per hour between masters and PhD for women in the medicine 
and dentistry subject area helps to explain its displacement from the top of the 
earnings rankings, although, men in medicine and dentistry experience gains from 
possession of a PhD, at 7.19% (table 5.8). The largest increase for women between 
masters and PhD level is found in mass communications, at 57.51%, but this result is 
found from a small sample at PhD level. Outside of mass communications, the 
largest female increase is found in medicine related subjects. Large percentage gains 
for men are found in the politics (33.42%) subject area, although this figure is 
influenced by low earnings at masters level. Negative returns are found for men 
with PhDs in technologies, linguistics and classics, and mass communications, and 
for women in business administration, economics, law, medicine and dentistry, 
politics, and language and literature.
For the purposes of this chapter the UK is divided into twelve regions, corresponding 
to NUTS1 definitions. Table 5.9 gives mean hourly earnings at first degree level for 
these twelve regions:48 The South Eastern regions of the UK display greater mean 
hourly earnings than Northern areas, particularly London, which has hourly earnings 
of £20.63 for men and £17.07 for women. London is followed by the South East and 
the East of England. At the lower end of the regional earnings rankings are Northern 
Ireland, Wales and the North East of England.
48 Mean earnings figures have been compared to figures taken from the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE). Figures are broadly similar, although APS means are lower, which would be 
expected according to Ada et al. (2006).
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Table 5.7
Mean Hourly Earnings by PhD Subject Area
Hourly
Earnings
Male
R. N. Hourly
Earnings
Female
R. N.
Medicine & Dentistry 27.28 1 75 22.75 3 55
Medicine Related 23.21 4 72 19.33 6 64
Biological Sciences 19.71 11 219 17.52 9 214
Veterinary & Agricultural 19.13 13 17 17.14 10 15
Physical Sciences 20.67 8 346 17.01 11 92
Maths & Computing 20.23 10 103 20.00 4 22
Engineering 21.71 6 133 18.79 8 20
Technologies 16.36 18 22 14.66 15 5
Architecture 21.08 7 4 16.57 13 4
Economics 24.18 2 26 13.40 19 6
Politics 20.60 9 11 13.82 18 4
Social Studies 18.49 14 40 18.82 7 32
Law 22.24 5 10 19.65 5 8
Business Administration 23.30 3 24 13.28 20 15
Mass Communications 15.38 20 3 23.61 1 4
Linguistics & Classics 15.42 19 25 16.93 12 26
Language & Literature 16.86 17 12 14.36 17 12
History & Philosophy 18.30 15 57 14.43 16 30
Arts 17.37 16 16 16.39 14 8
Education 19.43 12 24 23.27 2 17
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to PhD level 
in each subject area; R  is the rank of subject areas in order of mean hourly earnings.
259
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 
of 
M
ea
n 
Ho
ur
ly 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 a
t 
M
as
ter
s 
an
d 
PhD
 
Le
ve
l 
by 
Su
bj
ec
t 
A
re
as
.O'3
GG
Li<u r&
R
.
17 ON G VO <n m fN1-H O cn ON vo H" OOi-H 20 - oo in ■G-pH fN
N?
onVO
H^
CN fNIN
infN mON ooo <N(N ON«n oooo
VOin oot-
VOfN Hcn
VO© m 00 OnH- ©©
incn cnr-
oN
i ©^H I"-' cnpH rfr™( m(N vd 00 in
inpH1
T—H 1 ON^H oo■
ooCN1
r-in © o ’i ©
pH
pH o'cn
<+■« fN On oo r- in o VO fN r-" in t}- oo 00 fN © r- © l"- r-
QA 3- rH r- rH 00 (N r- pH ON CN o C'- rH vq vq © © vq G;JU 5 T-H 1 H^ r_l 1—1 (N cn H^ H^ o fNi o1 cn 1 mi 00 pH ©■ © H^ in
B<u IT) cn fN G i-H o ON VO r- O fN fN in 00 pH cn VO cn On r-M t"> cn pH o o vo m ■H" OO 00 VD CN VD On cn ■G; cn fNpC CN ON r-~' r-~' r-‘ o' oo' ■H- vd cn cn 00 ON cn cn vd •rf ■G" vd cnMH (N rH rH ,—l t-H <N ,— 11— 1 rT i * pH i-H -t fN 1 H^ fN
GO 00 vr> co fN 00 CN VO n vo 00 o r" ■H; ON fN ■G; ■G; r- 00CQM cn r»‘ vd in rf vd K in in in oo rf in Tf ■G" ■G-’ KfN pH rH T"'1 t-H t-H pH i—M |H fN *”1 T—H pH 1 rH pH H^
pH fN G r-pH m ▼—H ON 20 «n 00 iH vo^H fNi-H cn OOi—t ONpH inpH r- VO ©pH
ONpH
OnVO GO ocn
00H" cncn Ovo
■H"in H"ON cn•cf fN ocn cno cnin
ONcn ©r- r-fN
©fN t"m H^r-8' K VOCN r-rH fN ON Tf oo‘ i
■H" HpH mm cn S ■H" ©’i 001 ■G" CNpH fNpH r-'
cn On cn r- Tt <N 00 ■H- 00 VD On VO , vo oo ON ON G" ONG- 00 00 00 G m OO Tf r- l-H in •H" © © ■H- VO ON ON cn
coJW5 pH G fN O m O pH mi fN fN in o' ©i i-H1 ©' pH pH H^
"«
s 00 H^ rH m cn vo OO 00 o ON © 00 fN © © cnH fN CN l> pH VO <N r- cn o pH vo fN cn cn Tt; oo cn cn G-Sm . r-‘ cn ON ON o O t—4 vd pH ■H" o OO CN cn in in vd oo r-' ONHN fN fN H^ CN (N <N pH fN fN fN fN CN p H pH H^
GOG cn 00 r- cn cn On 00 cn t"; ON fN ■G- ON pH cn G ©
<1HH in 00 vd oo t> ON ON ON 00 in r- o fN in vd vd \6 in' 00CN pH 1pH 1 H^ H^ H^ iH fN 1— 1 *“1 fN fN pH 1 H^ H^
G
£ IA<L>
I
G
oon
b0
.g
o
■a
CAGo
C/3o• H
<D
gCO CJ a •d C/3CO cd Oh
■f<u
Q
uG• pHo
GJ<u
cd
75
Pi
aG• pHo
OGa>
o05P“HGo
‘5b
1
1
CAOJoG<D
a CA
73o
'S
1
u G*■ H 'pH<L>OJpH
cna>• pH00O
orl
d>
&o<L)+->
CAO
o CACJ
CAU
3C/5
<CACA<D
cdo
■a
oU
J3
U
COo
CO
H*
J
ub0G
OCAo
3Ph
Go
a
H3<D 43<D
s
jo
o
PQ
Ha>-H CA
Oh
1
s 1w
£o(U
H
o
4
GOo
W
vg
3Ph
73«oo
C/5 L
aw
.aCAG
PQ
MC/3cG
S .1J GrJ
OH
CO
2 A
rt
s o
aw
G<Du<3(3.
(U
■5
to
O'
bO
g'3
L .s>,
ao.C
g
8B
<oo
G (n
S SP,o> G£  J
<D Q> 
J2 bQ £ 
.2 G a>
•-G <U ^  O. C+-I
. O
t-ia M
<  o
o
VO
CN
Table 5.9
Mean Hourly Earnings for First Degree by Region
Hourly
Earnings
Male
R. N.
Female
Hourly
Earnings N.
East 17.31 3 750 14.00 3 829
East Midlands 16.64 5 746 13.68 6 735
London 20.63 1 2,182 17.07 1 2,001
North East 15.50 10 687 13.07 10 794
North West 16.08 7 1,470 13.51 8 1,550
Northern Ireland 15.20 11 235 12.69 12 322
Scotland 16.93 4 1,759 13.94 4 2,070
South East 18.52 2 1,954 14.86 2 1,892
South West 16.13 6 1,078 13.35 9 1,099
Wales 15.15 12 1,009 12.77 11 1,184
West Midlands 16.06 8 974 13.80 5 978
Yorkshire 15.82 9 1,006 13.67 7 1,033
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first 
degree level working in each region; R  is the rank of regions in order of mean hourly earnings.
Table 5.10
Mean Hourly Earnings for Masters by Region
Male
Hourly R. 
Earnings
N .
Female 
Hourly R. 
Earnings
N .
East 18.53 4 229 16.71 3 171
East Midlands 18.20 6 156 14.78 10 127
London 21.87 1 821 18.53 1 593
North East 17.89 10 174 16.59 4 153
North West 18.48 5 334 14.93 9 274
Northern Ireland 17.05 12 70 14.57 11 74
Scotland 17.97 7 489 15.42 12 426
South East 18.89 3 592 16.84 2 437
South West 19.02 2 309 15.71 8 217
Wales 17.92 9 286 15.81 6 286
West Midlands 17.82 11 273 15.79 7 210
Yorkshire 17.93 8 252 16.05 5 208
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to masters
degree level working in each region; R is the rank of regions in order of mean hourly earnings.
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Table 5.10 shows that, at masters degree level, London again offers higher earnings 
than other regions for both men and women (£21.87 and £18.53). For men, the 
South West offers the second highest earnings, followed by the South East and the 
East of England, with Northern Ireland offering the lowest earnings. This result is 
similar to that of first degree hourly earnings. Results for women at masters degree 
level display significant differences from those at first degree level outside of the 
South Eastern regions.
Table 5.11 presents the difference between first degree hourly earnings and masters 
degree hourly earnings for men and women by region. Regions are ranked in order 
of the percentage difference between first degree hourly earnings and masters degree 
hourly earnings. London, which offers the highest hourly earnings for both men and 
women at first degree level and masters degree level, has relatively small percentage 
gains for obtaining a masters degree relative to a first degree at 6 .0 1 % for men and 
8.55% for women. The only smaller percentage difference is found for males in the 
South East at 2%. Hourly earnings for women show significant differences between 
first degree and masters level. At first degree level, for women, the North East offers 
the 10th highest hourly earnings (only Northern Ireland and Wales offer lower hourly 
earnings). However, at masters degree level, the North East offers the fourth highest 
hourly earnings, a 26.93% jump, from £13.07 to £16.59. Wales, which offered the 
second lowest hourly earnings at first degree level (£12.77), offers far higher hourly 
earnings at masters degree level (£15.81%), resulting in a percentage difference of 
23.81%. The percentage difference for gaining a masters degree relative to a first 
degree is greater for women (14.63%) than men (10.17%), suggesting women benefit 
more than men from continuing their education to masters degree level. Regarding 
masters degree gains for men, the largest percentage gains are found in Wales 
(18.28%), followed by the South West (17.92%) and the North East (15.42%). It 
appears from these raw statistics that there is more to be gained from obtaining a 
masters degree relative to a first degree in the regions that tend to be characterised by 
lower earnings in general.
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Table 5.12 reveals that, at PhD level, London continues to dominate, for both men 
and women. PhD earnings are also high for both men and women in the South East. 
The West Midlands perform very strong, especially for women. Once again, 
Northern Ireland sits at the foot of the earnings rankings, for both genders.
The differences between masters and PhD earnings are shown in table 5.13. There 
are two instances of earnings falling between masters and PhD level: for men in 
Northern Ireland and women in the East of England (both these falls are fairly small: 
7.92% and 4.13%). No controls are included in the calculation of these raw 
statistics, so these falls may be caused by characteristics differences. The largest 
increases for men are found in the West Midlands, South East and Wales, and for 
women in the East Midlands, North West and West Midlands. Growth in London is 
small, at around 3-6%; although this is offset by high masters earnings.
I also intend to look at the returns to education by industry sectors. The sample is 
split into nine industry sectors. Table 5.14 gives mean hourly earnings at first degree 
level by the industry sector that the individual is employed in. At first degree level 
the highest hourly earnings are found in the energy and water; banking, finance and 
insurance; and manufacturing industries. The lowest hourly earnings for both males 
and females are seen in the agriculture and fishing sector.
Table 5.15 gives mean hourly earnings for industry sectors for those educated to 
masters level. Table 5.16 gives the percentage difference between first degree level 
hourly earnings and masters degree level hourly earnings by industry sector. The 
highest hourly earnings at masters degree level are found in the banking, finance and 
insurance sector for men (£22.13) and the energy and water sector for women 
(£19.15). Table 5.16 reveals that the largest percentage increase from gaining a 
masters degree relative to a first degree for men is found in the agriculture and 
fishing sector (69.52%). This effect is magnified by the agriculture and fishing 
sector’s particularly low mean hourly earnings at first degree level and the small 
number of observations at masters level. At first degree level, mean hourly earnings
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Table 5.12
Mean Hourly Earnings for PhD by Region
Hourly
Earnings
Male
R. N. HourlyEarnings
Female
R. N.
East 20.08 7 112 16.02 11 48
East Midlands 20.21 5 75 18.07 5 40
London 22.57 1 176 19.59 1 102
North East 19.63 11 59 17.09 9 44
NorthWest 19.69 10 141 17.65 7 77
Northern Ireland 15.70 12 22 15.14 12 13
Scotland 19.94 9 174 17.52 8 105
South East 21.42 2 234 18.23 3 106
South West 21.07 3 100 18.13 4 57
Wales 20.12 6 115 16.35 10 50
West Midlands 20.47 4 79 18.56 2 34
Yorkshire 20.05 8 96 17.82 6 56
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to PhD level 
working in each region; R. is the rank of regions in order of mean hourly earnings.
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Table 5.14
Mean Hourly Earnings for First Degree by Industry Sector
Male Female
Hourly R. N. Hourly R. N.Earnings Earnings
Agriculture & Fishing 10.40 9 45 11.53 9 38
Energy & Water 20.49 1 321 15.84 3 106
Manufacturing 18.42 3 2,321 16.05 2 977
Construction 17.56 5 668 13.81 6 157
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. 14.17 7 1,014 11.77 8 952
Transport & Communication 17.76 4 712 15.03 4 350
Banking, Finance & Insurance 20.17 2 3,801 16.45 1 2,388
Public Admin, Educ. & Health 15.92 6 4,330 14.09 5 8,853
Other Services 13.86 8 683 13.26 7 666
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first 
degree level working in each industry sector; R_ is the rank of regions in order of mean hourly 
earnings.
Table 5.15
Mean Hourly Earnings for Masters by Industry Sector
Male Female
Hourly
Earnings R. N.
Hourly
Earnings R- N.
Agriculture & Fishing 17.63 7 13 13.39 7 12
Energy & Water 21.19 2 91 19.15 1 23
Manufacturing 19.86 4 554 18.92 3 191
Construction 19.03 5 121 16.86 5 36
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. 16.46 8 194 11.06 9 117
Transport & Communication 20.57 3 176 19.00 2 63
Banking, Finance & Insurance 22.13 1 1,010 18.57 4 458
Public Admin, Educ. & Health 17.85 6 1,622 16.43 6 2,110
Other Services 16.46 8 220 13.37 8 170
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to masters 
degree level working in each industry sector; R. is the rank of regions in order of mean hourly 
earnings.
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are ranked fourth for the transport and communications sector, but this sector is 
ranked third at masters degree level for men (£20.07) and second for women 
(£19.00), resulting in the fourth largest percentage gains (15.82%) for men and the 
largest gains (26.41%) for women. The energy and water sector, which was ranked 
first for men and second for women at first degree level offers a very small 
percentage increase in mean hourly earnings between first degree and higher degree 
level for men (3.42%), but a large increase for women (20.90%). Wage differences 
between first degree and masters degree level are positive for all industry sectors, 
except for women in the distribution, hotels and restaurants sector, who experience a 
fall of 6.03%. At PhD level, results are affected by a very uneven distribution of 
observations, with the majority of PhD holders employed in the public 
administration, education and health sector. For this reason, I do not comment on 
the mean earnings
The majority of this research has been carried out at the regional level, 
corresponding to NUTS1 classification. I have taken Wales to use as a case study 
for a sub-regional analysis, extending the research to unitary authority level, 
according to where individuals work. This will allow me to see how changes in the 
returns to education vary at a sub-regional level. Table 5.A2 in the appendix gives 
summary statistics for the Welsh sample. Table 5.17 breaks down Welsh hourly 
earnings at first degree level across all twenty-two Welsh unitary authorities. 
Unitary authorities are ranked according to mean hourly earnings for ease of 
analysis.
For men, hourly earnings are greatest in Blaenau Gwent for men and the Vale of 
Glamorgan for women. There is much variation between male and female hourly 
earnings at unitary authority level. In Conwy, Anglesey and Powys, female hourly 
earnings exceed male hourly earnings, a result which is influenced by the low male 
earnings in these unitary authorities (Conwy is ranked last for male earnings). The 
lowest hourly earnings for women are found in Monmouthshire.
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Table 5.17
Mean Hourly Earnings for First Degree by Unitary Authority (Wales Only)
Hourly
Earnings
Male
R. N. Hourly
Earnings
Female
R. N.
Blaenau Gwent 18.65 1 14 12.48 13 10
Bridgend 14.67 13 49 11.93 18 61
Caerphilly 17.00 3 41 13.14 8 46
Cardiff 14.91 11 206 12.78 10 214
Carmarthenshire 13.93 15 39 11.66 20 42
Ceredigion 13.93 15 39 11.55 21 61
Conwy 12.49 22 17 13.35 7 34
Denbighshire 16.04 7 38 13.57 5 44
Flintshire 16.65 5 41 12.60 12 35
Gwynedd 12.72 21 45 12.35 14 71
Isle of Anglesey 13.25 20 18 13.42 6 20
Merthyr Tydfil 13.84 17 17 12.67 11 23
Monmouthshire 14.74 12 33 11.20 22 40
Neath Port Talbot 15.97 8 29 14.29 2 35
Newport 16.82 4 86 12.21 16 64
Pembrokeshire 15.00 10 39 11.68 19 38
Powys 13.71 18 36 13.91 3 43
RCT 15.16 9 34 13.88 4 78
Swansea 13.59 19 83 12.29 15 104
Torfaen 13.98 14 35 13.09 9 42
Vale of Glamorgan 16.33 6 31 14.63 1 44
Wrexham 18.10 2 39 12.09 17 35
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in fs; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first 
degree level working in each Welsh unitary authority; R. is the rank of unitary authorities in order of 
mean hourly earnings.
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Table 5.18 gives average hourly earnings at masters degree level for Welsh unitary 
authorities. Table 5.19 details the differences between first degree mean hourly 
earnings and masters degree mean hourly earnings, ranked by percentage difference. 
Masters degree earnings for men peak at £30.16 an hour in the Vale of Glamorgan, 
closely followed by the Wrexham (£28.39). The largest female hourly earnings at 
masters level are found in Flintshire (£20.41), followed by Torfaen (£20.13). The 
lowest masters degree hourly earnings are found in Anglesey, Conwy and 
Ceredigion. Turning to table 5.19, masters degree hourly earnings exceed first 
degree hourly earnings in all cases except for males in Denbighshire, and women in 
Anglesey and Powys. The largest masters degree gains relative to first degree for 
men are found in the Vale of Glamorgan and Wrexham. The large masters degree 
gains of Merthyr Tydfil (42.23%) are being driven by Merthyr’s position at the foot 
of the first degree hourly earnings rankings. Flintshire boasts the greatest percentage 
gains for women, at 61.95%, which reflects Flintshire’s large masters degree female 
earnings, which are greater than corresponding earnings for men. The next highest 
percentage gains for females are found in Blaenau Gwent and Wrexham.
Specification
So far, I have presented an analysis of mean earnings at varying degree levels across 
regions, subject areas and industries, but I have not included any controls for 
respondents’ personal characteristics, occupation and other personal characteristics. 
To gauge the effect of higher education on earnings, amongst other returns on 
education, I use an augmented Mincer (1974) earnings function with the following 
specification:
InEi = a + XFIRSTDEGALEVELi + pXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aYEARt+ (1)
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly earnings (E). A dummy variable 
is not required to control for gender, as regressions are gender specific. Controls for 
personal characteristics (X) include age and its square, job tenure, a dummy variable
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Table 5.18
Mean Hourly Earnings for Masters by Unitary Authority (Wales Only)
Hourly
Earnings
Male
R. N. Hourly
Earnings
Female
R. N.
Blaenau Gwent 19.60 6 3 19.77 3 4
Bridgend 17.54 11 15 14.26 17 10
Caerphilly 21.65 4 10 17.58 6 5
Cardiff 16.73 13 65 15.34 12 69
Carmarthenshire 15.29 17 13 13.29 18 13
Ceredigion 14.56 20 12 12.96 19 12
Conwy 14.10 22 9 14.33 16 9
Denbighshire 14.94 18 6 18.27 5 13
Flintshire 17.83 10 8 20.41 1 10
Gwynedd 14.72 19 17 14.43 15 23
Isle of Anglesey 14.47 21 6 7.95 22 2
Merthyr Tydfil 19.68 5 2 14.87 13 4
Monmouthshire 16.33 14 11 12.33 21 15
Neath Port Talbot 22.03 3 7 17.54 7 14
Newport 16.89 12 20 14.44 14 10
Pembrokeshire 15.34 16 10 16.58 10 5
Powys 19.25 9 9 12.41 20 10
RCT 19.29 8 18 16.03 11 8
Swansea 15.35 15 24 17.40 9 26
Torfaen 19.40 7 7 20.13 2 7
Vale of Glamorgan 30.16 1 6 17.46 8 8
Wrexham 28.39 2 8 18.98 4 9
Notes: mean hourly earnings expressed in £s; N. is the number of individuals qualified to masters 
degree level working in each Welsh unitary authority; R  is the rank of unitary authorities in order of 
mean hourly earnings.
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indicating whether an individual is married, a dummy variable indicating whether an 
individual suffers from a health issue that is activity limiting, a dummy variable 
indicating whether an individual is employed in the public sector and a dummy 
variable that indicates whether an individual is in part time employment. Vectors of 
dummy variables are included, which indicate an individual’s ethnicity (6  categories) 
and employer size (4 categories). Controls for industrial sector (IND) and 
occupational group (OCC) are included as vectors of dummy variables (with the 
importance of occupation in controlling for earnings variation demonstrated in the 
previous chapter). I also control for the year the observation is taken from (YEAR).
The dummy variable representing highest qualification level is the key variable in 
the model, giving a measure of the effect of education on hourly earnings49 Taking 
the effect of a first degree on hourly earnings relative to A levels as an example; the 
sample is restricted to those who are educated to either A level or first degree level, 
and a dummy variable (FIRSTDEGALEVEL) is inserted taking a value of 1 if an 
individual is educated to first degree level and 0  if they are not (therefore they would 
be educated to A level). The coefficient (A) will then give the effect of a first degree 
(highest education level in sample) on hourly earnings relative to A level (baseline 
education level in sample) all else held constant. The majority of results in the 
results section are based on a model measuring the effect on hourly earnings of first 
degree relative to a baseline of A level holders, but there are some exceptions, also 
measuring the premium paid to masters degrees relative to first degrees (2) and PhDs 
relative to masters degrees (3).
InEi = a + AMASTERSFIRSTDEGi + |3Xi + odNDt + aOCCi + aYEARt+ £ut (2)
49 As pointed out in Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), due to the semi-logarithmic form of the 
estimation equation, the coefficient (a) does not give the percentage effect on earnings (5). The 
percentage effect on earnings is given by 5 = exp(a) -  1. 5 is greater than a, however, they are very 
close at small magnitudes. We report the coefficient (a).
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InEi = a + XPHDMASTERSi + (3Xi + alNDi + aOCCi + aYEARt+ £irt (3)
Additionally, I measure the returns of masters degrees relative to A levels (4) and 
also PhDs relative to A level (5). This is particularly useful for PhDs, as the
difference in earnings between PhDs and masters degrees is often small. Using
specifications (4) and (5) it is possible to compare the returns to masters and PhDs 
both relative to A levels.
InEi = a + >MASTERS_ALEVELi + pXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aYEARt + £in (4)
InEi = a + ^PHDALEVELi + PXi + alNDi + aOCCi + aYEARt + £irt (5)
Whilst these are the basic specifications used in this chapter, disaggregations of the 
sample are also used to measure the differences in returns to qualifications over 
different groups and also over the earnings distribution.
5.4 Results
Table 5.20 presents results from a regression of a first degree dummy variable and a 
full set of controls on the log of hourly earnings. This corresponds to specification 
(1), which restricts the sample to those whose highest qualifications are A levels or 
first degrees. The coefficient on the first degree dummy suggests a return of .20651 
for men and .21652 for women to holding a first degree relative to A levels. These 
returns are highly significant. Most control variables behave as would be expected. 
Negative returns are found to marriage and to working in die public sector (for men 
only). All ethnicities, except for Chinese, display a mark-up relative to the omitted 
group (the ‘other’ category) for men, but results are insignificant for women. The
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Table 5.20
Full Regression Results for Returns to First Degree
Male
Coeff. t stat
Female
Coeff. t stat
First Degree .20651"’ 42.90 .21652’" 43.23
Age .05406*** 34.52 .03873*** 21.71
Age2 -.0006” * 33.61 -.00045*** 21.15
Part Time -.10245'“ 10.53 -.04758” * 10.24
Public -.0292 4.07 .01949**’ 3.13
Job Tenure .00609*** 27.25 .00957*** 30.68
Health Limit -.06955*** 10.54 -.03301*” 4.64
Married -.06394*** 13.60 -.01081” 2.32
Plant Size
25 to 49 .10424*** 16.75 .05424**’ 8.38
50 to 499 .14737 30.82 .09756” * 18.42
500 and over .22107*” 38.35 .14636 23.53
Ethnicity
White .1342*** 5.37 .01647 0.64
Mixed .1039*** 2.60 .04231 1.16
Asian .06656*’ 2.39 .00277 0 .1 0
Black .07727” 2.50 .03026 0.99
Chinese .01192 0.26 .01004 0 .2 2
Industry
Agriculture & Fishing -.29626*” 12.63 -.13277*” 3.93
Energy & Water -.01588 1.24 -.04521* 1.89
Manufacturing -.13421*” 21 .1 1 -.06838 7.21
Construction -.07179*” 9.26 -.0926*’* 5.35
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. -.24932*** 33.89 -.25659*** 30.39
Transport & Comms. -.10488*** 12.78 -.05188” * 4.26
Public Administration -.16663” * 19.89 -.16657*** 21.97
Other Services -.23586*** 21.90 -.1755**’ 16.74
Occupation
Managerial .41916*** 44.92 .3775*” 51.94
Professional .34206*” 35.54 .40012*” 54.16
Associate Pro. & Technical .23386 24.80 .21117*** 31.78
Skilled Trade .05538*’* 5.72 -.13567” * 7.00
Personal Service -.11713*** 7.83 -.12166 15.92
Sales -.09028*’* 6.06 -.13308 13.06
Process, Plant & Machinery -.08655*” 8.08 -.20939” * 9.35
Elementary -.22302 19.33 -.24975*** 21.28
Year
2005 .04149**’ 8 .10 .04711*** 8.23
276
2006 .07638’*’ 14.69 .07023*”  12.49
2007 .11018’”  21.26 .11196*”  20.11
Constant .88824*** 21.01 1.22808*** 27.64
Notes: regression results from specification (1); significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) 
and 1% (***) levels.
high earnings of the banking, finance and insurance sector can be seen when it is 
used as the omitted industry, with all other industries displaying negative 
coefficients. Relative to the control group of administrative and secretarial 
occupations, managerial, professional, and associate professional and technical 
occupations have positive returns. For men, returns to skilled trades are also 
positive. The coefficients on year dummies are increasing with time, suggesting 
earnings have risen over the sample period (as shown in the data section).
Whilst the primary focus of my research is on the returns to a first degree relative to 
A levels, masters degree relative to a first degree, and PhD relative to masters, table 
5.21 presents a breakdown of the returns to each level of qualifications relative to 
every lower qualification level. For example, the returns to a PhD are measured 
relative to masters, PGCE, first degree, higher education, A level, GCSE and no 
qualifications. The upper right hand section of table 5.21 contains results for men, 
whilst results for women are in the lower left hand section. For men, baseline 
qualifications are found on the horizontal, whilst for women they are on the vertical.
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The results in table 5.21 are obtained from variations of the specifications in the 
previous section. As previously stated, the main focus is on the effects of first 
degree relative to A level. Those with A levels are considered the most appropriate 
baseline as it is likely that they would have been able to obtain a university place had 
they so desired, but they have chosen not to pursue this route. By measuring the 
effects of a first degree relative to A level, there should be many individuals of a 
similar ability level allowing the formulation of a good estimate of the pecuniary 
benefit of undertaking (and completing) a first degree.
For men, the returns to a first degree relative to A levels is .20651, whilst it is 
slightly larger for women, at .21652. This is consistent with the majority of existing 
literature, which finds that women benefit more than men from gaining a first degree 
(for example Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary, 1999), although the difference 
between estimates is small. I also place high emphasis on the results of regressions 
measuring the premium paid to masters degree holders relative to those with a first 
degree. For men, I calculate a coefficient of .06713. For women, a slightly larger 
estimate of .07905 is found. This suggests that whilst women have more to gain 
from obtaining a first degree relative to A levels, this advantage extends to masters 
level, a result previously found by O’Leary and Sloane (2005). No significant effect 
is found for holding a PhD over a masters degree for either gender. This aggregated 
result may hide PhD premiums for smaller sub samples. This result is explored in 
greater depth throughout the chapter. All results appear as expected, with returns 
increasing with qualification level, with the exception of PGCE, which has no 
significant advantage over first degree level. The largest estimate is found for 
women with a PhD compared to no qualifications (.5595).
Class of First Degree
A recent addition to the APS is a question on the class of degree awarded at first 
degree level. Table 5.22 examines returns to class of degree relative to each lower 
class of degree. As with table 5.21, the upper right section presents coefficient
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Table 5.22
Regression Results by Class of First Degree
First Upper
Second
Lower
Second
Third
First .02105a .06592*** .09777"’
(1.19) (3.42) (3.42)
Upper Second -.02845* .05268*** .08593***
(1.68) (3.80) (3.42)
Lower Second .01043 .03706***b .03456
(0.58) (3.10) (1.29)
Third .04468 .07229** .04449
(1.16) (2.29) (1.41)
Notes: Separate regressions are carried out for each baseline qualification level; for example, the
coefficient labelled (a) gives the return to a first class award relative to upper second for men and (b) 
gives the return to an upper second relative to a lower second for women; t-statistics in parenthesis; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.23
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by Class of First Degree
Coeff.
Male 
t stat N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat N.
First .25093’" 17.10 703 .24912’" 16.80 683
Upper Second .22681*** 24.14 2,083 .26826*** 29.72 2,589
Lower Second .16954*** 16.34 1,569 .22048*** 21.46 1,679
Third .13849*** 6.50 304 .18568*** 6.65 159
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first
degree); baseline is A level; N. is the number of individuals qualified to each class of first degree; R. 
is the rank of unitary authorities in order of mean hourly earnings; significance is indicated at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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estimates for men; results for women are in the lower left section. The baseline for 
men is on the horizontal, the baseline for women is on the vertical.50
For men, no significant earnings advantage is found to possessing a first class degree 
relative to an upper second class degree. This may be due to a large number of first 
class degree holders continuing on to gain higher degrees. In this case, they would 
not be counted amongst first class first degree holders. A similar result has been 
found by Walker and Zhu (2010). Earnings premiums are found for possessing a 
first class degree over those with lower second class degrees and third class degrees 
(this figure increases as the baseline declines for men). No significant effect is found 
for those with a lower second class degree relative to a third class degree.
Table 5.23 investigates the effects that the class of first degree awarded have on the 
graduate premium relative to A level qualifications. At all degree classes except first 
class, the premium relative to A level is greater for women than men, as found across 
the literature. Whilst it may be expected that the earnings premium will increase 
uniformly with degree class relative to A level, this is not the case. Women with an 
upper second class degree are found to have a greater earnings advantage relative to 
A level than those with a first class degree. For men, the largest returns relative to A 
level are found for those with a first class degree, as would be expected. The largest 
difference in graduate returns for men occurs between those with upper second class 
degrees and those with lower second class degrees (.22681 to .16954), a result in line 
with that found by Walker and Zhu (2010). Walker and Zhu report the there are 
‘consistently strong returns to a 2.1 vs a 2.2\
Continuing the analysis of the effects of degree class on the graduate premium, table 
5.24 presents the returns to a masters degree relative to a first degree, by the class of
30 For example, the coefficient labelled (a) gives the return to a first class award relative to upper 
second for men and (b) gives the return to an upper second relative to a lower second for women.
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Table 5.24
Returns to Masters Relative to First Degree by Class of First Degree
Coeff.
Male
t stat
Female
Coeff. t stat
First .00909 0.48 .07538’’* 4.11
Upper Second .02884** 2.12 .04282*** 3.43
Lower Second © 00 * « « 5.32 .08679*** 6.25
Third .10989 4.16 .12809*** 3.99
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (masters 
degree); baseline is first degree, disaggregated by degree class; significance is indicated at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.25
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by NUTS 1 Region (National
Baseline)
Male Female
Coeff. t stat R. N. Coeff. t stat R. N.
East .20644*” 14.90 3 750 .22745"’ 17.42 3 829
East Midlands .15211*** 10.98 6 746 .19569**’ 14.16 7 735
London .39963*** 44.72 1 2,182 .42947*** 45.79 1 2,001
North East .12139*** 8.39 11 687 .15996*** 11.90 11 794
North West .15444*** 15.05 5 1,470 .19658*** 19.38 9 1,550
Northern Ireland .1319*** 5.49 10 235 .16312*** 8.18 10 322
Scotland .18442*** 19.33 4 1,759 .21917*** 24.24 4 2,070
South East .26072*** 28.25 2 1,954 .25568*** 26.82 2 1,892
South West - . _ ^ _ **♦ .14062 11.98 9 1,078 .17725*** 15.27 9 1,099
Wales .09993*** 8.24 12 1,009 .14713*** 12.99 12 1,184
West Midlands .14791*** 11.99 7 974 .20869*** 16.80 5 978
Yorkshire .14415*** 11.92 8 1,006 .18826*** 15.75 8 1,033
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by region; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level; N. is the 
number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each region; R. is the rank of regions in order 
of magnitude of return to first degree; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels.
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first degree. It would be expected that there would be less to gain from attaining a 
masters degree if an individual has a first degree with one of the higher first degree 
classes. Whilst table 5.24 does confirm that those possessing a lower class of first 
degree have more to gain from pursuing a masters degree than those with a first class 
or upper second class first degree, as observed in table 5.23, this effect does not 
uniformly decrease as the class of first degree rises in the case of women. For men I 
find no significant earnings advantage to possessing a masters degree over a first 
class first degree, although a small and significant effect is found compared to an 
upper second class first degree (.02884). A relatively large effect is found for 
women possessing a masters degree relative to a first class degree (.07538), which 
reinforces the result found in table 5.21 that women benefit more than men from 
obtaining a masters degree. This coefficient is larger than that found for upper 
second class first degrees (.04282). Results for both men and women confirm that 
those with a lower class of first degree have more to gain from obtaining a masters 
degree (although a lower class of first degree may obstruct an individual from 
gaining entry to a higher degree course, depending on the institution/course). As 
expected, the largest earnings advantage is found for those with a masters degree 
relative to a third class first degree (.10989 and .12809).
Region
A major focus of this chapter concerns how the graduate premium differs across 
regions (defined according to workplace). Table 5.25 presents results from a 
regression of those with a first degree (region specific) compared to a baseline of 
individuals with A levels from across the UK. This shows how graduates in a 
specific region fare compared to a national baseline of A level holders, and where 
mobile graduates will be able to enjoy the greatest earnings premiums.
Results reveal a large advantage in the earnings premium for the South Eastern 
regions, particularly London (.39963 for men and .42947 for women). This result is 
supported by the findings of O’Leary and Sloane (2008), where the premium in 
London is almost double that of any other region. As returns are measured against a
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national baseline of A level holders, much of this result can be attributed to the 
generally higher level of earnings in the South Eastern regions (this issue is explored 
in the following table). The largest graduate premium outside of the South Eastern 
regions is observed in Scotland. The earnings premium is greater for women than 
for men in all UK regions, with the exception of the South East. The smallest 
graduate premium is for Welsh men (.09993). Whilst the results of table 5.25 have 
implications for graduate migration, identifying where mobile graduate can enjoy the 
greatest graduate premiums, cost of living differences are not taken into account. 
Table 5.26 takes regional differences in earnings into account by comparing graduate 
earnings with a baseline of A level holders within the same region only. Results 
reveal that when measured against a regional baseline, the large advantage in the 
graduate premium experienced by the South Eastern regions is greatly diminished. 
For men, London now displays the smallest coefficient (.16449), a result that reflects 
the high earnings of A level holders in London. O’Leary and Sloane (2008) also find 
London to offer the smallest graduate premium when measured against its own A 
level holders. Of the South Eastern regions, only men in the South East of England 
maintain a (relatively) large graduate premium (.19732). In calculating the increase 
in earnings attributable to obtaining a first degree relative to A levels within regions, 
the variation in the graduate premium is greatly reduced (for men the graduate 
premium ranges from .16449 to .23458, and .15217 to .24146 for women). This 
shows that there is less incentive for graduate migration than table 5.25 would 
suggest, although given that there is still regional differences in the graduate 
premium, there is still some incentive for graduate migration. When focusing on just 
differences within regions, the largest graduate premiums for men are found in 
Northern Ireland and Scotland; and the East Midlands and the West Midlands for 
women. There are large differences within regions between genders. For example, a 
small female graduate premium is found in Northern Ireland, the site of the largest 
male premium, suggesting that women in Northern Ireland have significantly less to 
gain than men from obtaining a first degree (.23458 to .18336).
Whilst I have examined the returns to a first degree relative to A levels, table 5.27 
looks at the gains attributable to obtaining a masters degree relative to a first degree, 
using a national baseline.
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Table 5.26
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by NUTS 1 Region (Regional
Baseline)
Coeff.
Male
tstat R N. Coeff.
Female
tstat R. N.
East .16945*” 8.26 11 750 .17566” * 8.24 9 829
East Midlands .21083*** 10.33 3 746 .24146*** 11.51 1 735
London .16449*** 11.37 12 2,182 .16352*** 9.85 11 2,001
North East .18969*** 10.04 7 687 .19494*** 10.27 6 794
NorthWest -  * *** .20944 15.07 4 1,470 ^  * **♦ .21924 15.73 4 1,550
Northern Ireland .23458*** 6.82 1 235 .18336*** 5.20 8 322
Scotland .21492*** 17.42 2 1,759 .21763 18.46 5 2,070
South East .19732*** 14.57 5 1,954 .17409*** 12.32 10 1,892
South West .17551*** 10.75 10 1,078 .1875*** 10.56 7 1,099
Wales .18062*** 10.47 9 1,009 .15217*** 9.23 12 1,184
West Midlands .19231*** 11.19 6 974 .23056 12.23 2 978
Yorkshire .18811*** 11.76 8 1,006 .22782*** 13.04 3 1,033
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by region; regional baseline of individuals qualified to A level; N. is the 
number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each region; R. is the rank of regions in order 
of magnitude of return to first degree; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels.
Table 5.27
Returns to Masters Relative to First Degree by NUTS 1 Region (National
Baseline)
Male Female
Coeff. tstat R. N. Coeff. tstat R. N.
East .00804 0.37 - 229 * _  _.08052 3.62 6 171
East Midlands .01581 0.66 - 156 .04415* 1.83 12 127
London .19666*” 14.05 1 821 .21819*** 14.60 1 593
North East .03024 1.30 - 174 .09366*** 4.04 3 153
North West .02971 1.54 - 334 .07882*** 4.04 7 274
Northern Ireland .02358 0.83 - 70 .0882*** 3.23 5 74
Scotland .03065* 1.83 5 489 .06313*** 3.78 10 426
South East ^  ***.0533 3.39 2 592 .09222*** 5.54 4 437
South West .03265* 1.66 4 309 .05368** 2.55 11 217
Wales .01109 0.55 - 286 _ _ __ „#** .09681 5.05 2 286
West Midlands .04084** 1.99 3 273 . *** .07481 3.51 8 210
Yorkshire .03026 1.43 - 252 .07392*** 3.48 9 208
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (masters 
degree), disaggregated by region; national baseline of individuals qualified to first degree level; N. is 
the number of individuals qualified to masters degree level in each region; R. is the rank of regions in 
order of magnitude of return to masters degree; (-) denotes an insignificant return; significance is 
indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Relative to a national baseline of first degree holders, individuals from London have 
the most to gain from obtaining a masters degree, more than twice that of any other 
NUTS 1 region (.19666 for men and .21819 for women). Again, high returns are 
found in the high income South Eastern regions of the UK, with the South East of 
England NUTS 1 region displaying the second largest premium for men (although 
this is dwarfed by the London coefficient). Some of the regions that offered 
relatively small graduate premiums have large premiums for masters degree relative 
to first degree. For example, Wales has the second highest premium for women and 
the North East of England has the third largest premium. This is measured against a 
national baseline and therefore cannot be explained merely by relatively low first 
degree hourly earnings in these regions. Re-examination of the raw data (table 5.10 
in the data and methodology section) reveals that masters degree earnings in these 
regions are relatively low. The results on the masters degree coefficients suggest 
that a large portion of the earnings increase in these regions is directly attributable to 
the possession of a masters degree. Wales has similarly low mean hourly earnings 
for both men and women at masters degree level, but no significant premium is paid 
to a masters degree relative to a first degree for men. This would suggest that the 
possession of a masters degree is poorly rewarded in Wales for men, compared to 
women. This may suggest that men obtaining a masters degree in Wales and the 
other regions that offer no premium relative to a national baseline may need to 
migrate to another region to obtain a return on their additional human capital 
investment, although, this does not take into account cost of living differences. 
These are accounted for when using a regional baseline in the next table.
Table 5.28 examines the premium paid to a masters degree relative to a first degree 
measured against a regional baseline. When restricted to within region effects, the 
masters degree premium found in London shrinks to .02992 for men and .04199 for 
women (although both remain significant). This fall can be attributed to the high 
first degree earnings observed in London. This implies that an individual qualified 
to first degree level in London stands to gain relatively little by obtaining a masters 
degree, whereas the previous table showed that relative to a national baseline, 
masters graduates find their highest returns in London. There are several other 
examples of an insignificant masters premium: men in the East of England, the East
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Midlands, and Northern Ireland, and women in the East Midlands and Northern 
Ireland. The largest masters degree premiums are found in the West Midlands and 
the South West for men and the North East and Wales for women. In comparison to 
the national baseline results, coefficient estimates for Wales and the North East of 
England (amongst other regions) are greater when using a regional baseline, due to 
the below average hourly earnings in these regions at first degree level. Therefore, 
when taking account of cost of living differences, men in Wales are able to enjoy a 
return on their masters degrees.
Table 5.29 gives the returns to a PhD relative to a national baseline of masters 
holders. It is apparent from these results that a London effect dominates: only PhD 
holders in London enjoy an earnings advantage relative to a national baseline of 
masters degree holders. No other significant results are found using a national 
baseline. Restricting estimations to within region may shed more light on the PhD 
premium faced by those within that region.
When restricted to within region effects (table 5.30), positive returns to PhDs relative 
to masters degrees are found for women in the East Midlands and the South West. 
The majority of regions continue to show no significant PhD premium, which is due 
to the high earnings of masters degree holders across the UK.
Several studies in the existing literature measure the PhD premium relative to A 
level holders, instead of masters degree holders. This is shown in table 5.31, 
alongside the returns to first degrees and masters degrees (all relative to a national 
baseline of A level holders). From table 5.31, it can be seen that due to the high 
earnings of the London region, London offers the largest premiums, regardless of 
gender, at all qualification levels, although the increases between first degree, 
masters and PhD are small and there is an insignificant fall between the masters and 
PhD premiums for women. At both masters and PhD level, the highest returns for 
men outside of London are found in the South East and the South West. The South 
East also performs well at both levels for women.
287
Table 5.28
Returns to Masters Relative to First Degree by NUTS 1 Region (Regional
Baseline)
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
East .00165 0.05 - 229 .05854* 1.77 7 171
East Midlands .06115 1.63 - 156 .01312 0.34 - 127
London .02992* 1.74 9 821 .04199** 2.27 10 593
North East .09153*** 2.89 3 174 .14367*** 4.45 1 153
North West .06745*** 2.79 6 334 .08943*** 3.81 3 274
Northern Ireland .06846 1.43 - 70 .0431 0.98 - 74
Scotland .04821** 2.40 7 489 .04955*** 2.84 9 426
South East .03884** 1.96 8 592 .06659*** 3.14 5 437
Southwest .09819*’* 3.85 2 309 .05418* 1.71 8 217
Wales .07361** 2.57 5 286 .13063*** 5.25 2 286
West Midlands .11432*** 4.10 1 273 .08242*** 2.87 4 210
Yorkshire .08014*** 2.79 4 252 .05961” 1.98 6 208
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (masters 
degree), disaggregated by region; regional baseline of individuals qualified to first degree level; N. is 
the number of individuals qualified to masters degree level in each region; R. is the rank of regions in 
order of magnitude of return to masters degree; (-) denotes an insignificant return; significance is 
indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.29
Returns to PhD Relative to Masters by NUTS 1 Region (National Baseline)
Male Female
Coeff. t stat R. N. Coeff. t stat R. N.
East -.00226 0.06 - 112 -.06429 1.17 - 48
East Midlands -.07121 1.45 - 75 .04682 0.78 - 40
London .14296 4.39 1 176 .13115*** 3.41 1 102
North East -.02394 0.44 - 59 .00154 0.03 - 44
North West -.00899 0.25 - 141 -.04166 0.95 - 77
Northern Ireland -.09821 1.10 - 22 -.14551 1.39 - 13
Scotland .03589 1.10 - 174 -.02556 0.68 - 105
South East .02479 0.87 - 234 .00921 0.24 - 106
South West .04123 0.97 - 100 .0389 0.77 - 57
Wales -.00726 0.18 - 115 -.02336 0.43 - 50
West Midlands .03251 0.68 - 79 .05308 0.81 - 34
Yorkshire -.01381 0.32 - 96 -.01857 0.36 - 56
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (PhD), 
disaggregated by region; national baseline of individuals qualified to masters degree level; N. is the 
number of individuals qualified to PhD level in each region; R. is the rank of regions in order of 
magnitude of return to PhD; (-) denotes an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.30
Returns to PhD Relative to Masters by NUTS 1 Region (Regional Baseline)
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
East .05998 1.05 - 112 -.04104 0.62 - 48
East Midlands -.07701 1.01 - 75 .16251** 2.02 2 40
London .01163 0.30 - 176 -.01562 0.35 - 102
North East .00123 0.02 - 59 .03778 0.55 - 44
North West .0071 0.17 - 141 .02797 0.55 - 77
Northern Ireland .02403 0.24 - 22 .05844 0.52 - 13
Scotland .04219 1.15 - 174 -.01809 0.47 - 105
South East .04822 1.43 - 234 -.00041 0.01 - 106
South West .05882 1.32 - 100 .19815” * 2.79 1 57
Wales .01974 0.39 - 115 -.07323 1.34 - 50
West Midlands .05294 0.90 - 79 .09688 1.38 - 34
Yorkshire .00665 0.12 - 96 .06015 0.87 - 56
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (PhD), 
disaggregated by region; regional baseline of individuals qualified to masters degree level; N. is the 
number of individuals qualified to PhD level in each region; R. is the rank of regions in order of 
magnitude of return to PhD; (-) denotes an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.31
Returns Relative to A Level (National Baseline)
First Degree Masters PhD
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
Male
East .20644*** 14.90
•**0000<N 8.96 .29757*** 8.54
East Midlands .15211*** 10.98 .22363*** 7.54 .22941*** 5.42
London .39963 44.72 .42633*** 31.15 .45456*** 16.17
North East .12139*** 8.39 .25307*** 9.03 -  .*** .27855 5.86
North West .15444**’ 15.05 .25281*** 12.36 .30365*** 9.65
North. Ireland .1319*** 5.49 .21243**’ 4.89 .14449* 1.87
Scotland „ _ . . ^ *** .18442 19.33 .25441’** 15.01 _   ^ . ***.33954 12.00
South East .26072*** 28.25 .28859*** 18.33 .33996*” 13.84
South West .14062*** 11.98 .26842*** 12.70 .34135*** 9.28
Wales .09993*** 8.24 .22439*** 10.20 .28681*** 8.32
West Midlands .14791*** 11.99 .26365*** 11.75 .33315*** 8.05
Yorkshire .14415*** 11.92 .26223*** 11.18 .28244*** 7.46
Female
East .22745 17.42 .31702 11.58 .26982*** 5.38
East Midlands .19569 14.16 _ _ __* * *.21875 7.00 .37806*** 6.86
London .42947 45.79 .48363*** 31.05 .47214*** 13.21
North East . 15996 11.90 .33628*’* 11.70 .35586” * 6.77
North West .19658*** 19.38 .30876*** 14.14 .31505*** 7.78
North. Ireland .16312*** 8.18 .24406*** 6.03 .17475* 1.82
Scotland .21917 24.24 .30745*** 17.15 .32177*” 9.14
South East .25568*** 26.82 .35129*** 19.75 .37161*** 10.62
Southwest .17725*** 15.27 .2881*** 11.80 .36254’** 7.79
Wales .14713*** 12.99 .33649*** 15.62 .31409*** 6.31
West Midlands .20869*** 16.80 .30928*** 12.36 .40213*** 6.73
Yorkshire .18826*** 15.75 .30523*** 12.27 .33717*** 7.16
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree, masters or PhD), disaggregated by region; national baseline of individuals qualified to A 
level; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Using a regional baseline, London moves to the foot of the rankings for both men 
and women at all qualification levels, due to the high earnings of A level holders in 
the region (table 5.32). Relative to A level, the highest masters premium is found for 
men in the West Midlands and the North East, and for women in the North East and 
Wales. These regions also performed very well against a baseline of first degree 
holders. At PhD level, the greatest male returns are found in the South West and 
West Midlands and the greatest female returns are in the East Midlands and the West 
Midlands. Several PhD premiums are lower than their corresponding masters 
premiums (although the difference is often insignificant), suggesting there is little 
advantage to holding a PhD over a masters degree in these regions.
Subject Areas
Table 5.33 focuses on differences in the graduate premium by choice of 
undergraduate subject group.51 In table 5.33, the hourly earnings of individuals 
possessing a degree in a specific subject group (i.e. biological sciences) are regressed 
against a baseline of A level holders. The largest coefficient (by some margin) is 
found for those with an undergraduate degree in the subject area of medicine and 
dentistry (.51898 for men and .534 for women), a result previously found by 
Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary (1999). Whilst it may be expected that an 
individual possessing a degree in this subject area will have a larger graduate 
premium than an individual whose degree is in another area, the magnitude of this 
earnings advantage may be somewhat misleading. An individual who has obtained 
an undergraduate degree is compensated in the labour market for their increased 
human capital and the time investment they have made pursuing this degree. This is 
generally three years, for most undergraduate degrees, however, those who have 
studied in the medicine and dentistry area are likely to have taken more three years 
to complete their first degree, and the pecuniary rewards reflect this. This may 
account for some of the gap in the graduate premium between medicine and dentistry 
and the subject areas displaying the next highest premiums.
51 Due to a classification change in the APS between 2004 and 2005, we only use degree subject data 
from 2005 onwards.
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Table 5.32
Returns Relative to A Level (Regional Baseline)
First Degree Masters PhD
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
Male
East . 16945*** 8.26 .19216*** 6.07 .27811*** 6.07
East Midlands .21083*** 10.33 .2995*** 8.51 .22368*** 4.31
London .16449*** 11.37 .18476*** 9.37 .23796*** 6.46
North East .18969*** 10.04 .32872*** 10.75 .35177 7.01
North West ~  -  . *** .20944 15.07 .30185 12.77 .33606*** 9.21
North. Ireland .23458 6.82 .31476*** 5.72 /* . - ~***.25212 2.77
Scotland .21492 17.42 ***.29771 15.64 .37339*** 11.97
South East .19732*** 14.57 .23114’** 11.24 .29037 9.48
South West .17551*** 10.75 .31513*** 12.49 .40454*** 9.60
Wales .18062*** 10.47 .31158*** 11.49 .348*** 8.26
West Midlands .19231*** 11.19 .3311*** 12.44 .38838*** 8.42
Yorkshire .18811*** 11.76 .31326 11.68 .30312*** 6.96
Female
East .17566*** 8.24 .30021*** 7.58 .28843 4.63
East Midlands .24146*** 11.51 .30708*** 8.09 .49727*** 7.64
London .16352*** 9.85 .21715*** 9.03 .2063 3.90
North East ^ 4***.19494 10.27 .42674 12.64 .36334*** 6.33
North West .  „ _  _  .*** .21924 15.73 .35397 13.96 _ _  . _*** .38476 8.33
North. Ireland .18336*** 5.20 .26985*** 4.52 .08961 0.61
Scotland .21763*** 18.46 .32823 15.54 _ _ „ _ «*** .36198 8.85
South East .17409*** 12.32 .2779*** 11.99 .30587*** 7.05
South West .1875*** 10.56 .33016*** 10.46 .37349*** 6.78
Wales .15217*** 9.23 .37515*** 14.02 .31542*** 5.44
West Midlands .23056*** 12.23 .36502*** 11.40 .49642*** 7.20
Yorkshire .22782*** 13.04 .36055*** 11.59 .4226 7.43
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree, masters or PhD), disaggregated by region; regional baseline of individuals qualified to A 
level; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.33
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by Subject Area
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Medicine & Dent :51898w " 16.24 1 141 .534"’ 19.98 1 203
Medicine Related .20613*** 9.65 9 306 .30599*** 28.47 4 1,444
Biological Sci. .13921*** 9.30 16 630 .18742*** 15.06 16 931
Vet. & Agric. .17339 5.66 14 141 .12759*** 4.20 20 133
Physical Sciences .20556*** 17.47 10 1,064 .21893*** 12.43 13 437
Maths & Comp .23334*** 20.13 5 1,212 .26008*** 14.37 7 430
Engineering .24617*** 27.16 4 2,059 .29137*” 9.87 5 143
Technologies .14223*** 4.79 15 150 .16726*** 4.09 17 72
Architecture .20491*** 11.96 11 487 .21908**’ 7.30 12 138
Economics .31796*** 16.55 2 373 .32448*** 11.98 2 167
Politics .21545*** 7.47 8 161 .26488*** 8.34 6 119
Social Studies .19493*** 11.67 13 496 .22028*** 18.64 11 1,010
Law .29635*** 16.09 3 416 .30854*** 18.18 3 500
Business Admin. _  _  _  . *** .2224 20.84 7 1,354 .21575*** 20.52 14 1,326
Mass Comms. .06185** 2.08 19 150 .14844*** 6.57 19 239
Ling. & Classics .12561*** 5.36 17 246 .23716*** 15.72 9 597
Language & Lit .20207*** 7.08 12 165 .23351*** 12.36 10 351
History & Phil. .08326’** 5.21 18 560 .19159*** 12.32 15 549
Arts .05996*** 3.85 20 579 .15443**’ 11.56 18 775
Education .23272*** 11.35 6 376 .25992*** 18.98 8 1,335
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by subject area; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level; N. is the 
number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each subject area; R  is the rank of subject 
areas in order of magnitude of return to first degree; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) 
and 1% (***) levels.
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The second highest graduate premium for both men and women is found for those 
who studied economics at first degree level (.31796 and .32448), followed by law 
(.29635 and .30854). Previous strong returns to economics and law have been 
obtained by Blundell et al. (2000) and Walker and Zhu (2010). Results for these 
three subjects confirm my earlier finding (and the findings of previous studies) that 
women have more to gain by obtaining a degree than men. In fact, of the twenty 
subject areas in the data, only two subjects (veterinary and agricultural studies and 
business administration) show the graduate premium for men exceeding the graduate 
premium for women. The difference in the graduate premium by gender is very 
small for business administration (.2224 to .21575), but far larger for veterinary and 
agricultural studies (.17339 to .12759). All coefficients are highly significant and 
positive, confirming that, regardless of subject area chosen, all who obtain a first 
degree will enjoy an earnings premium over those who are qualified up to A level. 
The smallest graduate premiums are found for men with first degrees in arts 
(.05996), mass communications (.06185), and history and philosophy (.08326). 
Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary (1999) have also found arts to offer the smallest 
graduate premium.
Table 5.34 examines the premium paid to a masters degree relative to a first degree, 
by subject area. It was previously found that the premium for a masters degree 
relative to a first degree is .06713 for men and .07905 for women. It should be noted 
that the effect of gaining a masters degree relative to a first degree is found to be 
insignificant for twelve of the twenty subject areas for men and eleven of the twenty 
subject areas for women. The masters degree premiums that are observed with a 
level of significance of at least 10% vary gready in their magnitude. For both 
genders, the greatest masters degree premiums are found in the subject areas of 
veterinary and agricultural studies (.14536 and .17353) and business administration 
(.11652 and .13453). The strong performance of business administration at masters 
level has also been found by O’Leary and Sloane (2005). Where significant masters 
premiums are found in the same subject area for both genders, the female premium is 
always greater in magnitude. Engineering and law are the only subject areas that 
offer a masters premium to men but not to women. All significant masters premiums 
are positive. The existence of insignificant results and the variation in significant
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Table 5.34
Returns to Masters Relative to First Degree by Subject Area
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Medicine & Dent -.08557 1.13 - 36 .05321 0.63 - 31
Medicine Related .09633** 2.05 3 103 .11612*** 5.46 5 247
Biological Sci. .09177** 2.33 4 130 .10668*** 3.57 8 219
Vet. & Agric. .14536* 1.84 1 49 .17353** 2.27 1 37
Physical Sciences .00705 0.25 - 240 .09906** 2.26 9 123
Maths & Comp .02551 1.10 - 406 .04898 1.19 - 141
Engineering .09151**’ 4.51 5 451 .08801 1.35 - 63
Technologies .12643 1.40 - 36 -.00532 0.05 - 20
Architecture -.00225 0.06 - 124 .07597 1.13 - 51
Economics .04081 0.82 - 95 -.04396 0.57 - 43
Politics -.06744 0.79 - 55 -.01545 0.20 - 47
Social Studies .06837* 1.69 8 151 .11248*** 4.89 6 311
Law .08329* 1.78 6 127 .07982 1.47 - 78
Business Admin. .11652*** 5.64 2 779 .13453*** 5.88 2 406
Mass Comms. .07706 1.32 - 80 .13398*** 3.06 3 106
Ling. & Classics -.01229 0.18 - 61 .06495 1.60 - 131
Language & Lit -.00823 0.10 - 37 -.01997 0.37 - 64
History & Phil. .05499 1.43 - 164 .03958 1.00 - 144
Arts .07487* 1.80 7 116 .10821*** 2.81 7 109
Education .01727 0.49 - 151 .11908*** 4.57 4 245
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (masters
degree), disaggregated by subject area; national baseline of individuals qualified to first degree level, 
disaggregated by subject area; N. is the number of individuals qualified to masters degree level in 
each subject area; R. is the rank of subject areas in order of magnitude of return to masters degree; (-) 
denotes an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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results suggest that the choice of undertaking a masters degree course is highly 
dependent upon the degree subject area, more so than at first degree level, where all 
subject areas provided an earnings advantage, albeit at varying magnitudes. Further 
insight may be gained from examining the PhD premium.
Positive and significant earnings differences between PhD and masters are found for 
men with PhDs in physical sciences. It is possible that subject areas that offer high 
earnings at PhD level also reward masters degrees highly. These high earnings at 
masters level could account for many of the insignificant results in table 5.35.
Table 5.36 estimates premiums at first degree, masters and doctorate levels relative 
to A level holders across the twenty subject areas. Relative to A level holders, 
graduates in medicine and dentistry continue to display the largest returns at all 
qualification levels. Outside of medicine and dentistry, the largest masters premiums 
for men are found in law and business administration, and the largest masters 
premiums for women are found in law and education. Men in business 
administration and women in education also do very well at PhD level, displaying 
the largest returns after medicine and dentistry.
Table 5.23, which presented the mark up to a first degree relative to A level by 
degree classification showed similar returns for first and upper second class degrees 
and also lower second and third class degrees. Whilst I may have expected the 
graduate premium to rise uniformly with degree class, table 5.23 revealed some 
inconsistencies: Returns to an upper second class degree are greater than those for a 
first class degree for women, although this difference is small (.26826 to .24912). 
Table 5.37 examines these effects by first degree subject. Immediately it can be seen 
that there is great variation in returns to first degree class depending on the subject 
area. For men who chose to study medicine and dentistry, the returns to a first class 
degree are .34534, far smaller than returns to an upper second class degree (.78219). 
Similar effects are found for other subject areas, such as women who studied 
physical sciences and engineering. The clearest example of this effect is for women
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Table 5.35
Returns to PhD Relative to Masters by Subject Area
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Medicine & Dent .10051 1.23 - 75 .05034 0.57 - 55
Medicine Related .03571 0.54 - 72 .01861 0.41 - 64
Biological Sci. .03424 0.72 - 219 -.0112 0.29 - 214
Vet. & Agric. -.05721 0.39 - 17 .11437 1.02 - 15
Physical Sciences .08282** 2.37 1 346 -.0545 0.94 - 92
Maths & Comp .04585 0.92 - 103 .06116 0.74 - 22
Engineering .02128 0.49 - 133 .09856 0.72 - 20
Technologies -.4489** 2.13 - 22 - - - 5
Architecture -.01804 0.09 - 4 -.12717 0.66 - 4
Economics -.01328 0.11 - 26 .00827 0.04 - 6
Politics .19352 0.94 - 11 -.16158 0.51 - 4
Social Studies -.04644 0.61 - 40 .0028 0.04 - 32
Law -.10061 0.56 - 10 .08446 0.37 - 8
Business Admin. .13259 1.46 - 24 -.40891*** 3.45 - 15
Mass Comms. -.00256 0.01 - 3 .31319 1.36 - 4
Ling. & Classics -.09421 0.77 - 25 .00113 0.01 - 26
Language & Lit .15821 1.02 - 12 -.15358 0.91 - 12
History & Phil. .03777 0.50 - 57 -.09608 1.06 - 30
Arts -.01912 0.19 - 16 -.08696 0.56 - 8
Education .01266 0.14 - 24 .08529 0.98 - 17
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (PhD),
disaggregated by subject area; national baseline of individuals qualified to masters degree level, 
disaggregated by subject area; N. is the number of individuals qualified to PhD level in each subject 
area; R. is the rank of subject areas in order of magnitude of return to PhD; (-) denotes an insignificant 
or negative return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.36
Returns Relative to A Level by Subject Area
First Degree 
Coeff. t stat
Masters 
Coeff. t stat
PhD
Coeff. t stat
Male
Medicine & Dentistry .51898” ’ 16.24 .55184*” 9.06 .62051*” 14.45
Medicine Related .20613” * 9.65 .34466” * 9.45 .43852*” 10.16
Biological Sciences
_ _ . ***
.13921 9.30 .24408*” 7.58 .26989 10.60
Veterinary & Agric. .17339 5.66 .23259*” 4.50 .27156*” 3.10
Physical Sciences .20556*” 17.47 .20149*** 8.48 .30727 15.08
Maths & Comp. Sci. .23334*” 20.13 .26551*** 13.97 .30193*** 8.31
Engineering .24617*" 27.16 .30789*** 17.26 .34808*” 10.77
Technologies .14223*” 4.79 .25524*” 4.24 .18017** 2.34
Architecture .20491*** 11.96 .21207*” 6.45 .35473” 1.97
Economics .31796*" 16.55 .34398*** 9.22 .34927*** 4.91
Politics .21545” * 7.47 .13277*” 2.72 .30312*** 2.79
Other Social Sciences .19493” * 11.67 .27175*** 9.07 .27079*** 4.64
Law .29635*” 16.09 .41185*” 12.73 .32348*” 2.84
Business Admin. .2224*” 20.84 .38159*’* 27.88 .47787*” 6.47
Mass Comms. .06185” 2.08 .16665*** 4.08 .04053 0.19
Linguistics & Classics .12561*” 5.36 .18632*** 4.01 00 ■'J 00
#
2.53
Language & Lit. .20207 7.08 .18012*** 3.02 .25918” 2.49
History & Philosophy .08326*** 5.21 .12895*” 4.46 .20621*” 4.26
Arts .05996*” 3.85 .19849*** 5.81 .18445** 2.04
Education .23272*** 11.35 .30131*** 9.81 .32315*** 4.37
Female
Medicine & Dentistry .534*” 19.98 .60569*** 9.54 .64739*** 13.48
Medicine Related
_ _ _ _ 
.30599 28.47 .43265*** 19.11 .4654*** 10.57
Biological Sciences .18742” * 15.06 .30446*** 12.29 .32337*** 12.56
Veterinary & Agric. .12759*” 4.20 .30041*” 5.24 .41056 4.62
Physical Sciences .21893 12.43 .25754*** 8.11 .27928*** 7.55
Maths & Comp. Sci. .26008*” 14.37 .30152*” 9.98 .37652*** 5.10
Engineering
* _***
.29137 9.87 .33841*** 7.71 .44182*” 5.70
Technologies .16726” ’ 4.09 .20005*” 2.60 .33942” 2.20
Architecture .21908*” 7.30 .25856*** 5.31 .32841* 1.92
Economics .32448*” 11.98 .31164*** 5.93 .3135** 2.24
Politics .26488*” 8.34 .24624*** 4.85 .26884 1.57
Other Social Sciences .22028*** 18.64 .34009*** 16.36 .3744*** 6.07
Law .30854*” 18.18 .43617*** 11.10 .40398*** 3.33
Business Admin. .21575*” 20.52 .41078*** 22.79 .05295 0.58
Mass Comms. .14844*” 6.57 .28382*** 8.30 .42712” 2.49
Linguistics & Classics .23716’” 15.72 .31611*** 10.16 .35413*** 5.22
Language & Lit. .23351*” 12.36 .20516*** 4.74 .11412 1.15
History & Philosophy .19159*** 12.32 .24798*" 8.42 .16509*** 2.60
Arts .15443*” 11.56 .31119*** 9.23 .27423** 2.26
Education .25992 18.98 .43315*** 17.60
_* _ . _*** 
.52565 6.27
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first degree, masters degree or
PhD), disaggregated by subject area; national baseline o f  individuals qualified to A level, disaggregated by subject area; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
298
Table 5.37
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by Degree Classification and
Subject Area
Male
Coeff. t stat
Female
Coeff. tstat
Medicine & Dentistry
First .34534*** 3.56 .63361*** 6.86
Upper Second .78219*** 4.85 .43331*** 5.76
Lower Second .28272 1.11 .40053*** 3.09
Third - - .31379 0.92
Medicine Related
First .09142 1.04 .24057*** 6.41
Upper Second _„ _ _ -*** .21336 4.25 .3391*** 15.48
Lower Second .24237*** 3.74 .2988*** 9.25
Third -.27088 0.75 .44947*** 5.39
Biological Sciences
First .25925*** 3.93 .22817*** 4.36
Upper Second .15649*** 4.38 .21414*** 7.59
Lower Second .09107** 2.37 .1614**’ 5.04
Third .01809 0.22 .09122 0.96
Veterinary & Agric.
First .22999 1.56 .2019* 1.67
Upper Second _ _  _ _ _*** .29355 3.16 .20553*** 3.27
Lower Second .12004 1.29 .17893* 1.81
Third -.02195 0.15 -.17103 0.71
Physical Sciences
First .27014*** 5.99 .19065**’ 2.66
Upper Second .23187*** 7.37 .24764*** 5.91
Lower Second .19137*** 5.92 .32205*** 6.90
Third .0601 1.14 .31279** 2.42
Maths & Computing Sci.
First .23412*** 5.65 .24813*** 3.87
Upper Second .2367 8.81 .2847*** 6.79
Lower Second .22486*** 6.77 .22942*** 4.40
Third .18724*** 3.42 .12078 1.27
Engineering
First .34351*** 10.72 .2733*** 3.18
Upper Second .28781*** 12.89 .31348*** 4.63
Lower Second .18243*** 7.26 .34664*** 2.86
Third .25791’** 5.33 .40354** 2.02
Technologies
First .30548** 2.40 .3357** 2.19
Upper Second .01954 0.25 .0349 0.29
Lower Second .22985” * 2.99 .12396 1.02
Third .10965 0.80 .04578 0.19
Architecture
First .31485*** 3.80 .16926 1.21
Upper Second .24103*** 5.73 .1363* 1.94
Lower Second .10743** 2.10 .17034” 2.10
Third .10532 0.77 .23791 1.39
Economics
First .51075*** 5.48 .52487*** 3.43
Upper Second .34303 6.57 .36567*** 5.53
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Lower Second .2394 4.68 .21931 3.25
Third -.04958 0.24 .0649 0.46
Politics
First -.02308 0.17 .18646 0.94
Upper Second .17253 2.78 .34371*** 4.01
Lower Second .17486** 2.33 .3386**’ 3.56
Third .05146 0.14 - -
Social Studies
First .23294*** 2.58 .26992**’ 5.49
Upper Second .22348*** 5.13 -  -  .*** .23674 9.30
Lower Second _  „ _  _ . *** .21864 4.57 .23592*** 7.76
Third .18831 1.48 .08927 0.64
Law
First *  . __*** .2462 2.89 _  ^  . -*** .50045 6.79
Upper Second .33034*** 6.38 .32487*** 8.57
Lower Second .26468*** 5.17 .34351*** 8.05
Third .04563 0.36 .519*** 3.37
Business Administration
First .18444*** 4.12 .22003 5.53
Upper Second _  ^ ~ ***.30213 12.27 .30501*** 14.20
Lower Second .17442*** 6.29 .16396*** 6.13
Third .17406** 2.26 .24317** 2.13
Mass Communications
First .51978*** 3.53 .11365 1.37
Upper Second .06935 1.15 .21421*** 4.61
Lower Second -.01414 0.18 .04623 0.71
Third -.00332 0.02 .18354 0.76
Linguistics & Classics
First .01881 0.17 .17964*** 2.77
Upper Second .18882*** 3.58 _  _  _ . _*** .23613 7.85
Lower Second .06236 0.86 .24752 5.97
Third .19661 0.95 .05919 0.39
Language & Literature
First -.24179 0.95 .19969** 2.25
Upper Second .11148 1.57 .28456*** 6.79
Lower Second .20719** 2.30 .25327*** 4.93
Third .51355 1.43 -.16473 0.48
History & Philosophy
First .11641 1.58 .26267*** 2.87
Upper Second .06704** 1.96 .24847 7.32
Lower Second .16598 3.89 .19248 4.34
Third .17339 1.08 .09035 0.65
Arts
First .07892 1.20 .16489*** 2.92
Upper Second .10367*** 3.08 .15833 5.62
Lower Second -.06864* 1.68 .16882*** 5.05
Third -.0769 0.57 .04796 0.49
Education
First .17199** 2.07 .17993*’* 4.15
Upper Second .27618*** 6.32 _ .  _ ***.30412 12.50
Lower Second .2429*** 5.01 .26539 9.93
Third .14562 0.99 .04831 0.58
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first
degree), disaggregated by class of first degree; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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who have obtained medicine related first degrees. Their graduate premium actually 
decreases uniformly as degree class increases, from .44947 for third class degrees to 
.24057 for first class degrees. It may be possible to explain these effects by 
considering that as undergraduate degree classification increases, so does the 
probability that a person will continue their education and go on to attain a higher 
degree (such as masters or doctorate). These individuals will then not be included in 
the undergraduate degree group and may have filled jobs that otherwise would have 
gone to individuals possessing a high class of undergraduate degree only, thereby 
lowering the earnings of that group.52 Checking the premium paid to masters degree 
relative to first degree for women studying in medicine related subjects, a mark up of 
.11612 is found, greater than that of the premium of a masters degree relative to a 
first degree across all subjects for females, .07905. For many subject areas, such as 
economics and biological sciences, the graduate premium does increase uniformly 
with degree classification. Several reflect the female result of upper second class 
returns exceeding first class returns and falling thereafter. I also find third class 
degrees to offer insignificant returns relative to A level for over half of the 
gender/subject area groups.
Table 5.38 looks at the graduate premium by region and subject area relative to a 
national baseline of A level holders. The table identifies where in the UK the top 
three graduate premiums exist for each subject area (also disaggregated by gender). 
This would suggest where a mobile graduate should locate in order to maximise their 
earnings relative to a national baseline of A level holders, given the subject area they 
have graduated in. Given the large aggregated graduate premiums found in London 
(.39963 for men and .42947 for women) it is no surprise that London offers the 
largest graduate premium in 15 of the 20 subject areas, for both genders. In fact, 
there are only two subject areas for men (technologies and education) and two for 
women (medicine and dentistry, and economics), where London does not offer one 
of the top three graduate premiums. In two of these cases (technologies for men and
52 Data on class of first degree, if the respondent has also achieved a higher degree is included from 
2007 onwards (APS variable degcls7). However, when split across subject areas and degree class, 
observations are insufficient to test this.
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economics for women), the South East provides the greatest returns. For men 
studying mass communications and arts, the only positive and significant graduate 
premiums are found in London: no other region offers these first degree holders an 
earnings advantage over A level holders. This helps explain the low national 
graduate premiums for these two subject areas, as they are being driven entirely by 
London based graduates. Whilst table 5.38 identifies the largest graduate premiums 
in each subject area against a national baseline, it fails to take into account regional 
cost of living differences, which may have implications regarding migration of 
graduates.
Table 5.39 considers the graduate premium by subject using a regional baseline. 
Against a regional baseline, the dominance of London, and to a lesser extent the 
South East, is greatly reduced. The highest female graduate premium in veterinary 
and agricultural studies is found in London and London also offers top three 
premiums for men in the subject areas of social sciences and history and philosophy. 
The difference in these results may affect possible migration decisions, as when cost 
of living differences are controlled for, the ranking of regions by subject changes, 
dramatically in some cases. In some subject areas the greatest returns are offered by 
the same region for both genders, which suggests that demand for specific subject 
qualifications is high in these regions regardless of gender (for example, business 
administration in the East Midlands and Yorkshire, and maths and computer science 
in the East Midlands and Scotland). The subject areas of mass communications and 
linguistics and classics offered amongst the smallest graduate premiums for men 
when regions were aggregated to a national level. At a regional level I find no 
premiums for mass communications and only a graduate premium for linguistics and 
classics in the West Midlands. This is likely due to the small sample sizes required 
at this level of disaggregation.
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Table 5.38
Top Regional Graduate Premiums by Subject (National Baseline)
Reg.
Male
Coeff. t stat N. Reg.
Female
Coeff. t stat N.
Medicine & Dent EM .68202’" 4.63 6 SCO .79607"’ 12.90 32
LON .61535*** 7.58 20 E .67018*** 4.70 6
NE .61505*** 6.13 13 SW .65681*** 5.42 9
Medicine Related WM .28883*** 3.74 22 LON .44447*** 13.74 118
LON .28417*** 4.64 35 SE .33896*** 11.52 142
SCO .27751*** 4.61 36 EM .31998*’* 8.07 76
Biological Sci. LON .32601*** 8.63 93 LON .43567” * 13.27 114
SE .17613*** 4.61 90 SE .22372” * 7.62 143
E .17379*** 2.97 38 SW .22192*’* 5.98 87
Vet. & Agric. LON .46122*** 4.96 15 LON .585*** 5.91 12
EM .36641*** 3.05 9 SW .16946* 1.78 13
SE .23794** 2.47 14 SE .1478* 1.78 17
Physical Sciences LON .36037*** 11.13 129 LON .48945*** 9.95 49
SE .2692*** 9.68 172 SE .27923*** 6.75 73
E .2626*** 5.63 62 E .27461*** 3.99 25
Maths & Comp LON .4336*** 15.46 175 LON .47974*** 10.62 59
SE .29559*’* 12.01 229 EM .38172*** 5.10 21
E .29417**’ 6.53 65 SCO .30765*” 7.31 68
Engineering LON .39374*’’ 16.01 225 LON .39824*** 4.63 16
SE .32675*** 15.88 325 SE .35881*** 5.51 28
NW .24259*** 9.53 209 NE .3209*** 2.65 8
Technologies SE .3989*** 4.95 20 NW .34302*” 3.60 14
NE .3527* 1.70 3 LON .33278*” 2.91 9
SCO .31981*** 2.95 12 WA .29326* 1.92 5
Architecture LON .36374*** 8.80 79 E .54472*** 2.73 3
E .3385*** 4.60 24 EM .35043*** 2.89 8
EM .2547*** 3.31 22 LON * ♦♦.28861 4.48 29
Economics LON .51604*** 14.33 104 SE .42703*” 6.90 31
SCO .32669*** 5.94 43 NW .38783*** 4.24 14
SW .29832*” 4.22 26 WM .37563*” 3.64 11
Politics NI .64136** 2.52 2 LON .4463*** 5.66 19
SE .42661*** 5.16 19 SE .36554*** 4.27 16
LON .32803*** 5.82 42 WM .349*** 3.06 9
Social Studies LON .4851*** 11.31 72 LON .40986**’ 13.25 127
E .26292**’ 3.79 27 WM .23761*** 5.72 69
SW .25041*** 3.74 29 SCO .2364*** 8.14 144
Law LON .47858*** 12.96 99 LON .50685*” 14.26 101
SE .36614*** 7.15 50 E .41794*** 5.69 22
YOR .34622**’ 4.89 26 SE .38216*” 8.91 65
Business Admin. LON .38382*** 16.11 245 LON .43651*** 17.29 199
SE .32273*** 11.59 173 SE .29341*” 10.18 148
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E .27228 6.52 75 E .25223 5.99 68
Mass Comms. LON .28135*** 4.12 28 LON .32015*** 6.18 44
- - - - EM .2308* 1.90 8
- - - - E .2084** 2.02 11
Ling. & Classics LON .32486*** 6.54 54 LON .48815*** 15.22 120
E .23082* 1.92 9 NI .31715*** 2.61 8
SE .14055** 2.17 32 E .26827*** 4.49 33
Language & Lit LON .41006’** 7.54 45 LON .46406*** 11.96 79
E .34244*** 3.01 10 WM .26665 3.89 26
SE .32155*** 4.09 21 SE _  _  .  ^~***.23413 5.06 55
History & Phil. LON .35046*** 9.86 105 LON .45906*** 13.16 98
SW .13442** 2.50 45 E .27675 4.84 36
SE .09891** 2.15 62 SCO .25838 5.62 56
Arts LON .29843*** 8.09 98 LON .31801*** 9.89 118
- - - - NI .21873** 2.02 11
- - - - EM .1859*** 3.55 44
Education YOR .3788*** 4.57 19 SCO .37951*** 14.64 218
NI .37871*** 4.19 16 NI ,  >»*** .37413 4.96 22
E .35752*** 3.95 16 LON .30597*** 8.53 101
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by subject area and region; national baseline of individuals qualified to A 
level; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each subject area and region; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; REG denotes region; region 
names have been abbreviated to: East (E), East Midlands (EM), London (LON), North East (NE), 
North West (NW), Northern Ireland (NI), Scotland (SCO), South East (SE), South West (SW), Wales 
(WA), West Midlands (WM) and Yorkshire (YOR).
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Table 5.39
Top Regional Graduate Premiums by Subject (Regional Baseline)
Reg.
Male
Coeff. t stat N. Reg.
Female
Coeff. t stat N.
Medicine & Dent EM .65161” ’ 4.40 6 SCO .84404*" 13.03 32
NE .63013*" 6.39 13 E .80085*** 4.35 6
WA .607*** 5.71 12 SW .67373*** 5.43 9
Medicine Related WM .35946*** 4.69 22 EM .41673*** 9.85 76
SCO .31602*** 5.40 36 NW .34841 11.18 147
NI .30799** 2.24 6 YOR .34385*** 9.05 110
Biological Sci. NI .24301** 1.97 7 SW _  . _  _*** .24295 5.95 87
WA .19724 3.99 52 SCO .23102*’’ 7.65 136
YOR .16487 3.11 44 NW .19132*’* 5.39 104
Vet. & Agric. EM .39688*** 3.35 9 LON .33042*** 2.93 12
WM .2349** 2.16 11 SW .17584* 1.82 13
NI .21458* 1.81 8 - - - -
Physical Sciences NE .27053*** 5.63 51 EM .28898*** 4.09 22
NW .26375 7.87 122 NE .25863*** 4.13 31
SW .24837*** 6.21 83 SCO .25372*** 5.25 49
Maths & Comp SW .30092*** 7.63 95 EM .47792 6.44 21
SCO .27326*** 9.09 157 SCO .35085**’ 8.39 68
EM .27128*** 5.82 70 WM .29279 4.80 36
Engineering NI .31338*** 4.21 31 NI .37657** 1.99 3
NW .30611*** 11.19 209 NE _  _ _ _  _  „ *** .37251 3.32 8
NE .28099*** 7.44 93 SCO .36662**’ 4.78 18
T echnologies NE .39558** 2.11 3 NW .39793*** 4.19 14
SCO .33139*** 3.21 12 WA _  „ *** .3771 2.66 5
SE .32229*** 3.68 20 EM .22709* 1.75 6
Architecture NI .45396*** 2.94 5 E .62925** 2.47 3
E .31282*** 3.94 24 EM .4322 3.74 8
EM .29397 3.78 22 NW .32844*** 3.38 12
Economics SW .37642 5.42 26 NW .42161**’ 4.73 14
SCO .36343*** 6.88 43 WM »^ ***.42059 4.05 11
YOR .33936*** 5.09 26 EM .40409*** 3.55 8
Politics NI .71707*** 3.14 2 WM .38988*** 3.45 9
SE .36055*** 4.02 19 EM -  _.35677 3.70 11
SCO .35062*** 4.21 17 YOR .29597** 1.97 5
Social Studies SW .28805*** 4.35 29 EM .29779**’ 6.42 57
LON .24529*** 5.22 72 WM .27625*** 6.22 69
E .23599 3.13 27 SCO .26098*** 9.08 144
Law YOR .41683**’ 6.18 26 E .39586*** 4.57 22
WM ~  ~  ~  ~  - *** .38901 4.98 21 SCO .3537 8.34 73
SCO .37269*’* 7.46 49 YOR .35155*** 5.05 26
Business Admin. NI .32188 4.86 34 SW .27293 6.93 92
EM .26582*** 5.74 68 EM .26734 5.86 58
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YOR .25804” * 7.58 110 YOR .24187*” 6.53 97
Mass Comms. - - - EM .29193” 2.43 8
- - - YOR .25652*** 3.49 21
- - - WM .17933* 1.80 12
Ling. & Classics WM .1757” 2.27 20 NI .3692*** 2.88 8
- - - YOR .28858*** 5.73 51
- - - NW .23957*** 5.15 57
Language & Lit E .29728” 2.45 10 WM .31517*** 4.58 26
SE .2607 3.07 21 NI .25736* 1.67 5
SW .21451” 2.15 12 SW .24155*** 3.21 22
History & Phil. SW .18256” * 3.44 45 SCO .29527*** 6.86 56
WM .11087’ 1.92 39 E .22052*” 3.47 36
LON .10443” * 2.59 105 WM .20479*” 3.65 41
Arts WA .11908” 2.35 50 NI .25423” 2.43 11
WM .1181” 2.30 48 EM .23476*** 4.45 44
SCO .07542* 1.68 61 SCO .18696*** 4.84 79
Education NI .44391*** 4.21 16 SCO .40789*** 11.82 218
YOR .41059*** 5.05 19 NW .32788*** 9.16 133
WA .31609” * 5.53 49 YOR .31695*** 6.93 105
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first
degree), disaggregated by subject area and region; regional baseline of individuals qualified to A 
level; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each subject area and region; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels; REG denotes region; region 
names have been abbreviated to: East (E), East Midlands (EM), London (LON), North East (NE), 
North West (NW), Northern Ireland (NI), Scotland (SCO), South East (SE), South West (SW), Wales 
(WA), West Midlands (WM) and Yorkshire (YOR).
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Industiy
Table 5.40 looks at the earnings premium paid to first degree holders relative to A 
level holders, disaggregated by the industry sector the individual is employed in. 
Results show that the possession of a first degree provides a significant earnings 
advantage over A level holders for all industry sectors, except for those working in 
agriculture and fishing (where the graduate premium is insignificant). The industries 
in which the possession of a first degree brings the largest earnings advantage are 
energy and water (.28948 for men and .24944 for women) and manufacturing 
(.25402 for men and .26916 for women).
The masters degree premium is also estimated relative to first degree by industry 
sector (table 5.41). The energy and water industry sector, which offered large first 
degree premiums, fails to reward possession of a masters degree over a first degree. 
Manufacturing also offered a very large graduate premium, but there are positive and 
significant masters premiums to be found also. The greatest masters degree 
premium for men is in the distribution, hotels and restaurants industry sector 
(.10087), followed by banking, finance and insurance (.08138), whilst the largest 
masters degree returns for women are found in transport and communications 
(.09812), which is close in magnitude to the figure for the public administration, 
education and health sector (.09355) . As with first degrees (relative to A levels), 
masters degrees offer no earnings advantage relative to first degrees in the 
agriculture and fishing sector.
Only a few industry sectors offer a premium to PhD holders relative to masters (table 
5.42). The largest premium for women is found in the construction industry 
(.28388) and the largest premium for men is in the manufacturing sector (11566). 
The only other significant advantage to holding a doctorate over a masters degree is 
in the public administration, education and health sector (.03492 for men and .0365 
for women). This shows that, even though no PhD premium was found at an 
aggregated level, PhD premiums exist for smaller groups. For men I also find one
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Table 5.40
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Industry Sector
Coeff.
M ale 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Agric. & Fishing .03693 0.51 - 45 .08422 0.88 - 38
Energy & Water .28948 9.58 1 321 .24944” ’ 4.69 2 106
Manufacturing .25402 25.65 2 2,321 .26916"’ 13.74 1 977
Construction .23507 12.81 3 668 .15756’” 3.23 7 157
Dist., Hotels & Rest .18657 12.52 5 1,014 .15512’” 9.90 8 952
Transport & Comm .20124 11.35 4 712 .20095’’’ 7.18 4 350
Banking & Finance .18194 15.32 6 3,801 .17661’” 13.92 6 2,388
Pub Admin, Educ .17375 20.23 7 4,330 .22768’” 35.20 3 8,853
Other Services .12811’” 4.98 8 683 .18061’” 7.70 5 666
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by industry; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level, disaggregated 
by industry; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each industry; R  is the 
rank of industry sectors in order of magnitude of return to first degree; (-) denotes an insignificant 
return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.41
Returns to Masters Relative to First Degree by Industry Sector
Male Female
Coeff. t stat R. N. Coeff. t stat R. N.
Agric. & Fishing .10711 0.54 - 13 .02227 0.11 - 12
Energy & Water .0219 0.49 - 91 .10739 1.11 - 23
Manufacturing .04595’” 2.59 6 554 .07303” 2.33 4 191
Construction .07876” 2.07 3 121 .10957 1.17 - 36
Dist., Hotels & Rest .10087’’’ 2.70 1 194 .08169’ 1.80 3 117
Transport & Comm .05465 1.54 - 176 .09812’ 1.78 1 63
Banking & Finance .08138’’’ 4.89 2 1,010 .06593’’’ 2.92 5 458
Pub Admin, Educ .0647’" 6.16 5 1,622 .09355’” 10.98 2 2,110
Other Services .07454" 2.21 4 220 .06092’ 1.68 6 170
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (masters 
degree), disaggregated by industry; national baseline of individuals qualified to first degree level, 
disaggregated by industry; N. is the number of individuals qualified to masters degree level in each 
industry; R  is the rank of industry sectors in order of magnitude of return to masters degree; (-) 
denotes an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.42
Returns to PhD Relative to Masters by Industry Sector
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Agric. & Fishing .99582 0.88 - 5 - - - 3
Energy & Water -.07665 0.82 - 23 .09339 0.32 - 6
Manufacturing . 11566"* 3.46 1 191 -.00366 0.06 - 66
Construction .07362 0.62 - 15 .28388* 1.75 1 3
Dist., Hotels & Rest .02609 0.22 - 22 -.02077 0.13 - 10
Transport & Comm .13351 1.09 - 20 -.01455 0.05 - 4
Banking & Finance -.06526* 1.83 - 260 -.09084 1.63 - 90
Pub Admin, Educ .03492” 2.09 2 817 .0365” 2.09 2 523
Other Services -.00172 0.02 - 34 -.02997 0.33 - 28
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (PhD),
disaggregated by industry; national baseline of individuals qualified to masters degree level, 
disaggregated by industry; N. is the number of individuals qualified to PhD level in each industry; R  
is the rank of industry sectors in order of magnitude of return to PhD; (-) denotes an insignificant or 
negative return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.43
Returns Relative to A Level by Industry Sector
First Degree 
Coeff. t stat
M asters 
Coeff. t stat
PhD
Coeff. t stat
M ale
Agriculture & Fishing .03693 0.51 .10654 0.89 .40535” 2.34
Energy & Water .28948* 9.58 .34487*** 7.53 .35388” * 4.50
Manufacturing .25402* 25.65 .31579*** 18.89 .44166*** 16.58
Construction .23507* 12.81 .2973” * 8.41 .37931*** 4.10
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. .18657* 12.52 .32168*** 11.26 .43103*** 5.55
Transport & Comms. .20124* 11.35 .30249” * 9.73 .30817” * 3.65
Banking, Finance & Ins. .18194* 15.32 .2551” * 14.58 .17095*** 5.71
Pub Admin, Educ. & Health .17375* 20.23 .2704*** 21.84 .30568*** 15.85
Other Services .12811* 4.98 .22169*** 6.27 .22966*** 2.85
Female
Agriculture & Fishing .08422 0.88 .19647 1.27 .52649 1.30
Energy & Water .24944*
*
4.69 .48711” * 5.87 .69236*** 4.32
Manufacturing .26916* 13.74 .37617*** 11.10 .39755*** 7.26
Construction .15756* 3.23 .38884*** 4.31 .36252 1.31
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. .15512* 9.90 .24062*** 7.04 .23813" 2.02
Transport & Comms. .20095* 7.18 .35561*** 6.42 .3639* 1.75
Banking, Finance & Ins. .17661* 13.92 .24021*** 10.68 .12516*** 2.79
Pub Admin, Educ. & Health .22768* 35.20 .39215*** 38.52 .43191*** 23.31
Other Services .18061* 7.70 .24186*** 6.42 .18263" 2.29
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first degree, masters
or PhD), disaggregated by industry; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level, disaggregated by 
industry; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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industry which imposes an earnings penalty on possession of a PhD (relative to 
masters): banking, finance and insurance.
The negative premium at PhD level (relative to masters) for men in the banking, 
finance and insurance sector can be seen in table 5.43, as the premium (relative to A 
level) between masters and PhD level falls from .2551 to .17095. Manufacturing 
offered the largest male PhD premium relative to masters, and also offers the largest 
PhD premium when compared to A level holders. For women, the largest premiums 
at both masters and PhD levels are found in the energy and water sector, followed by 
the public administration, education and health sector.
Recent policy has placed an emphasis on the importance of STEM (science, 
technology, engineering and maths) to the economy. It is possible to look at 
graduates in these subjects and find out which industry they are employed in.53 I 
find that the dominant employer of STEM graduates (combined across first degree, 
masters, PGCE and PhD) is the public administration, education and health sector, 
with 36% of STEM graduates. Including medicine and dentistry and medicine 
related graduates in my STEM definition causes this figure to jump to 59%. It may 
have been expected that manufacturing would be the next highest STEM employer, 
but that is not the case. Whilst manufacturing employs 19% of STEM graduates, 
25% are employed in the banking, finance and insurance sector. With a sizable 
portion of STEM graduates moving out of STEM areas of work, it may suggest that 
the recent importance on STEM subjects may be somewhat misguided.54 Table 5.44 
calculates the premium paid to first degrees in STEM subjects relative to A levels by 
industrial sector. There is a significant rise in returns in the transport and 
communications industry for STEM graduates compared to all graduates. However, 
compared to all graduates, STEM graduates face a fall in returns if employed in the
531 define STEM as biological sciences, veterinary and agricultural sciences, physical sciences, maths 
and computer science, engineering and technologies. Some definitions also include medicine and 
dentistry and medicine related subjects. I only include medicine and dentistry and medicine related 
subjects in our STEM definition when explicitly stated.
54 Full figures are in table 5. A6 in the appendix.
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Table 5.44
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Industry Sector (STEM
Graduates)
Coefl*.
Male 
t stat R. N. CoefT.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Agric. & Fishing .09793 1.19 - 46 .22893 1.53 - 19
Energy & Water 26337*** 8.05 1 306 .16744** 2.00 3 44
Manufacturing 20671*** 17.99 3 1,822 .21875*** 7.25 2 61
Construction 2014*** 8.48 4 431 .06278 0.75 - 55
Dist., Hotels & Rest .1708*** 7.44 5 402 .11221*** 3.57 6 183
Transport & Comm .23745*** 9.47 2 396 .26282*** 4.70 1 82
Banking & Finance .11352*** 7.95 6 2,218 .14841*** 6.88 4 641
Pub Admin, Educ .08964*** 8.10 8 2,233 H912*** 10.63 5 2,018
Other Services 10109*** 2.75 7 270 .0892** 2.10 7 141
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree) for STEM graduates, disaggregated by industry; national baseline of individuals qualified to 
A level, disaggregated by industry; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in 
each industry; R. is the rank of industry sectors in order of magnitude of return to first degree; (-) 
denotes an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.45
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by Age Groups
Male Female
Coeff. t stat R. N. Coeff. t stat R. N.
25-34 .. .... .17304” * 20.65 3 5,091 .17564"' 22.08 3 6,078
35-49 .21954*** 30.21 2 6,041 .24669*** 32.49 1 6,075
50-64 .24318*** 24.25 1 2,773 .23221*** 19.04 2 2,344
25-29 .13347*** 11.33 8 2,475 .14891*** 14.57 7 3,208
30-34 .21045*** 17.76 5 2,616 .19657*** 15.80 6 2,870
35-39 .19474*** 16.06 7 2,416 .24232*** 18.88 3 2,227
40-44 .21441*** 17.20 4 1,965 .23756*** 18.34 4 2,149
45-49 .25338*** 18.88 1 1,660 .25787*** 18.65 2 1,699
50-54 .24864*** 17.38 3 1,371 .2286*** 13.72 5 1,318
55-59 .24876*** 14.97 2 1,049 .27283*** 13.85 1 814
60-64 .20508*** 7.59 6 353 .13227*** 3.06 8 212
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by age group; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level, 
disaggregated by age group; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each age 
group; R. is the rank of age groups in order of magnitude of return to first degree; significance is 
indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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manufacturing sector. 25% of STEM graduates were found to be employed in the 
banking, finance and insurance sector, however, returns to STEM graduates in this 
sector are lower than for all graduates (.18194 to .11352 for men, and .17661 to 
.14841 for women). The premium in the banking, finance and insurance sector is 
healthier for business administration and economics graduates (.16787 and .16979 
for business administration, and .30239 and .27584 for economics), suggesting that a 
university education in these fields (especially economics) better prepares graduates 
for employment in the banking, finance and insurance sector. The inclusion of 
medicine and dentistry and medicine related subjects in die STEM definition does 
little to change these results (table 5.A8).
Age Groups
Previous research (McIntosh, 2002) has shown the graduate premium to vary across 
age groups. Whilst I have not conducted a cohort analysis, it is likely that the 
majority of first degree holders will have enrolled on their (first) degree course 
immediately after leaving school or soon after, so age should be a fair estimate of the 
time a degree was obtained. Ages are grouped into three broad classifications and 
also into narrower bands.
The graduate premium by age is presented in table 5.45. Results show the graduate 
premium to be significant for all age groups. Focusing on the broad age bands first, 
it shows the male graduate premium to increase with age, with a large difference 
between those aged 25 to 34 (.17304) and those aged 35 to 49 (.21954). This large 
gap in the earnings premium between the youngest age groups is also seen for 
women (.17564 to .24669), but the graduate premium declines slightly for the 50 to 
64 age group (.23221). Narrower bands show that the difference between the 
youngest group (25 to 29) and the second youngest group (30 to 34) is large (.13347 
to .21045 for men and .14891 to .19657 for women). Similar results have been 
found by McIntosh (2002), with a large increase in gains up to individuals’ early 
thirties. McIntosh uses a pseudo-cohort analysis, which means his result is due to 
age or time effects. These results may be due to an age effect, where earnings
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increase with age and graduates require a certain amount of time and experience to 
find employment that sufficiently compensates them for their educational attainment, 
or it may be a cohort effect, where due to the rapid increases in student numbers, 
more recent graduates find that their degrees are in less demand and are they are less 
valued than previous graduates. This may be due to recent demand falling behind 
the supply of graduates or due to quality issues, where the increase in student 
numbers has lowered the quality of a degree through factors such as increased 
pressure on teaching resources and a lowering of the quality of the marginal student 
entering university (Chevalier, 2003 and Walker and Zhu, 2008). The male graduate 
premium peaks in the 45 to 49 year age range, followed by the 55 to 59 and 50 to 54 
year age groups. For women, the largest returns are found in the 55 to 59 year age 
group, but fall to their lowest level in the 60 to 64 year age group (.27283 to .13227).
At masters level, partially due to the large male earnings in the 50 to 64 year age 
group, the order of magnitude for the large age bands is reversed, with the masters 
premium decreasing with age (table 5.46). For women, there is a large rise between 
the 25 to 34 and 35 to 49 year age groups. Switching to narrow age bands, the low 
female masters premium for the young is caused by an insignificant masters 
premium in the 25 to 29 year age group. The largest female masters premium is 
found in the 60 to 64 year age group, which contrasts with the male premium in this 
age group, which is insignificant. Low returns are found for men in the 50 to 59 year 
age group, which helps explain why the male masters premium declines with age in 
the broad age bands.
At an aggregated level, the PhD premium relative to masters was found to be 
insignificant. By splitting the sample into three age groups, a PhD premium is found 
only in the 50 to 64 year age group (table 5.47). The magnitude of this return is 
greater for women than men (.06962 to .04608). Investigation of the narrower age 
bands reveals that this effect is driven by those in the 50 to 54 year age group. The 
only other narrow age band that displays significant returns to possession of a PhD 
relative to masters is the 40 to 44 year age group, for men.
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Table 5.46
Returns to Masters Relative to First Degree by Age Groups
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
25-34 .06908'" 5.58 1 1,171 .03937” * 3.22 3 1,051
35-49 .06857*" 6.01 2 1,832 .0939*** 8.13 2 1,478
50-64 .04842*** 2.93 3 1,004 .09734*** 5.40 1 658
25-29 .06375 3.73 4 524 .01818 1.14 _ 505
30-34 ,***.07676 4.32 2 647 .05133*** 2.75 7 546
35-39 .07337*’* 3.94 3 669 .0943*** 4.93 4 550
40-44 .  _  _  _  _*** .05856 2.97 5 630 .09201**’ 4.36 5 498
45-49 .07717*** 3.59 1 533 .09465*’* 4.84 3 430
50-54 .05344** 2.26 6 472 .10947*** 4.54 2 339
55-59 .0433* 1.65 7 383 .076*** 2.66 6 259
60-64 .05387 1.05 - 149 .13766* 1.71 1 60
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (masters 
degree), disaggregated by age group; national baseline of individuals qualified to first degree level, 
disaggregated by age group; N. is the number of individuals qualified to masters degree level in each 
age group; R  is the rank of age groups in order of magnitude of return to masters degree; (-) denotes 
an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.47
Returns to PhD Relative to Masters by Age Groups
Male Female
Coeff. t stat R. N. Coeff. t stat R. N.
25-34 -.01942 0.73 - 278 -.00875 0.33 - 236
35-49 .02122 1.02 - 662 .00244 0.10 - 350
50-64 .04608* 1.76 1 448 .06962* 1.80 1 147
25-29 .04298 0.98 _ 79 -.00187 0.05 _ 97
30-34 -.03649 1.07 - 199 -.02156 0.59 - 139
35-39 .02939 0.87 - 241 -.04156 1.10 - 121
40-44 .06848* 1.90 1 243 .04165 0.98 - 135
45-49 -.03419 0.84 - 178 -.00076 0.02 - 94
50-54 .06554* 1.76 2 207 .10964*’ 2.03 1 73
55-59 .03273 0.75 - 166 .10625 1.63 - 51
60-64 -.00226 0.03 - 75 .03382 0.24 - 23
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (PhD), 
disaggregated by age group; national baseline of individuals qualified to masters degree level, 
disaggregated by age group; N. is the number of individuals qualified to PhD level in each age group; 
R  is the rank of age groups in order of magnitude of return to PhD; (-) denotes an insignificant return; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Relative to A level holders, at both masters and PhD levels, returns are found to 
increase with age in the broad age bands (table 5.48). This fits with the prior result 
of a PhD premium only being found in the 50 to 64 year age band. Focusing on the 
narrow age bands, the largest higher degree premiums are found towards the upper 
parts of the age distribution. For both men and women, the largest masters premium 
is found in the 45 to 49 year age group, followed by the 50 to 54 and 55 to 59 year 
age groups. At PhD level, the greatest return is observed for those aged 50 to 54.
Employment Sector
It is likely that the public and private sectors will place different values on degree 
qualifications and that there will be even more variation across these employment 
sectors when region, subject area, industrial sector and age group are considered. 
The following estimations explore this theory.
Table 5.49 reveals there to be differences in the returns to first degrees (relative to A 
levels) across sectors and genders. Men find their first degrees to be more highly 
valued in the private sector, whilst for women the opposite result is found: their 
graduate premium is greatest in the public sector (McIntosh (2002) also reported that 
the private sector offers a larger graduate premium for men, than the public sector). 
Analysis across the earnings distribution would shed more light on this result (this is 
seen in table 5.54). This pattern holds at masters degree level; the rewards to 
masters degrees relative to first degrees are largest in the public sector for women 
(.09216 to .07242) and the private sector for men (.07051 to .06713). Going further, 
I find the PhD premium (relative to masters) to exist only in the public sector. These 
premiums are small: .03547 for men and .03199 for women (70% of female PhD 
holders in the sample work in the public sector, whilst the public sector employs 
close to 60% of male PhD holders). As with previous region based estimates, the 
graduate premium is calculated relative to both within region and national baselines 
of A level holders.
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Table 5.48
Returns Relative to A Level by Age Groups
First Degree 
Coeff. t stat
Masters 
Coeff. t stat
PhD
Coeff. t stat
Male
25-34 .17304*** 20.65 _ ___ _*** .25885 19.27 .264 10.63
35-49 .21954*** 30.21 .30583*** 27.98 Amm***.32147 18.11
50-64 _ . _ . ~*** .24318 24.25 .32371*** 21.90 . , _ . _ *** .36912 17.48
25-29 .13347*** 11.33 .22462*** 11.59 .2623*** 6.02
30-34 .21045*** 17.76 .28658*** 15.46 .25575*** 8.31
35-39 .19474*** 16.06 .28951*** 15.77 .30337 10.21
40-44 .21441*** 17.20 .28208*** 15.21 .34644*** 11.82
45-49 .25338*** 18.88 .34786*** 17.19 .3057*** 8.97
50-54 .24864*** 17.38 .33298 15.62 ^   ^^  , *** .3904 12.55
55-59 .24876 14.97 .32411 13.16 .37075*** 10.54
60-64 .20508*** 7.59 .30635*** 8.08 —. _  * — ~*** .33438 6.53
Female
25-34 .17564*** 22.08 .25283*’* 17.78 .25467*** 8.88
35-49 .24669 32.49 .38438*** 31.45 .39632*** 17.09
50-64 .23221*** 19.04 .40161*** 20.62 .43764*** 12.23
25-29 .14891*** 14.57 .1859*** 10.07 .19588*** 4.75
30-34 .19657*** 15.80 A  -  ***.31087 14.23 .27946*** 6.93
35-39 _ ___*** .24232 18.88 .37883*** 19.08  ^ A A-***.34305 8.65
40-44 ~ _ - ^ *** .23756 18.34 .35521*** 16.48 - -.44473 11.35
45-49 .25787*** 18.65 , ****** .42132 18.63 .39592*** 9.23
50-54 .2286*** 13.72 .41866*** 15.65 .50093*** 10.03
55-59 .27283 13.85 _ _ _ . ,*** .39046 12.34 _ * * *.43225 7.37
60-64 .13227*** 3.06 .34156 4.99 .23803” 2.12
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree, masters degree or PhD), disaggregated by age group; national baseline of individuals qualified 
to A level, disaggregated by age group; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) levels.
Table 5.49 
Returns by Public/Private Sector
Male Female
Public Private Public Private
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
First Deg. .1738 20.92 ,2153+” 37.22 .22134” * 32.28 .2081*”  29.08
Masters .06713” *“ 6.39 .07051*” 6.98 .09216*”  10.51 .07242*** 5.36
PhD .03547” 2.12 .02077 0.94 .03199* 1.85 .00247 0.07
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree, masters degree or PhD), disaggregated by employment sector; national baseline of individuals 
qualified to A level, first degree or masters level, disaggregated by employment sector; significance 
is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.50 reveals that, for women, only the South East and South West have greater 
graduate premiums in the private sector than the public sector. All other regions 
display the general result where the female earnings premium is greater in the public 
sector. The large private sector earnings in the South Eastern regions drive the 
private sector graduate premium up so that the returns for women are greater in the 
private sector for both the South East and London when using a national baseline 
(table 5.51). For men, the opposite general result is found, that the graduate 
premium is greater in the private sector. However, there are two exceptions using a 
regional baseline (London and the South West) and five exceptions using a national 
baseline. Using a regional baseline, the East Midlands and West Midlands show 
high public sector returns, whilst high private sector returns are found in Scotland 
and the North West.
The public/private sector split is extended to twenty subject areas at first degree level 
(table 5.52). There appears to be great differences across sectors for men and 
women: thirteen of the twenty subject areas have their largest graduate premium in 
different sectors for men and women, which is in line with the result found in table 
5.49. Some of the larger differences include linguistics and classics in the public 
sector, where men have a graduate premium of just .05523 compared to .25052 for 
women; mass communications in the private sector, where men have an earnings 
advantage of just .06072 compared to .14208 for women; and history and 
philosophy, where the public sector rate of return for women is .21816, far above the 
male figure of .07738 and the private sector figure for men is .08993, far below the 
premium of .17415 for women. There are also many within gender differences 
between sectors, particularly for men with linguistics and classics and medicine 
related degrees, women with first degrees in veterinary and agricultural studies, and 
for both men and women with education based degrees. Whilst premiums were 
found for all subject areas prior to splitting by employment sector, in the public 
sector, no premium is found for men with first degrees in mass communications, and 
returns are also insignificant for male private sector arts graduates.
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Table 5.50
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Region and Public/Private Sector
(Regional Baseline)
Male Female
Public
Coeff. t stat
Private
Coeff. t stat
Public
Coeff. t stat
Private 
Coeff. t stat
East
Sit
.11681 3.16 .18259**’ 7.58 .18313**’ 5.90 .15711*” 5.33
East Midlands .20373*** 5.34 .20771*** 8.71 .29535*** 9.88 .19565*** 6.59
London .16903*** 6.35 .16119*** 9.50 .18053*** 7.11 .14983*” 6.92
North East .18071*** 5.49
_ _  _ _  ~ *** 
.18998 8.11 - * * * * * * *  .19988 7.71 .17672*’* 6.31
North West - ^ * * * * * *  .16802 6.67 .21813*** 13.27 .24792 13.07 .19179*** 9.32
North. Ireland .24049*** 4.55 .25166*** 5.44 .20258*** 4.62 .12948** 2.21
Scotland .18999 9.79 .22231*** 14.31 .22227*** 13.68 .20178*** 11.76
South East .13397*** 5.20 .21028*** 13.37 .16069*** 7.51 .18114*** 9.70
South West .18213*** 6.43 .17538*** 8.86 .18508 7.21 .19088*** 7.81
Wales .1457*** 5.40 .20222*** 9.14 .16737*” 7.81 .1239’” 4.81
West Midlands .1901*** 5.76 - ******* .19292 9.64 .26498*** 10.19 .20911*” 7.64
Yorkshire .13637*** 4.70 .20778*** 10.85 .27722*** 11.52 .18667*** 7.34
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first
degree), disaggregated by region and employment sector; regional baseline of individuals qualified to 
A level, disaggregated by employment sector; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) levels.
Table 5.51
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Region and Public/Private Sector
(National Baseline)
Male Female
Public Private Public Private
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
East .16628*’* 7.24 .21567*** 12.98 .24358’” 14.91 .21433” * 10.88
East Midlands .14289*** 6.50 .15105*** 8.89 .25173*** 14.89 .14232*** 6.65
London .35943*** 22.78 .40954*** 38.93 .40278*** 29.76 .44002*** 34.92
North East .16937 8.39 .08404*** 4.38 .2356*** 15.19 .06326*** 2.79
North West .14907*** 8.77 .15093*** 12.14 .23969*** 19.69 .14885*** 9.19
North. Ireland .13918*** 4.60 .10162*** 3.03
- _ + * *  *** .22121 9.92 .07579” 2.18
Scotland .19564*** 13.55 .17135*** 14.10 .27267*** 25.03 .15513*” 10.78
South East .16159*** 9.79 .28828 26.67 .23818 18.46 .27097*** 20.24
South West .17464*** 9.49 .12639 8.79 .22094*** 15.03 .14295*** 8.27
Wales .12063*** 7.29 .08529*** 5.19 * * * * —+*+.20337 15.40 .07362*** 3.88
West Midlands .12811*** 6.63 .1516*** 9.94 .25688 16.91 .16451*** 8.52
Yorkshire .14193*** 7.68 .14272*** 9.43 .24999*** 17.37 .12096*** 6.37
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by region and employment sector; national baseline of individuals qualified to 
A level, disaggregated by employment sector; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.52
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Subject Area and Public/Private
Sector
Male Female
Public Private Public Private
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
Medicine & Dent. .52523*** 15.95 .43405*** 5.20 .59109*** 22.47 .46928*** 5.42
Medicine Related .16238*** 6.95
_ _ _  _  _  *** 
.30852 8.67 .29144*** 25.29 .39115*** 16.56
Biological Sci. .12985*** 6.57 .14947*** 7.36 .20667*** 13.01 .17936*** 9.76
Veterinary & Agric .15229*** 2.93 .18570*** 5.11 .1609*** 3.43 .09639** 2.43
Physical Sciences .18327*** 9.52 .21283*** 15.02 .2224*** 9.77 .21723*’* 8.50
Maths & Comp Sd .16614*** 8.32 .24984*** 18.26 .31714*** 13.51 .20676*** 7.89
Engineering .21198*** 11.05 .25354*** 24.96 .32502*** 6.45 .26243*** 7.07
Technologies .16112*** 2.98 .13699*** 3.97 .15255*** 2.61 .18149*** 3.30
Architecture .17672*** 5.95 .22442*** 11.12 .26668*** 6.35 .19758*** 4.77
Economics .25872*** 7.95 .32944*** 14.42 .3653*** 8.97 .29496*** 8.30
Politics .18413*** 5.05 .23633*** 5.94 .281*** 7.54 .25908*** 5.07
Other Social Sci. .20318*** 9.61 .181*** 7.70 .25312*** 18.23 .18832*** 9.78
Law .25979*** 9.28 .30722*** 13.49 .33537*** 13.34 .27721*** 12.18
Business Admin. .19346*** 10.05 .22812 18.39 .19241*** 11.57 .22032*** 16.39
Mass Comms. .05432 1.15 .06072* 1.69 .16437*** 5.52 .14208*** 4.40
Ling. & Classics .05523* 1.84 .17757*** 5.44 .25052*** 13.13 .22975*** 10.15
Language & Lit. .17791*** 4.64 .21969*** 5.81 .18635*** 7.50 .27783*** 10.27
History & Phil. .07738*** 3.69 .08993*** 4.08 .21816*** 11.42 .17415*** 7.29
Arts .1202*** 4.99 .0239 1.22 .21306*** 11.50 .11789*** 6.30
Education .24479*** 10.54 .07754* 1.80 .32678*** 21.42 .11503*** 4.11
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by subject area and employment sector; national baseline of individuals 
qualified to A level, disaggregated by subject area and employment sector; significance is indicated at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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I previously found there to be great differences in the graduate premium across the 
age profile (table 5.48), and these differences are amplified by splitting the 
employment sector. For men in the private sector, the graduate premium quickly 
climbs to .2291 by the 30 to 34 age group, before peaking at .27222 in the 45 to 49 
year age group (table 5.53). In the public sector, the male earnings premium climbs 
far slower, peaking at .24633 for the age group 55 to 59. This is likely a 
consequence of promotion in many public sector jobs being more tenure dependant 
than those in the private sector. However, for women, the public sector graduate 
premium is always higher than for men (except in the over 60 group), reflecting the 
greater earnings advantage a first degree provides women. The graduate premium 
still peaks in the 55 to 59 year age range (.28268), as for men, and rises steadily 
before this period (disregarding a spike in the premium in the 35 to 39 year age 
group). Private sector earnings for women peak in the 45 to 49 year age group, as 
with men.
Quantile Regression Results
It is likely that the graduate premium will differ across the earnings distribution. 
Walker and Zhu (2010) suggest that quantile regressions can be used to control for 
unobserved skills. They suggest two possible cases: where unobserved skills are 
correlated with observed skills, such as attainment of a qualification, the largest 
returns would be expected at the top of the earnings distribution, and alternatively, 
where low unobserved skills cause an increase in effort, placing the largest returns at 
die bottom of die earnings distribution. Table 5.54 presents results at diree points on 
the earnings distribution: the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile.
Initial results reveal that the graduate premium increases along the earnings 
distribution, although the changes are relatively small (table 5.54). Whilst I have 
shown women to benefit more from the possession of a first degree, at lower levels 
of the earnings distribution it is men who benefit more (although the difference is 
insignificant). For masters degrees relative to first degrees, both men and women 
see very little difference across the earnings distribution, however, at PhD level,
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Table 5.53
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by Age Groups and Public/Private
Sector
Male Female
Public Private Public Private
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
2 5 - 3 4 . 11862*** 7.33 .18626*** 19.31 .19363*** 15.13 .16473*** 16.33
3 5 - 4 9 .17891*** 15.11 .23759*** 26.84 .22994*** 24.13
^  . _*** .26049 22.16
5 0 -6 4 .22265*** 13.14 .24316*** 19.46 .25367 16.36 .20401*** 10.49
2 5 - 2 9 .09875*’* 3.95 .14083*** 10.52 .16536*** 9.07 .14255*** 11.54
3 0 - 3 4 .14261*** 6.54 .2291*** 16.66 .2169*** 11.93 .18287*** 10.99
3 5 - 3 9 .17098*** 8.43 .20493 14.07 .24111*** 14.49 .24114*** 12.78
4 0 - 4 4 .13707*** 6.61 .24425*** 16.18 .21576*** 13.35 .26024*** 12.77
4 5 - 4 9 .21997*** 10.47 .27222*** 16.23 .23183*** 13.62 .28158*** 12.38
5 0 - 5 4 .21229*** 8.97 .25464*** 14.27 .25113*** 11.83 .20124*** 7.52
5 5 -5 9 .24633**’ 8.93 .23971*** 11.41 .28268*** 11.61 .24676*** 7.59
6 0 - 6 4 .17175*** 3.34 .21262*** 6.47 .14928** 2.42 .10564* 1.65
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first
degree), disaggregated by age group and employment sector; national baseline of individuals qualified 
to A level, disaggregated by age group and employment sector; significance is indicated at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.54 
Returns by Quantile Regression
0.25 0.5 0.75
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
First Degree
Male .19115*** 35.83 .21109*** 42.46 -  .*** .2234 36.51
Female .18821*** 28.77 .21925*** 40.59 .22678*** 36.65
Masters
Male .06417*** 7.39 .06355*** 7.20 .05296*** 5.67
Female .07891’** 8.87 .07247*** 9.58 _ _  . #** .08631 10.33
PhD
Male .01149 0.72 .02027 1.48 .05316*** 3.15
Female -.00033 0.02 .00451 0.23 .03768* 1.71
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree, masters degree or PhD); national baseline of individuals qualified to A level, first degree or 
masters level; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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differences are apparent. A PhD premium (relative to masters) for both men and 
women is only identified in the upper quartile. I look at how the graduate premium 
varies across the earnings distribution when disaggregated by region, subject, 
employment sector, industry sector and age groups. While these results do have 
some variation, applying the theory of Walker and Zhu (2010), results suggest that 
unobserved skills complement observed skills, as returns tend to rise along the 
earnings distribution. 55
Table 5.55 gives the within region graduate premium at three points in the earnings 
distribution for men and women. Around half the regions follow the pattern of 
increasing rates of return along the earnings distribution; the remainder deviate from 
this pattern. It should be noted that these differences in the graduate premium 
between points in the earnings distribution are generally small, as they are for the 
sample as a whole. Women in the East Midlands were found to have the largest 
within region graduate premium (table 5.26); this can be seen to be driven by those 
in the upper parts of the earnings distribution (.29255). The graduate premium for 
women in the East Midlands shows the largest increases along the earnings 
distribution.
Whilst there is variation at the regional level, there is even greater variation in the 
graduate premium between subject areas (table 5.56). Eleven subject areas for men 
break from the expected result of an increasing graduate premium along the earnings 
distribution, whilst only two subjects see increases along the earnings distribution for 
women. In fact, in three subject areas for men (maths and computer science, 
engineering and architecture), the graduate premium falls along the earnings 
distribution. Five subject areas for women (medicine related, politics, social 
sciences, education and architecture) exhibit this same trait. No earnings advantage 
is found for male mass communications degree holders in the upper part of the 
earnings distribution. Many subject areas for women show a fall between the
55 Due to sample size limitations, I do not carry out disaggregated quantile regressions with higher 
degrees, but focus only on the premiums paid to first degrees.
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Table 5.55
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level across the Earnings Distribution by
Region
0.25
Coeff. t stat
0.5
Coeff. t stat
0.75
Coeff. t stat
Male
East .15525*** 5.86 -  v- -  ***.16691 7.07 .20065*** 7.91
East Midlands .19395*** 9.65 .2269 9.39 .22052*’* 6.96
London .17293 9.84 .16439*** 11.27 .17642*** 9.25
North East .19613*** 9.06 .18343*** 8.51 .20683 8.67
North West .1847*** 11.08 .20729*** 13.16 -***.21313 10.57
North. Ireland .21742*** 5.59 .19044*** 4.76 .23731*** 8.65
Scotland .20244*** 12.34 .2205*** 17.39 .22368*** 17.05
South East .18171*** 12.21 .19149*** 12.68 .20833*** 13.21
SouthWest .16607*” 8.77 .18007 12.38 .18167*** 10.00
Wales .14791*** 7.76 .20531 13.26 .18223 8.10
West Midlands .16767*** 7.89 .18662*** 9.24 .21961*** 9.72
Yorkshire .16527*** 8.24 .19258*** 11.08 .1993*** 8.92
Female
East .14286 5.04 .18323*** 7.44 .1562*** 8.18
East Midlands .18202*** 7.55 .23665*** 11.90 .29255*** 14.74
London .1627*** 9.38 .15554*** 10.26 .1652**’ 7.10
North East .19407*** 8.71 .21961*** 11.86 .19237*** 10.00
North West .2001*** 11.04 .20592*** 16.78 .224 15.54
North. Ireland .17697** 2.48 .17295*** 3.73 ^ . *** .21034 3.85
Scotland .18846*** 12.65 .21439*** 18.60 .22212**’ 14.93
South East .14659*** 10.31 .16549*** 10.96 .15624*** 9.41
SouthWest .14723*** 7.16 .21314*** 11.08 .2011*** 9.15
Wales .13081*** 7.50 .14579*** 10.85 .17082 9.30
West Midlands .24493 12.03 .23752*** 11.49 .25498*** 10.73
Yorkshire .17859*** 11.23 .21686*** 13.35 .26356*” 10.36
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first
degree), disaggregated by region; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level; significance is 
indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.56
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level across the Earnings Distribution by
Subject Area
0.25
Coeff. t stat
0.5
Coeff. t stat
0.75
Coeff. t stat
Male
Medicine & Dentistry .50615*** 12.78 .5026 15.23 .60237*** 15.18
Medicine Related 4  ^ s + *  +.15224 5.86 .18791*** 8.00 .23328*** 9.05
Biological Sciences .09648*** 5.40 .14825*** 9.04 .1436*** 7.89
Veterinary & Agric. .16038*** 4.12 .1525*** 4.77 .17323 4.66
Physical Sciences .20022*** 13.78 ^  a * * *.21234 15.63 .20332*** 14.36
Maths & Comp. Sci. .24087*** 16.79 .23834 18.76 .22352*** 15.71
Engineering .26889*** 25.33 .25743*** 26.89 .24029*** 22.10
Technologies .14775*** 4.01 .16171*** 5.16 .1704*** 4.68
Architecture .23779 11.15 .19957*** 10.96 .16084*** 7.95
Economics .29417*** 12.43 .33126*** 15.85 .32199*** 13.93
Politics .15167*** 4.36 .20813*** 6.92 .30906*** 8.33
Other Social Sciences .16837*** 8.20 .2038*** 11.11
_ _ _ _ * * *  
.20876 10.90
Law .24451*** 11.47 .28423 14.21
***
.32169 15.04
Business Admin. .19403 17.36 .2271 18.83 .26463 21.00
Mass Comms. .08496** 2.42 .07307** 2.31 .037 1.02
Linguistics & Classics .08981*** 3.16 .13155*** 5.07 .19046*** 6.63
Language & Lit. .14141*** 3.87 .2771*** 9.21 .23231*** 6.47
History & Philosophy .03333* 1.73 .11004*** 6.18 .12766*** 6.09
Arts .04496** 2.48
_ _ _ „ _*** 
.07517 4.40 .09803*** 5.20
Education .24837*** 9.14 .27507*** 12.51 .23589*** 9.70
Female
Medicine & Dentistry .48648*** 17.94 .51773*** 18.69 .54335*** 17.02
Medicine Related .34739*** 30.26 .31102*** 26.96 .26064*** 19.78
Biological Sciences .1733*** 13.19 .19848*** 14.76 .18734*** 11.85
Veterinary & Agric. .10926*** 3.42 .11079 3.78 o 00 o
•
2.44
Physical Sciences .18968*** 11.21 .23632*** 13.36 .22808*** 9.46
Maths & Comp. Sci. .25653*** 13.99
_ ^  _ - *** 
.30598 18.49 .26506*** 11.72
Engineering .31284*** 10.65 .3255*** 12.71 .29327*** 8.14
Technologies .16345*** 4.04 .17647*** 4.60 M 00 o
* •
2.57
Architecture .31446*** 10.51 .25171*** 8.75 .12781*** 3.62
Economics .33256 12.04 .35355*** 14.07 .30245*** 9.74
Politics .27201*** 8.41 .27037*** 9.13 .26301*** 6.91
Other Social Sciences
_ _
.23572 17.88 .23314*** 19.57 .19251*** 12.94
Law
_ . . .  _•** 
.24905 13.88 .31258*** 18.88 .33036*** 14.96
Business Admin. .17512*** 17.14 .21802*** 18.59 .21749*** 15.91
Mass Comms. .13916*** 6.41 .13507*** 6.39 .14639*** 5.75
Linguistics & Classics .19576*** 12.69 .26644*** 17.41 .25366*’* 13.80
Language & Lit. .21768*** 11.22 .23906*** 13.01 .21978*** 9.06
History & Philosophy .14489*** 8.98 .21582*** 13.31 .21079*** 10.85
Arts .13198*** 9.29 .15942*** 12.28 .15745*** 9.61
Education .2878*** 17.47 .2726*** 19.86 .2575*** 15.63
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by subject area; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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median and the 75th percentile, although for many subject areas this difference is 
small.
The graduate premium for industry sectors across the earnings distribution is shown 
in table 5.57. Whilst several industry sectors do not follow the expected pattern of a 
rising graduate premium, the deviations are generally small. Large increases in the 
graduate premium along the earnings distribution are found in the distribution, hotels 
and restaurants industry, increasing from .10774 to .25406 for men and .09085 to 
.17503 for women. Large increases are also observed between the 25th percentile 
and the median in the construction industry for women (.10191 to .20913). Energy 
and water provided the second largest graduate premium for women (table 5.40), but 
quantile regression reveals there to be no return to holding a degree in the lower 
portions of the earnings distribution.
Quantile regression analysis has also been carried out by employment sector (table 
5.58). Whilst results for both men and women, in both the public and private 
sectors, show an increasing graduate premium along the earnings distribution (apart 
from an insignificant fall for public sector females at the top of the earnings 
distribution), there are differences between the sectors. The graduate premium in the 
public sector is relatively stable, showing small increases along the earnings 
distribution, however, there are larger differences between the 25th and 75th 
percentiles in the private sector suggesting degree holders in the private sector have a 
greater earnings advantage than those in the public sector if they can rise up the 
earnings distribution.
Male results by age group vary little from the full sample (table 5.59). Most 
derivations from rises across the earnings distribution are minor differences. A large 
increase is also seen in the earnings premium between the 25th percentile and the 
median for several age bands, such as males aged 60 to 64, and females aged 35 to 
39, 50 to 54 and 55 to 59. The 60 to 64 year age group shows a large fall between 
the median and the 75th percentile (.16045 to .10688).
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Table 5.57
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level across the Earnings Distribution by
Industry Sector
0.25
CoefT. t stat
0.5
CoefT. t stat
0.75
Coeff. t stat
Male
Agriculture & Fishing .02459 0.24 -.01509 0.18 .10389 1.11
Energy & Water .27795” ' 7.25 .23594'" 7.32 .30153'" 8.74
Manufacturing .24787"' 17.76 .25448'" 23.17 .25922'" 21.44
Construction .2334"' 11.16 .23809'" 10.27 .23074'" 10.11
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. .10774'" 6.26 .18324"’ 10.48 .25406'" 13.73
Transport & Comms. .17503'" 9.16 .20744'" 11.96 .20845'" 8.95
Banking, Finance & Ins. .18085'" 12.94 .18877'" 14.31 .20498'" 11.63
Pub Admin, Educ. & Health .14814'" 12.01 .16698'" 18.47 .17893'" 17.70
Other Services .13552'" 4.90 .15609'" 5.66 .1347'" 4.26
Female
Agriculture & Fishing .01108 9.65 - - .19919 1.43
Energy & Water .1454 1.28 .27598'" 2.93 .33802'" 8.75
Manufacturing .2447 11.08 .24364'" 10.23 .2627'" 9.45
Construction .10191" 2.44 .20913'" 7.67 .21129'" 4.23
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. .09085'” 5.92 .14155'" 9.56 .17503'" 10.44
Transport & Comms. .21837'" 9.77 .19467'" 6.71 .18888*" 5.29
Banking, Finance & Ins. .13574'" 10.40 .19788'” 14.53 .21614'" 13.15
Pub Admin, Educ. & Health .21374'" 26.63 .22195'" 32.69 .21786'" 32.03
Other Services .15795'" 5.64 .15994'" 6.08 .17441"' 5.75
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first
degree), disaggregated by industry; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level, disaggregated 
by industry; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.58
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level across the Earnings Distribution by
Public/Private Sector
0.25 0.5 0.75
Coeff. t stat Coeft t stat Coeff. t stat
Male
Public .15348 14.62 .1664’” 21.49 .17078 16.67
Private .2099 31.90 .22685 38.06 .24226*** 32.01
Female
Public .20312*** 25.21 .21627*** 29.97 .21363 29.62
Private .17784*** 21.59 .2187*” 30.43 .23233*’* 25.60
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by employment sector; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level, 
disaggregated by employment sector; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels.
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Table 5.59
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level across the Earnings Distribution by
Age Groups
0.25
Coeff. t stat
0.5
Coeff. t stat
0.75
Coeff. t stat
Male
2 5 - 3 4 .15732 14.38 .16643*** 16.42 .18434 15.73
3 5 - 4 9 .20976*” 23.29 .22813*” 29.57 .24329*** 27.78
5 0 -6 4 .23335*** 20.34 .27017*” 26.53 .27751’** 21.77
2 5 - 2 9 .12943*** 9.18 .12623*” 9.41 .1307*” 8.84
3 0 - 3 4 .19684*** 11.70 .19936*** 17.34 .23527*** 15.68
3 5 -3 9 .17824*** 10.78 .19568*** 13.74 .2301*** 16.07
4 0 - 4 4 .20244*** 11.72 .21871*** 16.60 .2134*** 12.22
4 5 - 4 9 .26212*** 15.77 .26698 18.21 .27646 16.35
5 0 -5 4 .249*** 15.56 .28275*” 17.38 .27008*** 15.93
5 5 -5 9 .23545*** 12.98 .25615*** 13.67 —  «***.28775 16.08
6 0 - 6 4 .1441*** 4.00 .24515*** 11.42 .26303*** 9.07
Female
2 5 - 3 4 .15816**’ 18.50 .18195*** 26.15 .18384*” 19.59
3 5 -4 9 .21356*** 26.67 .25405*” 33.94 .25434*** 31.10
5 0 -6 4 .19924*** 13.53 .23149*** 19.97 .24786*” 15.71
2 5 - 2 9 .12321*** 9.68 .1408*** 13.48 .15403*** 11.68
3 0 -3 4 .18967*** 13.38 .21109*** 17.17 .21317*” 12.03
3 5 - 3 9 .20368*** 13.69 .25267 19.56 .24913*** 18.43
4 0 - 4 4 .20998 14.66 _  . _  .**+ .2484 19.23 .2542*” 24.55
4 5 - 4 9 .23622*** 13.04 ****.25484 17.77 .24857 15.72
5 0 -5 4 .18652*** 8.57 .22018*** 13.68 .23653*” 11.14
5 5 -5 9 -  . ,*** .21646 9.46 .27321*** 15.35 .30402*** 11.64
6 0 -6 4 .13451*’ 2.22 .16045 4.65 .10688** 2.52
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by age group; national baseline of individuals qualified to A level, 
disaggregated by age group; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Overall, the quantile regression estimates show that whilst there are some deviations 
from the expected result (an increase in the earnings premium along the earnings 
distribution), most of these deviations are minor and insignificant.
Sub-Regional Analysis: Wales
As I have decided to present Wales as a special case and go down to greater levels of 
disaggregation, I take a closer look at the within region graduate earnings premium 
in Wales, by subject (table 5.60). I also examine the graduate premium within Wales 
disaggregated by subject area, industrial sector, employment sector and age groups, 
and will compare these results to figures for the UK as a whole.
As would be expected, the greatest first degree earnings premium relative to A level 
is enjoyed by those with first degrees in medicine and dentistry (.607 for men and 
.54482 for women), with a magnitude larger than for the UK as a whole. After 
medicine and dentistry, men find their largest earnings mark-up with first degrees in 
education (.31609) and economics (.29983), with economics exceeding the UK 
average by several percentage points. For Welsh women, their largest earnings 
premiums after medicine and dentistry are found in the subject areas of technologies 
(.3771) and engineering (.34187), both of which are larger than the UK level 
premiums, with the Welsh premium for technologies more than doubling the UK 
figure. This contrasts with the male effect for holding a technologies degree, which 
is insignificant. Several other subjects fail to offer an earnings advantage over A 
level holders within Wales, namely mass communications, linguistics and classics, 
language and literature and history and philosophy for men, and veterinary and 
agricultural studies, architecture and mass communications for women.
Table 5.61 splits Wales into 22 unitary authorities according to workplace and 
estimates the graduate premium relative to A level holders working within that 
unitary authority. Results for men reveal that possession of a first degree provides a 
significant earnings advantage over A levels in every unitary authority except
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Table 5.60
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Subject Area (Wales Only)
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N.
Female 
Coeff. t stat R. N.
Medicine & Dent. .607 5.71 1 12 .54482"* 5.64 1 15
Medicine Related .23634*** 3.57 7 29 .28113*** 8.66 6 145
Biological Sci. .19724 3.99 9 52 * * -  * j * * *.11444 2.67 17 62
Vet. & Agric. .1798** 2.52 11 24 .08789 0.98 - 14
Physical Sciences .18605*** 4.50 10 79 .21915*** 3.95 8 38
Maths & Comp ^ « * *.12103 2.66 14 70 .268*** 3.82 7 22
Engineering .24685*** 7.63 6 145 .34187 3.10 3 9
Technologies -.11732 1.18 - 12 _  _ _  .  * * *  .3771 2.66 2 5
Architecture .27792 5.39 5 53 .12392 0.95 - 6
Economics .29983*** 4.08 3 23 .33429*** 3.54 4 12
Politics .29927 2.60 4 9 .15904* 1.65 11 11
Social Studies .15701*** 2.82 13 41 .14198*** 3.53 14 75
Law .2147*** 3.31 8 32 .29735*** 5.06 5 34
Business Admin. .16311*** 4.26 12 91 .14322*** 4.15 13 101
Mass Comms. .25787 1.30 - 3 .12697 1.41 - 13
Ling. & Classics .12747 1.42 - 15 .16591*** 3.43 10 52
Language & Lit -.09526 0.86 - 10 .12203* 1.80 16 23
History & Phil. -.00386 0.07 - 49 .14351*** 2.89 12 50
Arts .11908** 2.35 15 50 .13443*** 3.29 15 71
Education .31609*** 5.53 2 49 .17185*** 4.04 9 153
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by subject area; national (Wales) baseline of individuals qualified to A level; 
N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each subject area; R  is the rank of 
subject areas in order of magnitude of return to first degree; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.61
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Welsh Unitary Authority (UA
Baseline)
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Blaenau Gwent .43022” " 2.70 1 14 .22495 1.02 - 10
Bridgend .20368** 2.18 11 49 .14855 1.38 - 61
Caerphilly .24745*** 2.95 8 41 .21844** 2.34 6 46
Cardiff .15648*** 3.56 16 206 .14438 3.36 10 214
Carmarthenshire .27329*** 3.23 6 39 .28897*** 3.14 3 42
Ceredigion .16169* 1.77 15 39 .05772 0.74 - 61
Conwy .24881* 1.69 7 17 .21329* 1.69 7 34
Denbighshire .29739** 2.31 5 38 -.06769 0.62 - 44
Flintshire .19717*** 2.96 12 41 .12234 1.22 - 35
Gwynedd -.06355 0.62 - 45 .18994** 2.48 8 71
Isle of Anglesey .1921* 1.90 13 18 .27466** 2.37 5 20
Merthyr Tydfil .38769** 2.17 2 17 -.15248 1.28 - 23
Monmouthshire -.01477 0.15 - 33 .17099 1.60 - 40
Neath Port Talbot .22986** 2.57 10 29 „ _  . *** .28134 2.70 4 35
Newport .17786** 2.49 14 86 .0768 1.12 - 64
Pembrokeshire .3521*** 3.42 4 39 .11803 1.16 - 38
Powys .06102 0.64 - 36 .19338 1.57 - 43
RCT .35424*** 4.03 3 34 .38052*** 4.77 1 78
Swansea .1166* 1.75 17 83 .08727 1.31 - 104
Torfaen .23406** 2.26 9 35 .17654* 1.85 9 42
Vale Glamorgan .13553 1.46 - 31 .12318 1.26 - 44
Wrexham .12668 1.08 - 39 .3242 3.56 2 35
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by unitary authority; baseline of individuals qualified to A level, disaggregated 
by unitary authority; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each unitary 
authority; R. is the rank of unitary authorities in order of magnitude of return to first degree; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Gwynedd, Monmouthshire, Powys, the Vale of Glamorgan and Wrexham. For 
women, the graduate premium is found to be insignificant in twelve of the twenty- 
two unitary authorities, perhaps reflecting the larger national graduate premium for 
men within Wales. Whilst Wrexham fails to offer much incentive for men to pursue 
a university education, the graduate premium for women is large at .3242. Rhondda 
Cynon Taff (RCT) also offers great returns to a first degree, .35424 for men and 
.38052 for women (which is the largest female graduate premium). The largest 
premium for men can be found in Blaenau Gwent (.43022). I may have expected a 
‘London effect’ occurring with Cardiff, where the graduate premium in the Welsh 
capital would dwarf all other unitary authorities, but this is not found (although a 
significant graduate premium is found for both genders working within Cardiff). 
This may be due to the high earnings of A level holders living in Cardiff. As I am 
examining the within region graduate premiums in Wales, some of the larger 
premiums may be a reflection of the low A level earnings in those regions. 
Estimating the graduate premium for unitary authorities relative to A level holders in 
Wales as a whole may shed light on these results.
When using a national baseline of A level holders, the graduate premium for men 
living in Cardiff does increase, from .15648 to .21352 for men and .14438 to .20968 
for women, although Cardiff is still only ranked 10th and 11th. This suggests that 
there is no ‘Cardiff effect’ unlike the effect seen for London. The largest graduate 
premium for men remains in Blaenau Gwent. The suggestion that some of the large 
premiums seen within unitary authorities (table 5.61) is caused by low A level 
earnings within these unitary authorities is supported by table 5.62. For example, 
Merthyr Tydfil, which had the second largest male graduate premium compared to A 
level holders in the same unitary authority, offers no graduate premium relative to a 
national baseline, and the male graduate premium in RCT falls from .35424 to .2193 
when switching to a national baseline of A level holders.
Tables 5.63 and 5.64 estimate the returns to all education levels relative to persons in 
Cardiff with no qualifications. The poor returns to a first degree for men living in
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Table 5.62
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Welsh Unitary Authority
(National Baseline)
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Blaenau Gwent .41457" 4.49 1 14 .21838" 2.17 9 10
Bridgend - - - ^ ~*** .15568 3.00 16 49 .12916*** 2.78 19 61
Caerphilly .31069 5.45 3 41 .23165*’* 4.35 6 46
Cardiff .21352 7.50 11 206 .20968*’* 7.93 10 214
Carmarthenshire .19798*** 3.44 13 39 .18086*** 3.42 15 42
Ceredigion .21178*** 3.70 12 39 .13564*** 3.02 17 61
Conwy .14761* 1.73 17 17 .22924*** 3.84 7 34
Denbighshire .30076*** 5.22 4 38 .18999*’* 3.62 13 44
Flintshire .24685*** 4.43 5 41 .20323*** 3.62 11 35
Gwynedd .0058 0.11 - 45 ^ ^ _ _*** .19127 4.67 12 71
Isle of Anglesey .10111 1.23 - 18 .27279*** 3.69 2 20
Merthyr Tydfil .01726 0.20 - 17 .06779 0.99 - 23
Monmouthshire .22068*** 3.60 8 33 .16998 3.17 16 40
Neath Port Talbot .23839 3.62 6 29 _ . .*** .25838 4.39 4 35
Newport .19092*** 4.65 15 86 .13287*’* 3.05 18 64
Pembrokeshire .32229*** 5.61 2 39 .05879 1.06 - 38
Powys .12373** 2.06 18 36 .25787*** 4.77 5 43
RCT .2193*** 3.57 9 34 .27068*’* 6.54 3 78
Swansea .11157*** 2.74 19 83 .12336*** 3.38 20 104
Torfaen .19197*** 3.17 14 35 .2272*** 4.39 8 42
Vale Glamorgan .2212*** 3.52 7 31 .28895*** 5.59 1 44
Wrexham .21564*** 3.75 10 39 .189 3.36 14 35
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by unitary authority; national (Wales) baseline of individuals qualified to A 
level; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each unitary authority; R  is the 
rank of unitary authorities in order of magnitude of return to first degree; significance is indicated at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
332
Table 5.63
Male Returns Relative to No Qualifications in Cardiff
None GCSE A Level Higher
Educ.
First
Degree
Masters PhD
Blaenau Gwent -.03682 -.00614 -.05759 .14409 .38849** .37093 -
(0.56) (0.08) (0.76) (1.24) (2.00) (1.43) -
Bridgend -.04935 .09102 .11156* .15246* .08316 .33764 .07181
(0.86) (1.56) (1.66) (1.70) (0.63) (1.40) (0.22)
Caerphilly .05045 -.03602 .12401** .05687 .24501* .27274 .39205
(0.81) (0.61) (2.00) (0.55) (1.73) (1.09) (1.04)
Cardiff - .12687** .10252* .1559* .2336** .32511** .3416
- (2.48) (1.90) (1.71) (2.27) (2.56) (1.12)
Carmarthenshire -.00689 -.06238 .17917*** .02802 .17446 .31495 -1.2835***
(0.10) (0.92) (2.89) (0.27) (1.29) (1.62) (2.80)
Ceredigion -.09881 -.1025 .11059 .12377 .20052 -.18899 -.22199
(1.07) (1.28) (1.40) (0.93) (1.54) (0.89) (0.68)
Conwy .06287 -.05143 .13121* -.08157 -.05627 .01806 -1.6809***
(0.60) (0.59) (1.74) (0.66) (0.31) (0.08) (4.11)
Denbighshire -.11396 .03481 -.0211 -.08879 .2498** .41786 -
(1.48) (0.43) (0.27) (0.77) (1.98) (1.29) -
Flintshire -.01517 .12327* .26954*** .21195** .30472** .33512 .56544*
(0.18) (1.95) (4.55) (2.15) (2.53) (1.48) (1.78)
Gwynedd -.09267 -.11837 .08833 .0847 -.13208 .16663 .27728
(0.98) (1.50) (1.35) (0.89) (0.86) (0.88) (0.67)
Isle of Anglesey -.09294 .08945 .17804*’ -.03755 .08255 -.01142 .89115***
(0.93) (1.04) (2.58) (0.24) (0.49) (0.04) (2.80)
Merthyr Tydfil -.0903 -.08898 .03368 .08445 .02589 .29371 .28981
(1.31) (1.05) (0.44) (0.72) (0.13) (0.54) (0.67)
Monmouthshire -.03928 .14407** .16519*** .13383 .04375 .37643* .21466
(0.51) (2.04) (2.71) (1.17) (0.35) (1.78) (0.68)
Neath Port Talbot -.08298 .05429 .15735** .15418 .26042* .45143* -
(1.21) (0.72) (2.55) (1.61) (1.64) (1.83) -
Newport -.10568* .12214* .10809* .29942*** .25314** .49338** .29413
(1.73) (1.70) (1.80) (3.26) (2.21) (2.06) (1.12)
Pembrokeshire .00473 .03987 .21453*** .14478 .40525*** .05287 -
(0.05) (0.52) (3.08) (1.37) (3.19) (0.29) -
Powys -.15638* .03462 .08017 -.01641 .0889 .15732 .0202
(1.66) (0.50) (1.14) (0.12) (0.64) (0.59) (0.07)
RCT -.03836 .07023 .10507* .24336*** .24416 .17499 .57297**
(0.72) (1.14) (1.75) (2.70) (1.38) (0.83) (2.05)
Swansea -.00932 .03371 .07535 -.08896 .11656 .20857 .42998
(0.13) (0.49) (1.26) (1.05) (0.93) (1.38) (0.99)
Torfaen -.05781 -.0084 .13968** .06967 .20527 .2262 .72787*
(0.84) (0.11) (2.02) (0.83) (1.53) (0.94) (1.85)
Vale of Glam. -.03511 .02796 .20255** .2234** .29094** .95147*** .5908*
(0.33) (0.26) (2.33) (2.43) (2.09) (2.71) (1.94)
Wrexham .01328 .01422 .16932** .03662 .01592 .1319 .73947*
(0.19) (0.20) (2.12) (0.33) (0.10) (0.41) (1.84)
Notes: coefficient reported on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification, disaggregated by 
unitary authority; baseline of individuals with no qualifications working in Cardiff; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 5.64
Female Returns relative to No Qualifications in Cardiff
None GCSE A Level Higher
Educ.
First
Degree
Masters PhD
Blaenau Gwent .03873 .04101 .08706 .27859*** .63824*" 1.6222"* -
(0.71) (0.76) (1.12) (2.78) (4.29) (6.16) -
Bridgend .04519 .09448** .05804 .20723** .41221*** .72272*** .78554**
(1.20) (2.13) (0.88) (2.46) (3.08) (2.97) (2.34)
Caerphilly .06346 .1017** .09898 .15341* .46826*** .66534*** 1.3775***
(1.17) (2.19) (1.52) (1.82) (4.05) (2.88) (3.43)
Cardiff - .13772*** .17252*** .25001*** .27789*** .67303*** 1.502***
- (3.16) (2.85) (3.66) (3.89) (5.52) (5.53)
Carmarthenshire -.01081 -.00433 .12309** .25951*** .41009*** .68726*** -
(0.25) (0.09) (2.10) (3.20) (3.76) (3.45) -
Ceredigion .03023 .04087 .14772** .28032*** .20619** .66148*** 1.9389***
(0.40) (0.84) (2.17) (3.06) (2.45) (5.10) (4.70)
Conwy .09276 .07373 .11076* .18797*** .30886** .87546*** -
(1.59) (1.46) (1.77) (2.59) (2.40) (4.71) -
Denbighshire -.03736 .15892*** .13756** .03277 .15863 .89871*** .48987**
(0.64) (3.10) (2.19) (0.37) (1.30) (5.19) (2.05)
Flintshire .00667 .07255 .10279* .3117*** .39418*** 1.9284*** -
(0.11) (1.58) (1.69) (4.06) (3.10) (8.69) -
Gwynedd .02526 .08774** .1373** .34221*** .17163* .72449*** 1.3499***
(0.46) (2.03) (2.35) (4.23) (1.93) (4.21) (5.03)
Isle of Anglesey .03628 .08427 .12987* .24867* .36741*** -.45739 -
(0.61) (1.59) (1.86) (1.84) (2.76) (1.44) -
Merthyr Tydfil .0483 .03708 .16997*** .2441*** .07179 1.867*** -
(0.93) (0.69) (2.62) (2.75) (0.44) (4.11) -
Monmouthshire .04977 .10092* .11524* .2354*** .23662** .51357*** 1.7216***
(0.83) (1.95) (1.70) (2.79) (1.98) (3.92) (6.94)
Neath Port Talbot .01347 .06634 .1762** .19418** .24191* 1.3087*** .58943**
(0.28) (1.57) (2.57) (2.38) (1.69) (7.85) (2.55)
Newport .06101 .09838** .10781* .32529*** .25359** .771*** 1.8005***
(1.14) (2.39) (1.90) (4.52) (2.27) (2.97) (4.70)
Pembrokeshire .05096 .03662 .06312 .1758*’ .31666’* 1.4195*** -
(1.02) (0.78) (1.09) (2.44) (2.09) (4.79) -
Powys .04281 .09215** .18747*** .22356*** .27182** .77905*** .89453***
(0.97) (2.05) (3.03) (2.73) (2.14) (4.18) (3.78)
RCT -.00138 .09397** .14286** .18353* .4214*** 1.3451*** .64047***
(0.03) (2.22) (2.35) (1.66) (4.12) (4.83) (3.37)
Swansea -.0036 .07185 .14261*** .22508*** .25002** .91515*** .31254
(0.08) (1.59) (2.68) (3.86) (2.15) (4.72) (0.98)
Torfaen .05672 .1161** .13842** .20945*** .43289*** 1.3644*** -
(1.39) (2.38) (2.33) (2.92) (3.56) (5.53) -
Vale of Glam. .06519 .11207** .13617* .06142 .31513*** .48521** -
(1.20) (2.18) (1.70) (0.71) (3.18) (2.28) -
Wrexham .02163 .10911** .04634 .19633** .31447*** .03425 -
(0.44) (2.17) (0.69) (2.57) (2.89) (0.13) -
Notes: coefficient reported on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification, disaggregated by 
unitary authority; baseline of individuals with no qualifications working in Cardiff; t-statistics in 
parenthesis; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Cardiff can be seen in table 5.63, with many unitary authorities exceeding the 
Cardiff figure. Masters holders in Cardiff fare better, having the fifth largest 
premium compared to persons with no qualifications working in Cardiff. Due to the 
earnings of women with no qualifications in Cardiff, there are some very large 
premiums at masters level and above. Due to small sample sizes, there are some 
erratic results, although most are statistically significant. I also identify a group in 
the sample of over a thousand individuals who live in Wales but work outside Wales. 
These individuals enjoy a higher graduate premium than those who work within 
Wales, with the gap being larger for women, .19859 to .17998 for men and .24219 to 
.15374 for women. Over a half of graduates living in Wales, but working elsewhere 
work in the North West and South West, regions characterised by greater earnings 
(and graduate premiums) than Wales.
The graduate premium is estimated for industry sectors within Wales in table 5.65. 
The largest premiums are found in the energy and water (.5552), transport and 
communications (.24484), and manufacturing (.22717) sectors for men and the 
transport and communication (.27102) and public administration, education and 
health (.17802) sectors for women. The differences in the energy and water sector 
graduate premiums between Wales and the UK is especially large as the figure for 
men in Wales is far above that found for the UK (which was the largest graduate 
premium of all industry sectors, for both men and women) and the result for women 
is insignificant. As the public administration, education and health sector is the 
largest industrial sector in Wales, it is likely that the large earnings advantage in this 
sector is driving the graduate premium found for women in Wales (results for this 
sector are fairly similar to the UK as a whole). Wales has a far smaller banking, 
finance and insurance sector than England, and comparison of the graduate 
premiums in this sector reveals that workers in this industry sector in Wales enjoy 
less of an earnings advantage than their counterparts in the UK as a whole. This 
result is especially prevalent for women, as the female Welsh banking, finance and 
insurance graduate premium is just over half that of the UK.
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Table 5.65
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Industry Sector (Wales Only)
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Agric. & Fishing - - - - - -
Energy & Water .5552*** 3.88 1 17 -.09472 0.23 - 8
Manufacturing _  _  _  „ _*** .22717 6.83 3 172 .1382** 2.26 4 53
Construction <1 00 * * 2.49 4 57 -.09543 0.43 - 12
Dist., Hotels & Rest. .15325*** 2.62 6 64 -.02636 0.46 - 72
Transport & Comm .24484*** 3.11 2 26 .27102* 1.82 1 14
Banking & Finance .13536** 2.33 7 167 .09732* 1.88 5 117
Pub Admin, Educ .16111*** 5.89 5 431 .17802**’ 8.61 2 838
Other Services .01281 0.17 - 72 .16824** 2.33 3 67
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by industry; national (Wales) baseline of individuals qualified to A level, 
disaggregated by industry; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each 
industry; R  is the rank of industry sectors in order of magnitude of return to first degree; (-) denotes 
an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
Table 5.66
Returns by Public/Private Sector
Male Female
Public Private Public Private
Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat Coeff. t stat
First Degree .1457*** 5.40 .20222” ' 9.14 .16737"" 7.81 .1239*" 4.81
Masters .08045" 2.18 .04972 1.13 .13287*" 4.84 .13656" 2.53
PhD .03789 0.61 .0153 0.15 -.03522 0.62 -.12384 0.72
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree, masters or PhD), disaggregated by employment sector; national (Wales) baseline of 
individuals qualified to A level, first degree or masters, disaggregated by employment sector; 
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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In Wales, the percentage of STEM graduates employed in manufacturing is 19%, as 
with the full UK sample. The large public sector in Wales causes the share of public 
administration, education and health STEM graduates to jump from 36% to 45%. 
This reduces the percentage of STEM graduates employed in the banking, finance 
and insurance sector from 25% to 17% (which would be expected given Wales’ 
smaller banking, finance and insurance sector). Whilst this figure is less than for the 
whole of the UK, it is still a sizable portion of STEM graduates, suggesting that 
policies promoting STEM may not have the desired effect upon the Welsh (and UK) 
economy.56 However, table 5.60 revealed that women in Wales who did STEM 
subjects at first degree level enjoyed large graduate premiums.
By comparing the graduate premium across employment sectors in Wales (table 
5.66) with results for the UK as a whole, it is apparent that females in the private 
sector do far worse in Wales (.2081 to .1239). This confirms the result found in the 
previous table that the female graduate premium in Wales is driven by the public 
administration, health and education sector, which is primarily based in the public 
sector. Public sector female first degree returns for Wales are also below the UK 
level, although not to the extent of the private sector. At first degree level, Welsh 
results for men are more similar to the UK as a whole, with the private sector 
difference being very small. I previously found the returns to a masters degree for 
women working in Wales to be the second highest in the UK. Comparison with UK 
figures shows that both the Welsh returns in the public and private sectors are far 
above the figures for the UK as a whole. Men in the private sector in Wales fare 
poorly, as no significant masters premium is found, although the public sector 
masters premium is greater than the UK public sector masters premium. At PhD 
level, no significant return is found in Wales, regardless of gender or employment 
sector.
56 The full breakdown of STEM graduates working in Wales by industry sector is available in the 
appendix in table 5. A7.
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Table 5.67
Returns to First Degree Relative to A Level by Age Groups
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
25-34 .162?** 5.46 2 355 .1021” * 3.77 3 480
35-49 .23768*** 9.19 1 423 .19138*** 7.88 1 479
50-64 .13776 3.77 3 231 .17315*** 4.05 2 225
25-29 .07085* 1.70 7 181 .08656** 2.37 6 252
30-34 .25405*** 5.74 2 174 .12383*** 2.90 4 228
35-39 .25314*** 6.17 3 167 .10849** 2.43 5 161
40-44 .25071*** 5.26 4 136 _ * * *.22755 5.11 3 170
45-49 .19831*** 3.87 5 120 .25226 6.15 2 148
50-54 .08831* 1.75 6 118 .10349 1.52 - 115
55-59 .26532*** 4.18 1 89 _ «***.25795 4.23 1 89
60-64 -.04445 0.40 - 24 .22855 1.12 - 21
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree), disaggregated by age group; national (Wales) baseline of individuals qualified to A level, 
disaggregated by age group; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in each age 
group; R. is the rank of age groups in order of magnitude of return to first degree; (-) denotes an 
insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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The graduate premium over age groups in Wales is given in table 5.67. Focusing 
first on the broad age bands, in Wales there is a far greater rise from the 25 to 34 
year age group to the 35 to 49 year age group than is observed for the UK as a 
whole. This is particularly apparent for women, where the graduate premium almost 
doubles between these age groups. The female 25 to 34 year graduate premium in 
Wales is very small compared to the UK (.1021 to .17564). The graduate premium 
in Wales falls in the 50 to 64 year age group, an effect not seen for men in the full 
UK sample. The 50 to 64 year male graduate premium in Wales is smaller than the 
other age bands, whereas in the UK it is the highest. This fall in the graduate 
premium over the 50 to 64 year age group, coupled with Wales’ relatively aged 
population is likely to be a contributing factor to Wales’ low graduate premium (and 
low earnings). Narrower age bands show that it is a low or insignificant graduate 
premium in the 50 to 54 and 60 to 64 year age groups that causes this effect. 
Conversely, the graduate premium in Wales actually peaks in the 55 to 59 year age 
group. The graduate premium for men in the 25 to 29 year age group and women 
under 40 in Wales is quite small compared to the UK average.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the private pecuniary benefits to gaining a university 
education at both first degree and higher degree levels, using the Annual Population 
Survey between 2004 and 2007. I identify a graduate premium for men of .20651 
and .21652 for women, a masters degree premium relative to first degree of .06713 
for men and .07905 for women. I find there to be no significant effect of holding a 
PhD relative to a masters degree at the aggregate level, although I do observe a PhD 
earnings advantage for more disaggregated groups. The majority of results support 
the notion that women benefit more from gaining a first degree than men do, which 
is in line with the majority of the existing literature.
I have placed an emphasis on the variation in the graduate premium across the UK, 
by NUTS 1 regions. When the graduate premium is calculated relative to a national 
baseline of A level holders, the South Eastern regions dominate, particularly London.
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However, switching to a baseline of A level holders within the same regions sees the 
South Eastern advantage dissipate, with the largest graduate premiums being found 
in Northern Ireland, the East Midlands and Scotland Much of the reduction in the 
magnitude of the South Eastern regions can be attributed to their high A level 
earnings. At masters level, the largest premiums relative to first degree are again 
found in London when using a national baseline, but with a regional baseline 
London displays one of the lowest masters degree premiums. Instead, the largest 
within region masters premiums are found in the West Midlands and the South West 
for men, and the North East and Wales for women. The PhD premium is highly 
dependent on work place, with the only significant within region PhD premiums 
found for women in the East Midlands and the South West.
I have also looked at differences in the graduate premium across subject areas. 
Individuals possessing degrees in medicine and dentistry enjoy the largest earnings 
advantage by a large margin, although this may be explained by the extra time that a 
person may spend obtaining a degree in this subject area (and the associated 
increases in human capital). Outside of medicine and dentistry, the largest graduate 
premiums are found in economics and law, with those holding first degrees in arts, 
mass communications, and history and philosophy benefitting the least relative to A 
level holders (although a positive first degree earnings advantage is found for all 
subject areas). At masters degree level, many results are found to be insignificant, 
with many subject areas offering no earnings advantage relative to first degree. The 
largest masters degree premiums are found in the veterinary and agricultural studies 
and business administration subject areas. A PhD premium (relative to masters) is 
only found for men with PhDs in physical sciences. This is likely due to high 
earnings at masters level along with PhD level for several subjects. Due to the great 
variation in the masters and PhD premiums, the choice to pursue a higher degree 
should be highly dependent on subject area. Quantile regression results suggest the 
return to first degrees increases along the earnings distribution, but the difference 
between quartiles is insignificant. The masters premium is also relatively stable 
along the earnings distribution, but for PhDs (relative to masters) a premium is only 
observed in the upper quartile.
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The results of this chapter have shown that, despite the large number of graduates 
currently in the labour market, the graduate premium has persisted and remains 
large. The substantial graduate premiums identified mean that there are still 
significant financial benefits to a degree level education, even in the face of 
increased tuition fees, although due to the heterogeneity in the graduate premium, the 
size of the earnings advantage depends heavily on subject area and geographical 
location.
In terms of policy implications, the large premiums paid to first degrees seem to 
support recent decisions to increase tuition fees. That graduates still enjoy a large 
return to their human capital investment suggests that tuition fee increases will not 
make a university level education unfeasible, although it will inevitably dissuade 
some potential students. Work must be done using more recent data, as the recent 
sharp increases in unemployment amongst recent graduates may suggest that demand 
for graduates has now fallen behind supply. If this is the case and the graduate 
premium is falling, this will have policy implications, perhaps that tighter controls 
should be introduced on the number of students. Subsidised tuition fees in Scotland 
and Wales should preserve the private returns available to these students, although 
Wales has an issue with retaining graduates after graduation (O’Leary and Sloane, 
2008). National baseline results show Wales to have the lowest graduate premium of 
all UK regions, which would seem to support out migration of Welsh graduates, 
however, this does not take into account cost of living differences. Against a 
regional baseline the Welsh male graduate premium ranks 9th in the UK. The 
regional difference in the graduate premium shrinks when using a regional baseline, 
reducing the gains from migration. Wales offers premiums in the top three of all 
regions for men with degrees in medicine and dentistry, biological sciences, arts and 
education, and women with technologies degrees. Graduates from these subject 
areas may benefit from in migration to Wales. Policy makers should make it known 
that these subject areas are well rewarded in Wales, to entice the best graduates in 
these areas to migrate to Wales. The recent policy of heavily promoting STEM 
subjects receives mixed support in this chapter, as some STEM subjects generate
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large premiums (maths and computer science and engineering), but a large 
proportion of STEM graduates do no stay in the subject area after graduation, with a 
quarter employed in the banking, finance and insurance sector.
The large differences in the graduate premium between subject areas suggest that 
tuition fees could vary depending on subject choice. With empirical evidence 
showing that those with degrees in medicine and dentistry, economics and law 
should earn significantly more than those with degrees in subjects such as arts, this 
could be used to suggest that those who enrol on highly rewarded courses could pay 
a higher contribution to their education than those who are not expected to benefit 
financially to the same magnitude. Results also show that subject areas attract 
differing returns according to the region of employment. This may suggest that in 
addition to fees varying across subject areas, they could also vary within one subject 
area across regions, however, this may lead to ‘educational arbitrage’, with well 
informed potential students enrolling where fees are lower and then looking for 
employment in an area of high returns (and high fees) post graduation.
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Appendix 5.A
Earnings
Age
Age2
Part Time
Public
Job Tenure 
Health Limit
Married
Plant Size
Ethnicity
Variable Definitions
Gross hourly earnings of individual. Entered into 
model in log form
Age of individual
Square of age of individual
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
employed part time, 0 if full time
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
employed in the public sector, o if private sector
Job tenure of individual
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual 
has an activity limiting health problem
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual is 
married, 0  otherwise
Vector of dummy variables indicating size of 
employer. 4 categories: under 25 employees, 25 to 49 
employees, 50 to 499 employees, and 500 and over 
employees
Vector of dummy variables indicating ethnicity of 
individual. 6  categories: white, mixed, black, Asian, 
Chinese, and other.
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Industry
Occupation
Qualifications
Year
Vector of dummy variables indicating industry sector. 
9 categories: agriculture and fishing; energy and water; 
manufacturing; construction; distribution, hotels and 
restaurants; transport and communications; banking, 
finance and insurance; public administration, health 
and education; and other services
Vector of dummy variables indicating occupation. 9 
categories: managers and senior officials; professional; 
associate professional and technical; administrative and 
secretarial; skilled trades; personal services; sales and 
customer service; process, plant and machinery; and 
elementary
Vector of dummy variables indicating highest 
qualification attained. 9 categories: PhD, masters,
PGCE, first degree, higher education, A level, GCSE, 
other, and none
Vector of year dummy variables
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Table 5.A1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Hourly Earnings 11.44666 6.808654 1.37 54.94
Male 0.475654 0.499408 0 1
Female 0.524347 0.499408 0 1
Age 42.54854 10.13429 25 64
Age2 1913.082 881.7279 625 4096
Tenure 8.839224 8.681765 0 55
Part Time 0.241303 0.427875 0 1
Full Time 0.758697 0.427875 0 1
Public Sector 0.344334 0.475152 0 1
Private Sector 0.655666 0.475152 0 1
Activity Limiting Health Problem 0.101089 0.301448 0 1
Married 0.242568 0.428637 0 1
Qualifications
PhD 0.011466 0.106466 0 1
Masters 0.038892 0.193338 0 1
PGCE 0.019976 0.139917 0 1
First Degree 0.153545 0.360513 0 1
Higher Education 0.135521 0.34228 0 1
A Level 0.247098 0.431326 0 1
GCSE 0.246104 0.430741 0 1
None 0.120481 0.325524 0 1
Plant Size
Under 25 0.311136 0.462959 0 1
25 to 49 0.138741 0.345677 0 1
50 to 499 0.352604 0.477782 0 1
500 & Over 0.19752 0.398129 0 1
Ethnicity
White 0.949876 0.218202 0 1
Mixed 0.004407 0.066241 0 1
Asian 0.023442 0.151304 0 1
Black 0.013146 0.113901 0 1
Chinese 0.002623 0.051146 0 1
Other 0.006506 0.080394 0 1
Industrial Sector
Agriculture & Fishing 0.00613 0.078052 0 1
Energy & Water 0.013974 0.117385 0 1
Manufacturing 0.150574 0.357634 0 1
Construction 0.051748 0.221518 0 1
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 0.147837 0.354939 0 1
Transport & Communications 0.063531 0.243916 0 1
Banking, Finance & Insurance 0.146327 0.353435 0 1
Public Admin., Education & Health 0.375608 0.484281 0 1
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Other Services 0.044266 0.205685
Occupation Group
Managerial 0.160917 0.367455
Professional 0.151756 0.358785
Associate Professional & Technical 0.16149 0.367983
Administration 0.139783 0.346763
Skilled Trade 0.079785 0.270961
Personal Service 0.082402 0.274977
Sales 0.061237 0.239765
Process, Plant & Machinery 0.066774 0.249631
Elementary 0.095857 0.294395
Year
2004 0.451407 0.497635
2005 0.183322 0.386931
2006 0.183803 0.387325
2007 0.181468 0.385406
NUTS 1 Region
East 0.059295 0.236176
East Midlands 0.05471 0.227414
London 0.085082 0.279004
North East 0.063555 0.243958
North West 0.115805 0.319992
Northern Ireland 0.017824 0.132312
Scotland 0.150037 0.357108
South East 0.122627 0.32801
South West 0.077556 0.267473
Wales 0.09244 0.289646
West Midlands 0.074794 0.263059
Yorkshire 0.08339 0.276471
Subject of First Degree
Medicine & Dentistry 0.00186 0.043084
Medicine Related 0.009461 0.096805
Biological Sciences 0.008439 0.091476
Veterinary & Agricultural 0.001481 0.038459
Physical Sciences 0.008115 0.089715
Maths & Computing Science 0.008877 0.093798
Engineering 0.011904 0.108456
Technologies 0 .0 0 1 2 0.034623
Architecture 0.003379 0.05803
Economics 0.002919 0.053952
Politics 0.001514 0.038877
Social Studies 0.008142 0.089863
Law 0.004952 0.070196
Business Administration 0.014488 0.119493
Mass Communications 0.002103 0.04581
Linguistics & Classics 0.004557 0.067355
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Language & Literature 0.00279 0.052743
History & Philosophy 0.005995 0.077198
Arts 0.00732 0.085243
Education 0.00925 0.095731
Subject of Masters
Medicine & Dentistry 0.000362 0.019028
Medicine Related 0.001892 0.043458
Biological Sciences 0.001887 0.043396
Veterinary & Agricultural 0.000465 0.021557
Physical Sciences 0.001962 0.044256
Maths & Computing Science 0.002957 0.054299
Engineering 0.002779 0.052641
Technologies 0.000303 0.017397
Architecture 0.000946 0.030744
Economics 0.000746 0.027304
Politics 0.000551 0.023476
Social Studies 0.002498 0.049914
Law 0.001108 0.033272
Business Administration 0.006406 0.079783
Mass Communications 0.001006 0.031694
Linguistics & Classics 0.001038 0.032201
Language & Literature 0.000546 0.023361
History & Philosophy 0.001665 0.040772
Arts 0.001216 0.034856
Education 0.002141 0.04622
Subject of PhD
Medicine & Dentistry 0.000703 0.026501
Medicine Related 0.000735 0.027105
Biological Sciences 0.002341 0.048326
Veterinary & Agricultural 0.000173 0.013152
Physical Sciences 0.002368 0.048603
Maths & Computing Science 0.000676 0.025987
Engineering 0.000827 0.028748
Technologies 0.000146 0.012081
Architecture 4.32E-05 0.006576
Economics 0.000173 0.013152
Politics 8.11E-05 0.009005
Social Studies 0.000389 0.019725
Law 9.73E-05 0.009864
Business Administration 0 .000211 0.014519
Mass Communications 3.78E-05 0.006152
Linguistics & Classics 0.000276 0.016602
Language & Literature 0.00013 0.01139
History & Philosophy 0.00047 0.021682
Arts 0.00013 0.01139
Education 0 .0 0 0 2 2 2 0.014886
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 5.A2
Summary Statistics (Welsh Sample)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Hourly Earnings 10.15473 5.676554 1.38 54.94
Male 0.455231 0.498006 0 1
Female 0.544769 0.498006 0 1
Age 42.81116 10.10968 25 64
Age2 1934.995 881.2072 625 4096
Tenure 9.259578 8.900952 0 47
Part Time 0.256244 0.436571 0 1
Full Time 0.743756 0.436571 0 1
Public Sector 0.400422 0.489998 0 1
Private Sector 0.599578 0.489998 0 1
Activity Limiting Health Problem 0.114159 0.318013 0 1
Married 0.231768 0.421974 0 1
Qualifications
PhD 0.00965 0.097761 0 1
Masters 0.033452 0.17982 0 1
PGCE 0.025206 0.156755 0 1
First Degree 0.128253 0.334381 0 1
Higher Education 0.141938 0.348997 0 1
A Level 0.231943 0.422085 0 1
GrCSE 0.275806 0.446932 0 1
None 0.131821 0.338306 0 1
Plant Size
Under 25 0.3468 0.475965 0 1
25 to 49 0.138755 0.345701 0 1
50 to 499 0.321785 0.467175 0 1
500 & Over 0.19266 0.3944 0 1
Ethnicity
White 0.985436 0.119803 0 1
Mixed 0.002866 0.05346 0 1
Asian 0.004621 0.06782 0 1
Black 0.00234 0.048314 0 1
Chinese 0.001287 0.03585 0 1
Other 0.003451 0.058645 0 1
Industrial Sector
Agriculture & Fishing 0.00468 0.068248 0 1
Energy & Water 0.013337 0.114714 0 1
Manufacturing 0.16536 0.371516 0 1
Construction 0.047672 0.213078 0 1
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 0.153662 0.360635 0 1
Transport & Communications 0.045566 0.208549 0 1
Banking, Finance & Insurance 0.098327 0.297765 0 1
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Public Administration, Education &
Health 0.425831 0.494483 0
Other Services 0.045566 0.208549 0
Occupation Group
Managerial 0.127406 0.333437 0
Professional 0.134074 0.340742 0
Associate Professional & Technical 0.160983 0.367526 0
Administration 0.143434 0.350525 0
Skilled Trade 0.089032 0.284798 0
Personal Service 0.095993 0.29459 0
Sales 0.06575 0.247852 0
Process, Plant & Machinery 0.082246 0.274748 0
Elementary 0.101082 0.301446 0
Year
2004 0.518861 0.499659 0
2005 0.159483 0.366137 0
2006 0.162056 0.368513 0
2007 0.1596 0.366245 0
Unitary Authority
Blaenau Gwent 0.025674 0.158166 0
Bridgend 0.055968 0.229867 0
Caerphilly 0.04474 0.206737 0
Cardiff 0.126733 0.332683 0
Carmarthenshire 0.042693 0.202169 0
Ceredigion 0.033043 0.178754 0
Conwy 0.030002 0.170597 0
Denbighshire 0.033277 0.179364 0
Flintshire 0.039944 0.195833 0
Gwynedd 0.046143 0.209801 0
Isle of Anglesey 0.022574 0.148547 0
Merthyr Tydfil 0.023861 0.152621 0
Monmouthshire 0.041172 0.198694 0
Neath Port Talbot 0.046085 0.209674 0
Newport 0.066203 0.248643 0
Pembrokeshire 0.042342 0.201373 0
Powys 0.036084 0.186505 0
RCT 0.053921 0.225869 0
Swansea 0.072168 0.258773 0
Torfaen 0.043453 0.20388 0
Vale of Glamorgan 0.033394 0.179668 0
Wrexham 0.040529 0.197201 0
Subject of First Degree
Medicine & Dentistry 0.001579 0.039707 0
Medicine Related 0.010176 0.100365 0
Biological Sciences 0.006667 0.081382 0
Veterinary & Agricultural 0.002222 0.047091 0
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Physical Sciences 0.006843 0.082438
Maths & Computing Science 0.00538 0.073156
Engineering 0.009006 0.094476
Technologies 0.000994 0.031516
Architecture 0.003451 0.058641
Economics 0.002047 0.045198
Politics 0.00117 0.034181
Social Studies 0.006784 0.082088
Law 0.00386 0.06201
Business Administration 0.011229 0.105372
Mass Communications 0.000936 0.030576
Linguistics & Classics 0.003918 0.062476
Language & Literature 0.00193 0.04389
History & Philosophy 0.00579 0.075872
Arts 0.007076 0.083826
Education 0.011814 0.108049
Subject of Masters
Medicine & Dentistry 0.000234 0.015294
Medicine Related 0.002515 0.050086
Biological Sciences 0.001755 0.041851
Veterinary & Agricultural 0.000409 0.02023
Physical Sciences 0.00193 0.04389
Maths & Computing Science 0.002456 0.049502
Engineering 0.002105 0.045838
Technologies 0.000468 0.021626
Architecture 0 .001111 0.033317
Economics 0.000526 0.022937
Politics 0.000643 0.025356
Social Studies 0.002105 0.045838
Law 0.00117 0.034181
Business Administration 0.004445 0.066522
Mass Communications 0.000877 0.029606
Linguistics & Classics 0.00076 0.027564
Language & Literature 0.000234 0.015294
History & Philosophy 0.001988 0.044549
Arts 0.000994 0.031516
Education 0.002924 0.053998
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 5. A3
Full Time / Part Time Employment by Qualification Level
Male
Full Time Part Time
Female 
Full Time Part Time
PhD 95.17 4.83 80.49 19.51
Masters 93.96 6.04 78.54 21.46
PGCE 92.50 7.50 73.48 26.52
First Degree 95.42 4.58 73.50 26.50
Higher Educ. 95.11 4.89 61.91 38.09
A-Level 95.89 4.11 58.37 41.63
GCSE 95.15 4.85 52.06 47.94
None 90.72 9.28 41.45 58.55
Notes', percentage of full time/part time employment by highest qualification level; expressed as
percentage
Table 5.A4
Full Time / Part Time Employment by NUTS 1 Region
Full Time
Male
Part Time
Female 
Full Time Part Time
East 94.57 5.43 55.07 44.93
East Midlands 94.38 5.62 55.79 44.21
London 95.67 4.33 72.87 27.13
North East 94.59 5.41 59.00 41.00
North West 95.13 4.87 60.69 39.31
Northern Ireland 95.55 4.45 60.81 39.19
Scotland 95.30 4.70 59.88 40.12
South East 95.00 5.00 56.47 43.53
South West 93.70 6.30 52.41 47.59
Wales 94.28 5.72 57.74 42.26
West Midlands 94.91 5.09 57.21 42.79
Yorkshire 94.69 5.31 55.23 44.77
Notes: percentage of full time/part time employment by region of workplace; expressed as 
percentage
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Table 5.A5
Proportion of Qualifications by Gender and Region
PhD Masters PGCE First
Deg.
Higher
Educ.
A Level GCSE None
M ale
East 2.16 4.48 1.42 14.99 10.71 31.90 21.53 12.81
East Midlands 1.46 3.21 1.46 15.73 10.63 33.36 20.03 14.13
London 2.19 10.24 1.15 27.93 9.24 23.96 16.72 8.58
North East 1.04 3.12 1.25 12.97 12.12 36.62 22.13 10.75
North West 1.39 3.27 1.42 15.16 11.74 34.17 20.83 12.02
Northern Ireland 1.33 3.80 0.93 15.67 8.87 32.47 15.87 21.07
Scotland 1.38 3.81 0.99 14.27 16.38 39.50 12.82 10.85
South East 2.11 5.42 1.37 18.57 12.24 30.77 20.23 9.29
South West 1.35 4.51 1.51 16.58 13.26 33.55 21.64 7.60
Wales 1.48 3.69 1.89 13.35 13.03 32.38 21.23 12.95
West Midlands 1.20 4.05 1.37 15.00 11.70 30.63 21.93 14.12
Yorkshire 1.23 3.32 1.60 14.02 10.64 35.92 21.50 11.79
Female
East 0.78 2.94 2.24 14.60 13.25 17.63 34.79 13.77
East Midlands 0.77 2.39 2.73 14.42 14.64 18.19 31.63 15.24
London 1.36 7.88 2.65 27.87 12.35 16.14 23.06 8.69
North East 0.65 2.32 1.88 12.86 14.68 17.88 34.89 14.84
North West 0.61 2.35 2.38 13.86 13.86 18.96 33.85 14.13
Northern Ireland 0.65 3.70 2.29 18.92 14.98 15.98 27.03 16.45
Scotland 0.68 2.84 1.96 14.30 22.56 20.07 21.57 16.02
South East 0.88 3.66 2.83 16.60 14.65 19.43 31.22 10.73
South West 0.68 2.79 3.02 14.87 15.11 20.35 33.85 9.35
Wales 0.51 3.05 3.00 12.97 15.80 16.63 34.08 13.97
West Midlands 0.47 2.84 2.46 13.97 13.95 18.39 32.50 15.42
Yorkshire 0.66 2.52 2.76 13.15 13.51 17.83 35.38 14.19
Notes: percentage of highest qualification by region of workplace; expressed as percentage
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Table 5.A6
Proportion of STEM Graduates by Industry Sector
STEM (%) STEM and Medicine (%)
Agriculture & Fishing 0.56 0.38
Energy & Water 3.00 1.79
Manufacturing 18.71 11.68
Construction 4.17 2.52
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. 5.01 4.55
Transport & Comms. 4.10 2.67
Banking, Finance & Ins. 24.50 15.25
Pub Admin, Educ. & Health 36.43 58.66
Other Services 3.52 2.5
Notes: proportion of individuals who graduated from STEM subjects, according to industry of 
employment.
Table 5.A7
Proportion of STEM Graduates by Industry Sector (Wales only)
STEM (%) STEM and Medicine (%)
Agriculture & Fishing 0.80 0.44
Energy & Water 1.37 0.72
Manufacturing 19.13 9.92
Construction 3.87 2.04
Distribution, Hotels & Rest. 4.87 3.97
Transport & Comms. 3.30 1.76
Banking, Finance & Ins. 16.74 9.26
Pub Admin, Educ. & Health 45.44 69.35
Other Services 4.56 2.54
Notes: proportion of individuals who graduated from STEM subjects, according to industry of 
employment; Wales only.
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Table 5.A8
Returns to First Degree Relative to A level by Industry Sector (STEM and
Medicine Graduates)
Coeff.
Male 
t stat R. N. Coeff.
Female 
t stat R. N.
Agric. & Fishing .09403 1.15 - 48 .2209 1.48 - 29
Energy & Water .26366*** 8.08 1 311 .17287** 2.07 4 51
Manufacturing .20297*** 17.73 3 1,871 .20006*** 6.93 2 487
Construction 20257*** 8.57 4 438 .0457 0.54 - 70
Dist., Hotels & Rest .18248*** 8.34 5 490 .17652*** 6.37 3 428
Transport & Comm 23229*** 9.33 2 411 .24266*** 4.50 1 129
Banking & Finance 10964*** 7.74 6 2,275 .16435*** 7.82 5 804
Pub Admin, Educ .07553*** 7.41 8 3,449 .12428*** 16.41 6 8,397
Other Services .09157** 2.52 7 288 .09455** 2.42 7 217
Notes: coeff. reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating highest qualification (first 
degree) for STEM graduates, disaggregated by industry; national baseline of individuals qualified to 
A level, disaggregated by industry; N. is the number of individuals qualified to first degree level in 
each industry; R  is the rank of industry sectors in order of magnitude of return to first degree; (-) 
denotes an insignificant return; significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
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6.1 Conclusions
In the introduction to this thesis I identified a set of specific research questions. I 
believe that, over the course of four empirical chapters, I have provided answers to 
these questions and have considered the policy implications that have arisen. This 
conclusion draws the key findings and their policy implications together, as well as 
considering possible extensions to the research. I considered the earnings response 
to unemployment in the second chapter (for Wales, using the Living in Wales 
survey) and the third chapter (for die UK, using die APS). This was split into two 
separate chapters as, besides the dataset and geographic differences, each chapter 
approached the subject in a different way. Regardless of differences in data, 
geography and methodology, all of the main results were clustered around 
Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1994) economic law of unemployment elasticity of -.1, 
and were well within the bounds of the results presented by die literature in this area. 
Using the Living in Wales survey (with additional controls in the form of the WIMD 
domain scores) the focus in chapter two was on Wales only, using the 
unemployment rate and the claimant count rate as measures of labour market slack. 
The stated research aim was to test whether these two measures would produce 
differing results. If so, it may suggest that those who are unemployed and claim 
benefits placed more downward pressure on wages than those who are unemployed 
and don’t claim benefits. At the unitary authority level of aggregation, wages were 
found to be more flexible when using the claimant count rate. This would suggest 
that those who are unemployed and claiming unemployment benefits do place 
greater downward pressure on wages than those who are unemployed but don’t claim 
unemployment benefits, although the differences are relatively small (-.12391 to - 
.09161). Regardless of the differences in the wage responses of those who claim 
unemployment benefits and those who do not, it is clear that the unemployed do 
place downward pressure on wages. This suggests more resources should be 
directed towards schemes aimed at reducing unemployment, such as Jobs Growth 
Wales.
Chapter two also considered whether the economically inactive or the long-term 
unemployed (defined as those unemployed for one year or more) placed any
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downward pressure on wages. The effect of the long-term unemployed on wages has 
been tested previously in the literature (such as by Blackaby and Hunt, 1992) and 
tends to find that the long-term unemployed have no effect on earnings. The effect 
of the economically inactive on earnings is an issue that as yet has received very 
little attention, with this study marking an early foray into this area. Initial findings 
from most specifications suggest that both the long-term unemployed and the 
economically inactive do not place downward pressure on earnings. This result was 
not expected, as economic logic would suggest that as a person moves further from 
the labour market, their effect on earnings would decrease (to the point there would 
be no effect). It is possible that this result was due to some spurious regression, 
caused by some factor not controlled for in the model. In response to this, a vector 
of postcode sector level dummy variables were added to ‘mop up’ any regional 
differences unaccounted for by the regular controls (the range of control variables 
offered by Living in Wales are less than that of the other dataset used, the APS). 
With the inclusion of area dummies, the effects of both the long-term unemployed 
and the economically inactive were found to be insignificant. Policy implications 
depend on whether the effect of the long-term unemployed or the economically 
inactive on earnings is real or due to some other factor. If real it provides a further 
reason for funding to be directed towards those who have left the labour market or 
have been unemployed for a lengthy time (increasing their chances of leaving the 
labour market and becoming economically inactive). Initiatives would focus on 
providing those individuals with the skills needed to re-engage with the labour 
market and be successful in job searches.
The earnings response to unemployment was also the focus in chapter three, 
although this chapter expanded the analysis to the UK, using the APS. Five levels of 
aggregation in the unemployment rate were used (NUTS 1, NUTS 2, NUTS 3, 
unitary authority and TTWA), representing wage bargaining from the national to 
local level, to consider what effect this had on wage flexibility. The majority of 
wage curve studies use only one level of aggregation -  this chapter tested whether 
this is sufficient. Unemployment elasticity was found to differ across these levels of 
aggregation, resulting in a U-shape, with the largest elasticities found for the NUTS 
3 and unitary authority levels of aggregation. It appears that this U-shape in wage
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flexibility for the aggregate sample may be due to a combination of the male and 
female wage curves. This result, while unprecedented (and untested, to the best of 
my knowledge) in the wage curve literature is similar to that found by Groth and 
Johansson (2004) using different methodology. Groth and Johansson test the link 
between the level of wage bargaining centralisation and the length of contracts (used 
as a proxy for wage flexibility), finding wages to be most flexible over intermediate 
levels of wage bargaining (as opposed to centralised or de-centralised bargaining 
systems). This result suggests that the use of more than one level of the 
unemployment rate provides a more complete picture of the wage response to 
unemployment.
In addition to using several levels of unemployment rate aggregation, wage 
flexibility was estimated at several points along the wage distribution. Most studies 
focus solely on estimation at the mean, however, the results of this study (and 
previous studies that have utilised quantile regression techniques) show that wages at 
different points along the wage distribution respond differently to unemployment. 
As with the levels of unemployment rate aggregation, this suggests that focusing on 
one point (the mean) does not provide a full picture and that further points along the 
wage distribution should be estimated. Interesting results are found when combining 
the use of different levels of bargaining centralisation with estimation along the wage 
distribution. Building on the work of Buettner and Fitzenberger (1998), wages are 
found to be most flexible for those at the lower parts of the wage distribution when 
using highly aggregated unemployment rates, with the largest wage flexibility 
switching to the upper portions of the wage distribution as the unemployment rate 
becomes more disaggregated (although at TTWA level wage flexibility is fairly flat 
across the distribution). The addition of house prices as a control variable 
diminishes this effect, with the effect becoming similar across unemployment rate 
aggregation levels, with the largest wage flexibility for those at the lower tail of the 
wage distribution. It is likely that the wages of those at the lower end of the wage 
distribution will be more responsive to any changes in the unemployment rate; 
efforts should be focused to get these individuals back into employment.
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Chapter three also tested differences in the wage response to unemployment over 
worker groups. It was found that men, private sector workers and the least educated 
have the most responsive wages. Therefore, policy should be aimed at targeting 
these groups as part of economic recovery, as this is where success in raising wage 
levels in most likely to occur.
Spatial inequalities in earnings, employment and economic activity were tackled in 
chapter four. The UK was split into 124 labour market areas (based on TTWAs) and 
the ability of people and place to explain spatial inequalities was measured. This 
was based on the methodology found in Gibbons et al. (2010), but expanded the 
analysis to also consider employment and economic activity and make use of the 
wide range of controls for personal characteristics that are available in the APS 
(Gibbons et al make use of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings). Initial 
results for earnings suggested that it was the people residing in an area that explained 
the largest part of spatial earnings inequalities, and that the role of the labour market 
area itself played a relatively minor role. The model was expanded to consider the 
effects of people versus place in the context of employment and economic activity, 
in addition to earnings. Once again, individual characteristics explain far more 
variation in employment and economic activity than the places themselves. The 
major policy implication of this result is that efforts to reduce spatial inequality 
should not be directed at the areas themselves, but at improving the personal 
characteristics of those people that live in the area. The analysis moved on to 
consider which specific personal characteristics had the largest effect on earnings, 
finding that occupation can explain the largest proportion of earnings variation. 
Whilst it is not possible to include SOC dummies as in the earnings model (as the 
sample also includes unemployed and economically inactive persons) a set of 
National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) dummies are included 
instead. As a proxy for occupation, this again is the greatest determinant of whether 
a person is in employment or economically active. From these results, individuals 
must be targeted by improving their skills so they are prepared for employment in a 
higher occupational group, but places must also be targeted in that policy makers 
must work to ensure that an area’s occupational profile provides jobs in those 
occupational groups that offer the highest earnings. For this reason, future work may
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need to consider refinements to the model to take account of factors such as 
agglomeration effects (perhaps using population density controls) and to question 
how much of the occupational mix is due to the area (as opposed to allocating all 
occupation effects to people).
The final empirical chapter explored the returns to qualifications, with a particular 
focus on the returns to first degrees, masters degrees and doctorates. This chapter 
found that a graduate premium does exist, suggesting that (up until 2007, at least) the 
demand for graduates had managed to keep pace with the rapid increase in the 
supply of graduates. The premium paid to a first degree relative to A levels was 
slightly larger for women at .21652 compared to .20651 for men. The policy 
implication of this result may be that UK universities should continue producing 
graduates, as the results would suggest that the graduate labour market is not over 
saturated. However, much has changed since the end of the data period used in this 
study (2007). The rises in unemployment amongst recent graduates suggests that 
demand may now have fallen behind supply, suggesting that there may need to be a 
reduction in the number of graduates produced each year, perhaps closer to the level 
of replacement demand in graduate level occupations, with scrutiny on the areas that 
have graduate level skill shortages. This has policy implications, as given that a 
large graduate premium is found (up until at least the end of the sample period) this 
would support the decision to increase tuition fees, as degrees should still provide a 
significant premium. A premium is also found for masters degrees relative to first 
degrees, although this was accordingly smaller at .07905 for women and .06713 for 
men. No premium was found for PhDs relative to masters degrees at the aggregate 
level (although disaggregations did reveal evidence of PhD premiums in specific 
areas).
At the subject area level, there was significant variation in returns. A PhD premium 
(relative to masters degrees) was found, for men who studied physical sciences. 
There was much variation in the masters degree premium across subject areas, with 
twelve out of twenty subject areas failing to offer a masters premium for men and 
eleven for women. The largest masters premiums were found in the areas of
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veterinary and agricultural studies and business administration for both men and 
women. This large variation in returns to post graduate degrees makes it imperative 
that individuals are kept well informed of the returns available to them, to aid in 
making the correct educational choices. In terms of aiding economic recovery, there 
may be a case to be made that institutions should focus funding and recruitment at 
postgraduate level to those subject areas that do offer premiums (although this may 
ignore non-pecuniary social benefits that result from postgraduate knowledge in 
other subject areas).
Whilst there is also much variation in the first degree premium, all subject areas do 
offer a significant premium for both men and women. The largest premium for both, 
by some margin, was for those who studied medicine and dentistry, although this 
likely reflects the longer study time required in this subject. Outside of medicine and 
dentistry, the largest premiums were found in the subject areas of economics and 
law, whilst the smallest were found in arts and mass communications. This result 
may suggest that there is scope for a policy of variable fees over subject areas. As 
those that study subjects with a high premium would be expected to earn more, their 
graduate premiums would be preserved even if they paid a higher fee than those 
studying subjects with a low premium.
An important contribution of this paper to the literature is that it examines how the 
returns to qualifications vary by region, an area of research which has received 
relatively little attention previously, with only a few studies considering this, such as 
O’Leary and Sloane (2008). When calculating the graduate premium against a 
national baseline of A level holders, the South Eastern regions, in particular London, 
were found to offer the largest premiums; this result was expected due to their high 
levels of earnings in general. When restricting estimations to first degree and A 
level holders within a region, the South Eastern regions fare relatively poorly, partly 
due to their high earnings at A level. When the sample is restricted to those within 
each individual region, the largest graduate premiums for men are found in Northern 
Ireland and Scotland and the largest graduate premiums for women are found in the 
East Midlands and West Midlands. At masters degree level, the largest premiums
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are found in the West Midlands for men and the North East for women. Against a 
regional baseline, PhD premiums are only found for women in the South West and 
East Midlands. Whilst the differences across regions (when using this methodology) 
are not as large as those found by subject area, this result could be taken to mean that 
universities in different regions should charge different fees depending on the returns 
in each region. However, this may lead informed potential students to enrol in a 
university in a low return region, enjoying lower fees, and then graduating and 
looking for employment in a region of high returns (where they would have had to 
have paid higher fees).
The current economic climate provides plenty of scope for a continuation of the 
research presented in this thesis. Due to the sharp rises in unemployment 
experienced in recent years, it is important that research examines the earnings 
response over this period, in order to better understand the effects on earnings in 
anticipation of any future economic downturns. It is also of interest to policy makers 
to know which regions were affected worst in terms of earnings during the downturn 
and which were able to rebound fastest during the upturn. This will allow policy 
makers to identify those regions which are resilient and those regions that will 
require additional assistance in the recovery process. In addition, further exploration 
of the effect of economic inactivity on earnings should be undertaken. This study 
represents a starting point for research in this area and the methodology should be 
refined in order to more accurately quantify the effect of inactivity on earnings. 
Also, the effects of using more than one level of disaggregation of the 
unemployment rate in wage curve studies warrants further examination, as results 
presented in this thesis suggest that there are significant differences in results 
between different aggregation levels.
The economic downturn, combined with the overhaul of the university funding 
system and rises in graduate unemployment means that research into the returns to 
qualifications is currently of utmost importance. Due to rises in tuition fees, 
potential students should be aware of the potential returns to a university education. 
Recent research by Walker and Zhu (2008) suggests that the graduate premium has
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fallen for the most recent cohorts. Given that more graduates are accepting 
employment in non-graduate occupations and that there may be downward pressure 
on graduate wages due to the high level of graduate unemployment, it will be very 
interesting to quantify any changes in the graduate premium over this period. It may 
also be possible to amalgamate the methodologies of chapters two, three and five and 
calculate the graduate wage curve over this period using regional graduate 
unemployment rates and controls for subject choice. Given that chapter four 
expanded the analysis of people versus place from earnings to encompass 
employment and economic activity, it would be of interest to do the same for chapter 
five, testing the effects of holding particular qualifications on the likelihood of being 
employed or economically active. As in chapter five this could consider the 
differences by region and subject area. Given the trends in unemployment amongst 
recent graduates, this type of study would be of particular interest to policy makers.
The current economic climate also provides an impetus to continue with work on the 
determinants of spatial inequalities. With the possibility of regional public sector 
pay being introduced, the inequalities between prosperous and less prosperous 
regions may increase. The methodology used in chapter four must be expanded to 
consider the role (if any) that place has in determining occupational structure, given 
that this is the key determinant for earnings, employment and economic activity.
363
References
Ada, H. Y., Roberts, E., Elliot, R. F., Bell, D. & Scott, A. (2006). Comparing the 
New Earnings Survey (NES) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS): An analysis of 
the differences between the data sets and their implications for the pattern of 
geographical pay in the UK. Regional Studies, 40(6):645-665
Adams, J. D. (1985). Permanent differences in unemployment and permanent wage 
differentials. Quarterly Journal o f Economics 100:29-56
Ammermuller, A., Lucifora, C., Origo, F. & Zwick, T. (2010). Regional Studies 
44(4) :401-421
Ashenfelter, O., Harmon, C. & Oosterbee, H. (1999). A review of estimates of the 
schooling/earnings relationship, with tests for publication bias. Labour Economics, 
6(4):453-470
Baker, C. (1995). A parents' and teachers' guide to bilingualism. Multilingual 
Matters, Clevedon.
Baltagi, B. H. & Blien, U. (1998). The German wage curve: Evidence from the IAB 
employment sample. Economics Letters 69(1): 135-142
Baltagi, B. H., Blien, U. & Wolf, K. (2008). New evidence on the dynamic wage 
curve for Western Germany: 1980-2004. 7Z4 Discussion Papers 3433
Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development 
policies? Kalamazoo, Michigan: W. E. Upjohn Institute.
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital. New York: Columbia University Press
Bell, B., Nickell, S. & Quintini, G. (2002). Wage equations, wage curves and all 
that. Labour Economics 9:341-360
Bell, D., Elliott, R. F., Ma, A., Scott, A. & Roberts, A. (2007). The pattern and 
evolution of geographical wage differentials in the public and private sectors in 
Great Britain. The Manchester School, 75(4):386-421
364
Belman, D. & Heywood, J. S. (1991). Sheepskin effects in the returns to education: 
An examination of women and minorities. Review o f Economics and Statistics, 
73:720-724
Berg, J. & Contreras, D. (2004). Political-economic regime and the wage curve: 
Evidence from Chile, 1957-96. International Review o f Applied Economics 
18(2):151-165
Bils, M. (1985). Real wages over the business cycle: Evidence from panel data. 
Journal o f Political Economy 93(4):666-689
Bjorklund, A. & Kjellstrom, C. (2002). Estimating the return to investments in 
education; how useful is the standard Mincer equation? Economics o f Education 
Review, 21:195-210
Black, A. J. & FitzRoy, F. (2000). Earnings curves and wage curves. Scottish 
Journal o f Political Economy 47(5): 471-486
Black, D. A., Sanders, S. & Taylor, L. (2003). The economic reward for studying 
economics. Economic Inquiry, 41(3):365-377
Blackaby, D. H. & Hunt, L. C. (1992). The “wage curve” and long-term 
unemployment: A cautionary note. The Manchester School 60(4):419-428
Blackaby, D. H. & Manning, D. N. (1987). Regional earnings revisited. Manchester 
School 55:158-183
Blackaby, D. H. & Manning, D. N. (1990). Earnings, unemployment and the 
regional employment structure in Britain. Regional Studies 24:529-535
Blackaby, D. H. & Manning, D. N. (1990). The North-South divide: Earnings, 
unemployment and cost of living differences in Great Britain. Papers o f the 
Regional Science Association 69:43-55
Blackaby, D. H. & Manning, D. N. (1990). The North-South divide: Questions of 
existence and stability. Economic Journal 100:510-527
365
Blackaby, D. H. & Murphy, P. D. (1991). Industry characteristics and inter-regional 
wage differences. Scottish Journal o f Political Economy 38(2): 142-161
Blackaby, D. H., Bladen-Howell, R. C. & Symons, E. J. (1991). Unemployment, 
duration and wage determination in the UK: Evidence from the FES 1980-86. 
Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics 53(4):377-399
Blackaby, D. H., Murphy, P. D. & O’Leary, N. C. (1999). Graduate earnings in 
Great Britain: A matter of degree? Applied Economics Letters, 6:311-315
Blanchard, O. J. & Katz, L. (1992). Regional evolutions. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 23(1): 1-61
Blanchflower, D. G. & Oswald, A. J. (1990). The wage curve. Scandinavian 
Journal o f Economics 92(2):215-235
Blanchflower, D. G. & Oswald, A. J. (1994). The wage curve. MIT Press: 
Cambridge
Blanchflower, D. G. & Oswald, A. J. (1995). An introduction to the wage curve. 
Journal o f Economic Perspectives 9:153-167
Blinder, A. S. (1973). Wage discrimination: Reduced form and structural estimates. 
The Journal o f Human Resources, 8:436-455
Blundell, R., Dearden, L., Goodman, A. & Reed, H. (1997). Higher Education, 
Employment and Earnings in Britain. Institute fo r  Fiscal Studies
Blundell, R., Dearden, L., Goodman, A. & Reed, H. (2000). The returns to higher 
education in Britain: Evidence from a British cohort. The Economic Journal, 
110:F82-F99
Bonjour, D., Cherkas, L., Haskel, J., Hawkes, D. & Spector, T. (2002). Returns to 
education: Evidence from UK twins. Working Papers 453, Queen Mary, University 
o f London
366
Bratti, M. & Mancini, L. (2003). Differences in early occupational earnings of UK 
male graduates by degree subject: Evidnce from the 1980-1993 USR. IZA 
Discussion Paper, 890
Buettner, T & Fitzenberger, B. (1998). Central wage bargaining and local wage 
flexibility: Evidence from the entire wage distribution. ZEW Discussion Papers 98- 
39
Buettner, T. (1999). The effect of unemployment, aggregate wages, and spatial 
contiguity on local wages: An investigation with German district level data. Papers 
in Regional Science 78:47-67
Card, D. & Hyslop, D. (1996). Does inflation grease the wheels of the Labour 
Market. NBER Working Paper 5538
Card, D. (1995). The wage curve: A review. Journal o f Economic Literature 
33:785-799
Chevalier, A. & Conlon, G. (2003). Does it pay to attend a prestigious university? 
IZA Discussion Paper, 848
Chevalier, A. & Lindley, J. (2009). Overeducation and the skills of UK graduates. 
Journal o f the Royal Statistical Society, 172(2):307-337
Ciccone, A. & Hall, R. (1996). Productivity and the density of economic activity. 
American Economic Review, 86(l):54-70
Ciccone, A. (2002). Agglomeration effects in Europe. European Economic Review, 
46(2):213-28
Collier, B. (2000). The UK wage curve: New evidence from the British Household 
Panel Survey. Studies in Economics 10, Department of Economics, University of 
Kent
Combes, P. P., Duranton, G. & Gobillon, L. (2008). Spatial wage disparities: 
Sorting matters! Journal o f Urban Economics, 63(2):723-742
367
Dearden, L. (1999). The effects of families and ability on men’s education and 
earnings in Britain. Labour Economics, 6:551-568
Devicienti, F., Maida, A. & Pacelli, L. (2008). The resurrection of the Italian wage 
curve. Economics Letters 98:335-341
Dickey, H. (2007). Regional earnings inequality in Great Britain: Evidence from 
quantile regressions. Journal o f Regional Science, 47(4):775-806
Drinkwater, S. J. & O'Leary, N. C. (1997). Unemployment in Wales: Does language 
matter? Regional Studies 31(6):583-591
Duranton, G. & Monastiriotis, V. (2002). Mind the gaps: The evolution of regional 
earnings inequalities in the U.K., 1982-1997. Journal o f Regional Science, 
42(2):219-256
Falk, M. & Leoni, T. (2008). Further evidence on the wage curve for Austria. 
Austrian Institute of Economic Research WIFO
Festerer, J. & Winter-Ebmer, R. (2003). Are Austrian returns to education falling 
overtime? Labour Economics, 10:73-89
Freeman, R. & Katz, L. (1995). Differences and changes in wage structures. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Freeman, R. (1988). Evaluating the European view that the United States has no 
unemployment problem. American Economic Review 78:294-299
Freeman, R. (1990). Employment and earnings of disadvantaged young men in a 
labour-shortage economy. NBER Working Paper 3342
Gibbons, R., S. & Katz, L. (1992). Does unmeasured ability explain inter-industry 
wage differences? Review o f Economic Studies, 59:515-35
Gibbons, S., Overman, H. G. & Pelkonen, P. (2010). Wage disparities in Britain: 
People or place? SERC Discussion Papers 60
Gibbons, S., Overman, H. G. & Resende, G. (2011). Real earnings disparities in 
Britain. SERC Discussion Papers 65
368
Groth, C. & Johansson, A. (2004). Bargaining structure and nominal wage 
flexibility. European Economic Review 48:1349-1365
Hall, R. (1970). Why is the unemployment rate so high at full employment? 
Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 3:369-402
Hall, R. (1972). Turnover in the labor force. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 
3:709-756
Halvorsen, R. & Palmquist, R. (1980). The interpretation of dummy variables in 
semilogarithmic equations. American Economic Review, 70(3):474-475
Hamermesh, D. S. (1999). The art of labormetrics. NBER Working Paper Series
Harmon, C and Walker, I. (2000). Returns to the quantity and quality of education; 
evidence for men in England and Wales. Economica, 67:19-35
Harris, J. & Todaro, M. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A two- 
sector analysis. American Economic Review 60:126-142
Heckman, J. J., Lochner, L. J. & Todd, P. E. (2003). Fifty years of Mincer earnings 
regressions. Technical Report 9732, National Bureau o f Economic Research
Heckman, J. J., Lochner, L. J. & Todd, P. E. (2008). Earnings functions and rates of 
return. IZA Discussion Paper, 3310
Henley, A. & Jones, R. E. (2005). Earnings and linguistic proficiency in a bilingual 
economy. The Manchester School 73(3):300-320
Hussain, I., McNally, S. & Telhaj, S. (2009). University quality and graduate wages 
in the UK. CEE Discussion Paper, 99
Janssens, S. & Konings, J. (1998). One more wage curve: The case of Belgium. 
Economics Letters 60:223-227
Johansen, K. (1997). The wage curve. Convexity, kinks and composition effects. 
Applied Economics 29:71-78
369
Johnes, G. (2007). The wage curve revisited: Estimates from a UK panel. Economic 
Letters 94:414-420
Katz, L. & Kruegar, A. (1991). Changes in the structure of wages in die public and 
private sectors. Research in Labour Economics 12:137-172
Kennedy, S. & Borland, J. (2000). A wage curve for Australia? Oxford Economic 
Papers 52:774-803
Knight, J. B. & Li, S. (2006). Unemployment duration and earnings of re-employed 
workers in urban China. China Economic Review 17(2): 103-119
Krueger, A. & Summers, L., H. (1988). Efficiency wages and the inter-industry 
wage structure. Econometrica, 56(2):259-93
Lang, K. (1986). A language theory of discrimination. Quarterly Journal o f 
Economics 101:363-382
Layard, R. & Nickell, S. J. (1986). Unemployment in Britain. Economica 53:121- 
170
Layard, R. & Nickell, S. J. (1987). The labour market, in Dornbusch, R. & Layard, 
R. (eds), The performance o f the British economy, OEP.
Leslie, D. (2003). Using success to measure quality in British higher education: 
which subjects attract the best qualified students? Journal o f the Royal Statistical 
Society, 166:329-347
Levin, A. & Lin, C. (1993). Unit root tests in panel data: new results. University o f 
California at San Diego Discussion Paper, 56
Longhi, S., Nijkamp, P. & Poot, J. (2006). Spatial heterogeneity and the wage curve 
revisited. Journal o f Regional Science 46(4):707-731
Lucifora, C. & Origo, F. (1999). Alla ricerca della flessibilita: Un’analisi della curva 
dei salari in Intalia. Rivista Italianadegli Economisti 1:3-35
Machin, A. (2004). Comparisons between unemployment and the claimant count. 
Labour Market Trends, February 2004:59-62
370
Machin, S. & Puhani, P. A. (2003). Subject of degree and the gender wage 
differential: evidence from the UK and Germany. Economics Letters, 79:393-400
Marston, S. (1985). Two views of the geographic distribution of mi employment. 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics 100:57-79
McIntosh, S. (2006). Further analysis of the returns to academic and vocational 
qualifications. Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics, 68(2):225-251
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience and earnings. New York: Columbia 
University Press
Mion, P. & Natticchioni, G. (2009). The spatial sorting and matching of skills and 
firms. Canadian Journal o f Economics, 42(l):28-55
Montuenga, V., Garcia, I. & Fernandez, M. (2003). Wage flexibility: evidence from 
five EU countries based on the wage curve. Economics Jitters 78:169-174
Montuenga-Gomez, V. M. & Ramos- Parreno, J. M. (2005). Reconciling the wage 
curve and the Phillips curve. Journal o f Economic Surveys 19(5): 735-765
Moulton, B. (1986). Random group effects and the precision of regression 
estimates. Journal o f Econometrics 32:385-397
Nijkamp, P. & Poot, J. (2005). The last word on the wage curve? Journal o f 
Economic Surveys 19(3):421-450
O’Leary, N. C. & Sloane, P. J. (2005). The return to a university education in Great 
Britain. National Institute Economic Review, 193:4-18
O’Leary, N. C. & Sloane, P. J. (2008). Rates of return to degrees across British 
regions. Regional Studies, 42(2): 199-213
O’Leary, N. C. & Sloane, P. J. (2011). The wage premium for university education 
in Great Britain during a decade of change. The Manchester School, 79(4):740-764
Oaxaca, R. (1973). Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets. 
International Economic Review, 14:693-709
371
Pannenberg, M. & Schwarze, J. (1998). Labor market slack and the wage curve. 
Economics Letters 58: 351-354
Patacchini, E. & Rice, P. (2007). Geography and economic performance: 
Exploratory spatial data analysis for Great Britain. Regional Studies 41(4):489-508
Patrinos, H. A. & Psacharopoulos, G. (2011). Education: Past, present and future 
global challenges. Policy Research Working Paper Series, 5616, World Bank
Phillips, A. W. (1958). The relation between unemployment and the rate of change 
of money wage rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957. Economica 25(100):283- 
299
Psacharopoulos, G. (1981). Returns to education: an updated international 
comparison. Comparative Education, 17(3): 321-341
Reza, A. M. (1978). Geographical differences in earnings and unemployment rates. 
Review o f Economics and Statistics 60:201-208
Rice, P. & Venables, A. J. (2003). Equilibrium regional disparities: Theory and 
British evidence. Regional Studies 37(6 & 7):675-686
Rice, P. & Venables, A. J. (2004). Spatial determinants of productivity: Analysis for 
the regions of Great Britain. CEPR Discussion Papers 4527
Rice, P. G., Venables, A. J. & Pattachini, E. (2006). Spatial determinants of 
productivity: Analysis for the regions of Great Britain. Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 36(6):727-752
Roback, J. (1982). Wages, rents and the quality of life. Journal o f Political 
Economy 90(6): 1257-1278
Sabin L. (1999). The development of urban labour market: China's urban wage 
curve, 1980-92. Journal o f Development Studies 35:134-152
Sanz-de-Galdeano, A. & Turunen, J. (2006). The euro area wage curve. Economics 
Letters 92:93-98
372
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. American Economic Review; 
51(1): 1-17
Shapiro, C. & Stiglitz, J. (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device. 
American Economic Review 74:433-444
Shilov, A. & Moller, J. (2009). The wage curve in Russia, 1995-2005. Economics 
Letters 102:90-92
Sloane, P. J., O’Leary, N. C., Murphy, P. D. & Blackaby, D. H. (2003). Returns to 
education: A survey of findings. Report for Welsh Assembly Government
Solon, G., Barsky, R. & Parker, J. (1994). Measuring the cyclicality of real wages: 
How important is composition bias? Quarterly Journal o f Economics 109(1): 1-26
Srinivasan, S. & Stewart, G. (2004). The quality of life in England and Wales. 
Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics 66(1): 1-22
Taylor, K. (2006). UK wage inequality: An industry and regional perspective. 
Labour: Review o f Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, 20(1):91-124
Trostel, P., Walker, I. & Woolley, P. (2002). The returns to education in 28 
countries. Labour Economics, 9:1-16
Turunen, J. (1998). Disaggregated wage curves in the United States: evidence from 
panel data of young workers. Applied Economics 30(12): 1665-1677
Walker, I. & Zhu, Y. (2008). The college wage premium and the expansion of 
higher education in the UK. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(4):695-709
Walker, I. & Zhu, Y. (2010). Differences by degree: Evidence of the net financial 
rates of return to undergraduate study for England and Wales. IZA Discussion 
Paper, 5254
Wu, Z. (2004). Wage curve for urban China: a panel data approach. Applied 
Economics Letters 11:425-428
373
